Com. v. Shaheen, N.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket3098 EDA 2025
JudgeBeck
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NAVEED ASLAM SHAHEEN :
:
Appellant : No. 3098 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0006142-2023
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Naveed Aslam Shaheen (“Shaheen”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (“trial
court”) following his guilty plea to indecent assault. 1 On appeal, Shaheen
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his designation as a
sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and the legality of the sentence imposed.
After review, we affirm.
On September 8, 2023, while working at a Sunoco station in
Montgomery County, Shaheen kissed customer Megan Doyle (“Doyle”) on her
face, neck, and hand without her consent. Police arrested Shaheen and the
Commonwealth charged him with indecent assault and harassment.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1).
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On September 3, 2024, Shaheen agreed to enter a guilty plea to one
count of indecent assault in exchange for one to two years of incarceration
followed by a consecutive term of three years of probation. Pursuant to the
plea, Shaheen also acknowledged that he was required to register as a lifetime
Tier III offender pursuant to the Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”).2 The trial court accepted the terms of the
plea and deferred sentencing for an SVP assessment. The trial court directed
a psychosexual evaluation as well as an assessment by the Sexual Offenders
Assessment Board (“SOAB”).
At the subsequent SVP hearing for Shaheen, the trial court heard
testimony from Michael Lavetsky, MA, LPC, NCC (“Mr. Lavetsky”), a member
of the SOAB since 2021 and a licensed clinician since 2002, who works with
individuals who have committed sexual offenses. After the hearing, the trial
court found Shaheen was an SVP and further imposed the agreed-upon
sentence. Shaheen filed a timely notice of appeal followed by a court-ordered
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b).
He raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support an SVP
classification?
2. Whether the sentence imposed was illegal?
____________________________________________
2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.42.
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Shaheen’s Brief at 5.
SVP Determination
Shaheen contends the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to find
he was an SVP by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 15, 18. He asserts
that Mr. Lavetsky’s testimony “was not so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing” to establish he was an SVP. Id. at 18. Shaheen argues that the
current offense did not involve multiple victims, no violence or predatory
behavior, “only involved non-consensual kissing,” and Doyle was not a minor,
intoxicated, or have a diminished mental capacity. Id. at 19. According to
Shaheen, although his prior criminal history and some personal characteristics
may establish a risk of reoffending, the current offense did not show he has a
“lifelong risk of future sexual reoffending.” Id.
“A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation presents a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence for which our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Steager, 357 A.3d 137,
145 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted).
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP
designation requires the reviewing court to accept the
undiminished record of the case in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. The reviewing court must examine all of the
Commonwealth’s evidence without consideration of its
admissibility. … We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
satisfied.
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Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en
banc) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The clear and convincing
standard requires evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as
to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d
1165, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2011) (cleaned up).
The procedure for SVP determinations is statutorily mandated. Aumick,
297 A.3d at 777. Following conviction, but before sentencing, the trial court
must order an assessment by the SOAB of an individual who has committed a
sexually violent offense to determine whether that individual should be
classified as an SVP.3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(a)-(b). The assessment must
include, but is not limited to, an examination of the following fifteen factors:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary
to achieve the offense.
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
____________________________________________
3 Under Subchapter H of SORNA, the Commonwealth must first demonstrate
that an individual has been convicted of a “sexually violent offense.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(a). SORNA defines a sexually violent offense as “[a]n
offense specified in section 9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier
system) as a Tier I, Tier II[,] or Tier III sexual offense committed on or after
December 20, 2012, for which the individual was convicted.” Id. § 9799.12.
Here, there is no dispute that Shaheen was convicted of indecent assault,
which is included under section 9799.14.
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(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
(v) Age of the victim.
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available
programs for sexual offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Use of illegal drugs.
(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental
abnormality.
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the
individual’s conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
Id. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4).
There is no requirement that all the statutory factors or any
number of them be present or absent to support an SVP
designation; the factors are not a check list with each one
weighing in some necessary fashion for or against SVP
designation. Nor does the Commonwealth have to show that any
certain factor is present or absent to support an SVP
determination. Rather, the presence or absence of one or more
factors might simply suggest the presence or absence of one or
more particular types of mental abnormalities. Ultimately, it is
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the trial court’s task to determine whether the Commonwealth has
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant
is to be classified as an SVP due to a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in
predatory sexually violent offenses.
Commonwealth v. Person, 325 A.3d 823, 842 (Pa. Super. 2024) (cleaned
up; emphasis in original).
As noted above, Mr. Lavetsky testified at Shaheen’s SVP hearing. N.T.,
10/31/2025, at 4-5. Shaheen’s counsel accepted Mr. Lavetsky’s
qualifications, and the trial court recognized him as an expert in sex offender
assessments. Id. at 13. When conducting an SOAB assessment, Mr. Lavetsky
explained that he reviews the current offense, prior offending history (both
sexual and non-sexual), and the characteristics of the defendants. Id. at 16.
Mr. Levetsky recognized that the current offense involved Shaheen
kissing Doyle on her neck and hand and an attempt to kiss her on the mouth.
Id. at 18. All physical contact was without her consent. Id. at 18, 33. He
further observed that Shaheen had previously engaged in similar conduct with
Doyle, which caused her to stop going to that Sunoco for three months. Id.
at 22, 34. She was the only victim, was twenty-four years old at the time of
the offense, and did not have any sort of diminished mental capacity. Id. at
17, 19, 35, 36. Shaheen did not engage in any display of unusual cruelty with
Doyle or physically restrain her. Id. at 19, 31-33, 35.
As to Shaheen’s prior offenses, Mr. Levetsky reported that he had two
prior criminal episodes, one of which was for sexual offenses committed
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against three separate victims. Id. at 20. The first victim was a seventeen-
year-old girl with whom Shaheen exchanged text messages that included
offers by Shaheen to pay the girl for oral sex. Id. He also touched her breasts
without her consent. Id.
The second victim was a twenty-year-old woman with an intellectual
disability who went for a job interview at the Sunoco where Shaheen worked.
Id. at 20-21. Shaheen took her to the back room, turned out the lights, pulled
up her shirt and began sucking on her breasts without her consent. Id. at 21.
Shaheen continued even when the victim told him to stop and pulled her
toward him and grabbed her buttocks. Id. Shaheen then offered her money
to allow him to continue, which she refused. Id. The victim reported the
incident to police, and Shaheen again offered her money to recant the report.
Id.
The third victim was a fifteen-year-old girl who worked at Sunoco with
Shaheen. Id. He made comments to her that escalated from compliments to
sexual comments. Id. One day he grabbed her buttocks and breasts over
her clothing while they were in the back storage area and did not stop when
she asked. Id. at 21-22. When Shaheen engaged in similar behavior three
months later, she quit her job. Id. at 22.
Following his conviction, Shaheen was sentenced to a period of
incarceration and required to complete sex offender treatment. Id. at 22, 23.
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He was still on probation from that sentence at the time he committed the
offense against Doyle. Id. at 22.
Mr. Lavetsky explained that Shaheen’s prior convictions for sexual
offenses involving similar conduct as the instant offense, completion of sexual
offender treatment, and the fact that he was still on probation when he
assaulted Doyle speaks to Shaheen’s sexual drive and lack of volitional
control. Id. at 22-24, 34-35. He further noted Shaheen was in his thirties
when he committed the previous offenses against the minor victims and was
over forty years old when he committed the offense against twenty-four-year-
old Doyle. Id. at 24. Mr. Lavetsky perceived the age differences between
Shaheen and his victims to be evidence of a power differential. Id. As to
Shaheen’s drug use, he noted that there was no information provided
regarding whether Shaheen used illicit substances. Id.
Mr. Lavetsky concluded that Shaheen satisfied the criteria in the DSM-
5 for the mental abnormality of unspecified paraphilic disorder. Id. at 25, 26-
28. He also stated that Shaheen exhibited predatory behavior with all four
victims and determined that he met the statutory definition of an SVP within
a reasonable degree of professional certainty. Id. at 29-30.
The trial court found there was sufficient evidence to designate Shaheen
as an SVP based on Mr. Lavetsky’s testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2026,
at 12, 13; see also N.T., 10/31/2025, at 40. Specifically, it concluded that
Shaheen suffers from a mental abnormality that makes him likely to engage
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in future predatory sexually violent offenses based upon his prior criminal
conduct, following which he completed sex offender treatment, but then
committed a substantially similar sexual offense against Doyle while still on
probation for his prior sex crimes. Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2026, at 12-13.
According to the trial court, “[Shaheen’s] attempt to have this court focus
solely on one aspect of one incident with the current victim, only one of [his]
four known victims, is sorely misplaced.” Id. at 13.
Based upon our review of the record, in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly
supported a finding that Shaheen was an SVP. Although Shaheen is correct
that the evidence presented did not support a finding as to all SVP factors, it
is improper for this Court to reweigh the evidence presented in his favor. See
Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 222-23 (Pa. 2006) (concluding that
this Court erred in reweighing the SVP evidence presented before the trial
court by “giving more weight to the ‘absent’ factors than those found and
relied upon by the trial court”). Again, the SVP factors are not intended to be
a “check list.” See Person, 325 A.3d at 842. Rather, a trial court examines
all the evidence to determine whether the Commonwealth has demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant meets the definition of an
SVP. Id.; see also Aumick, 297 A.3d at 776-77. Accordingly, based on our
review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Shaheen met the
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statutory criteria to be designated as an SVP. See Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-
79.
Legality of Sentence
In his second and final issue on appeal, Shaheen argues that because
the maximum penalty for a conviction of indecent assault is two years, and he
was sentenced to one to two years of incarceration followed by three years of
probation, his sentence is illegal. Shaheen’s Brief at 20-21.
When reviewing challenge to the legality of a sentence, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 52 (Pa. Super. 2020). “If no statutory authorization
exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
correction.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted). “Likewise, a sentence that exceeds the statutory
maximum is illegal.” Id.
SORNA mandates that courts impose a three-year term of probation,
consecutive to a sentence of incarceration, in certain circumstances:
§ 9718.5. Mandatory period of probation for certain sexual
offenders
(a) Mandatory probation supervision after release from
confinement.—A person who is convicted in a court of this
Commonwealth of an offense under section 9799.14(d) (relating
to sexual offenses and tier system) shall be sentenced to a
mandatory period of probation of three years consecutive to and
in addition to any other lawful sentence issued by the court.
(b) Imposition.—The court may impose the term of probation
required under subsection (a) in addition to the maximum
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sentence permitted for the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.
(c) Authority of court in sentencing.—There shall be no
authority in a court to impose on an offender to which this section
is applicable a lesser period of probation than provided for under
subsection (a). Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the
mandatory period of probation provided under this section.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5(a)-(c).
Section 9799.14(d) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) Tier III sexual offenses.--The following offenses, or an
attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit any of the following
offenses, shall be classified as Tier III sexual offenses:
* * *
(16) Two or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II
sexual offenses.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14.
Shaheen pled guilty to indecent assault without consent, a second-
degree misdemeanor. N.T., 9/3/2024, at 4. Shaheen does not dispute that
he has two or more prior convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or II offenses
under section 9799.14(d)(16). See SVP Report, 11/15/2024, at 3 (noting
Shaheen was previously “convicted of two counts of corruption of minors,
unlawful contact with minor, two counts of indecent assault, and intimidation
of witnesses or victims”). Both parties agreed on a sentence of one to two
years of incarceration with a three-year term of probation, which the court
imposed at sentencing. N.T., 9/3/2024, at 5, N.T., 10/31/2025, at 3, 42, 49.
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Shaheen’s sentence is lawful. Although the maximum term of
imprisonment for a second-degree misdemeanor is two years, see 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1104(2), “[s]ubsection 9718.5(b) gives express statutory authorization to
permit the three-year term of probation to exceed the statutory maximum for
the underlying offense.” Commonwealth v. Osman, 362 A.3d 3, 12 (Pa.
2026). Indeed, “[s]ubsection 9718.5(c) declares that a trial court cannot
impose a term of probation of less than three years for a qualifying offense.”
Id. Thus, there is statutory authority to impose a probationary sentence
above the statutory maximum. As such, no relief on this claim is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/16/2026
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