Com. v. Reid, E.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket122 EDA 2026
JudgePanella
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ERIC T. REID :
:
Appellant : No. 122 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001420-2024
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Eric T. Reid appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed for his
convictions of one count of conspiracy to commit murder, three counts of first-
degree murder, four counts of recklessly endangering another person, and
one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying
firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and possessing
instruments of crime.1 Reid challenges the denial of a motion to suppress out
of court identifications, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and the
imposition of consecutive life sentences. After careful review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2502(a), 2705, 6106, 6108, and 907, respectively.
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We obtained the following procedural and factual history from the
certified record. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on August 11, 2023, five people
entered the basketball courts located at 8th and Diamond Streets in the city
of Philadelphia. These people fanned out, pulled firearms, and shot at the
individuals who were on the basketball court. A total of 75 fired cartridge
casings were later discovered by police. Three men died as a result of this
shooting, one man was injured, and multiple people had to run and take cover
to avoid the massacre.
Police obtained numerous surveillance videos during their investigation
into the shooting. One video captured the shooting, but the perpetrators were
all wearing masks. However, police were able to identify the vehicle, a
Chevrolet Silverado, that the perpetrators arrived in and subsequently used
to flee the area. Police later tracked the Silverado on surveillance cameras and
obtained footage recorded prior to and after the shooting.
Using this footage, police were able to positively identify Reid as one of
the shooters. Two Philadelphia police officers, Officer Ryan Daut and Thomas
Schaffling, viewed the footage with homicide detectives and identified Reid in
the videos. After they told the detectives the person in the videos was Reid,
detectives showed Officers Daut and Schaffling a Justice Network (“JNet”)
photograph of Reid to confirm they were discussing the same person. Police
further obtained Reid’s cell phone and searched it, linking him to his co-
defendants and this shooting.
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On September 3, 2025, Reid filed a motion to suppress the identification
evidence provided by Officers Daut and Schaffling. The court held a hearing
on this motion on September 8, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court denied the motion, finding the identification procedure used was not
unnecessarily suggestive.
Reid proceeded to a jury trial, held jointly with four co-defendants. At
the conclusion of trial, the jury was hung as to co-defendant Tynel Love, found
co-defendant Sufyaan Kinslow not guilty, and found Reid, co-defendant Quaza
Lopez, and co-defendant Tyyon Bates guilty of all charges. On October 20,
2025, the same day the jury returned its verdict, the court sentenced Reid to
three consecutive life sentences plus a consecutive 24 to 48 years of
incarceration.
Reid filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on
December 10, 2025. Reid filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. The trial
court did not order Reid to file a Rule 1925(b) statement or file a Rule 1925(a)
opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).
Reid raises four questions for our review:
I. Did the trial court err by denying [Reid’s] motion to suppress
the identifications of Officers Ryan Daut and Thomas Schaffling?
II. Was the evidence of [Reid’s] involvement in the crime
insufficient as a matter of law?
III. Was the jury’s verdict against the weight of the evidence?
IV. Did the court abuse [its] discretion when it sentenced [] Reid
to three consecutive life sentences?
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Appellant’s Brief, at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In his first claim, Reid argues the identification procedure used by
homicide detectives to identify individuals on a surveillance video was
impermissibly suggestive.2 See id. at 14-16. Reid submits the trial court erred
in failing to suppress the identifications made by Officers Daut and Schaffling
based upon that allegedly suggestive procedure. See id.
We begin with our well-established standard and scope of review:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are
bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they
are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions
of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the
ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 314 A.3d 515, 531-32 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citation omitted).
The officers here made an out of court identification while viewing
surveillance video provided by homicide detectives. We are mindful that:
____________________________________________
2 We note with disapproval that Reid’s argument section is not “divided into
as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). The
arguments pertaining to each question seem to overlap and it is unclear when
one argument ends and the next begins. We will address, however, the
arguments we can clearly discern.
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Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed as
unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is determined
from the totality of the circumstances. Suggestiveness in the
identification process is a factor to be considered in determining
the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone does
not warrant exclusion. Identification evidence will not be
suppressed unless the facts demonstrate that the identification
procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. …
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 266 A.3d 56, 63 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
omitted).
After the suppression hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the record:
But I will just state in terms of factual findings that the reason
that these two officers were questioned [was] because of their
familiarity with the vehicle from the patrol alert, the officers were
called in and shown video which is not unnecessarily suggestive,
I will—this is a conclusion of law I’m interspersing there—that’s
normal police work in every case where surveillance video depicts
people and the officer trying to figure out who they are. I should
say homicide people trying to figure out who they are. They ask
the cops in the area do you know these guys; and that’s a perfectly
lawful non-suggestive thing to do. There’s no basis for any
constitutional suppression here.
Absolutely they are entitled once they say I know it’s John Doe to
show an actual photograph that’s a known picture of John Doe to
be sure it’s the right John Doe that they’re talking about. That’s
all that happened here. That’s all fine.
So your motion for suppression the way that you’ve styled it,
which is a motion to suppress identification evidence, which is a
constitutional motion based on unnecessarily suggestive
identification, I find that there’s no factual basis for any
constitutional violation. So that is denied.
There is, I suppose in the nature of a motion in limine to exclude
the identification of the officers as violating rule 701. And I do
believe that there is an independent basis for them to make an
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identification. I will find as a fact that they have extensive
familiarity with the defendant based on seeing him on social
media, seeing him in the area that they patrol, having seen [him]
in connection with a [violation of the Uniform Firearms Act
(“VUFA”)] arrest that occurred in 2021.
And with regard to Officer Schaffling also having seen the
defendant in court on numerous court appearances and, in fact,
having stood next to him and his mother outside on the street on
one occasion, I guess after a court appearance.
So that is an ample basis to distinguish it, because this is how I
look at it: Are they in a different position than the jurors to make
an identification based on appearance because of a history of
familiarity with the defendant. And they have that history. They
are in a different position from me or any other juror. Although I’ll
say that there is an extraordinary likeliness between the
defendant and the one photograph that shows him standing there.
***
It shows his face and looks just like him to me. But I’m not familiar
with him as the officers are, so that their identification would have
more believability because they know him and have a history with
him … .
So for all those reasons, your motion is denied.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/8/25, at 86-89.
The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Officers
Daut and Schaffling explained the process used by homicide detectives 3 in
identifying Reid from surveillance videos. Specifically, they were both asked
to come to the homicide unit to view videos. See id. at 21-22; 59-60. The
officers were each shown the surveillance videos; they did not view the videos
____________________________________________
3The officers were interviewed by different detectives within the homicide
unit.
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together. See id. at 37; 60. Neither officer was told who the suspects were or
if there were any suspects seen on the videos prior to viewing the videos. See
id. at 21-22, 35-36; 69.
Upon arrival, the officers were shown the surveillance video and still
shots of the people seen on the videos. See id. at 21-23; 59-61. Both officers
were able to identify Reid as one of the suspects based upon prior interactions
with Reid. See id. at 23; 60. Officer Daut told detectives that he was not
100% positive that the one suspect was Reid but believed it to be Reid. See
id. at 23.
After the officers each identified Reid, the detectives provided the
officers a JNet photograph of Reid to confirm the identification provided was
the same Eric Reid that the detectives suspected. See id. at 49-50; 72-73. It
is this portion of the identification procedure that Reid takes issue with, as he
claims that the JNet photograph was only shown to bolster their identification
of Reid from the surveillance videos. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-16.
We agree with the trial court that there is nothing inherently suggestive
about this process. Officers Daut and Schaffling were not shown the JNet
photograph of Reid until after they identified him from the surveillance videos.
Reid has failed to convince us that this identification procedure was
suggestive, let alone “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Bishop, 266 A.3d at 63
(citation omitted). Reid’s first issue therefore does not entitle him to relief.
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In his second claim, Reid seemingly claims the evidence was insufficient.
However, Reid merely asserts “[t]he Commonwealth failed to produce
competent evidence that [Reid] participated in the crime” and again argues
the identification by Officers Daut and Schaffling should not have been
admitted. Appellant’s Brief, at 16.
The Commonwealth submits this argument is woefully undeveloped and
therefore waived. See Appellee’s Brief, at 12. Alternatively, the
Commonwealth submits the evidence was sufficient to establish Reid’s identity
as one of the shooters. See id. at 13-14. We agree with the Commonwealth
that this claim is both waived and without merit.
First, we note Reid’s entire sufficiency argument is one paragraph, does
not include our standard or scope of review, and provides only one case
citation. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17. Claims that are not sufficiently
developed for our review are waived. See Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 333
A.3d 417, 434 (Pa. Super. 2025). Because Reid fails to provide a developed
argument on his sufficiency claim, we find it waived.
However, even if we did not find the claim waived, it is meritless. Reid
argues that the only evidence of his identification as one of the shooters should
not be considered in the sufficiency analysis. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17.
Our standard of review required this Court to consider all evidence “whether
or not the trial court’s rulings thereon were correct[.]” Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 444 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). We would
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therefore be required to consider the identification testimony provided by
Officers Daut and Schaffling in our review of the sufficiency of the evidence,
even if it was improperly admitted, as Reid unpersuasively alleges. When
considering this evidence, we find there was sufficient evidence that Reid was
one of the shooters. Therefore, even if not waived, Reid is not entitled to relief
on this claim.
Next, Reid asserts the verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
again relying upon his claim that the officer identifications were erroneously
admitted. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-18. Reid further asserts that, because
police were unable to find any firearms or other physical evidence in Reid’s
home after the shooting, the jury should not have believed he participated in
the shooting. See id.
The standards applicable to a weight of the evidence claim are as
follows:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
the trial court’s discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because
the trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial court when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is, or is not,
against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the trial court’s
conviction that the verdict was, or was not, against the weight of
the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
of justice.
A trial court abuses its discretion where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
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applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. By comparison, the role of the
trial court is to determine whether, notwithstanding all the
evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them, or to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to
deny justice. For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the
evidence claim, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and
uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 351 A.3d 1245, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2026)
(brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).
The trial court here relied upon its sufficiency analysis when it found the
verdict was not against the weight of the evidence:
The evidence established that as a result of a beef between a
group associated with the area of 4th and Diamond Streets in
Philadelphia, which included [Reid], and a group associated with
8th and Diamond Streets, [Reid] and four other men came out
onto a basketball court located at 8th and Diamond and opened
fire on defenseless young men who were playing basketball. Three
men were shot dead and a fourth was grievously injured. All of
this was depicted on video surveillance.
[Reid’s] sole sufficiency argument is that the Commonwealth
failed to prove [his] identity as one of the shooters. However, the
evidence overwhelmingly refutes this claim. This evidence
included video surveillance of the vacant lot where the shooters
parked the murder vehicle, which showed [Reid] getting out of the
vehicle shortly after the murders occurred. He is clearly seen
directly under the vacant lot’s surveillance camera, and had a
distinctive appearance, towering over the other shooters. Two
officers who knew [Reid] identified him from that video. [a] That
the vehicle in question was used for the murders was
demonstrated by surveillance video before and after the shootings
and by a license plate reader which captured the plate number.
Moreover, the video from the lot shows [Reid] removing from that
vehicle and carrying codefendant Tyyon Bates, who had been
accidentally shot by one of his coconspirators during the attack at
the playground. In addition, Uber records showed [Reid] being
dropped off one block from the vacant lot shortly before the
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murder. This evidence was more than sufficient to prove that
[Reid] was one of the shooters.
[a] One made a positive ID, while the second, although
identifying [Reid], stated that he was not 100% sure.
Even without the testimony of the officers, it was
evident to the court from the video and from [Reid’s]
appearance in the courtroom that one of the people
clearly depicted in the video at the lot was defendant
Reid.
***
As stated above, the Commonwealth’s evidence plainly
established that [Reid] was one of the shooters. Because the
evidence fully supported the verdict, the verdict did not shock the
conscience of the court. [Reid’s] weight claim is therefore
meritless.
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/10/25, at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
We cannot find the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court
detailed the evidence establishing Reid’s identity as one of the shooters. The
jury had the opportunity to see and hear the evidence, including the
surveillance videos and the identification provided by Officers Daut and
Schaffling, and Reid’s cross-examination of those officers. As such, Reid’s
weight of the evidence claim is meritless.
Finally, Reid asserts the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to three consecutive life sentences. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18. Reid
seemingly claims he was not one of the shooters and therefore the application
of the guidelines was clearly unreasonable. See id. at 18-19.
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A challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed does
not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. See Commonwealth v.
Jennings, 351 A.3d 1215, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
[see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code.
Id. at 1239-40 (citation omitted).
Reid filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim in a post-
sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. We
therefore turn to whether Reid has raised a substantial question that the
sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. [This Court has] found a
substantial question exists when the appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process. We cannot look beyond the statement of
questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to
determine whether a substantial question exists.
It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of
sentencing errors. When we examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f)
statement to determine whether a substantial question exists, our
inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought,
in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary
only to decide the appeal on the merits. A Rule 2119(f) statement
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is inadequate when it contains incantations of statutory provisions
and pronouncements of conclusions of law.
Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
Reid’s entire Rule 2119(f) statement provides as follows:
The trial court abused its discretion by sentencing [Reid] to three
consecutive life sentences. The trial court’s sentence was clearly
unreasonable, even though it was within the range of sentences
allowed by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. The
applicable guidelines were clearly unreasonable because the
Commonwealth failed to prove that [Reid] participated in the
shooting at all, or if he did, what role he played in the crime.
Appellant’s Brief, at 13.
The Commonwealth argues Reid failed to present a substantial question.
See Appellee’s Brief, at 16-17. We agree. Reid’s claim is again predicated on
his assertion that the Commonwealth failed to establish his identity. We
already found this claim lacked merit and further note that this claim goes to
the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sentence imposed. To the extent that
Reid challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence, we find the claim fails
to present a substantial question and is meritless.
A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence
concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a
substantial question. Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather
than concurrent sentences will present a substantial question in
only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the
aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the
crimes and the length of imprisonment.
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Because the imposition of consecutive sentences only raises a
substantial question where it is unduly harsh when considering the nature of
the offense, we must first look at the aggregate sentence. The aggregate
sentence here is a life sentence. “Due to the nature of a life sentence, two
consecutive life sentences are, in reality, no longer than two concurrent life
sentences or, for that matter, one life sentence. All would require appellant to
spend his life in prison.” Commonwealth v. Szczesniewski, 591 A.2d 1055,
1057 (Pa. Super. 1991).
The nature of the crimes here are three counts of first-degree murder,
where Reid and four coconspirators stormed a basketball court and opened
fire, leaving behind 75 fired cartridge casings. We cannot find an aggregate
sentence of life is unduly harsh under the circumstances of this case. 4 We
therefore find that Reid has not presented a substantial question for our
review.
Even if we were to address Reid’s discretionary aspects of sentencing
claim, it would be meritless. Our standard of review is well-established:
[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to
affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court [has] offered:
____________________________________________
4 We also note that the court is required to impose a life sentence for a
conviction of first-degree murder where the death penalty is not sought by
the Commonwealth. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.
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An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an
appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly
erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly
deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing
court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a
particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court
sentences flesh-and-blood defendants, and the nuances of
sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the sentencing
guidelines, the power of sentencing is a function to be performed
by the sentencing court.
Jennings, 351 A.3d at 1241-42 (brackets and citation omitted).
The trial court explained its reason for the consecutive sentences as
follows:
[T]he imposition of consecutive sentences was completely
reasonable. [Reid], after much planning with numerous
coconspirators, ran onto a basketball court at a neighborhood
playground with four other killers, opening fire and slaughtering
three defenseless men, grievously wounding a fourth, and
endangering the lives of at least four little children who ran from
the bullets. [Reid] not only extinguished the lives of three men
who were merely playing basketball at a city playground, but also
created terror in the community. It is difficult to find criminal
behavior more deserving of consecutive sentences.
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/10/25, at 7.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Reid and his coconspirators
engaged in a massacre that took the lives of three people, injured another,
and risked the life of at least four children who had to run from the basketball
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court. The court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of life for each victim
killed was not an abuse of discretion.
As Reid’s final issue is waived and meritless, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/16/2026
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