Full Opinion

J-S31021-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RYAN JOSEPH KRANZ : : Appellant : No. 281 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001259-2020 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RYAN JOSEPH KRANZ : : Appellant : No. 282 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 22, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001251-2023 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Appellant, Ryan Joseph Kranz, appeals from the January 22, 2026 judgments of sentence entered by the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas following the court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss for failure to sentence him timely in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgments of sentence. J-S31021-26 These consolidated appeals follow a convoluted procedural history. While the factual details of the underlying crimes are not relevant, we glean the applicable procedural history from the trial court’s opinion and the certified record. On July 14, 2021, Appellant pled guilty to multiple criminal counts at three docket numbers, including Aggravated Assault (“Count 1 (Aggravated Assault)”). While Appellant received sentences for the lesser counts, he did not receive a sentence for Count 1 (Aggravated Assault).1 The court deferred ____________________________________________ 1 Appellant plead guilty and received an aggregate sentence of 30 to 60 days of incarceration followed by 4 years and 10 months of probation, in addition to costs and fees, at the following dockets: - CP-41-CR-0001259-2020 (“1259-2020”): Count 1 (Aggravated Assault): deferred sentence Count 2 (Possession of an Instrument of Crime): 5 years of probation, concurrent with Count 4’s sentence Count 4 (Terroristic Threats): 30 to 60 days of incarceration and a consecutive term of 4 years and 10 months of probation Count 9 (Recklessly Endangering Another Person): 1 year of probation concurrent with the sentences at Counts 2 and 4 - CP-41-CR-000131-2019 (“131-2019”): Count 3 (Resisting Arrest): 1 year of probation concurrent to the sentence at Docket 1259-2020 - CP-41-CR- 000252-2021 (“252-2021”): Count 2 (Possession of a Controlled Substance (fentanyl)) and Count 3 (Possession of Drug Paraphernalia): 1 year of probation at each count to run concurrent with each other and Docket 1259- 2020. -2- J-S31021-26 sentencing for Count 1 (Aggravated Assault) and permitted Appellant to enter the Lycoming County Drug Court diversion program (“Drug Court program”), which provided Appellant the opportunity to have Count 1 (Aggravated Assault) dismissed upon his successful completion of the program. Importantly, as part of his placement into the Drug Court program, Appellant waived his Rule 704 right to imposition of sentence within 90 days of conviction. Order, 7/14/21, at 4. In April 2024, while in the Drug Court program, Appellant pled guilty to Simple Assault at CP-41-CR-0001251-2023 (“1251-2023”) and received a sentence of two years of probation. In July 2024, the court removed Appellant from the Drug Court program, after he “repeatedly violated” the program conditions. Trial Ct. Op., 1/6/25, at 1. Despite his removal from the program, he did not receive a sentence for Count 1 (Aggravated Assault), nor did Appellant “do anything to seek sentencing on the pending Count 1.” Id. at 2. On December 4 and 18, 2025, Lycoming County Adult Probation filed supervision violation reports, listing numerous probation violations. The reports also noted that Appellant had not been sentenced on Count 1 (Aggravated Assault). On December 29, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 (Aggravated Assault), based upon the court’s failure to sentence Appellant within 90 days of his removal from the Drug Court program, alleging a violation of Rule 704(A)(1). Appellant claimed that his original waiver of Rule -3- J-S31021-26 704 for his placement into the Drug Court program cannot be applicable “for an indefinite period of time.” Motion to Dismiss Count 1, 12/29/25, at ¶ 14. He argued that the 90-day period began again following his removal from the Drug Court program. On January 2, 2026, approximately 1½ years after his removal from the Drug Court program, Appellant appeared before the court for a probation violation hearing at Docket Numbers 1259-2020 and 1251-2023. The court revoked his probation, following Appellant’s stipulation to several probation violations. The court, however, deferred sentencing, pending its decision on Appellant’s motion to dismiss. On January 6, 2026, the court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that Appellant had waived his claim under Rule 704 when he accepted placement in the Drug Court program and, alternatively, that he failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the delayed sentencing. On January 22, 2026, the court held a sentencing hearing to address Docket Numbers 1259-2020 and 1251-2023.2 During the hearing, the court and parties addressed Appellant’s mental health and substance abuse history and potential treatment in state prison. The parties noted that if Appellant received a longer sentence, he would have to “sit” in prison until he became eligible for the State Drug Treatment Program, which required his remaining minimum term to be less than two years. N.T. Sent. Hr’g, 1/22/26, at 18-19; ____________________________________________ 2 The court observed that it had “never seen a file in Lycoming County with more probation violation orders[.]” N.T. Sent. Hr’g, 1/22/26, at 3. -4- J-S31021-26 see 61 Pa.C.S. § 4103 (defining an “eligible person,” in relevant part, as one “serving a term of confinement, the minimum of which is not more than five years where the person is within two years of completing the person’s minimum term”). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced Appellant to 4 to 8 years of incarceration at Count 1 (Aggravated Assault).3 The court requested the Department of Corrections to consider Appellant for participation in mental health and drug abuse programs, further indicating that the Commonwealth did not object to Appellant’s placement in the State Drug Treatment Program, “which the Court recommends.” Sent. Order, 1/22/26, at 1 (unpaginated). Importantly, Appellant did not file a post- sentence motion. On February 19, 2025, Appellant filed notices of appeal at Docket Numbers 1259-2020 and 1251-2023. Appellant and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This court consolidated his appeals. Appellant raised the following questions on appeal: I. Whether the lower court erred by failing to dismiss the felony held in abeyance after Appellant was removed from the Lycoming County Drug Treatment Program based upon the length of time between removal and sentencing[?] ____________________________________________ 3 The court additionally sentenced Appellant to lesser sentences at Counts 2, 4, and 9 at Docket 1259-2020 and Count 2 at Docket 1251-2023, to run concurrently with his Count 1(Aggravated Assault) sentence. Sent. Order, 1/22/26, at 1; Supp. Sent. Order, 2/13/26. The court also imposed a “one- year re-entry supervision resentence[.]” Id. -5- J-S31021-26 II. Whether the lower court abused its discretion when it sentenced Appellant to a minimum of four (4) years and a maximum of eight (8) years[?] Appellant’s Br. at 8 (suggested answers omitted). Sentencing challenges under Rule 704 present “mixed question[s] of fact and law[,]” with factual questions predominating. Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 192 (Pa. Super. 2018). Accordingly, we review for abuse of discretion as “trial judges sit in the best position to determine the causes and impacts of [sentencing] delays in their own courtrooms.” Id. “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 704 evidentiary hearing and the factual findings of the trial court[,]” which we review “in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. at 193. Rule 704 mandates that a “sentence in a court case shall ordinarily be imposed within 90 days of conviction[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(1). “Failure to sentence within the time specified in paragraph (A) may result in the discharge of the defendant.” Id. cmt (citing Commonwealth v. Anders, 725 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa. 1999)). Discharge, however, is appropriate “only where the defendant can demonstrate that the delay in sentencing prejudiced him or her.” Anders, 725 A.2d at 173. In assessing the prejudice, we remain cognizant that “Rule 704 is not aimed at addressing or eliminating clerical error[;]” but in “[p]rotecting the accused from inexcusable or intentional delay on the part of the court or the Commonwealth[.]” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 51 A.3d 884, 889 (Pa. Super. 2012). -6- J-S31021-26 To determine whether a delay in sentencing warrants discharge, courts consider the following four factors: “(1) the length of the delay falling outside of Rule [704], (2) the reason for the improper delay, (3) the defendant’s timely or untimely assertion of his rights, and (4) any resulting prejudice to the interests protected by his speedy trial and due process rights.” Anders, 725 A.2d at 173. Rather than presuming prejudice from the mere fact of an untimely sentence,” courts consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in refusing to dismiss Count 1 (Aggravated Assault) in light of the 1½ year delay in sentencing following his removal from Drug Court, despite appearing before the court several times in the interim. Appellant’s Br. at 14-22. He also asserts that the trial court violated Rule 704(A)(2) by failing to “include in the record the specific time period for the extension” of the 90-day period for sentencing. Id. at 15; see Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(2) (mandating that when sentencing must be delayed, “the judge shall include in the record the specific time period for the extension”). While Appellant does not frame his argument in relation to the four- factor test, he generally argues that he satisfies the test. Appellant’s Br. at 15. Addressing the length of sentencing delay, he contends that his initial waiver of Rule 704 prior to his placement into the Drug Court program should not result in the Commonwealth having “an indefinite time to delay sentencing” following removal from Drug Court. Id. at 21-22. -7- J-S31021-26 Turning to the second factor, Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth did not provide a reason for the delay; rather, he contends that the record demonstrates “intentional and inexcusable conduct” by the Commonwealth because it did not seek to sentence him even when he appeared in court multiple times during the year and a half following his discharge from the Drug Court program. Id. at 16, 18-19. Appellant does not address the third factor—the defendant’s timely or untimely assertion of his rights. Regarding the fourth factor of prejudice, Appellant contends that he was unduly prejudiced by the delayed sentencing because he “faces a lengthy sentence of incarceration that will greatly affect his life and his right to his liberty.” Id. at 18. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss based upon Rule 704. Applying the four-factor test, we initially recognize that the 1½ year sentencing delay satisfies the first factor—length of delay. See Commonwealth v. Fox, 953 A.2d 808, 813 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding a delay of approximately a year “sufficient to trigger further inquiry”). This Court has held that the second factor—the reason for the delay—does not “weigh heavily against the government” where the delay, as in the instant case, is caused by negligence rather than “bad faith or deliberate intent on the part of the government.” Id. Moreover, we have found the third factor—the timeliness of the defendant’s assertion of the delay—to weigh against the defendant where the court or the Commonwealth acted promptly once alerted to a resentencing that “fell [] through the -8- J-S31021-26 cracks[.]” Id. In this case, the trial court acted promptly to hold hearings on the issue and impose sentence after the probation officer flagged the absence of a sentence on Count 1 (Aggravated Assault). Finally, we agree with the trial court that Appellant fails to demonstrate prejudice, as he does not argue that he was denied a “full and fair opportunity to present evidence, witnesses and argument in mitigation of the sentence” or that “an earlier sentencing date would have yielded a different outcome.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Thus, applying the four-factor test and considering the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss.4 Appellant next challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, claiming that the court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that “would make Appellant ineligible for the State Drug Treatment Program[,]” at least for a period of time. Appellant’s Br. at 22-25 (citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 4103). As challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not reviewable as of right, we address them as petitions for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). In order to obtain this Court’s review, an appellant must comply with the following requirements: (1) file a timely notice of appeal; (2) preserve the issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) include within his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for ____________________________________________ 4 The trial court alternatively concluded that Appellant’s initial waiver of his right under Rule 704 remained valid following his discharge from the Drug Court program. We need not reach this question as Appellant fails to demonstrate his right to relief even in the absence of waiver of his right. -9- J-S31021-26 allowance of appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) raise a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Appellant failed to meet these requirements as he did not file a post- sentence motion following his most recent sentencing at either docket. Appellant neither acknowledges nor explains his failure to preserve this issue. Accordingly, we deny relief as Appellant failed to preserve his challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. Judgements of Sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/29/2026 - 10 -