Full Opinion

J-S28014-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN PATRICK MCGLORY : : Appellant : No. 414 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004619-2025 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 Shawn McGlory appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count of terroristic threats.1 He claims that his attorney was ineffective in representing him. Additionally, McGlory’s counsel asked to withdraw from representation and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Upon review, we grant counsel's petition and affirm the judgment of sentence. This matter arises from the following incident. On November 4, 2025, police were dispatched to Stryten Energy in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. An employee found a handwritten note on the floor outside the foreman’s office. The note stated: “I suggest you back the f--- off me c---- with your bull---- ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). J-S28014-26 before someone dies in the parking lot. The first one will be Kristine Johnson. Facts.” The note was given to the facility manager, who reviewed video surveillance footage. He observed an individual, wearing a hat, red sweatshirt, and light tan pants walk by the foreman’s office and intentionally drop the note on the ground. The facility manager recognized this individual as McGlory. McGlory was arrested and charged. On February 6, 2026, McGlory entered a negotiated guilty plea to terroristic threats. The trial court accepted McGlory’s plea and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement to 2 years’ probation with restrictive conditions: the first 3 months to be served on house arrest with electronic monitoring, followed by up to 2 months’ intensive supervision. The court credited McGlory for time served from November 4, 2025. McGlory did not file a post-sentence motion. McGlory filed this timely appeal. Counsel filed an Anders brief with this Court and a petition to withdraw. McGlory did not retain independent counsel or file a pro se response to the Anders brief. When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and wishes to withdraw from representation, counsel must do the following: (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring -2- J-S28014-26 to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points [the defendant] deems worthy of this Court's attention. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Once counsel has satisfied the Anders requirements, it is then this Court's responsibility “to conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018). Here, counsel filed both an Anders brief and a petition for leave to withdraw. Further, the Anders brief substantially comports with the requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in Santiago. Additionally, counsel sent a letter to McGlory indicating counsel's intention to seek -3- J-S28014-26 permission to withdraw and advising McGlory of his right to proceed pro se or retain new counsel and file additional points he deems worthy of the Court's consideration. Accordingly, as counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation, we will review the issues raised by counsel to determine whether McGlory’s appeal is wholly frivolous. In the Anders brief, counsel considers several issues that McGlory could potentially raise, and that McGlory wishes to raise on appeal, which we have summarized and reordered as follows: 1. Whether McGlory’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary? 2. Whether McGlory’s sentence was illegal? 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced McGlory? 4. Whether counsel for McGlory was ineffective? See Anders Brief at 8-9, 11-12. The first issue relates to the validity of McGlory’s plea. Counsel indicates that, although McGlory could challenge the validity of his guilty plea, a review of the record shows it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and, therefore, would be frivolous. See Anders Brief at 12, 15. “A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-610 (Pa. Super. 2013); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. Failing -4- J-S28014-26 to do so generally results in the waiver of the issue on appeal. Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 610. Upon review of the record, we observe that McGlory did not object to his plea at the hearing. In fact, McGlory indicated that his decision to plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied with the process. N.T., 2/6/26, at 6- 7. McGlory also did not file a post-sentence motion to challenge the validity of his plea. Therefore, McGlory waived this issue. Furthermore, because it is waived, it would be frivolous under Anders. See Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888–89 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Having been waived, pursuing this matter on direct appeal is frivolous.”). The second issue relates to the legality of McGlory’s sentence. Counsel indicates that McGlory’s sentence was legal, as it was within the maximum allowable sentence, and any challenge to it would be frivolous. Anders Brief at 8. The general definition of an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the jurisdiction or power of the sentencing court to impose. See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 2000) (“When a trial court imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be remanded for correction.”). “The two most basic and classic examples of an illegal sentence are sentences that exceed the statutory maximum and a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663, 668 (Pa. Super. 2014) -5- J-S28014-26 Id. “Other legality of sentence issues include the failure to grant appropriate credit for time served, violations of the minimum-maximum sentencing requirement, merger claims, imposing a sentence absent jurisdiction, [and] the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment . . . .” Id. at 669 (citations omitted). Here, McGlory was sentenced to 2 years’ probation. The conviction for terroristic threats was graded as a first-degree misdemeanor. Therefore, the statutory maximum was 5 years’ incarceration. The trial court imposed McGlory’s sentence within the applicable statutory maximum. Further, McGlory’s minimum sentence was not more than half of the maximum sentence. Additionally, McGlory received credit for time served from the date of the incident. Thus, we agree that the sentence was legal and any challenge to the legality of his sentence would be frivolous. The third issue relates to the discretionary aspects of McGlory’s sentence. Counsel indicates McGlory is not entitled to review of the discretionary aspects of his sentence because he did not preserve any issue related thereto for appellate review. Therefore, an appeal of such issue would be frivolous. See Anders Brief at 9. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Instead, to reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we must conduct a four-part analysis to determine: -6- J-S28014-26 (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant preserved his issue; (3) whether [a]pellant's brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence [in accordance with 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code . . . [I]f the appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case. Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Here, although McGlory filed his appeal timely, thereby satisfying the first requirement under Colon, he failed to preserve any sentencing claim for appeal to satisfy the second requirement. “Issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Pa. Super. 2006)); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). Additionally, “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). As noted above, McGlory did not file a post-sentence motion. Furthermore, McGlory did not object to his sentence, nor could he. McGlory entered a negotiated guilty plea and agreed to his specific sentence. We note: -7- J-S28014-26 When the plea agreement contains a negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no authority to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence. If either party to a negotiated plea agreement believed the other side could, at any time following entry of sentence, approach the judge and have the sentence unilaterally altered, neither the Commonwealth nor any defendant would be willing to enter into such an agreement. Permitting a discretionary appeal following the entry of a negotiated plea would undermine the designs and goals of plea bargaining, and would make a sham of the negotiated plea process. Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and footnote omitted). McGlory negotiated the terms of his guilty plea, including his specific sentence. The trial court accepted his plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. See N.T., 2/6/26, at 2, 8. Because McGlory’s guilty plea agreement included a negotiated sentence, which the trial court adhered to when it sentenced him, McGlory cannot challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286, 290 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that when appellant has negotiated the “specific duration of the sentence” and “the trial court sentenced him to the agreed-upon sentence,” the appellant “waived his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim”). Thus, McGlory waived his sentencing claim, and an appeal thereof would be frivolous. The last issue relates to the ineffectiveness of McGlory’s counsel. McGlory claims that his prior attorney misled him and was unwilling to fight for him. Anders Brief at 11. -8- J-S28014-26 Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 563, 563 (Pa. 2013). Instead, we defer such review to petitions under the Post Conviction Relief Act2 (“PCRA”). Id. Further, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to this rule, our review of the record indicates that they do not apply here. See id. Because this claim is premature and must be deferred to collateral review, and it is frivolous on direct appeal. Based upon the foregoing, we agree with counsel that McGlory’s appeal is frivolous. Further, in accordance with Dempster, we have independently reviewed the certified record to determine if there are any non-frivolous issues that counsel may have overlooked. Having found none, we agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Consequently, we grant counsel's petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence. Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 ____________________________________________ 2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. -9-