Full Opinion

J-S20009-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RAYMOND C. RUSSELL : : Appellant : No. 1602 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002511-2021 BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant Raymond C. Russell1 appeals from the judgment of sentence following his conviction of one count each of rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault-complainant less than 13 years old, unlawful contact with a minor-sexual offenses, incest, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a child, and aggravated indecent assault of a child.2 Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition to withdraw his guilty plea and when it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the bills of information. Additionally, ____________________________________________ 1 We have amended the caption to reflect the accurate spelling of Appellant’s last name. See N.T. Trial, 7/23/24, at 6, 21. 2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3125(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 4302(a), 4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3123(b), and 3125(b), respectively. J-S20009-26 Appellant raises challenges relating to the preliminary hearing. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history: [Appellant] repeatedly raped and sexually abused his biological daughter, A.R., when she was eleven to approximately fifteen years old. His conduct included penetrating A.R. with his penis vaginally, orally, and anally. Although the penetration stopped when A.R. was close to thirteen years old, [Appellant] continued to fondle her breasts, kiss her on the lips, and “smack” her butt until she was fifteen years old. [Appellant] was charged with fourteen sex offenses. On the first day of his bench trial, after the direct testimony of the first witness (the complainant, A.R.), [Appellant] entered into an open guilty plea on eight counts: rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault– complainant less than thirteen years old, unlawful contact with a minor–sexual offenses, incest, [endangering] the welfare of a child–parent commits offense, corruption of a minor–defendant age 18 or above, [IDSI] with a child [], and aggravated indecent assault of a child. In exchange for the guilty plea, the Commonwealth withdrew the charges on the other counts, waived [a Sexual Offender Assessment Board] assessment, and agreed not to pursue a sexually violent predator determination. A presentence investigation (PSI) and a mental health evaluation were ordered. [Appellant] subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was heard and denied on September 26, 2024. New counsel entered an appearance for [Appellant] on December 11, 2024, and sentencing was deferred until April 21, 2025. [Appellant] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 156 to 312 months (13 to 26 years) of incarceration with confinement for rape of a child, incest, and IDSI with a child[,] to run consecutive; confinement for the remaining offenses to run concurrent; and no period of probation. * * * [Appellant] timely filed a post-sentence motion requesting reconsideration of [his] sentence. The [trial court] denied the -2- J-S20009-26 motion. On June 26, 2025, [Appellant] timely filed a notice of appeal. On June 30, 2025, the [trial court] ordered [Appellant] to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Trial Ct. Op., 10/10/25, at 1-3 (citations omitted and formatting altered). Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the record demonstrates assertions of innocence, confusion about the plea, and a lack of full understanding of the consequences? 2. Did the trial court err and commit reversible error by permitting multiple substantive amendments to the criminal information, including changes to charges with differing elements, without ensuring Appellant’s right to notice and opportunity to prepare a defense? 3. Did the court err in sustaining objections during cross- examination at the preliminary hearing, thereby restricting Appellant’s ability to test the credibility, motive, and bias of the complaining witness? 4. Did the trial court err by failing to require the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case on any count where the testimony lacked proof of the essential elements? Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some formatting altered). In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his pre-sentence petition to withdraw his guilty plea. See id. at 10. Specifically, he argues that his petition to withdraw his guilty plea was based on his assertion of innocence and his confusion about the consequences of the entry of a guilty plea. See id. Appellant states that the -3- J-S20009-26 trial court erred because his “assertion of innocence was timely, unequivocal, and would not have prejudiced the Commonwealth.” Id. at 10-11. It is well settled that a criminal defendant “has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa. Super. 2013). “An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, and/or misapplication of law.” Id. (citation omitted). The standards required for withdrawing a guilty plea differ “depending on whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or after sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2017). In the context of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea, our Supreme Court has stated: [T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair- and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92 (Pa. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (stating that -4- J-S20009-26 “[a]t any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit . . . the withdrawal of a plea”). This Court has explained that “the law does not require that the defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently made.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted and formatting altered). “A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court's power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Id. at 782 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although not constitutionally mandated, a proper plea colloquy ensures that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 300 A.2d 503, 504 (Pa. 1973) . “Furthermore, nothing in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-13 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. “A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he -5- J-S20009-26 made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). In his petition to withdraw his guilty plea, Appellant “claimed his innocence on all charges in this matter and continues to do so; and therefore, [Appellant’s] assertion is a fair and just reason to grant this motion to withdraw plea of guilty.” Appellant’s Mot. for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 7/24/24, at 2 (unpaginated); ¶ 7. “[W]hen a defendant files a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, the innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 327 A.3d 640, 648 (Pa. Super. 2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 120 (Pa. 2019)). Put another way, a bare assertion of innocence, without more, is an insufficient reason to require a court to grant withdrawal of a guilty plea. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1285; see also Commonwealth v. Pryor, 702 EDA 2025, 2026 WL 1649085 at *2 (Pa. Super. filed June 8, 2026)3 (applying Carrasquillo). The record reflects that at the time the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea, A.R.’s direct-examination trial testimony was incorporated by reference in lieu of Appellant’s allocution, and Appellant explicitly agreed with “how [A.R.] explained what happened.” N.T. Trial, 7/23/24, at 91. At the hearing on Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Appellant simply ____________________________________________ 3 We may cite to unpublished memoranda filed by this Court after May 1, 2019 as persuasive authority. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). -6- J-S20009-26 reiterated that he asserted his innocence “first and foremost.” N.T. Hr’g, 9/26/24, at 4. Appellant provided no other argument as to the plausibility of his assertion of innocence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court reached the following conclusion: . . . I’m going to deny the motion to withdraw the plea. . . . [Appellant] had the benefit of hearing the full testimony of the complainant, and then we had a lunch break so they had time to think about that in the context of all of the earlier discovery . . . * * * . . . I think that [Appellant] has not met [his] burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason [for withdrawing his guilty plea]. N.T. Hr’g, 9/26/24, at 48-50; see also Trial Ct. Op., 10/10/25, at 5-6. Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. See Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 382; Gordy, 73 A.3d at 624. Appellant has failed to set forth a plausible claim of innocence that would constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. See Norton, 201 A.3d at 120; Torres, 327 A.3d at 648. Indeed, Appellant only proffered a bare assertion of innocence, which is not sufficient to have required the trial court to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1285; Pryor, 2026 WL 1649085 at *2. Appellant, therefore, is not entitled to relief. -7- J-S20009-26 Appellant’s remaining issues allege that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case at the March 31, 2021 preliminary hearing, that the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to make substantive amendments to the bills of information, and that the trial court erred when it sustained objections restricting Appellant’s cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s sole witness at the preliminary hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-14. The Commonwealth contends that these issues are waived because Appellant failed to include them in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12. It is well settled that issues not included in an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Becher, 293 A.3d 1226, 1237 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2023); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not included in the [Rule 1925(b)] Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). In the instant case, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement is limited to the withdrawal of his guilty plea and discretionary aspects of his sentence. 4 See ____________________________________________ 4 Because Appellant failed to include his discretionary aspect of sentence claim in his appellate brief, that claim is deemed abandoned on appeal and is, therefore, waived. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003). -8- J-S20009-26 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/16/25. Therefore, these issues are waived. See Becher, 293 A.3d at 1237 n.7; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 5 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 11/3/2026 ____________________________________________ 5 Even if Appellant has preserved the pre-trial issues relating to the preliminary hearing and the Commonwealth’s amendments to the bills of information in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he waived those issues when he entered his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Goodco Mechanical, Inc., 291 A.3d 378, 401 (Pa. Super. 2023) (stating that when a defendant enters an open guilty plea, he or she waives all issues except for jurisdiction of the trial court, validity of the guilty plea, the legality of the sentence, and the discretionary aspects of the sentence). -9-