Full Opinion

J-S40034-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WAEL MOHAMED-JONES : : Appellant : No. 1308 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001289-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WAEL HASI MOHAMED-JONES : : Appellant : No. 1309 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001290-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WAEL HASI MOHAMED-JONES : : Appellant : No. 1310 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001291-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA J-S40034-26 : v. : : : WAEL H. MOHAMED JONES : : Appellant : No. 1311 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001294-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WAEL MOHAMED-JONES : : Appellant : No. 1312 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001295-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WAEL HASI MOHAMED-JONES : : Appellant : No. 1313 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001296-2024 BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. -2- J-S40034-26 MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: October 27, 2026 Appellant, separately docketed under the names Wael Hasi Mohamed- Jones, Wael H. Mohamed Jones, and Wael Mohamed-Jones, appeals from the judgments of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County after he jointly entered partially negotiated guilty pleas in each of his underlying criminal matters. He challenges the discretionary aspects of his aggregate sentence term. We affirm. Between November 20, 2023, and January 1, 2024, Appellant engaged in a spree of commercial property break-ins and store-front robberies, resulting in his arrest and the recovery of a firearm from his person. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 4/21/25, 4-9. In particular, the following factual summaries for each of the underlying criminal matters were accepted at his guilty plea hearing: [O]n or about November 20, 2023, [Stowe Township police] officers were dispatched to 728 Broadway within Allegheny County for a theft. Upon arrival, [the] officers met with the store owner, who informed [the officers] that one of the employees was working at the register whe[n Appellant] purchased a water bottle. [Appellant] then accused the victim of overcharging him and reached into the register and took $800[.00]. [Appellant] then fled the store and shoved the victim when the victim tried to stop him. Id. at 7 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001294-2024/appeal no. 1311 WDA 2025). [O]n or about December 25, 2023[,] at approximately 3:32 [a.m.], a store security system within a store located at 728 Broadway Avenue within Allegheny County, reported [that Appellant committed] a break[-]in. He was wearing a -3- J-S40034-26 brown[/]maroon jacket with fur on the hood, black pants, black boots[,] and blue gloves. The video recorded [Appellant] coming through the window and go[ing] into the cash register. [The] estimate for the replacement of broken glass and the front door [was] for $1,185[.00]. Id. at 6 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001291-2024/appeal no. 1310 WDA 2025). [O]n or about December 29, 2023, [McKees Rocks police] officers were dispatched to a robbery at 911 Chartiers Avenue [] within Allegheny County. Upon arrival, the officer[s] spoke with the victim, who was an employee of the store who informed them that [Appellant] entered the store and inquired about having his coat cleaned. [Appellant] then walked behind the counter, showed the victim a firearm under his jacket and grabbed money. [He left] with $431[.00]. Id. at 5-6 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001290-2024/appeal no. 1309 WDA 2025). On or about December 30, 2003, [McKees Rocks police] officers were dispatched to 713 Chartiers Avenue within Allegheny County for a robbery in progress. The victim, the clerk of the store, did not speak English so the officer spoke with the victim’s boss, who was the store owner and who looked at the surveillance footage of the robbery. The footage show[ed that Appellant] approach[ed] the register and gesture[d] in his jacket that he had a firearm. [Appellant] then proceeded to take money from the register. [T]he total amount stolen was $2,681[.00]. Id. at 4-5 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001289-2024/appeal no. 1308 WDA 2025). [O]n or about December 31, 2023, [Stowe Township police] officers were dispatched to the Galaxy Market at 801 Broadway Street in Allegheny County to respond to a silent panic alarm. [The o]fficers made contact with the victim who was an employee at the market. The victim told the officers that the Galaxy Market had been robbed. The officers were able to review [surveillance] cameras [and] they identified the actor as [Appellant]. The victim -4- J-S40034-26 described the robbery to the officers and said that [Appellant] had pulled out what appeared to be a firearm and removed all the cash from the register before leaving the store. In that [incident], [Appellant] took $400[.00]. Id. at 7-8 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001295-2024/appeal no. 1312 WDA 2025). [O]n or about January 1, 2024, [Stowe Township police] officers were dispatched to [the] Anytime Market at 730 Broadway Avenue within Allegheny County. [The o]fficers were informed that there was a male, later identified as [Appellant] currently in the store that matched the description of the person who committed the other strings of robberies. [The officers o]rdered [Appellant] out of the store, arrested him[,] and recovered a firearm [from him]. [Afterwards, Appellant] confessed to the numerous robberies and burglaries[.] Id. at 8-9 (addressing case no. CP-02-CR-0001296-2024/appeal no. 1313 WDA 2025). The recovered firearm was a 22-caliber Taurus pistol, that was determined to be operable. See id. at 9. As of the time the firearm was recovered from him, Appellant did not have a license to carry firearms. See id. On April 21, 2025, Appellant appeared in court for a guilty plea hearing, addressing all six of his underlying criminal matters. He pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii) (CP-02-CR- 0001289-2024, CP-02-CR-0001290-2024, and CP-02-CR-0001295-2024), and single counts of robbery in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v) (CP- 02-CR-0001294-2024), burglary in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(2) (CP- 02-CR-0001291-2024), and carrying a firearm without a license in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(2) (CP-02-CR-0001296-2024). See N.T. Guilty Plea -5- J-S40034-26 Hearing, 4/21/25, 10-15. Although the parties did not agree on a particular sentencing recommendation, the guilty pleas were partially negotiated in the sense that the Commonwealth agreed to withdraw additional charges in exchange for the entry of the guilty pleas.1 See id. at 2-4. At the start of the plea hearing, the Commonwealth also sought and was granted a request to amend the three robbery charges under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii), where those charges were originally approved for trial as violations under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), and sought and was granted a request to amend the section 6106(a)(2) firearms offense, where that first-degree misdemeanor charge was originally approved for trial as a third-degree felony charge under 18 ____________________________________________ 1 The withdrawn charges included: (1) theft by unlawful taking (18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a)), carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)), possessing an instrument of crime (18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)), and simple assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3)) at CP-02-CR-0001289-2024; (2) carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)), theft by receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a)), and possession of a weapon (18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b)) at CP-02-CR-0001290-2024; (3) criminal mischief by tampering with property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(2)) and loitering and prowling at night time (18 Pa.C.S. § 5506) at CP-02-CR-0001291-2024; (4) theft by unlawful taking (18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a)) and simple assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1)) at CP-02-CR- 0001294-2024; (5) carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)), terroristic threats (18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1)), and possession of a weapon (18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b)); and (6) carrying a loaded weapon (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.1(a)). See Order (sentencing), 9/18/25, 1 (CP-02-CR-0001289- 2024); Order (sentencing), 9/18/25, 1 (CP-02-CR-0001290-2024); Order (sentencing) 9/18/25, 1 (CP-02-CR-0001291-2024); Order (sentencing) 9/18/25, 1 (CP-02-CR-0001294-2024); Order (sentencing) 9/18/25, 1 (CP- 02-CR-0001295-2024); Order (sentencing) 9/18/25, 1 (CP-02-CR-0001296- 2024). -6- J-S40034-26 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).2 See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 4/21/25, 2-3; Bills of Information, 4/1/24 (CP-02-CR-0001289-2024); Bills of Information, 4/1/24 (CP-02-CR-0001290-2024); Bills of Information, 4/1/24 (CP-02-CR-0001296- 2024). The plea court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre- sentence investigation report (“PSI”). See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 4/21/25, 15. On July 15, 2025, the plea court presided over a sentencing hearing. Appellant’s counsel submitted letters of support to the court in lieu of presenting witnesses for mitigation evidence. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/25, 3. Counsel downplayed the circumstances of Appellant’s offenses, asserting that the cases did not involve “serious situations,” that the charges did not “deserve to be first[-]degree felonies,” and that crimes were not “traumatic for the people on the other end of it.” Id. at 3. In support, Appellant’s counsel alleged that Appellant did not point a firearm “at anybody” and “never yell[ed] at anybody.” Id. at 4. Counsel argued that the cases were “the result of mental health issues.” Id. As for mitigating factors, Appellant’s counsel asserted that: (1) Appellant had been diagnosed with a generalized anxiety disorder and ____________________________________________ 2 While the amendment of the robbery counts did not reflect a change in the grade from the original robbery charges, the amended robbery charges carried lowered offense gravity scores under the Sentencing Guidelines than the original robbery charges. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (7th ed., amend 6) (offense list indicating an offense gravity score of ten for non-drug-related robbery convictions under Section 3701(a)(1)(ii) and an offense gravity score of nine for non-drug-related robbery convictions under Section 3701(a)(1)(iii)). -7- J-S40034-26 depression; (2) Appellant’s mental state made it such that he “obviously was not in his right mind” at the time of his crimes; (3) “from day one[, Appellant] ha[d] been trying to admit what he did was wrong, [and] to apologize to the other people”; (4) Appellant had been attending weekly therapy sessions during the pendency of the criminal cases; (5) the letters submitted by counsel reflected Appellant’s familial support or connections; and (6) Appellant maintained steady employment since his arrest and desired to get a commercial driver’s license “because he want[ed] to be sort of more independent as a worker.” N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/25, 5-8. In an allocution statement, Appellant expressed that he was sorry to the businesses and families impacted by his crimes, characterized his crimes as “the biggest mistake” of his life, and expressed that therapy was making him “a better person.” Id. at 13-17. The sentencing court expressed to Appellant during the allocution statement that, while it found him to be remorseful, it also found that his actions during his crimes were frightening, inexcusable, and unsettling: THE COURT: [… T]his is not an easy thing to do because I do believe that you are remorseful. I’m not really sure what was going on with you during that time frame because there’s no indication that there was drugs or alcohol, just robbing people, and so even if you didn’t point the gun directly at anybody, even to brandish it, you know, that’s very frightening. [APPELLANT]: Absolutely. THE COURT: Right? [APPELLANT]: Right. -8- J-S40034-26 THE COURT: And to just take from people who work hard every day just trying to, you know, make it through their day-to-day lives. So[,] I really don’t know what was going on with you during that time. You haven’t said anything. Defense [counsel] hasn’t […] made any statements about what was happening to you during that time, but, you know, there’s no excuse, not to say that [] was an excuse for that, but, you know, it’s unsettling that you would go from place to place and then go to another place twice, you know, and damage property and take [sic]. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/25, 15-16. At the conclusion of the allocution statement, the court noted that, while it appreciated Appellant’s apology to his victims, the faces of those victims present in the courtroom suggested that they were not accepting his apology. See id. at 17 (the court: “I appreciate your apology, but looking at the face of the victims, I don’t know that they’re accepting it today.”). After the court took a recess to review the defense exhibits for the hearing, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of three to six years’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ probation. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/25, 17-23. The aggregate term included: one to two years’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ probation for the robbery conviction at CP-02-CR-0001289-2024; a consecutive term of one to two years’ imprisonment and a concurrent term of three years’ probation for the robbery conviction at CP-02-CR-0001290-2024; a concurrent terms of six to twelve months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a concurrent three-year probation term for the burglary conviction at CP-02-CR-0001291-2024; a concurrent three-year probation term for the robbery conviction at CP-02-CR- -9- J-S40034-26 0001294-2024; a consecutive term of one to two years’ imprisonment to be followed by a concurrent three-year probation term for the robbery conviction at CP-02-CR-0001295-2024; and a concurrent three-year probation term for the firearms conviction at CP-02-CR-0001296-2024.3 See id. The court explained that, while it accepted Appellant’s alleged remorsefulness, the sentencing scheme was chosen to provide for “accountability for the conduct that occurred when [Appellant] committed these robberies.” Id. at 18-19. On July 23, 2025, Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions seeking a modification of his sentence. See Post-Sentence Motion, 7/23/25, ¶¶ 1-6. He stated that his aggregate term “was composed of low-standard range sentences at each case, run mostly consecutive,” and sought reconsideration based on the following assertions: a. Consecutive sentences are especially harsh where the defendant has accepted responsibility, avoided trial at six different cases, pled guilty at the earliest opportunity, and stipulated to restitution[;] ____________________________________________ 3 All of the probation terms were designated to be concurrent with each other and consecutive to the imprisonment terms. For the three counts of robbery in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii), which formed the aggregate imprisonment term, the trial court imposed individual sentencing terms at the bottom of the standard range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, where the court did not apply any weapon enhancements: twelve to twenty- four months’ imprisonment, plus or minus twelve months for aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (7th ed., amend. 6) (offense listing designating an offense gravity score of nine for non-drug- related convictions of robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iii)); 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (7th ed., amend. 6) (basic sentencing matrix); N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/15/25, 18 (court’s reference to Appellant’s prior record score of zero). - 10 - J-S40034-26 b. Standard range sentences, especially when run consecutively, are longer than called for where the defendant’s life and cases contain mitigating factors and where the aggravating factors – here, the showing of a gun during four of the cases – are already accounted for by the charges and guidelines[; and] c. The factors in the Sentencing Code, in Section 9721(b) (Sentencing Generally), in Section 9722 (Order of Probation), and in Section 9725 (Total Confinement) weigh strongly in favor of a sentence of probation, rather than total confinement. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4(a)-(c). Appellant requested the court to modify his sentencing scheme so that it would consist of “non-confinement” terms that would “run concurrently.” Id. at ¶ 5. He also requested a hearing at which he intended to “enlighten the court” as to how his “mental health issues contributed to the charges.” Id. at ¶ 6. Along with his post-sentence motions, Appellant filed a counseled brief, arguing, inter alia, that his crimes were influenced by “mental illness [that] had [spiraled] out of control,” “financial difficulties,” a loss of employment from a job at a CVS pharmacy, and a pending eviction from an apartment at a time during which Appellant’s partner of seven years was pregnant and then had a miscarriage in late 2023. See Post-Sentence Motions Brief, 7/23/25, 11-15. On September 18, 2025, the sentencing court presided over a hearing on the post-sentence motions at which it rejected Appellant’s request for a modification of his sentence but granted his separate request for eligibility for boot camp placement. See Orders (post-sentence motions), 9/18/25, 1. In denying the modification request, the court noted that Appellant already - 11 - J-S40034-26 benefited from the charge amendments and charge withdrawals made in connection with the entry of his guilty pleas, and, while the court appreciated his acceptance of responsibility and the benefits to judicial economy resulting from his guilty pleas, the sentencing scheme comprised of terms at the bottom of the standard range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines was nevertheless appropriate. See N.T. Post-Sentence Motions Hearing, 9/18/25, 18-20. On the same date, the court issued new sentencing orders. See Orders (amended sentencing orders), 9/18/25. Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal in each of his underlying criminal matters.4 See Notices of Appeal, 10/16/25. Appellant and the sentencing court have satisfied their obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.5 See Orders (granting extension of time to file ____________________________________________ 4 While the notices purported to initiate appeals from the judgments of sentence imposed pursuant to the sentencing court’s July 15, 2025 orders, we have sua sponte corrected the captions and dockets for these appeals to reflect that the appeals properly lie from the judgments of sentence imposed by the amended orders that the sentencing court issued on September 18, 2025. See Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245, 1254 & n.6 (Pa. Super. 2010) (where the trial court amends the judgment of sentence during the period it maintains jurisdiction, the direct appeal lies from the amended judgment of sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (acknowledging corrected appellate court caption when appellant misstated the proper order on appeal). 5 On July 14, 2026, the sentencing court granted a motion filed by Appellant to supplement the record certified for this appeal to include the PSI which was originally omitted in the record transmitted to this Court. See Motion to Supplement Certified Record, 7/2/26; Order (granting motion to supplement certified record), 7/14/26. - 12 - J-S40034-26 Rule 1925(b) statement), 1/22/26; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/12/26; Sentencing Court Opinion, 4/16/26. Appellant presents the following question for our review: Whether the [sentencing] court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to consider all of the mandatory sentencing factors under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b) and 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9725? Appellant’s Brief, 14 (unnecessary capitalization and Roman numeral prompt omitted). Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, alleging that the sentencing court “failed to consider all the factors in [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9721(b) and [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9725.” Appellant’s Brief, 28-30. With respect to Section 9721(b), he refers us that statute’s requirement that a total confinement sentence shall be “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Appellant’s Brief, 27. With respect to Section 9725, he refers us to that statute’s requirement that a court imposing a sentence of total confinement must be of the opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary because: (1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or partial confinement the defendant will commit another crime; (2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or - 13 - J-S40034-26 (3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the defendant. Appellant’s Brief, 27, quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9725. “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as a matter of right.” Commonwealth v. Hoyle, 337 A.3d 544, 574 (Pa. Super. 2025). This Court must first evaluate an appellant’s discretionary sentencing challenge to determine if he has properly invoked our jurisdiction: We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). Id. (brackets and case citation omitted). Here, Appellant timely filed notices of appeal within thirty days of the sentencing court’s denial of his timely-filed post-sentence motions and the sentencing court’s simultaneous issuance of new corrected sentencing orders. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a) (providing that “If the defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal of appeal shall be filed … within 30 days of the entry of the order deciding the motion[.]”). Moreover, we conclude that he preserved his instant claim because he requested reconsideration of his sentence in his post-sentence motion based on, inter alia, “[t]he factors in the Sentencing Code,” including with reference to Sections 9721(b) and 9725, and alleged that those factors “weigh[ed] strongly in favor of a sentence of - 14 - J-S40034-26 probation, rather than total confinement.” Post-Sentence Motions, 7/23/25, ¶ 4(c). Lastly, we agree that Appellant has included a separate section in his brief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief, 26-30. We must now turn to the issue of whether Appellant has raised a substantial question. “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014). This Court will not look beyond the statement of questions involved and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 323 A.3d 26, 30 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 285 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). Appellant’s lone basis for a substantial question is his allegation that the sentencing court “failed to consider all the factors in Section 9721(b) and Section 9725.” Appellant’s Brief, 29-30. In support of his assertion of a substantial question, he cites opinions from our Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson-Daniels, 167 A.3d 17 (Pa. Super. 2017), Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780 (Pa. Super. 2012), and Commonwealth v. Morgan, 258 - 15 - J-S40034-26 A.3d 1147 (Pa. Super. 2021).6 See Appellant’s Brief, 29. Upon reviewing the cited opinions, we are unable to agree with Appellant that he has raised a substantial question permitting us to proceed with substantive review of his claim. In the Johnson-Daniels and Riggs cases, the defendants at issue raised substantial questions where they presented claims combining an assertion of an excessive sentence with an assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider statutory sentencing factors which are compulsory to review under the Sentencing Code. In Johnson-Daniels, the defendant simultaneously claimed that his aggregate imprisonment sentence was “excessive” and that his sentence “violate[d] several specific goals of the Sentencing Code,” specifically that his sentence did not “comport with the protection of the public, gravity of the offense, and his rehabilitative needs,” factors which we would agree are addressed in Section 9721(b). 167 A.3d at 26-27. Similarly, in Riggs, the defendant asserted a discretionary sentencing claim with three subparts, two of which simultaneously alleged the imposition of an “excessive” sentence and a failure to “take into account all relevant sentencing criteria.” 63 A.3d at 785-86. Our holdings concerning the existence of substantial questions in Johnson-Daniels and Riggs are based on our legal conclusions that ____________________________________________ 6 Appellant incorrectly cites to Morgan under the Atlantic reporter as appearing at 158 A.3d 1147, rather than 258 A.3d 1147. See Appellant’s Brief, 29. - 16 - J-S40034-26 combined assertions of excessive sentences and the failure to consider statutory sentencing factors raise substantial questions permitting us to review the substantive merits of the combined multi-faceted claims. In Johnson-Daniels, we cited our following opinions making that clear: Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” (citing Commonwealth v. Mouzon, [] 812 A.2d 617, 627 ([Pa.] 2002)); Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) ) [(en banc)], appeal denied, [] 126 A.3d 1282 ([Pa.] 2015 (concluding that an “[a]ppellant’s challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs upon fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial question.”). Johnson-Daniels, 167 A.3d at 27 (footnote omitted). In Riggs, we mentioned, as Appellant quotes, that the defendant raised a substantial question where the defendant “argue[d] that the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria” including the factors set forth in Section 9721(b). Riggs, 63 A.3d at 786; Appellant’s Brief at 29. In that case, however, Riggs’s claim for review combined an excessive sentence assertion with an assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider statutory sentencing factors. See Riggs, 63 A.3d at 785-86. Johnson-Daniels and Riggs do not support the existence of a substantial question in the instant case because Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement does not present combined assertions of a failure to consider statutory sentencing factors along with an excessive sentence claim. We have - 17 - J-S40034-26 carefully reviewed Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, and it fails to explicitly assert that the underlying sentencing terms or the aggregate sentencing scheme was excessive or manifestly unreasonable. Appellant’s failure to raise a combination of an excessive sentence challenge with an assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider statutory sentencing factors sets his claim apart from the claims raised in Johnson-Daniels and Riggs. On that basis, we find that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question for our review. See, e.g., Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 769 (stating that “ordinarily, a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not raise a substantial question.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Reid, 323 A.3d 26, 30 (Pa. Super. 2024) (acknowledging that, while our jurisprudence on whether a substantial question has been raised based on claims about the failure to consider or adequately consider sentencing factors “has been less than a model of clarity and consistency,” claims of inadequate consideration of sentencing factors raise a substantial question where they are “raised in conjunction with a general excessiveness claim or an excessiveness claim due to the imposition of consecutive sentences”). While Appellant additionally relies on our Morgan opinion for his argument for the presentation of a substantial question, that case addresses an altogether inapposite claim. In that case, the defendant sought reconsideration after a resentencing proceeding after his original sentence was found to be the result of the imposition of illegal mandatory minimum - 18 - J-S40034-26 sentencing terms and, in the resentencing proceeding, the trial court reimposed the same sentencing scheme it originally imposed. 258 A.3d at 1149-50. Morgan’s discretionary sentencing claim, which we found to raise a substantial question, did not consist of just a lone assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider statutory sentencing factors. See Morgan, 258 A.3d at 1157. Instead, that claim included two to three separate subparts, in which Morgan asserted that “the court essentially continued to impose the illegal ten-year mandatory minimum sentence and failed to consider the factors enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(b) and 9725 or order a new presentence investigation report.” Morgan, 258 A.3d at 1157 (emphasis added). As the instant case does not present us with a similar instance of a discretionary sentencing claim raised in the context of a resentencing proceeding or a combination of sentencing arguments beyond just the failure to consider the sentencing factors in Sections 9721(b) and 9725, we disagree with Appellant that our opinion in Morgan supports the existence in this case of a substantial question. Alleging that his sentence was excessive in combination with his assertion that the sentencing court failed to consider the sentencing factors in Sections 9721(b) and 9725 was an extremely low threshold for Appellant to establish a substantial question for our review under our existing caselaw. The instant claim presented in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, however, falls below that threshold. Appellant’s failure to explicitly raise a combined excessive sentence claim together with his claim of inadequate consideration - 19 - J-S40034-26 of statutory factors requires us to decline to review the substantive merits of his discretionary sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Neafie, 341 A.3d 813, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2025) (noting that we will only proceed with substantive review of a discretionary sentencing claim where an appellant, inter alia, presents a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code or sentencing norms). Judgments of sentence affirmed. Judge Olson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. DATE: 10/27/2026 - 20 -