Full Opinion

J-S36018-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANIEL K. WALTON : : Appellant : No. 117 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002631-2024 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Daniel K. Walton (“Walton”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury convictions for rape1 and related offenses. We affirm in part and vacate in part. We summarize the evidence presented at trial. In September 2023, Walton’s daughter, D.W., then sixteen years old, reported to her youth group counselor that her father had sex with her and took explicit pictures of her with his phone. At the time of the incidents, D.W. lived with her grandmother but visited her parents and siblings at her parents’ home. The counselor made ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1). J-S36018-26 a child-line report. The police initiated an investigation and obtained a warrant to search Walton’s cell phone. The York County’s Children Advocacy Center (“CAC”) conducted two forensic interviews of D.W. D.W. provided detailed accounts that: Walton engaged in vaginal intercourse with her multiple times during the summer of 2023; and he forced her to perform oral sex on him and to pose for explicit photographs. Police discovered photographs on Walton’s phone consistent with D.W.’s interview. The Commonwealth charged Walton with rape and related offenses. The trial court summarized: A [jury] trial was held on August 18-22, 2025. [D.W.] testified extensively in both direct and cross examination with regard to the incidents supporting the charges. The Commonwealth also presented evidence from [the youth group counselor] to whom [D.W.] had originally reported the offenses. Additionally, testimony was given regarding the extraction of the pictures from the cell phone as well as testimony from a forensic interviewer from the CAC. The appropriate portions of the taped interviews from the CAC were shown to the jury. The Commonwealth’s witnesses also included [D.W.’s] grandmother, [as well] as a blind expert regarding victim behavior and delayed reporting. Trial Court Opinion, 3/12/26, at 3. Walton called D.W.’s mother as a witness, who testified that the explicit photographs found on Walton’s phone depicted her, and not D.W. Walton testified in his own defense. He denied sexually abusing D.W. and stated that he loved all his children. He explained that the explicit photographs on his phone depicted D.W.’s mother and not D.W. -2- J-S36018-26 The jury found Walton guilty of all charges: one count each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), sexual assault, incest of a minor, corruption of minors, photographing sexual acts, and possession of child sexual abuse material;2 as well as two counts each of aggravated indecent assault — without the complainant’s consent and forcible compulsion — and indecent assault — without the complainant’s consent and forcible compulsion.3 On December 4, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nineteen years and six months to thirty-nine years’ imprisonment, with “3 years of reentry [sic]” “that’s mandatory.”4 N.T., 12/4/25, at 18 (discussed infra). Walton filed a timely post sentence motion, arguing that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, as D.W.’s testimony was inconsistent. Walton maintained that “the time periods when D.W. stated she was sexually abused by her father were directly contradicted and proven impossible by the work records and youth center records that were entered into evidence.” Post Sentence Motion, 12/12/25, at unnumbered 2. Walton ____________________________________________ 2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(1), 3124.1, 4302(b)(2), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 6312(b)(1), (d). 3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(a)(1), (2), 3126(a)(1), (2). 4 The trial court also ordered Walton to register with the Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75. -3- J-S36018-26 highlighted D.W.’s “acknowledge[ment]” of inconsistencies between her preliminary hearing testimony, forensic interview, and trial testimony. Id. The trial court denied Walton’s motion. Walton timely filed a notice of appeal. Both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Walton raises the following issue on appeal: “Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in rejecting [Walton’s] challenge that the weight of the evidence was against all of his convictions where each depended on the credibility of D.W., her credibility was extremely deficient, and there was no meaningful corroboration?” Walton’s Brief at 4. Walton’s sole issue presents a challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. Preliminary, we note that while the jury found Walton guilty of eleven counts, he fails to identify any offense, let alone discuss any element of any offense, allegedly not sufficiently established by the evidence. We remind counsel that an appellant may waive a weight-of- the-evidence challenge when he fails to identify which “verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence” and fails to “offer a specific reason to support his generalized claim.” Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 75 (Pa. Super. 2020). Furthermore, where an appellant fails to present developed arguments supported with citations to relevant legal authority, this Court may deem his issues waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring argument to set forth “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”); see also Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 326 (Pa. 2011). -4- J-S36018-26 Nevertheless, here we will consider the merits of Walton’s issue. As our Supreme Court has explained: A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.[] An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations and footnote omitted). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, “the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. at 546 (citation omitted). An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court: -5- J-S36018-26 Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and emphasis in original). Additionally, “[t]he testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated” in sexual offense prosecutions. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3106. “It is well settled that even the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may alone be sufficient to convict a defendant.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 335 A.3d 1236, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Walton argues that all his above-mentioned convictions were against the weight of the evidence. He maintains that all his “convictions hinged on D.W.’s version of events and thus her credibility,” but “D.W.’s credibility was badly damaged due to . . . inconsistencies in her accounts[.]” Walton’s Brief at 20. In support, Walton argues that D.W.’s testimony was “unclear, confusing, and sometimes contradictory[,]” and lacked “meaningful corroboration.” Id. at 25. Walton purports that “many of the allegations were also improbable[,]” as he “testified that he had serious mobility issues due to an accident and back problems,” and this casts “doubt on D.W.’s claims, -6- J-S36018-26 particularly that [he] ‘knelt behind her’ during one of the incidents.” Id. at 23-24 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Walton argues that D.W.’s testimony consisted of “many contradictions[,]” specifically related to how many incidents there were, where they occurred, and how they ended. Id. at 22-23. Walton notes that D.W. had “difficulty remembering what she had said on which occasion[,]” and could not “remember what she previously alleged[.]” Id. 24. Walton maintains that there was “neither physical evidence nor any incriminating statement” made by him to corroborate D.W.’s allegations. Id. at 25. Walton also cites his own “explicit[]” denial “on the stand that he did not abuse or photograph D.W. as alleged.” Id. at 26. Therefore, Walton argues that his testimony and that of D.W.’s mother contradicts D.W.’s account in that the photographs on Walton’s phone depicted D.W.’s mother. See id. at 26. Walton maintains that “the jury had little strong reason to believe D.W.’s allegations and many grounds on which to reject them.” Id. at 26-27. The trial court determined that Walton’s weight of the evidence claim was without merit. The trial court found: D.W. was alone with [Walton] and at times physically restrained during the incidents in question. Inconsistencies in the testimony are not unusual in these cases given the age of the child as well as the delay between the charges and the trial. [D.W.’s] testimony was consistent regarding the major details affecting the elements of the crimes charged. . . . Trial Court Opinion, 3/12/26, at 7. -7- J-S36018-26 The trial court then reviewed each offense in this case and cited the relevant evidence establishing the elements of each offense. First, relating to count 1, rape by forcible compulsion, the trial court provided the following definition: A person commits rape if he has sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion or a threat of forcible compulsion that involves the genitalia of at least one person and the genitalia, mouth, or anus of another with some penetration, however slight. A person can commit rape by using or threatening intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force. Id. at 7-8; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1). The trial court found that “D.W.’s testimony as a whole” supported this conviction. Specifically, the court cited the following: [Commonwealth:] And then what was he doing at that point? [D.W.: Walton] was in front of me rubbing his penis along the outer sides of my vagina. Q. What did he do next then? A. He inserted it inside. And from there, I don’t remember what happened. Id. at 8 (citing N.T. 8/18-8/22/25, at 171) (“N.T. 8/18/25”). Second, relating to count 2, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, the trial court provided the following definition: A person engages in deviate sexual intercourse if [their] genitalia penetrates the mouth or anus of a person, or if a person’s tongue penetrates the sexual organ of [another]. Forcible compulsion must be the kind of threat that would have prevented a reasonable person, faced with the same circumstances present here, from resisting. -8- J-S36018-26 Id.; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1). The trial court found that “D.W.’s testimony as a whole” supported this conviction. Specifically, the court cited the following exchange: [Commonwealth:] Okay. And where did [Walton’s] hand go? [D.W.:] Down to my vaginal area. Q. Okay. When his hands went down there, where do you remember them going? A. I don’t really — like, all I know is they went down to my vaginal area. I just felt numb after — Q. Okay. — A. — he started touching. Q. Do you remember, did his hands go on the inside of your labia, the outside of your labia, or something else? A. They started on the outside and then traveled to the inside. Q. When [Walton] was doing this, did he ever ask for permission to touch that part of your body? A. No. No. Q. How did you feel when he was doing this? A. Uneasy. Q. Uneasy. How did you respond when he was touching you? A. I just — shocked. Terrified. Q. Were you able to move when this happened? A. No. Q. Why not? -9- J-S36018-26 A. He had me to the point that I wouldn’t be able to get away. **** A. He had his hand — or, well, his arms, like, wrapped around my stomach pinning me to the ground. Id. at 9 (citing N.T., 8/18/25, at 160-61). The trial court reviewed each of the remaining offenses in a similar manner, first by setting forth the statutory elements and then citing the particular testimony by D.W. that established each element. See id. at 9-15. As noted above, Walton does not refer to any of his offenses in his argument, let alone address any particular element. Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Walton’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. Here, Walton asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and discredit D.W.’s testimony based upon his allegation that “D.W.’s credibility was badly damaged due to improbabilities and inconsistencies in her accounts[.]” Walton’s Brief at 20. This we cannot do. See Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545 (holding that the weight to be accorded to the evidence and testimony presented at trial was exclusively for the fact-finder, which was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and testimony and to determine credibility). Further, even the uncorroborated testimony of D.W. alone was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if believed by the jury. See Beatty, 335 A.3d at 1243. As explained above, this Court will give the gravest consideration to the trial court’s findings and reasons when reviewing its determination as to whether the verdict is against the weight of - 10 - J-S36018-26 the evidence. See Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Moreover, one of the least assailable reasons for denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. See id. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Walton’s challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions for rape and related offenses. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 752 (instructing that “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony”); see also Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545. Accordingly, we hold that Walton’s sole issue is meritless. At this juncture, we sua sponte consider the legality of the trial court’s imposition of three years’ “reentry [sic]” on the count of possession of child sexual abuse material. N.T., 12/4/25, at 18; see also Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 673 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that “[t]he legality of a criminal sentence is non-waivable, and this Court may raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte”); Commonwealth v. Wykoff, 297 A.3d 752 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum at 9 n.6) (construing the claim, “that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered one-year reentry supervision at each trial court docket,” to implicate the legality of a sentence).5 “[T]he legality of a sentence presents a pure question of a law,” ____________________________________________ 5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (providing that an unpublished non- precedential memorandum decision of the Superior Court, filed after May 1, 2019, “may be cited for [its] persuasive value”). - 11 - J-S36018-26 and thus “our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.” Derrickson, 242 A.3d at 673. When reviewing issues of statutory construction, our standard of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005). We note that Section 6137.2 of the Prisons and Parole Code 6 sets forth the mandatory imposition of twelve months’ “reentry supervision,” consecutive to any “aggregate minimum sentence of” four years’ total confinement. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2(a)-(b). The statute provides, however, that it does not apply to anyone “subject to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2(a). Section 9718.5 of the Sentencing Code,7 in turn, provides: Mandatory period of probation for certain sexual offenders. (a) Mandatory probation supervision after release from confinement. A person who is convicted in a court of this Commonwealth of an offense under section 9799.14(d) (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall be sentenced to a mandatory period of probation of three years consecutive to and in addition to any other lawful sentence issued by the court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.5(a) (some emphases added). ____________________________________________ 6 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-7301. 7 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9701- 9799.75. - 12 - J-S36018-26 Section 9799.14(d),8 which falls within Subchapter H of SORNA, sets forth the offenses that comprise “Tier III” SORNA offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3) (providing that “[a]n individual convicted of a Tier III sexual offense shall register for” life). Here, six of Walton’s instant offenses fall under Tier III: rape, IDSI, sexual assault, two counts of aggravated indecent assault, and incest of a minor. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(2), (4), (5), (7), (9). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a “mandatory” “3 years of reentry [sic]” at the count of possession of child sexual abuse material. N.T., 12/4/25, at 18. It did not cite any particular authority or provide further explanation for this sentence. Id. The sentencing order states: • Re-Entry Plan – Eligible – Re-Entry Plan: 3 year re-entry. • Sex Offender Conditions: It is hereby ordered and directed that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s Standard Special Conditions for Sex Offenders and Optional Special Conditions for Sex Offenders be applied in this case. Order of Sentence, 12/4/25, at 1 (emphases added). A plain reading of the term “reentry” above, without further information, suggests that Walton’s “3 years of” “mandatory” “reentry” was imposed pursuant to section 6137.2 of the Prisons and Parole Code. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. ____________________________________________ 8 We note that after sentencing in this case, the legislature amended Section 9799.14(c) with an effective date of September 18, 2026. The amendments are not implicated in this matter. - 13 - J-S36018-26 § 6137.2(b). Reading sections 6137.2(a), 9718.5(a), and 9799.14(d) together, however, we determine that the trial court could not have imposed a “reentry supervision” sentence on Walton. By virtue of Walton’s instant convictions of rape, IDSI, sexual assault, two counts of aggravated indecent assault, and incest of a minor, he is a person subject to section 9718.5. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(2), (4), (5), (7), (9). In any event, a “reentry supervision” is twelve months in duration. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137.2(b). We surmise, however, that the trial court may have intended to impose a mandatory term of three years’ probation pursuant to section 9718.5. Such a sentence applies to a person convicted of an offense under section 9799.14(d), and in the instant matter, Walton incurred six such convictions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9718.5(a), 9799.14(d)(2), (4), (5), (7), (9). Given the lack of clarity, as well as our general requirement for a defendant’s presence at the imposition of any amended sentence, we decline to amend Walton’s sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) (providing that “[t]he defendant shall be present . . . at the imposition of sentence”). Instead, we affirm Walton’s convictions but vacate the portion of his sentence imposing three years’ “re-entry” on the count of possession of child abuse material. Order of Sentence, 12/4/25, at 1. We remand for the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing, reconsider only this portion of the sentence, and impose the proper sentence, if any. - 14 - J-S36018-26 In sum, we determine no relief is due on Walton’s weight of the evidence challenge and affirm his convictions. However, we vacate a portion of his sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this memorandum. Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/29/2026 - 15 -