Com. v. Johnson, A.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket1124 EDA 2025
JudgeOlson
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AARON JOHNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1124 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005535-2023
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Appellant, Aaron Johnson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on March 13, 2025, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s
post-sentence motion on April 25, 2025. We affirm.
The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:
On April 24, 2023, at approximately 4:20 a.m., Marquis
Edgar was shot and killed on the 3200 block of Kensington
Avenue in Philadelphia. Officer Christopher Campbell of the
Philadelphia Police Crime Scene Unit (CSU) arrived at the
scene at 6:05 a.m., which was being held by uniformed
personnel from the 24th District. No ballistic evidence, DNA,
or fingerprints were found on the scene. However, Officer
Campbell recovered a cell phone, which he turned over to the
assigned detective, Vincent Parker of the Philadelphia Police
Homicide Unit.
As a part of the investigation, Detective Thorsten Lucke of
the Philadelphia Police Homicide Unit, a stipulated expert in
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A19007-26
surveillance video recovery and analysis, compiled a video
compilation of this incident. The video showed a red vehicle
arriving at the 3200 block of Kensington Avenue. Upon
arrival, three [] individuals could be seen exiting the vehicle.
Amongst these individuals, Marquis Edgar could be seen
stumbling out of the rear passenger side door before fleeing
the scene. After a few steps, Mr. Edgar collapsed in the
middle of the street while the driver, later identified as
Appellant, quickly returned to the vehicle and drove away.
After viewing this video footage, Detective Parker put out a
patrol alert on the red vehicle. On April 27[], 2023, Police
Officer Nicholas O’Neill observed the red sedan while on
patrol and pulled it over as part of a routine traffic stop.
Officer O’Neill identified the driver as Rasania Smith and the
passenger as Almirah Kemp. The vehicle was later confirmed
as a red 2007 Mercury Milan with Georgia [plates]. After
receiving a warrant to search the vehicle, law enforcement
found four [] cell phones inside, as well as [16] mylar bags
with a green substance, believed to be marijuana.
Subsequently, Rasania Smith and Ms. Kemp were brought
into the Homicide Unit for questioning. While Smith gave a
lengthy statement, Detective Parker testified that he gained
no substantial information from the encounter.
On June 10, 2023, Smith returned to the Homicide Unit and
gave her recollection of the incident. Smith testified that she
had picked up Jameer Brooks that evening and subsequently
met up with Appellant. Later in the evening, when Appellant
was driving the vehicle, they stopped at a convenience store
located at the corner of 17th Street and Cecil B. Moore
Avenue. Mr. Brooks exited the vehicle and returned with an
unknown individual, later identified as Mr. Edgar. Mr. Edgar
asked to go to Kensington and Allegheny, but when the
vehicle arrived, Appellant pulled out a firearm, prompting Ms.
Smith to exit the vehicle and flee.
On June [16], 2023, Mr. Brooks came into the Homicide Unit
with Ms. Smith and told Detective Parker that Appellant had
wanted to sell a gun shortly after the incident. During
Appellant’s trial, Mr. Brooks testified and corroborated Ms.
Smith’s testimony, confirming Appellant as the individual who
shot Mr. Edgar.
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During Appellant’s arrest on June 17, 2023, Detective Parker
recovered a cell phone belonging to Appellant. Detective
Robert Daly of the Philadelphia Police Homicide Unit, a
stipulated expert in call detail record analysis and geospatial
plotting, analyzed the call detail records of [Appellant].
Detective Daily placed Appellant in proximity to the
documented events of April 24, 2023.
At Appellant’s trial, Dr. Khalil Wardock, an Assistant Medical
Examiner in Philadelphia, testified to completing a
posthumous medical examination of Mr. Edgar on April 25,
2023, and determined that the cause of Mr. Edgar’s death
was a perforating gunshot wound to the chest, and the
manner of his death as homicide.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/25, at 1-4 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Appellant was charged with multiple crimes, including murder.
Following trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder,
possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”), firearms not to be carried without a
license, and carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia. 1
On March 13, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an
aggregate term of 20 to 40 years in prison for his convictions. N.T.
Sentencing, 3/13/25, at 52. The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence
motion on April 25, 2025 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant raises one claim to this Court:
Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence that
Commonwealth witness Jameel Brooks had been arrested for
pistol-whipping Commonwealth witness Rasania Smith with
an illegal firearm, and that Smith thereafter testified falsely
at Brooks’s preliminary hearing to secure dismissal of those
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 907(a), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.
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charges, where the excluded evidence was admissible to
establish third-party guilt, motive to fabricate, and bias under
Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021), and
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on appeal. “Our
standard of review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings is narrow, as the
admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will be
reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion.” Commonwealth
v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may
not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different
conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 231 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “Instead, an abuse of discretion
occurs only where the trial court has reached a conclusion that overrides or
misapplies the law, or when the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “To constitute reversible error, an
evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial
to the complaining party.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine, seeking to
preclude Appellant from offering evidence that, in a prior, unrelated shooting
investigation, Commonwealth witness Rasania Smith had provided a false
statement to the police. See Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 10/4/24, at
1-5. As the Commonwealth argued, evidence that Rasania Smith was
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untruthful in this prior, specific, unrelated instance was inadmissible under
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 608 and Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d
1063 (Pa. Super. 2010). See Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 10/4/24, at
1-5; see also Pa.R.E. 608(a) and (b)(1) (“A witness's credibility may be
attacked or supported by testimony about the witness's reputation for having
a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness;” however, “the character of a
witness for truthfulness may not be attacked . . . by cross-examination or
extrinsic evidence concerning specific instances of the witness’ conduct”);
Minich, 4 A.3d at 1072-1073 (holding: evidence that “the victim of a sexual
assault was caught lying in school about matters wholly unrelated to the
allegations against [the defendant]” was inadmissible under Rule 608, as the
defendant was intending to use the evidence to challenge the victim’s
credibility).
During voir dire, the trial court held oral argument on the
Commonwealth’s motion, where the Commonwealth argued that Appellant
could not challenge witness Rasania Smith’s credibility with the prior, specific
instance where she was untruthful to the police in the unrelated matter. See
N.T. Trial, 10/8/24, at 20-24. As argument on that issue was concluding,
Appellant raised a different, specific instance where Rasania Smith was
untruthful. This instance involved another Commonwealth witness in the case,
Jameel Brooks. Appellant declared:
[Appellant’s Counsel]: The second part of this, and it wasn't
outlined, but as an officer of the court, it's my obligation.
There is another case where Ms. Smith had Jameel Brooks,
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the second witness in this case, who was her boyfriend,
arrested for aggravated assault, that he pistol whipped her.
And that case, she went into the preliminary hearing and
said, I [sic] didn't do this, nothing happened, I'm fine. So at
one point, she is telling the police my boyfriend pistol
whipped me, hit me, gets him arrested, goes to court, and
then says nothing happened.
...
This is a woman who when it's convenient for her will tell the
truth, and when it's not, will lie.
Id. at 24.
Apparently addressing both the issue the Commonwealth raised in its
written motion, as well as the issue Appellant orally raised at argument, the
trial court ruled:
If you have reputation evidence of [Rasania Smith], some
witness who says she is a known liar, she is this, you know,
you can certainly present that. . . . But asking specifically
about another case where she may not have told the truth, I
don't want it to become a trial within a trial. You'll have
plenty of leeway to cross-examine her about what it took to
get it out even here in Homicide on this case.
...
So the motion is granted, however, you do have leeway to
cross her. And if you have a witness to come in as negative
character for her truthfulness, feel free to bring that in.
Id. at 25-26.
Now on appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it
excluded evidence that Rasania Smith accused Jameel Brooks of
pistol-whipping her and then, at the preliminary hearing in that unrelated
matter, testified that Jameel Brooks “didn't do this, nothing happened, I'm
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fine.” See Appellant’s Brief at 23; see also N.T. Trial, 10/8/24, at 24.
According to Appellant, the trial court incorrectly “treated this evidence as
inadmissible specific instances of conduct under [Rule] 608(b),” when the trial
court should have viewed the evidence as relevant to Jameel Brooks’
“third-party guilt,” as well as “impeachment evidence to show motive to
fabricate and bias under Commonwealth v. Nolan, 634 A.2d 192 (Pa. 1993)
and Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986).” Appellant argues
on appeal:
the trial court hamstrung the defense by granting the
Commonwealth's motion in limine and excluding evidence
that Brooks had been arrested for pistol-whipping Smith with
an illegal firearm and that Smith thereafter lied under oath at
Brooks’s preliminary hearing to secure dismissal of those
charges. This evidence was critical: it put a gun in Brooks’s
hands that could have been the murder weapon, it gave both
witnesses a motive to cooperate with the Commonwealth to
protect themselves and each other, and it gave Smith a
specific reason to implicate Appellant rather than Brooks,
who she was afraid of. The trial court treated the evidence
as inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 608(b), but it never engaged
with the correct framework for third-party guilt evidence
under Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021).
The resulting conviction is built on the uncorroborated,
contradictory testimony of two self-interested witnesses, and
the jury was unfairly denied the evidence it needed to
evaluate their credibility and assess an alternate suspect.
Appellant’s Brief at 23-24.
At the outset, Appellant did not raise any of the above grounds to the
trial court in support of his oral motion to (apparently) admit evidence that,
in a separate, unrelated case, Rasania Smith recanted an accusation that
Jameel Brooks pistol-whipped her. Instead, during argument on the
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Commonwealth’s motion to exclude evidence that Rasania Smith was
untruthful during one prior, specific instance of providing a false statement to
the police in an unrelated shooting, Appellant’s counsel declared that, “as an
officer of the court, it's [his] obligation” to inform the trial court that Rasania
Smith was untruthful in another, specific instance – this one regarding the
alleged pistol-whipping by Jameel Brooks. See N.T. Trial, 10/8/24, at 24.
Further, as Appellant’s counsel informed the trial court, this separate instance
of untruthfulness was relevant to demonstrate that Rasania Smith “is a woman
who when it's convenient for her will tell the truth, and when it's not, will lie.”
Id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103 declares: “[a] party may claim error
in a ruling to . . . exclude evidence only . . . [if the] party informs the court of
its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from
the context.” Pa.R.E. 103(a). As this Court has explained:
An offer of proof must be sufficient to alert the trial judge to
the purpose for which the evidence is being offered, and a
trial court's exclusion of evidence must be evaluated on
appeal by a review of the contents of the offer at the time it
was made. The party specifying the purpose for which the
testimony is admissible cannot argue on appeal that the
evidence was admissible for a purpose other than that offered
at trial. Appellant is deemed to have waived any grounds,
other than those offered at trial, for the admission of the
evidence at trial.
Commonwealth v. Newman, 555 A.2d 151, 156 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(citations omitted).
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In the case at bar, Appellant specifically informed the trial court that
evidence Rasania Smith recanted her accusation against Jameel Brooks was
relevant to demonstrate she “is a woman who when it's convenient for her will
tell the truth, and when it's not, will lie.” N.T. Trial, 10/8/24, at 24.
Appellant’s offer of proof did not include any of the grounds he currently raises
on appeal, i.e., that the evidence was relevant to establish: Jameel Brooks’
possible “third-party guilt;” a motive for Rasania Smith and Jameel Brooks “to
cooperate with the Commonwealth to protect themselves and each other;” or,
a possible reason for Rasania Smith “to implicate Appellant rather than
Brooks, who she was afraid of.” See Appellant’s Brief at 23-25. Further, none
of these newly-raised grounds were remotely “apparent from the context” of
Appellant’s proffer. See Pa.R.E. 103(a). Thus, Appellant’s claims on appeal
are waived. See Pa.R.E. 103.2
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2 Within Appellant’s brief, Appellant argues that, “should [this Court] find that
trial counsel did not articulate [the newly-raised appellate] arguments
thoroughly enough to preserve the issue[s],” this Court should conclude that
Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the claims he
currently raises on appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 38-39. Under our
Supreme Court's precedent, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim may
not be raised on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726
(Pa. 2002) (holding: “as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review”). We have
explained:
Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Holmes, [79 A.3d 562, 577-580 (Pa. 2013)].
Instead, such claims are to be deferred to [collateral] review [in a
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 11/18/2026
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42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546]. Id. However, our Supreme Court
has recognized three exceptions to the general rule. In Holmes,
[our Supreme] Court held that a trial court has discretion to
address ineffectiveness claims on direct review in cases where (1)
there are extraordinary circumstances in which trial counsel's
ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and “meritorious to
the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests
of justice;” or (2) “there is good cause shown,” and the defendant
knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek
subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. More
recently, our Supreme Court adopted a third exception, which
requires “trial courts to address claims challenging trial counsel's
performance where the defendant is statutorily precluded from
obtaining subsequent PCRA review.” Commonwealth v.
Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. 2018).
Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 760-761 (Pa. Super. 2023).
None of the above three listed exceptions apply to the case at bar. Thus,
Appellant's claim of ineffectiveness is barred on direct appeal, without
prejudice for Appellant to seek relief through collateral review.
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