Com. v. Greer, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2766 EDA 2025
JudgeOlson
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JULIUS GREER :
:
Appellant : No. 2766 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008283-2023
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Appellant, Julius Greer, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
July 15, 2025 in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County, as made
final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on October 24, 2025. We
affirm.
Appellant entered open guilty pleas on November 12, 2024 to
aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), contempt for violation of a
protection from abuse order, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114, and possessing
instruments of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907. During the plea colloquy, the
Commonwealth placed the following facts on the record as the basis for
Appellant’s guilty pleas:
[The victim] would have testified that she and [Appellant] are
common law married, and that in November -- on November 18,
2022, she took out a [three-year] protection from abuse order
against [Appellant]. [The victim] would have testified that on
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[January] 11, 2023, she was going to pick up her children [along]
West Luzerne Street in Philadelphia. She was going to pick up her
kids from their father's home which is not [Appellant]. As she got
in the neighborhood she noticed that [Appellant’s] car was driving
around, and she became nervous that [Appellant] might be
present in the neighborhood. … [S]he is walking down the street,
[Appellant] approaches her. He turns the corner [at] West Luzerne
Street. He turns the corner and he has maybe a two-second
conversation with the complainant, and then he takes a knife and
stabs her in the chest. He stabs her -- it is in her left chest, her
right neck. And as she turns to run away, he stabs her in the back.
He then flees after he stabs her. And she runs in the opposite
direction. …
She is admitted to Temple Hospital on that same day, January 11,
2023. She is treated for trauma to her esophagus. There is a hole
in her esophagus that needs to be repaired from surgery. She is
also treated for thyroid rupture, and she is treated for injury to
her chest and her back. She is in the hospital from January 11,
2023, until January 25, 2023. She is then readmitted again on
January 28, 2023, until February 1, 2023. She had to have her
esophagus repaired and a flap put in, which she will have to have
reevaluated by surgeons for the rest of her life.
N.T., 11/12/2025, at 35-38.
On March 14, 2025, Appellant received concurrent sentences of 10 to
20 years’ incarceration for aggravated assault and two and one-half to five
years’ incarceration for possessing instruments of crime. N.T., 3/14/2025, at
51-53. He received no further penalty for contempt. Id. Appellant’s
aggregate sentence was 10 to 20 years. Appellant filed a post-sentence
motion on March 24, 2025, challenging the calculation of his prior record
score. The sentencing court granted Appellant’s motion and vacated his
sentence on April 14, 2025. On July 15, 2025, Appellant was resentenced to
eight to 20 years’ incarceration for aggravated assault, one to two years’
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incarceration for possessing instruments of crime, and no further penalty for
contempt. His sentences ran concurrently, for an aggregate of eight to 20
years’ incarceration.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on July 25, 2025, challenging his
newly-imposed sentence as excessive due to improper application of the
sentencing guidelines, failure to state adequate reasons supporting the
sentence, and failure to adequately examine Appellant’s background,
character, and rehabilitative needs. Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion at 2-3;
see also Appellant’s Supplemental Post-Sentence Motion at 1. The
sentencing court denied Appellant’s motion on October 24, 2025, making his
July 15, 2025 judgment of sentence final. This appeal followed. 1
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in applying two
sentence enhancements stemming from the same factor in
violation of 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(a)(3)(ii)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by incorporating the
presentence investigation report at sentencing without
addressing allegations of inaccuracies contained therein and by
failing to either make factual findings or supplement the record
with accurate evidence, thus failing to consider all required
statutory factors at sentencing?
Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant’s challenges go to the discretionary aspects
of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa.
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1 Appellant filed his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on November 21, 2025. The sentencing court
followed, on December 15, 2025, with its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).
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Super. 2010) (“Because [Appellant] claims that his sentence is excessive, he
does not challenge its legality; rather, he challenges its discretionary
aspects.”); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 305 A.3d 961, *2 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision) (“This Court has held that a challenge to the
application of the [deadly weapon enhancement] implicates the discretionary
aspects of sentencing.”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Bynum, 362
A.3d 802, *2 (Pa. Super. 2026) (non-precedential decision) (“claim that court
failed to consider [sentencing factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)]
pertain[s] to discretionary aspects of sentencing”) (citations omitted).
There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a
sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). To permit a discretionary sentencing
challenge to proceed, we must determine whether Appellant has satisfied the
following four-part test: 1) whether Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal;
2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence; 3) whether Appellant’s brief contains a fatal
defect; and 4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. See
Commonwealth v. Kearns, 332 A.3d 1267, *12 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(non-precedential decision), citing Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11
(Pa. Super. 2007). As detailed above, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
and properly preserved the issues in a timely post-sentence motion. See
Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. Additionally, Appellant’s brief complies
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with the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and is therefore free from any fatal
defect.
To raise a substantial question, an appellant must advance “a plausible
argument that his sentence is either inconsistent with a particular provision of
the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the
sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 622 (Pa.
2002) (citations omitted). To determine whether a claim raises a substantial
question, this Court only considers Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement of
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. Id. at 621-622. Appellant first
raises a claim that the sentencing court miscalculated his sentencing
guidelines range. “A claim that the sentencing court misapplied the
sentencing guidelines presents a substantial question.” Cook, 941 A.2d at
11; see also Rhoades, 8 A.3d at 916 (collecting cases which conclude that
the application of the deadly weapon enhancement presents a substantial
question). Appellant’s first issue therefore raises a substantial question.
Appellant also claims that the sentencing court abused its discretion in
failing to address his assertion that the presentence investigation report (PSI)
contained inaccuracies. As a result, according to Appellant, the record was
unclear as to what information in the PSI was accepted as true and what
information the trial court relied upon in fixing Appellant’s sentence. See
Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant therefore reasons that the record does not
establish that the sentencing court relied upon accurate information or
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considered the relevant statutory factors as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b). “Failure to consider the statutory factors [laid out in Section
9721(b) as the sentencing court did here], raises a substantial question.”
Appellant’s Brief at 12, citing Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786
(Pa. Super. 2012).
“[P]rior decisions from this Court [addressing] whether a substantial
question has been raised by claims [asserting] that the sentencing court ‘failed
to consider’ or ‘failed to adequately consider’ sentencing factors [have] been
less than a model of clarity and consistency.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 323
A.3d 26, 30 (Pa. Super. 2026). There is consensus, however, that a
substantial question will be found where such claims are raised in conjunction
with a general allegation of excessiveness or excessiveness owing to the
imposition of consecutive sentences. See id. Though Appellant’s Rule 2119(f)
statement failed to link its sentencing factors argument to the imposition of
an excessive sentence, his argument uses the required language. Appellant
alleges that the imposition of a statutory maximum sentence was excessive
because the sentencing court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors,
particularly those that favored mitigation. See Appellant’s Brief at 28. Since
Appellant has asserted that his punishment fails to comply with a provision of
the Sentencing Code, we conclude that he has raised a substantial question.
We therefore move to the merits of Appellant’s claims.
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Review of sentencing decisions proceeds according to the following
standard:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the [trial
court], and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of
discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
[trial] court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment
for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill[-]will, or arrived
at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Appellant’s first issue is that the sentencing guidelines calculation for his
aggravated assault charge counted the same sentencing factor twice. See
Appellant’s Brief at 14. The improper application of the sentencing guidelines
raises a mixed question of law and fact. Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d
410, 435-436 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). This Court examines the
sentencing court’s legal conclusions according to a de novo standard and
plenary scope of review. Commonwealth v. Troell, 290 A.3d 296, 299 (Pa.
Super. 2023) (citation omitted). However, we defer to the sentencing court’s
factual findings as long as they are supported by competent evidence. Batts,
163 A.3d 410 at 436.
“When a court sentences a criminal defendant convicted of a felony
and/or misdemeanor, the Guidelines require calculation of both the
defendant's offense gravity score and prior record score to arrive at a
recommended sentencing range.” Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128 A.3d
234, 242 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania Sentencing
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Guidelines assign every crime an offense gravity score. 204 Pa.Code
§ 303.3(a). Certain offenses are subcategorized; they are assigned multiple
offense gravity scores based on additional sentencing factors. 204 Pa.Code
§ 303.3(a)(b). Aggravated assault is a subcategorized offense, see 204
Pa.Code § 303.15; thus, the offense gravity score for aggravated assault
depends, inter alia, on whether severe bodily injury was attempted or caused.
Id. Where severe bodily injury was caused, such as here, the offense gravity
score is 11. Id.
Using the sentencing matrix, the offense gravity score is matched with
the appropriate prior record score (calculated based on the individual’s
criminal history) to obtain a sentencing range. An offense gravity score of 11,
alongside Appellant’s prior record score of four, 2 generates a sentencing range
of 60 to 78 months’ incarceration. If, however, the sentencing court finds that
other relevant enhancements apply, then the correct sentencing range may
be increased further. See 204 Pa.Code § 303.10. One of these enhancements
is the deadly weapon enhancement. If an individual is found by the sentencing
court to have used a deadly weapon in the commission of their offense, the
sentencing range is calculated with a different sentencing matrix. Id. Using
that matrix, the same offense gravity score of 11 and prior record score of
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2 Appellant and the Commonwealth agreed on Appellant’s prior record score
at resentencing. N.T., 7/15/2025, at 32. Appellant does not challenge it on
appeal.
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four yields a sentencing range of 78 to 96 months’ incarceration. See 204
Pa.Code § 303.18.
Appellant argues that the sentencing court relied on the same factor in
subcategorizing his offense as it did in applying the deadly weapons
enhancement. Appellant’s Brief at 15. To support his claim, Appellant points
to Section 303.9(a)(3)(ii)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which forbids use
of the deadly weapon enhancement “if the enhancement factor is . . . a
sentencing factor used to subcategorize the offense, pursuant to [Section]
303.3(b).” 204 Pa.Code § 303.9(a)(3)(ii)(B). Appellant reasons that the use
of a knife was the basis on which both the deadly weapon enhancement and
the subcategorization into “severe bodily injury caused” were predicated. As
such, according to Appellant, the sentencing court misapplied the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Contrary to Appellant’s contention, however, only the application of the
deadly weapon enhancement was based on Appellant’s use of a knife. The
trial court applied the subcategorization enhancement for Appellant’s
aggravated assault conviction because of the precise harm inflicted upon the
victim - namely, severe bodily injury. This factor does not mention the means
used to inflict injury. Instead, the relevant factor is the injury itself. As a
result, the application of the deadly weapon enhancement was not based on
the same enhancement factor used to subcategorize Appellant’s offense. The
sentencing court correctly calculated Appellant’s sentence under the
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Sentencing Guidelines and did not err as a matter of law or abuse its
discretion.
Next, Appellant challenges the sentencing court’s failure to consider all
of the statutory sentencing factors. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant first
challenges the sentencing court’s use of the PSI and argues that, in light of
allegations that it contained inaccuracies, the court was required to make
factual findings stating which portions of the PSI it accepted and which it did
not. Id. at 24-25. In the absence of those findings, Appellant reasons, it
remains unclear which facts the sentencing court relied upon and, therefore,
which sentencing factors it considered. Id. at 26-27. This allowed the
sentencing court, according to Appellant, to impose an excessive sentence.
Id. at 28.
According to this Court:
The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the
sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the
defendant and all witnesses firsthand. In conducting appellate
review, this Court cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose
judgment in place of the sentencing court where the lower court
was fully aware of all mitigating factors.
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(internal citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
omitted) (“The sentencing court merely chose not to give the mitigating
factors as much weight as Appellant would have liked and decided that the
facts did not warrant imposition of a sentence lower than the standard range.
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We cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the
place of the sentencing court.”). On appellate review, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). Moreover, when a defendant is sentenced within the
standard sentencing guidelines range for each offense, this Court shall vacate
the sentence only in “circumstances where the application of the guidelines
would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). In imposing
sentence, the sentencing court must weigh “the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and
on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
Here, Appellant’s minimum sentence of eight years was within the
standard guidelines range of six and one half to eight years. 204 Pa.Code
§ 303.15. As such, vacatur is only permissible where the sentence was clearly
unreasonable. Appellant’s sentence, however, is not clearly unreasonable; it
was imposed pursuant to an on-the-record weighing of all required sentencing
factors and the sentencing court had ample opportunity to observe Appellant
and considered only undisputed facts.
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The sentencing court stated, several times, that it had not relied at
sentencing, and would not rely at resentencing, on the disputed PSI. N.T.,
7/15/2025, at 9, 23-24.3 The sentencing court also made numerous findings
regarding the credibility of the information in the mitigation report submitted
by trial counsel and the mitigation testimony presented at sentencing. For
example, the sentencing court indicated skepticism regarding the mitigating
factor of substance abuse because Appellant never voluntarily sought
assistance. Id. at 17, 19-20. It expressed a similar skepticism with regard
to Appellant’s childhood trauma and mental illness. Id. at 20. The sentencing
court questioned the veracity of statements documenting Appellant’s work
history. Id. at 16, 51-52. Moreover, it concluded that Appellant’s work
history, truthful or not, was insufficient to alleviate its concerns about
protecting the public. Id. at 53.
In making its credibility determination and weighing the evidence, the
sentencing court made it abundantly clear that it relied upon its own
impression of Appellant, obtained through its observations of him throughout
the proceedings and from his numerous violations of the PFA. Id. at 56. Its
disregard for the presented mitigation factors was not a refusal to consider
those factors, as Appellant argues, but a determination that they did not
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3 However, the sentencing court did use the PSI for the prior record score and
Appellant’s past convictions, see N.T., 7/15/2025, at 24, neither of which
Appellant alleged were inaccurate. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.
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outweigh the aggravating factors. The sentencing court noted a pattern of
control and power over the victim, the violent nature of the attacks on the
victim, the repeated violations of the PFA, and daily violations of its no contact
order. Sentencing Court Opinion, 7/15/2025, at 21. These concerns reflect
its consideration of the requisite sentencing factors—protection of the public,
impact on the victim, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b). As discussed above, the sentencing court’s assessment of relevant
sentencing factors should not be disturbed on appellate review. See
Lawrence, 313 A.3d at 286. As long as the sentencing court was aware of
the relevant information regarding mitigating factors, which the record
conclusively establishes it was, we can discern no abuse of discretion in the
sentence imposed.
In sum, we conclude that the sentencing court correctly construed and
applied the sentencing guidelines, made well-supported findings of fact, and
properly considered all relevant statutory sentencing factors. Because the
sentencing court relied on Appellant’s uncontested history of repeated and
escalating patterns of violence directed toward the victim, the court did not
abuse its discretion in weighing the protection of society and the impact of the
offense on the victim more heavily than Appellant’s need for, and amenability
to, rehabilitation. Appellant received a standard-range sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines. Hence, his punishment was not clearly
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unreasonable. As such, we perceive no reason to disturb the sentencing
court’s determination.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/18/2026
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