Full Opinion

J-S28035-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MANUEL R. PEREZ : : Appellant : No. 484 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004635-2018 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MANUEL R. PEREZ : : Appellant : No. 1724 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002070-2024 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 Appellant, Manuel R. Perez, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (“PWID”).1 Deborah Lynn Bogart Brown, Esquire, ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). J-S28035-26 (“counsel”) of the Berks County Office of the Public Defender, has applied to withdraw as Mr. Perez’s counsel and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), stating that she does not offer meritorious argument in support of the underlying claims but, instead, sets forth the issues for this Court to determine whether any non-frivolous grounds for appeal exist. Anders Brief at 16. After careful review, we affirm judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel. The facts establish that in the matter at No. 484 MDA 2025, Mr. Perez was charged by Information in 2018 with two counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance,2 two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance,3 and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.4 He failed to appear for a status hearing on March 12, 2020, however, which necessitated the issuance of a bench warrant. On May 23, 2024, the bench warrant was stayed after he was apprehended and charged additionally at No. 1724 MDA 2025 with one count of PWID, one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. On February 6, 2025, Perez, represented by private counsel, entered guilty pleas to the counts of PWID at each information at issue in the present appeal and proceeded immediately to sentencing, where he received an ____________________________________________ 2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 4 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). -2- J-S28035-26 aggregate sentence of 3 to 10 years’ incarceration with credit for time served. He filed no post-sentence motion. On March 28, 2025, Perez filed pro se a facially untimely notice of appeal to this Court. In his notice, he requested a new lawyer to represent him and review his case for appeal. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order directing him and his guilty plea counsel to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, and guilty plea counsel responded by filing a motion to withdraw, which the trial court granted on April 21, 2025. The trial court subsequently filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion deeming all appellate issues waived for Perez’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement, but, on July 28, 2025, this Court entered an order remanding the matter and directing the trial court to conduct a Grazier 5 hearing to confirm Mr. Perez’s counsel status on this direct appeal. On remand, counsel from the Berks County Public Defender’s Office entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Perez and filed a request to consolidate the two dockets at issue, which was granted by the trial court on April 10, 2026. Counsel subsequently filed in this Court an Anders brief opposing the trial court’s determination that Perez’s appeal was untimely but concluding, after conscientious review, that Perez’s claim assailing the trial court’s order denying his post-sentence challenge to his guilty plea is frivolous because, inter alia, his post-sentence motion was untimely. ____________________________________________ 5 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). -3- J-S28035-26 Prior to reviewing the merits of Perez’s claims raised in the Anders brief, we must determine whether counsel has complied with the dictates of Anders and its progeny in her request to withdraw from representation. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (this Court may not review merits of underlying issues without first examining counsel's request to withdraw). Court-appointed counsel seeking to withdraw from representation on the basis that the appeal is frivolous must: (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might support the appeal[;] and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise the defendant of his [ ] right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points that he [ ] deems worthy of the court's attention. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A. 3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a proper Anders brief must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. After determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, this Court must then -4- J-S28035-26 “conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appears on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Our review of the Anders brief and petition to withdraw as counsel reveals that counsel has complied with the technical requirements of Anders, Santiago, and Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981). In her Anders brief, counsel provided a detailed summary of the facts and procedural history, with citation to the record. See Anders Brief at 7-14. Counsel identified one issue—whether this Court should forgo quashing the present appeal as untimely filed when a breakdown in the post-trial processing of Mr. Perez’s Spanish-language pro se letter of appeal contributed to the delay—that, if meritorious, would enable him to avoid waiver for filing an untimely appeal. She concludes, however, that even if we were to identify a breakdown in post-sentence court operations and excuse the untimely filing of the notice of appeal, Mr. Perez has waived his challenge to the validity of his counseled guilty plea where he neither objected during the plea colloquy nor filed a timely post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. Counsel avers that she reviewed the record for the possibility of challenging the validity of Mr. Perez’s guilty plea and the trial court’s 1925(a) conclusion that his filing of a facially untimely post-sentence motion challenging the plea’s validity precluded such review, but she concludes she could find no non-frivolous argument to support such claims. See Anders -5- J-S28035-26 Brief at 16-24. Furthermore, counsel provided Mr. Perez with a letter advising him of his rights pursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 2005).6 Accordingly, we proceed with our independent review as to whether Perez’s appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246 (Pa. Super. 2015). This Court has observed. “Pennsylvania law makes clear that by entering a plea of guilty, a defendant waives his right to challenge on direct appeal all non- jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. 2018). Rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Furthermore: A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges ____________________________________________ 6 Counsel included letters dated May 18, 2026, in English and in Spanish containing the required advice. Rather than attach the letters to the petition to withdraw, counsel filed them separately on the same date as the petition. -6- J-S28035-26 of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the agreement. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 cmt. (setting forth a non- exhaustive list of questions a trial judge should ask before accepting a plea). As noted, Mr. Perez was represented by counsel during his guilty plea hearing, and he did not object at the time of his sentencing or file a post- sentence motion to withdraw his plea within ten days of his sentence. It is well-settled that: a defendant who wishes to withdraw his or her guilty plea following the imposition of a sentence must do so within 10 days of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 307 A.3d 95, 99 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1)); see also Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 609-10 (“A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.”). Failure to do so results in waiver of any involuntariness claim. See Moore, supra; see also Lincoln supra. Commonwealth v. Ortiz-Pagan, 322 A.3d 247, 254 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some formatting altered). Our independent review of the notes of testimony from Mr. Perez’s guilty plea and sentencing hearing of February 6, 2025, furthermore, shows that while the trial court did not explicitly advise Perez of his post-sentence motion and appellate rights, it clearly referenced, on the record,7 Mr. Perez’s signed acknowledgment that he had been advised by counsel of those rights pursuant ____________________________________________ 7 See Guilty Plea/Sentencing Hearing, 2/6/25, at 9. -7- J-S28035-26 to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(c)(3)(a) (“The judge shall determine on the record that the defendant has been advised of the following: (a) of the right to file a post- sentence motion and to appeal, of the time within which the defendant must exercise those rights, and of the right to assistance of counsel in the preparation of the motion and appeal[.]”).8 Given this record, we discern no error with the trial court’s guilty plea colloquy advising of Mr. Perez’s post- sentence and direct appeal rights. Accordingly, we conclude that Perez’s failure to raise a challenge to his guilty plea at sentencing or in a timely post- sentence motion results in the waiver of any such claim. Judgment of sentence is affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 ____________________________________________ 8 As such, the present facts are distinguishable from those in Commonwealth v. Bey, 564 & 565 WDA 2025, 2026 WL 2019588, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed July 13, 2026) (acknowledging caselaw identifying the failure to issue a Rule 704(c)(3)(a) advisement of post-sentencing or appellate rights as a “breakdown in the processes of the court” and remanding to trial court) and Commonwealth v. Evans, 201 A.3d 248, 252 (Pa. Super. 2018) (finding trial court erred by not ensuring Evans was advised of his post-sentence motion rights, and remanding for the trial court to permit Evans to file a post- sentence motion nunc pro tunc.). -8-