Com. v. Piper, R.

J-A22012-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RENEE LYNN PIPER : : Appellant : No. 1394 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-05-CR-0000139-2024 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: October 30, 2026 Renee Lynn Piper appeals from the judgment of sentence of ninety months to forty years of imprisonment, followed by twelve months of re-entry supervision, imposed after she entered an open plea of nolo contendere to twenty counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, twenty counts of cruelty to animals, and ten counts of failure to keep a dog license. We affirm. On December 31, 2023, the Pennsylvania State Police responded to the Bedford Township residence owned by Appellant and her husband, Nyal Barton Piper (“co-defendant”) to conduct a welfare check on animals believed to be inside. Troopers observed that the couple were dirty and covered in feces, as were multiple dogs in the backyard, one of which had an open wound on its ears. After obtaining consent to search, troopers found the house in a deplorable condition. The floors were covered in feces, cages holding the J-A22012-26 animals were stacked three high throughout the residence, and no clean food or water was provided or accessible to the animals. Volunteers from the Bedford County Humane Society, as well as volunteers from other local shelters, removed ninety dogs, eight cats, and a tortoise from the home.1 Four dogs had to be euthanized at the scene, and a fifth was euthanized the following day. Many of the surviving animals required veterinary procedures, including dental extractions, treatment for severe skin infections and sores, and surgery for infected wounds. Only nine of the dogs were licensed. See N.T. Plea, 6/17/25, at 11-13. The Commonwealth charged Appellant and co-defendant with nearly 500 offenses. On June 17, 2025, the day scheduled for jury selection, Appellant entered an open plea of nolo contendere to the charges enumerated above, with the remaining charges to be nolle prossed.2 The parties agreed that each of the forty cruelty counts corresponded to a separate animal. Id. at 16-17. During the colloquy, the court explained that a nolo contendere plea meant that Appellant was “not agreeing with what the Commonwealth says happened in the case factually,” but was agreeing that, “if a jury were to ____________________________________________ 1 Kathy Ramsey, the manager of the Bedford County Humane Society, testified at sentencing that their agency removed ninety-four dogs. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 17. 2 Co-defendant entered an identical plea at the same proceeding. His separate appeal from his judgment of sentence, docketed at 1396 WDA 2025, is addressed in a separate memorandum. -2- J-A22012-26 believe all of the allegations in the case and the evidence, that they could convict [her] of those counts.” Id. at 3. The court further advised Appellant that each felony count of aggravated cruelty carried a maximum of seven years of imprisonment, that the sentences could be imposed consecutively, and that sentencing was open to the court’s discretion. Id. at 3-5. The court accepted the plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. The court imposed its sentence on Appellant on September 26, 2025. In fashioning the sentence, the court considered the PSI report, sentencing memoranda from all parties with exhibits, the Commonwealth’s photographs and videos of the residence and the animals, letters from rescuers, volunteers, and adoptive owners, and the report of the defense expert, Wayne D’Agaro, Psy.D. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of a representative of the Bedford County Humane Society, Kathy Ramsey, and Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. D’Agaro and her mother, Mary Ann Hazen. Appellant also exercised her right of allocution. Ms. Ramsey of the Bedford County Humane Society described the rescue, the condition of the animals, the five dogs that had to be euthanized, and the burden borne by the shelter, its staff, and the community. See N.T. Sentencing 9/26/25 at 15-22. The Commonwealth requested consecutive sentences at the top of the standard range to the aggravated range because each count represented an individual animal. Id. at 23-24. -3- J-A22012-26 Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. D’Agaro, who evaluated her and found no cognitive impairment, but identified severe depression and anxiety. Id. at 35. He described several subtypes of animal hoarding, including the “overwhelmed caregiver,” who attempts to care for animals but becomes overwhelmed psychologically and financially, and the more culpable “exploiter” and “breeder” hoarders, who lack empathy for the animals. Id. at 37-38. He placed Appellant in the overwhelmed-caregiver subtype. Id. at 37. On cross-examination and in response to the court’s questions, Dr. D’Agaro acknowledged that his opinions were based solely on his interviews with Appellant and information supplied by counsel, and conceded that he had not reviewed the photographs or videos of the home, information about the couple’s retirement benefits or financial assets, or any statement from Appellant’s ninety-two-year-old mother, Ms. Hazen, whom Appellant cared for daily. Id. at 43-46, 50-53. In her allocution, Appellant apologized for the time and expense her “hoarding” had caused and stated that she never intentionally harmed an animal. Id. at 48-50. During argument, counsel emphasized Appellant’s education, career with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), lack of a criminal record, mental-health conditions, and role as her mother’s caregiver, and stressed that she had taken responsibility by pleading rather than proceeding to trial. Id. at 53-62. -4- J-A22012-26 The court then explained the reasons for its sentence at length. Id. at 67-96. It recounted its review of the entire record, which it had read “at least three to five times,” and described the photographs as “some of the most extreme” it had seen in approximately twenty years as a prosecutor and judge. Id. at 68-69. The court rejected Dr. D’Agaro’s overwhelmed-caregiver opinion as resting on an incomplete factual basis and found that Appellant was “more closely aligned with an exploiter hoarder.” Id. at 81-88. After addressing the gravity of the offenses, the protection of the public, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, the court imposed the following sentence. On the five counts of aggravated cruelty that corresponded to the five animals that had to be euthanized, the court imposed aggravated-range sentences of six to twenty-four months of imprisonment. On each of the remaining fifteen counts, it imposed four to twenty-four months of imprisonment, which was at the top of the standard range. All twenty sentences were set to run consecutively. The aggregate sentence was ninety months to forty years of imprisonment, followed by twelve months of re-entry supervision.3 ____________________________________________ 3 The court also found Appellant eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) program and, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5555, prohibited her from owning, possessing, or caring for animals for forty years. See Sentencing Order, 9/26/25, at ¶¶ 2, 7. It declined the Commonwealth’s request for restitution to the rescue organizations, a ruling that is not at issue in this appeal. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 9-13. The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that her sentences merged, because each count represented a separate animal. Id. at 8-9. -5- J-A22012-26 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied, and a timely notice of appeal. She complied with the court’s order to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that its reasons for the sentence were fully set forth on the record at the sentencing hearing and referred this Court to the transcript. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/7/26, at 1. Appellant presents the following issues for our review: I. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive aggregate sentence of ninety months to forty years through the consecutive imposition of twenty felony sentences where Appellant, a [sixty-four]-year-old with no prior criminal history, over [fifteen] years of distinguished public service working for the FBI, had a prior record score of zero, extensive mitigating evidence was presented, and the resulting aggregate sentence was clearly unreasonable under 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(b) and 9781(c)? II. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by substituting its own adverse psychological classification that Appellant was an "exploiter hoarder" for unrebutted expert testimony diagnosing Appellant as an overwhelmed caregiver suffering from animal-hoarding disorder? Appellant’s brief at 8 (cleaned up).4 ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant’s brief also includes a third question, which asserts that the court improperly assigned aggravating weight to her refusal to admit the Commonwealth’s factual allegations after entering a nolo contedere a plea. As we explain below, that issue was not preserved and is therefore waived. -6- J-A22012-26 Each of Appellant’s claims implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing.5 We begin our review mindful of the following legal principles. “An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 762–63 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (cleaned up). Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the following four factors: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Id. at 763 (cleaned up). A substantial question is raised when an appellant sets forth a colorable argument that his sentence is either: “(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). In addressing whether an appellant has presented a substantial question, “[o]ur inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying ____________________________________________ 5 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised additional challenges, including that the court deviated from the guidelines without sufficient justification. Since Appellant has not included or developed those claims in her brief, we do not address them. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009). -7- J-A22012-26 the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). To determine whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, our review is confined to the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement and the statement of questions presented. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[A] court may look to both Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement and statement of questions presented to determine if substantial questions are raised[.]” (citation omitted)). Here, Appellant timely appealed and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief. She preserved her first two sentencing challenges in her post- sentence motion. However, she did not raise her third issue, which challenges the court’s comments regarding her nolo contendere plea, at the sentencing hearing or in her post-sentence motion. Therefore, the issue is waived and we will not review it. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” (cleaned up)); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). We therefore consider whether Appellant’s two preserved issues raise substantial questions, which the Commonwealth maintains they do not. See Commonwealth’s brief at 4. -8- J-A22012-26 The Commonwealth is correct that a bald challenge to the court’s exercise of its discretion to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences and that a claim that the court failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors does not, standing alone, raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. DiSalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013). However, Appellant’s claims are not so limited. Considered together, as Appellant presents them, they allege that the consecutive imposition of twenty felony sentences produced an aggregate sentence that is clearly unreasonable and not individualized in light of her age, lack of criminal history, career in public service, and rehabilitative needs. She also contends that the court relied upon a characterization of her culpability that lacked support in the record. See Appellant’s brief at 14-16. These claims present substantial questions for our review. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (explaining that the imposition of consecutive sentences presents a substantial question where “the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment” (cleaned up)). See also Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that a claim that the sentencing court relied upon impermissible factors raises a substantial question). We therefore proceed to the merits. -9- J-A22012-26 The following principles govern our review of Appellant’s challenges: To prevail, Appellant must demonstrate that the sentencing court abused its discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, Appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Solomon, 247 A.3d 1163, 1168 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). Where, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report, “it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 303 A.3d 1058, 1065 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). “We cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.” Macias, 968 A.2d at 778. While it is broad, “the trial court’s discretion is not unfettered.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa.Super. 2011). The sentence imposed “should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). A sentencing court must weigh the specific facts of the offense alongside the defendant’s character, looking to factors such as criminal history, age, individual traits, and prospects for - 10 - J-A22012-26 rehabilitation. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa.Super. 2022). Furthermore, “the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Where, as here, each individual sentence falls within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, we may vacate only if “the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). In making that assessment, we consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any PSI report, the findings upon which the sentence was based, and the sentencing guidelines. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). An unreasonable sentence is one that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. 2007). Our deference to the sentencing court reflects that it “is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it,” as it “can accord the proper weight to the defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.” Id. at 961 (cleaned up). Mindful of these principles, we turn to Appellant’s first issue. - 11 - J-A22012-26 Appellant argues that, by running twenty felony sentences consecutively, the court transformed guideline sentences measured in months into an aggregate sentence that exposes a sixty-four-year-old first offender with a distinguished career at the FBI to decades of state control. She emphasizes that the court acknowledged that protection of the public was not a primary concern and separately barred her from possessing animals for forty years, and she points to the court’s comment that “the best case scenario for these types of cases is not to put people in jail.” Appellant’s brief at 16-25. Appellant reads this observation as a sign that the court did not believe incarceration was appropriate for animal abuse. It does not bear that interpretation. The court’s next words were: “[i]t’s that, the animals don’t get abused in the first place.” N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 93. It proffered this sentiment in urging the community to recognize and respond to the early signs of animal hoarding and to draw something positive from the case. It was not expressing doubt about the sentence it was about to impose. Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. At the outset, we note that the court had the benefit of a PSI report, which was expressly reviewed along with the sentencing memoranda, Dr. D’Agaro’s report and testimony, Appellant’s written statement, and the letters submitted on her behalf. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 2-5, 67-68, 76-85. We therefore presume that the court was aware of and weighed the mitigating circumstances Appellant highlights, including her age, health, lack of a - 12 - J-A22012-26 criminal record, career, and caregiving responsibilities. See Torres, 303 A.3d at 1065. Indeed, Appellant does not dispute that the court considered this information. See Appellant’s brief at 21, 23. Her disagreement is with the weight the court assigned to it, which, as noted above, does not raise a substantial question. See DiSalvo, 70 A.3d at 903. The record further confirms that the court applied each of the considerations required by § 9721(b). Regarding the gravity of the offenses, the court described in detail the conditions depicted in the photographs and videos: rusted, corroded cages stacked atop one another; floors entirely covered in feces, urine, and hair; excrement on the walls and ceilings; a dog standing in feces deep enough to cover its paws; and the carcasses of two dogs and a pig, one of them left in a kennel with living dogs and so decomposed that the court could not tell “where the dog carcass ends and the floor begins.” N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 68-71. It found that the accumulation reflected neglect over a long period of time, and it reviewed the accounts of rescuers and adoptive owners describing similarly situated dogs that could not walk, play, or pass through a doorway after significant time spent confined in crates. Id. at 69-76. The court also considered the substantial impact on the community, including the shelter staff, volunteers, and organizations that absorbed the rescue and rehabilitation of nearly one hundred animals. Id. at 71-76, 92-93. It concluded that this was “an extreme case” of animal abuse. Id. at 90. - 13 - J-A22012-26 The court did not ignore the remaining § 9721(b) considerations. It acknowledged that protection of the public was not “a critical consideration” and that the primary future risk was that the defendants might again possess animals. Id. at 91. As to rehabilitative needs, the court expressly recognized that Appellant “[is] advanced in age” and has medical needs, but found those needs to be normal for her age and better met in a state correctional setting than by county resources. Id. The court also considered what it found to be Appellant’s lack of genuine remorse and appreciation for the harm she caused, and it remarked that it did not impose the sentence “with any type of celebration” or “take joy in the fact of incarcerating anyone [her] age.” Id. at 91-92. The court thus weighed each of the statutory considerations and explained why the gravity of the offenses warranted a significant term of incarceration notwithstanding Appellant’s age and the limited risk Appellant posed to the public. Appellant’s reliance on the court’s acknowledgment that public protection was not a critical concern is misplaced. Section 9721(b) directs the court to fashion a sentence consistent with protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the victim and the community, and the defendant’s rehabilitative needs. The court’s candid recognition that one factor weighed less heavily here demonstrates that it considered all three, not that it failed to individualize the sentence. - 14 - J-A22012-26 Nor are we persuaded that the consecutive structure of the sentence rendered it clearly unreasonable. The key inquiry is “whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). Each of the twenty felony counts represented a different animal subjected to the conditions described above, as Appellant agreed when entering the plea. See N.T. Plea, 6/17/25, at 16-17. None of the individual sentences exceeded the guidelines. With an offense gravity score of eight and a prior record score of zero, the standard-range minimum sentence on each count of aggravated cruelty to animals was one to four months of incarceration, plus or minus three months. See, N.T. Sentencing 9/26/25, at 6. The court imposed sentences at the top of the standard range on fifteen counts. On the remaining five counts, it imposed aggravated range sentences, explaining that those counts corresponded to the five animals that died. The guidelines for the torture variant of aggravated cruelty to animals, to which Appellant pled, do not account for that aggravating circumstance.6 See N.T. ____________________________________________ 6 The aggravated cruelty statute provides that “[a] person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly does any of the following: (1) Tortures an animal. (2) Violates section 5532 (relating to neglect of an animal) or 5533 (relating to cruelty to an animal) causing serious bodily injury to the animal or the death of the animal.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5534(a). Appellant pled to the torture variant set forth in subsection (a)(1), which does not require that the animal die. - 15 - J-A22012-26 Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 95-96. Appellant does not challenge that rationale. Absent circumstances in which the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010). Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for multiple crimes by having all sentences run concurrently. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216 (Pa.Super 2021). In light of the number of animals involved, the prolonged and severe nature of their suffering, and the deaths of five of them, an aggregate minimum of ninety months does not appear excessive on its face. As noted, because the court had the benefit of a PSI report, we presume that it considered the mitigating evidence on which Appellant relies, and our review of the record reveals nothing to rebut that presumption. To the contrary, the court acknowledged her education, her career with the FBI, and her lack of a prior record, and it heard Ms. Hazen’s testimony regarding the care Appellant provided. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 77, 84-85. The court did not find that evidence sufficiently mitigating to warrant a lesser sentence. Indeed, it found that Appellant’s ability to attend to all of Ms. Hazen’s daily needs demonstrated that she was capable of caring for the animals in her custody. Id. at 84-85. Appellant’s lack of a prior record, - 16 - J-A22012-26 moreover, was already reflected in her prior record score of zero, upon which the guideline ranges were calculated. Id. at 6. In sum, the court considered the circumstances of the offenses, Appellant’s character, her lack of a prior record, her age and health, and her rehabilitative needs, and it placed on the record its reasons for the sentence imposed. That the court weighed these considerations differently than Appellant would have preferred does not render the sentence clearly unreasonable, as we cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court. See Macias, 968 A.2d at 778. We discern no abuse of discretion. In her second issue, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by rejecting Dr. D’Agaro’s unrebutted opinion that she was an overwhelmed caregiver and substituting its own psychological classification that she was more closely aligned with an exploiter hoarder. She concedes that the court was free to determine the weight and credibility of Dr. D’Agaro’s testimony and was not required to accept it. See Appellant’s brief at 26. She maintains, however, that the court did not merely reject that testimony, but transformed an unsupported classification into an aggravating factor that increased her perceived blameworthiness and permeated the court’s sentencing rationale. Id. at 26-30. We disagree. The principle that the factual basis for a sentence must be supported by the record was not violated here. The court did not purport - 17 - J-A22012-26 to render a psychological diagnosis. To the contrary, it acknowledged, “I’m not a doctor, so I can’t diagnose [Appellant] as [an] exploiter hoarder[],” and it concluded only that the Appellant was “closer to” and “more closely aligned with” that subtype than with the overwhelmed-caregiver subtype. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 84, 88. The framework the court used was Dr. D’Agaro’s own. Dr. D’Agaro described the overwhelmed caregiver as someone with a strong attachment to the animals who wants to provide proper care but lacks the financial resources or emotional capacity to do so, and he distinguished the exploiter and breeder subtypes by their lack of empathy for the animals. Id. at 36-38, 79-80. Having accepted that framework, the court permissibly assessed which description better fit the evidence before it. Commonwealth v. Moye, 224 A.3d 48, 56 (Pa.Super 2019) (holding that appellate courts defer to credibility determinations and findings of fact made by the sentencing court, as long as they are supported by competent evidence). In doing so, the court explained that Dr. D’Agaro’s opinion was “faulty” because it rested on an incomplete and inaccurate factual foundation. Dr. D’Agaro admitted that he relied solely on his interviews with Appellant and co-defendant and information from their counsel, and that he had not reviewed the photographs, the videos, their finances, or the statements of Ms. Hazen. Id. at 43-46, 81. The court then identified record evidence that undermined the premise of the overwhelmed-caregiver opinion. First, the PSI - 18 - J-A22012-26 reports showed that the couple received more than $7,000 per month in combined retirement benefits, Appellant continued to work as an attorney until her arrest, and both defendants posted $250,000 bonds shortly after their arrest, which contradicted Dr. D’Agaro’s contention that they lacked the financial means to care for the animals. Id. at 77, 81, 83, 86, 88-89. Second, the letters submitted on Appellant’s behalf established that Appellant managed all of Ms. Hazen’s daily needs, cooking, cleaning, and handling her medications and appointments, demonstrating that she had the physical capacity to care for other living things. Id. at 84-86. Third, the letters from adoptive owners established that many of the animals were young and desirable breeds, some as young as six months old, which undercut the claim that the couple had taken in older animals that would otherwise have been euthanized. Id. at 72-76, 82. Fourth, the photographs showed that Appellant had not taken even minimal steps to ameliorate the conditions, such as removing a dog carcass from a kennel where living dogs were kept, and that the conditions had accumulated over a long period. Id. at 69-70, 88-89. Finally, the court found no genuine remorse or appreciation for the harm caused, noting that Appellant’s written statement focused almost entirely on her own accomplishments and said little or nothing about the animals or the volunteers who rescued them. Id. at 77-78, 85, 87-88. From this evidence, the court inferred that Appellant “had both the physical ability and the financial ability to do something and [she] didn’t,” and - 19 - J-A22012-26 that the animals had been kept for her own purposes rather than as rescues. Id. at 88-89. Those findings are grounded in the record, and they were corroborated by Kathy Ramsey’s testimony that the ages of the dogs demonstrated that “this was not two people who were overwhelmed.” Id. at 19. The court’s conclusion that Appellant was more culpable than the overwhelmed caregiver described by the defense expert was therefore not an unsupported assumption, but a reasonable inference drawn from record evidence, which the sentencing court is uniquely positioned to make. See Walls, 926 A.2d at 961. Appellant’s argument that the court could reject Dr. D’Agaro’s opinion, but could not make contrary findings would, in effect, require the court to accept an expert’s factual premises even after finding them contradicted by the record. The law imposes no such requirement. At bottom, because the record supports the court’s assessment of Appellant’s culpability, we will not disturb it. Finally, we note that the court’s assessment of Appellant’s culpability did not dictate the structure of the sentence in the manner Appellant suggests. The court imposed aggravated-range sentences only on the five counts corresponding to the animals that died, for reasons unrelated to its rejection of Dr. D’Agaro’s overwhelmed-caregiver opinion, and it imposed standard- range sentences on the remaining fifteen felony counts. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 95-96. Assessing a defendant’s culpability and character is a core function of the sentencing court, and the court properly considered them here. - 20 - J-A22012-26 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); Taylor, 277 A.3d at 593. Appellant’s second issue merits no relief. In sum, the court considered all necessary sentencing factors and properly placed the reasons for the sentence on the record, and our review of Appellant’s claims reveals no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. DATE: 10/30/2026 - 21 -