Full Opinion

J-S36011-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : HEIDI ANN DOWER : : Appellant : No. 92 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000898-2025 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2026 Heidi Ann Dower (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following her jury conviction of one count of simple assault, and her nonjury summary convictions of one count each of harassment and disorderly conduct.1 Appellant’s appointed counsel, Kent D. Watkins, Esquire (Counsel), has also filed an application to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we grant Counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 5503(a)(4). J-S36011-26 Appellant was charged with one count each of aggravated assault, simple assault, strangulation, harassment, and disorderly conduct, arising from her assault on her mother (the victim).2 The trial court summarized the incident underlying the criminal charges as follows: [O]n July 22, 2025[, the victim] had legal custody of Appellant[’s] … two children[, who were ages 11 and 6 at the time]. … On this day[, the victim] took her grandchildren to McGuire’s [Pub,] which is located in Mahanoy City, Schuylkill County. When she arrived, [the victim] and the children went to the rear of the restaurant where there are tables and chairs. After ordering food and while sitting on a chair, [the victim] observed Appellant enter[] the room with her phone out, videoing [the victim] and the children. [The victim] grabbed [] Appellant’s phone and then Appellant lunged toward her, grabbed [the victim] around the throat[,] and “choked” [the victim] with one hand. According to the [victim], she was yelling at Appellant to get off her while Appellant was “squeezing” her throat[,] which was causing [the victim] substantial pain. A waitress from the restaurant intervened[,] and the [victim] and [Appellant] were separated. Within a few minutes, [the victim] began having trouble swallowing and her voice became raspy. The incident caused bruising to [the victim’s] neck/throat and fingernail marks on [the victim’s] arm. … The next morning[,] the [victim] sought medical attention from St. Luke’s Medical Center for injury to her neck and throat. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 2/18/26, at 1-2. Police responded to a 911 call3 reporting the assault. Mahanoy City Police Officer Frank Gallo (Officer Gallo), who responded to the restaurant, spoke with both the victim and Appellant. Officer Gallo observed redness ____________________________________________ 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2718(a)(1). 3 Ashley Emery (Ms. Emery), a bartender and cook at McGuire’s Pub, called 911. N.T., 11/18/25, at 66. -2- J-S36011-26 around the victim’s neck and left elbow. See Police Criminal Compliant, 7/24/25, Affidavit of Probable Cause. Appellant was arrested on the same date, and Officer Gallo subsequently filed a police criminal complaint charging Appellant with the above-described offenses. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of simple assault, and acquitted of aggravated assault and strangulation. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the summary offenses of harassment and disorderly conduct. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report. On January 7, 2026, the court sentenced Appellant to time served to 23 months’ incarceration for her simple assault conviction.4 The trial court directed Appellant to apply for parole, and indicated that the court would grant release immediately upon approval of a home plan. The trial court also ordered Appellant to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and a mental health evaluation, and to complete any recommended treatments. For the disorderly conduct conviction, the court imposed a $25 fine. Additionally, the trial court ordered that Appellant have no contact with the victim. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On June 26, 2026, Counsel filed in this Court an application to withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief. ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant’s harassment conviction merged with her simple assault conviction for sentencing purposes. -3- J-S36011-26 We address Counsel’s application to withdraw before considering the issues raised in the Anders brief. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”) (citation omitted). Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary for the effective appellate representation thereof. Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention. Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and paragraph break omitted). Pursuant to Santiago, counsel must also (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reason for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citing Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361). Once counsel has complied with the procedural requirements, we review the record and render an independent -4- J-S36011-26 judgment as to whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Instantly, Counsel filed an Anders brief and a separate application to withdraw as counsel. In his application to withdraw, Counsel stated he reviewed the record, including the trial transcript, and concluded Appellant’s appeal is frivolous.5 See Application to Withdraw, 6/26/26. Additionally, Counsel sent a letter to Appellant informing her of Counsel’s intent to withdraw, and advising Appellant of her right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se to raise additional claims. The record reflects that Counsel furnished Appellant with copies of the application to withdraw and the Anders brief. The Anders brief summarizes the factual and procedural history of this appeal, identifies the issue Appellant wishes to raise, and explains Counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is wholly frivolous.6 As Counsel has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Anders and ____________________________________________ 5 Though the application to withdraw does not state that Counsel made a conscientious examination of the record, we conclude the language of the application to withdraw substantially complies with Anders. See generally Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. Super. 2007) (concluding Anders counsel’s statement that he made a “thorough review” was substantially compliant with Anders, but noting that “it would have been better if counsel had tracked the Anders language precisely”). 6 Appellant did not file a counseled orpro se appellate brief in response to Counsel’s application to withdraw or Anders brief. -5- J-S36011-26 Santiago, we review the record to determine whether Appellant’s appeal is wholly frivolous.7 In the Anders brief, Counsel raises the following issue: “Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to prove the charge of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt?” Anders Brief at 5. When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the following standard of review: As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner[,] giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. … Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld. Commonwealth v. Mumford, 353 A.3d 247, 256 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation and original brackets omitted). ____________________________________________ 7We caution Counsel that counsel seeking withdrawal under Anders “may not file a brief that argues against his client’s interest.” Commonwealth v. Vilsaint, 893 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2006). -6- J-S36011-26 The Crimes Code defines simple assault, in relevant part, as follows: (a) Offense defined.--Except as provided under section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of assault if he: (1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. § 2301. Further, the Crimes Code defines the relevant kinds of criminal culpability as follows: (1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross -7- J-S36011-26 deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation. Id. § 302(b)(1)-(3). During trial, the victim testified that on July 22, 2025, she took her two grandchildren to dinner at McGuire’s Pub in Mahanoy City. N.T. 11/18/25, at 13-14. According to the victim, she gained legal and physical custody of the children in May 2025. Id. at 14. The victim testified that she and the children sat toward the back of the restaurant. Id. at 15. The victim testified that one of the children got her attention, at which time she noticed Appellant in the restaurant with her phone. Id. at 17. The victim testified that she positioned herself between Appellant and the children, and she told Appellant to leave. Id. at 19. The victim also took Appellant’s phone from her hand. Id. According to the victim, Appellant lunged toward her, grabbed her around the throat, and choked her. Id. at 20; see also id. (the victim explaining that Appellant squeezed the victim’s throat with her hand). A restaurant employee who witnessed the assault then tried to pull Appellant away from the victim and told Appellant to leave. Id. at 21. The victim testified that within a few minutes after the altercation, she noticed she had trouble swallowing and her voice was raspy. Id. During the victim’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced photographs of the victim’s throat and arm. See id. at 23; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 (photograph of the victim’s throat) and Exhibit 2 (photograph of the victim’s arm). The victim testified that she had bruises -8- J-S36011-26 around her throat. N.T., 11/18/25, at 23. The victim also identified “marks on [her] arm from [Appellant’s] fingernails.” Id.; see also id. at 24 (the victim pointing to the marks on her arm depicted in Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2). The following morning, the victim sought treatment at St. Luke’s Medical Center. Id. at 24; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3 (the victim’s medical records). The victim stated that, at that time, she “could hardly talk.” N.T., 11/18/25, at 25; see also id. at 26 (the victim describing her voice as “croupy”). According to the victim, hospital staff instructed her to take Tylenol, rest, and apply warm compresses. Id. at 26. Ms. Emery testified that she was working in the kitchen at McGuire’s Pub on July 22, 2025, and at around 7:00 p.m., she heard the victim yell. Id. at 62. Ms. Emery then heard a “commotion” and left the kitchen. Id. at 63. When Ms. Emery entered the main room of the restaurant, she observed Appellant grab the victim’s arm and “pull her arm down.” Id. at 64. Ms. Emery testified that she placed herself between Appellant and the victim and yelled at Appellant to step away from the victim. Id. at 64-65. Ms. Emery called 911 to report the incident. Id. at 66. Ms. Emery stated that “[a] little bit after the incident, [the victim’s] neck was red.” Id. at 68. The Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Mahanoy City Police Officer Hugh Clinton (Officer Clinton), one of the officers who responded to McGuire’s Pub following the assault. Id. at 79-80. Officer Clinton described -9- J-S36011-26 the victim as “upset” and “a little stunned.” Id. at 80. Officer Clinton testified that the victim told him that Appellant had strangled her. Id. Additionally, pointing to Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, Officer Clinton identified bruises around the victim’s neck, which he had observed upon responding to the scene. Id. Officer Gallo confirmed the victim’s account that Appellant had put her hands on the victim’s throat during an altercation. Id. at 83. Officer Gallo observed the marks on the victim’s neck and arm, and identified those marks on Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1 and 2. Id. at 83-84. Instantly, the trial court concluded the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s simple assault conviction. The court reasoned that, [b]ased on [the victim’s] testimony, when Appellant lunged at her and grabbed her throat, she felt substantial pain and then had trouble swallowing and her voice became raspy. Further, the grasp was strong enough to cause bruising. These actions could easily be determined to be intentional, knowing, or reckless. While Appellant denied grabbing [the victim’s] throat, the issue of credibility rests solely with the jury[,] and it is clear, based on the overwhelming evidence, that the jury chose to believe [the victim]. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 2/18/26, at 3. We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. The jury, as the finder of fact, was free to weigh any conflicting testimony and make credibility determinations. See Commonwealth v. Mancuso, 357 A.3d 957, 985 (Pa. Super. 2026) (stating that “the finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility - 10 - J-S36011-26 of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”) (citation omitted). The victim testified that Appellant placed her hands around the victim’s neck and squeezed, causing substantial pain to the victim. Two responding police officers confirmed their observations of redness and bruising around the victim’s neck, as well as marks on her arms. The victim’s testimony was further corroborated through the introduction of photographs depicting the resulting marks. See Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1 and 2. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim. See In re M.H., 758 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2000) (concluding that evidence that the minor appellant aggressively grabbed an educational aide’s arms and pushed her against the wall, causing bruises that lasted several days, was sufficient to prove simple assault). Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge lacks merit and is frivolous. Finally, our independent review discloses no non-frivolous issues that Appellant could raise. We therefore grant Counsel’s request to withdraw from his representation of Appellant and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. - 11 - J-S36011-26 Application to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/30/2026 - 12 -