Full Opinion

J-S24028-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KENNETH JOHN SCHLEIFER : : Appellant : No. 1288 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 7, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000277-2025 BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: October 29, 2026 Appellant Kenneth Schleifer appeals from the August 7, 2025 judgment of sentence imposed by the Venango County Court of Common Pleas following the entry of his guilty plea to one count each of Harassment and Possession of a Controlled Substance.1 He contends, inter alia, that because the court ordered his individual sentences of six months to one year of incarceration to be served consecutively, his aggregate sentence of one to two years was manifestly excessive. After careful review, we affirm. We glean the following relevant factual and procedural history from the trial court opinion and the certified record. On May 14, 2025, Appellant began serving parole in a domestic violence case, the terms of which included a no- ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709(a)(1) (graded as a third-degree misdemeanor) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), respectively. J-S24028-26 contact order to protect the victim.2 On May 23, 2025, despite the no-contact order, Appellant threatened the same victim. Police officers arrested him and Appellant admitted to threatening the victim, admitted he had drugs inside his home, and consented to a search of the home. In searching the home, police recovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. On June 13, 2025, the Commonwealth charged Appellant under the instant docket number with terroristic threats, marijuana – small amount personal use, possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and harassment. On July 8, 2025, Appellant entered a guilty plea to harassment and possession of a controlled substance.3 The court accepted the plea and ordered a pre- sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. On August 7, 2025, the court held a sentencing hearing for both the CR- 80-2025 case and the instant case. The trial court acknowledged its review of the PSI report, as well as its consideration of the circumstances surrounding the offenses, the sentencing guidelines, and statements made by counsel and Appellant. The sentencing court also provided extensive reasons for imposing a sentence above the standard guideline ranges for Appellant’s new offenses. ____________________________________________ 2 CP-61-CR-0000080-2025 (“CR-80-2025”). In CR-80-2025, Appellant had entered a negotiated guilty plea to simple assault on May 5, 2025, and the court sentenced him on May 9, 2025, to one month to 23 months, 29 days, and ordered him to have no contact with the victim. 3 The court nolle prossed the remaining charges pursuant to the plea agreement. Appellant stipulated to violating his parole at docket CR-80-2025. -2- J-S24028-26 The court then revoked Appellant’s parole in CR-80-2025, and ordered him to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed in that case (“VOP sentence”). In the instant case, the court sentenced Appellant to six to twelve months’ incarceration on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate term of one to two years.4 The court directed this aggregate sentence to run consecutive to his VOP sentence. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on August 12, 2025, which the court summarily denied on September 23, 2025. On October 9, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant’s statement of the question presented for review identifies a single issue: Was the sentence in this case manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable in its length and the consecutive nature of the sentence to a prior sentence for which [Appellant] was revoked and resentenced on at the same time[?] ____________________________________________ 4 These are legal sentences, because they do not exceed the statutory maximum allowable sentence of one year of incarceration for a third-degree misdemeanor (Harassment) or an ungraded misdemeanor (Possession of a Controlled Substance). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(9); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(3). The parties agree that Appellant’s Harassment conviction is in the aggravated range of the applicable sentencing guidelines. Appellant’s sentence for Possession of a Controlled Substance is a departure above the guidelines; however, a sentencing court may depart from the suggested guidelines where, as here, the court “state[s] on the record and report[s] to the [Sentencing] Commission a reason or reasons for the sentence.” 204 Pa. Code § 303a.6(e), (f)(1); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303a.6(c)(2) (providing that if the standard range is a term of probation, “[t]he use of confinement . . . is a procedural departure from the guidelines.”). -3- J-S24028-26 Appellant’s Amended Br. 2. As a first matter, we note that the above issue was not raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement. Rather, in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, Appellant challenged only the length and consecutive nature of the sentences imposed for his harassment and possession convictions. Specifically, he averred: The sentences handed down in this case were manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable in their consecutiveness, as a concurrent sentence would serve the purposes of rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation. Specifically, the sentence imposed at CR No. 277-2025 is the maximum sentence allowed. Further, the trial court stated as a reason for its sentence the fact that [Appellant] had contact with the victim, but the victim had maintained contact with [Appellant] previously. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 11/10/25, at ¶ 9. The issue presented in his brief, however, challenges the sentence as manifestly excessive in its length and “consecutive nature to a prior sentence[.]” Amended Br. 2. Because Appellant did not raise the issue now raised in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).5 ____________________________________________ 5 Moreover, although Appellant filed a separate notice of appeal challenging the VOP sentence, this Court quashed that appeal after Appellant’s counsel conceded that that appeal was untimely filed. See Docket No. 1289 WDA 2025, Order, 3/6/26. Appellant invokes the VOP sentence to challenge his sentence in the instant case as “manifestly excessive;” however, we consider only the sentence imposed for the harassment and possession convictions at issue here. -4- J-S24028-26 We, nonetheless, recognize that within the argument section of his brief, Appellant addresses the issue raised in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, where he challenges the court’s imposition of “high range sentences” rather than the standard range suggested by the guidelines for harassment and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s Amended Br. 8 (arguing “standard range sentences, or at least concurrent sentences (to each other at this docket. . . ) would have sufficiently served the purposes of rehabilitation and especially punishment and incapacitation”). He also contends the court did not properly consider mitigating facts, i.e., that he showed remorse and had no misconducts in prison. Id. at 9. This argument presents a challenge to the discretionary aspect of his sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015). Instead, an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);6 and (4) presenting a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 83. ____________________________________________ 6 Rule 2119(f) requires an appellant to include, as a distinct section of his brief, “a concise statement of the reason relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). -5- J-S24028-26 Here, Appellant timely appealed, preserved his sentencing challenge in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.7 Accordingly, we consider whether Appellant has presented a substantial question for review. “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Bald allegations of excessiveness, unaccompanied by a plausible argument that the sentence imposed violated a provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme, are insufficient to raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627-28 (Pa. 2002). “A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 835 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent ____________________________________________ 7 Appellant alleged in his Rule 2119(f) Statement that “the fundamental norm violated was that the sentence was manifestly excessive in that it was not individualized.” Appellant’s Amended Br. 4. -6- J-S24028-26 sentences will present a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, where the court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, we may presume that it “was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). Here, Appellant argues that his aggregate sentence of one to two years was excessive because the individual sentences did not fall within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines and were imposed consecutive to one another. Appellant’s Br. 8. He also argues his sentences were excessive because the court failed to properly consider that “the victim had continued to pursue a relationship with him prior to this incident despite issues between the two in the past,” he had no misconducts in jail, and that he was sorry for this incident. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the court indicated it deviated from the sentencing guidelines because, inter alia, Appellant repeatedly contacted or attempted to contact the victim of his prior domestic violence case. The court observed that Appellant’s disregard for the court’s no-contact order, even after he was incarcerated for harassment and possession of a controlled -7- J-S24028-26 substance, indicated a blatant disregard of the court’s authority and the judicial process. N.T. Sent’g, 8/7/25, at 22-23. The court added: In imposing sentence in this matter, the [c]ourt considered all information set forth in the PSI, all statements made on behalf of the Defendant, the statement of the Defendant, arguments of the Commonwealth, the circumstances surrounding the case and all other relevant factors, including but not limited to, public protection, gravity of the offense as it impacts the victim and the community, the rehabilitative needs of the Defendant, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the Defendant, including the Defendant’s failure to understand the severity or nature of the offense, lack of remorse and failure to take responsibility. Id. at 24-25. In challenging his sentence, Appellant merely lists factors that the trial court should have weighed differently and does not clearly articulate a substantial question by tying specific factors to any fundamental norm underlying our sentencing scheme.8 Based on our review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question. Accordingly, he has failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. We, thus, affirm the judgment of sentence. ____________________________________________ 8 Compare Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[W]e have held that a claim that a court did not weigh the factors as an appellant wishes does not raise a substantial question.”), with Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020) (where sentencing court imposed an aggravated-range sentence, appellant “raise[d] a substantial question by asserting the sentencing court relied on an impermissible factor and ignored mitigating evidence”), and Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 (holding en banc that appellant’s “challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs upon fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial question”). -8- J-S24028-26 Judgment of sentence affirmed. DATE: 10/29/2026 -9-