Com. v. Marsh, A.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket2391 EDA 2024
JudgeMcLaughlin
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
J-S27045-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALI MARSH :
:
Appellant : No. 2391 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 22, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0005820-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Ali Marsh appeals from the order dismissing his Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
This Court previously summarized the facts as follows:
On March 5, 2012, shortly after 3:00 a.m., [Marsh] and
his co-conspirator Charles Davis broke into the home of John
Paul Sr., and his wife, Sherrel, and demanded money. When
told there was none, they fatally shot Mr. Paul. They also
shot his wife, Sherrel, about a dozen times, but she
survived, although she required multiple surgeries and still
carries bullets and bullet fragments within her.
[Marsh] was also shot in the leg during the melee. The
bullet moved down his left leg to his ankle. He was bleeding
profusely. The co-conspirators fled by car. A neighbor of the
Pauls heard the gunfire and saw the conspirators depart.
Davis and [Marsh] rendezvoused with Davis[’s] wife, Nicole
Walton. Sometime during this trip [Marsh] called his then-
girlfriend, Nija Pasture. At trial, Pasture testified that
[Marsh] told her that “shit went bad” and he got shot.
[Marsh] needed medical attention for the bullet wound in
his ankle, but did not want to risk apprehension in a
J-S27045-26
Philadelphia hospital, so Walton drove him (and Davis) to
Union Hospital in Elkton, Maryland. [Marsh] checked in using
the name Jabbar Rice. However, he was soon transferred to
a hospital in Christiana, Delaware for treatment.
Still using the name Jabbar Rice, [Marsh] told Delaware
hospital personnel that he had been robbed, and shot, in
Delaware. Maryland state trooper Alan Flaugher was
dispatched to investigate the shooting. He soon realized that
[Marsh] had given him a false name. Nevertheless, he
identified [Marsh] through FBI fingerprint records, and
linked him to the murder in Philadelphia. Delaware police,
now assisted by Philadelphia homicide detective John
Harkins, obtained a search warrant to have blood drawn
from [Marsh]. DNA testing later confirmed that blood on the
Pauls[’] porch and on the street outside belonged to
[Marsh]. [Marsh] checked out of the hospital before the
scheduled removal of the bullet, apparently against medical
advice.
A day or two later he appeared at Ms. Pasture[’]s
residence. She took him to buy some clothes and they
began moving from one hotel to another until a few days
later when they were apprehended.
. . . Over [Marsh’s] objection, the trial court allowed
Walton[’]s testimony that when she picked up her husband,
Davis, he told her, “We got into some shit and [Marsh] got
shot,” under the co-conspirator exception.
Also during trial, after his counsel finished cross-
examining [Marsh’s] girlfriend, Nija Pasture, a lawyer sitting
in the courtroom as a spectator, said to [Marsh’s] counsel,
“Why did you cross[-]examine her? She didn[’]t hurt you.”
[Marsh’s] counsel made a motion for a mistrial which the
trial court denied.
Commonwealth v. Marsh, No. 2442 EDA 2015, 2016 WL 5419210, *1-2
(Pa.Super. filed Aug. 11, 2016) (unpublished mem.) (citations and footnote
omitted).
-2-
J-S27045-26
Marsh was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted murder,
robbery, burglary, conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, and violations
of the Uniform Firearms Act.1 Marsh was sentenced to life imprisonment for
first-degree murder, along with an aggregate consecutive sentence of 56 to
112 years for the remaining convictions. Marsh filed a post-sentence motion,
which was denied. On August 11, 2016, this Court affirmed Marsh’s judgment
of sentence.
In October 2017, Marsh filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Counsel
entered his appearance and filed an amended PCRA petition. Marsh filed two
more amended petitions. After a bifurcated hearing, the court dismissed
Marsh’s PCRA petition. This appeal followed.
Marsh raises the following issues:
1. Did the Commonwealth violate due process of law when
it failed to provide trial counsel information that the
police were considering alternative suspects and that
there was drug activity in the immediate area?
2. Was [Marsh’s] right to confront a witness against him
violated by a detective’s testimony regarding a C[AT]
scan and was appellate counsel ineffective for failing to
raise this preserved claim on direct appeal?
3. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to
opinion testimony of Nija Pasture as to her interpretation
of statements made by [Marsh], when such opinions
were offered without sufficient factual foundation?
4. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request an
instruction advising the jury to give the testimony of Nija
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 901, 3701, 3502, 903, 907, 6106, and 6108,
respectively.
-3-
J-S27045-26
Pasture and Nicole Walton “special scrutiny” because
each had a penal interest in testifying for the
Commonwealth?
5. Was trial counsel [] ineffective for failing to request a
curative instruction after a non-party attorney in the
gallery directed disruptive and prejudicial statements to
trial counsel in the presence of the jury?
6. Was [Marsh] denied his rights to due process and the
effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed
to object to improper, prejudicial prosecutorial argument
and/or failed to request an appropriate curative
instruction?
7. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request a
limiting instruction to cure the potential for improper
consideration of prior bad act evidence?
8. Was [Marsh] deprived of the effective assistance of trial
counsel and due process of law, when the jury never
learned that Nicole Walton testified pursuant to a use
immunity order issued in the co-defendant’s trial and
that the Commonwealth considered seeking immunity for
her in [Marsh’s] trial?
9. Was trial counsel ineffective when he failed to object
when the trial court failed to provide adequate opening
instructions, thus abusing its discretion and violating
[Marsh’s] right to a fair trial[?]
10. Is [Marsh] entitled to relief based on the
cumulative impact of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and
the various due process violations briefed herein?
Marsh’s Br. at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We review an order dismissing a PCRA petition to determine whether
the order “is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 223 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). We will not disturb the PCRA court’s findings “unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted). “We
-4-
J-S27045-26
apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”
Commonwealth v. Davis, 326 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citation
omitted).
Brady Issue
Marsh first argues that the Commonwealth failed to disclose certain
information that was contained in the District Attorney’s File and Homicide File
(the “Files”) prior to trial in violation of Brady2 and due process. First, he
argues that the Files contained documents indicating that “the police believed
that there was drug activity in the area of the Paul home, including that the
decedent may have been involved in marijuana sales.” Marsh’s Br. at 26.
Second, he maintains that the Files “also indicated that other people were
under consideration as suspects, including one unidentified person, whose
fingerprint was found on the inside of a storm door.” Id. According to Marsh,
this evidence could have bolstered his claim that he was merely present at the
scene buying drugs and was shot during a drug transaction, and that the
victims were shot and killed by other people not connected to Marsh. In his
view, the documents in the Files contained three types of exculpatory
information: “1) alternative suspects; 2) support for [Marsh’s] narrative that
he was shot while others were present either inside or outside of the Paul
home; and 3) support for [Marsh’s] narrative that he was present at the
location to buy drugs.” Id. at 28. Marsh maintains that this evidence was
____________________________________________
2 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-5-
J-S27045-26
material under Brady and “[i]ndividually, or cumulatively, this new and
previously suppressed information could have reasonably led to a different
result.” Id. at 31.
To establish a Brady violation, the claimant must prove: “(1) the
evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the
prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.”
Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 607 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
A defendant has the burden to “prove, by reference to the record, that
evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” Id. (citation
omitted). Further, “[t]he evidence at issue must have been ‘material evidence
that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Favorable
evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by
the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. (citation omitted). As to Brady claims advanced under the
PCRA, a claimant must establish that the alleged Brady violation “so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d
61, 76 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
Further,
Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is
not exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for
possible arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the
-6-
J-S27045-26
prosecution to disclose every fruitless lead considered
during a criminal investigation. The duty to disclose is
limited to information in the possession of the government
bringing the prosecution, and the duty does extend to
exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the
government bringing the prosecution. Brady is not violated
when the appellant knew or, with reasonable diligence,
could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when the
evidence was available to the defense from other sources.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1062 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up). Lastly, “Brady sets forth a limited duty, not a general rule of
discovery for criminal cases.” Roney, 79 A.3d at 608. “[T]here is no
generalized constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did
not create one.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the PCRA court found that Marsh’s claim was without merit
because the evidence was not material for purposes of Brady. It explained:
After looking at the totality of the evidence, [t]his [c]ourt
finds there is not a reasonable probability that the trial
would have resulted in a different outcome, but for the
failure to turn over the early police investigative notes
indicating rumors and other possible doers, against whom
no inculpatory evidence had ever been developed.
[Marsh] would have [t]his [c]ourt believe that, if he only
had information that the police were attempting to
investigate other people, there is a reasonable probability
that the jury would believe that he was merely present when
he was shot by an unknown robber. It is important to note
that the documents cited by [Marsh] do not identify others
as individuals who participated in the home invasion. These
documents list names of people who could have been
involved, based on tips received by police and individuals
who police knew frequented the area at the time of the
shooting. At the time of the shooting, before police had the
opportunity to locate and identify [Marsh] in Delaware,
police were following any possible lead. Looking at the
-7-
J-S27045-26
evidence presented at trial, including phone tracking
information, conspirator statements, [Marsh’s] blood at the
door, and prolonged evidence of consciousness of guilt,
[t]his [c]ourt finds that it is not reasonably likely that the
outcome of trial would have been any different.
PCRA Court Opinion, filed 10/29/25, at 4.
The court did not err. Marsh failed to establish that had the information
been disclosed to the defense, there is reasonable probability that its
production would have caused a different result at trial. The Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence of Marsh’s guilt and Marsh’s purported Brady
evidence was not material. This claim fails.
Claims of Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel
Marsh’s remaining issues raise claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness rests on [the petitioner].” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d
1276, 1279 (Pa.Super. 2010). To obtain relief based on a claim of
ineffectiveness, a petitioner must establish: “(1) his underlying claim is of
arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction;
and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result.” Commonwealth
v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). Prejudice in this context means that,
“absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Velazquez,
216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). A failure to meet
any of these prongs bars a petitioner from obtaining relief. Commonwealth
v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012). “Counsel will not be deemed
-8-
J-S27045-26
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Spotz,
896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Pa. 2006).
Ineffectiveness Claim Regarding Testimony About the CAT Scan:
At trial, Detective John Harkins of the Philadelphia Police Department
testified that he reviewed a CAT scan of Marsh’s injured leg that was taken at
the hospital in Delaware. N.T., 9/25/14, at 36. When Detective Harkins began
to describe what he observed on the CAT scan, defense counsel objected
because the CAT scan was not given in discovery and the doctor who
performed the scan was not there to testify about it. Id. at 37-38. The court
sustained the objection in part and overruled it in part. Id. at 38. The court
permitted Detective Harkins to describe what he saw on the CAT scan but
“[l]imit it to that.” Id. Detective Harkins then testified that he observed a 10-
millimeter bullet lodged in Marsh’s leg on the scan. Id. at 37-38.
Marsh argues that his right to confront a witness against him was
violated by Detective Harkins’ testimony and appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this preserved claim on direct appeal. He claims that
Detective Harkins’ testimony that the bullet measured 10 millimeters in
diameter “proved pivotal to the prosecution’s narrative, as it placed [Marsh]
inside [the victims’ home], while the shooting was underway – alleging that
the .40 caliber handgun that had left 6 fired cartridge casings inside the
residence, was the same weapon responsible for the projectile in [Marsh’s]
foot.” Marsh’s Br. at 32. Marsh points out that “[b]allistic expert testimony
later established that .40 caliber projectiles – one of the calibers retrieved
-9-
J-S27045-26
from the scene of the shooting – measure 10mm in diameter.” Id. at 32 n.9.
Marsh argues that “this was the only physical evidence that purported to place
[him] inside the home.” Id. at 32.
Marsh asserts that “[t]he Commonwealth presented no doctor,
radiologist, lab technician or other medical professional with expertise in this
area to lay a foundation for the scan’s admission, nor establish its authenticity,
nor the truth of the content of [Detective] Harkins’ testimony.” Id. In Marsh’s
view, “Detective Harkins did not have the expertise required to render the
opinion that the artifact visible in the CAT scan was [a] bullet, nor to its
dimensions” and “[i]f [Detective] Harkins was told what he was looking at by
a physician, then those statements are prohibited hearsay.” Id. at 33. He
highlights that he presented the testimony of Dr. David Smoger, the Chairman
of the Radiology Department at Holy Redeemer Hospital, at the PCRA hearing.
Id. at 35. Dr. Smoger testified that it would not be possible for a person who
is not trained in medicine or radiology to read a CAT scan to provide the actual
measurements, and opined that Detective Harkins “maybe . . . heard
somebody say something” about the bullet’s measurements. Id. (citing N.T.,
1/5/23, at 39). Marsh argues that Detective Harkins’ testimony violated his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, Pa.R.E. 701 (Opinion Testimony by
Lay Witnesses), and/or Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining “hearsay”). Id. at 33, 36.
According to Marsh, “[w]ithout the evidence that purported to place the same
kind of bullet used in the murder of [the victim] in [Marsh’s] leg, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
- 10 -
J-S27045-26
different.” Id. at 37. He concludes that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. Id.
The reasonable basis prong of the ineffectiveness test does not require
counsel representing a criminal defendant in an appeal to argue every possible
claim on appeal. “[A]ppellate counsel is entitled, as a matter of strategy, to
forego even meritorious issues in favor of issues he believes pose a greater
likelihood of success.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa.
2014) (citation omitted). Appellate counsel may strategically decide to
“winnow out weaker claims in favor of pursuing claims that counsel believes
offer a better chance of relief.” Commonwealth v. Pou, 201 A.3d 735, 740-
41 (Pa.Super. 2018). “Appellate counsel need not (and should not) raise every
nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to
maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Williams,
141 A.3d 440, 471 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).
Here, Marsh’s trial/appellate counsel, Coley Renyolds, Esq., testified at
the PCRA hearing that he had a strategic basis on which to not raise the issue
on appeal. He testified as follows:
[PCRA Counsel] Q. The Court allowed testimony from
Detective Harkins regarding the diameter or length of the
projectile that was in Mr. Marsh’s leg at the time he was
seen in the hospital, correct?
[Trial/Appellate Counsel] A. I believe the diameter.
Q. And that was over your objection?
A. Correct.
- 11 -
J-S27045-26
Q. Do you remember representing Mr. Marsh on direct
appeal?
A. I did.
Q. You raised six issues. The issue about the CAT scan was
not one of the six. Do you recall having a strategy for not
including that hearsay-confrontation clause issue in your
direct appeal?
A. Say that again.
THE COURT: Why wouldn’t you have included that as one of
your basis of appeal?
THE WITNESS: Clearly Mr. Marsh was at the scene. His
blood was there. Now whether he got shot there or not, I do
not remember his testimony. But who shot him did not
change the fact that he was there, so I did not see it as my
best issue going forward.
N.T., 3/9/22, at 13-14.
Upon review, we find that the PCRA court did not err in rejecting this
claim. Attorney Renyolds specifically testified that he did not pursue the issue
because he believed that six other issues had the better chance of success
and decided to forgo the instant issue because it was a weaker claim. Such an
approach has been found to be a reasonable one. Pou, 201 A.3d at 740-41.
Because counsel had a reasonable basis for forgoing the claim about the
detective’s CAT scan testimony, counsel was not ineffective for not presenting
it on direct appeal.
Ineffectiveness Claim for Failing to Object to Nija Pasture’s Testimony:
As set forth previously, Nija Pasture, Marsh’s then-paramour, testified
at trial that Marsh called her on the way to the hospital on the day of the
incident and told her that “shit went bad” and he got shot. Pasture told the
- 12 -
J-S27045-26
police that she interpreted Marsh’s statement that “shit went bad” as meaning
that an attempted robbery had failed, since Marsh had previously told her that
he needed money and needed to rob someone to get the money. Pasture’s
statement to the police was read at trial. See N.T., 9/25/14, at 102-04.
Marsh argues that counsel should have objected to Pasture’s
interpretation of what he told her because it was based on speculation. His
argument on this issue, in full, is as follows.
Without any recollection as to when those conversations had
been, Pasture was purely speculating as to their relevance
to the statements [Marsh] made to her on March 5, 2012.
Without any factual foundation [or] support for her opinion,
such testimony was inadmissible speculation, and should
have been objected to by trial counsel. Counsel was
therefore ineffective for failing to object. Without this
testimony there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the trial would have [been] different.
Marsh’s Br. at 39.
Marsh provides no case law in support of his claim and offers only
conclusory statements without any further development. Marsh also does not
explain how the outcome of the trial would have been different absent
Pasture’s testimony. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 349 (Pa.Super. 2022) (an
“[a]ppellant’s failure to develop [his] claims with argument, applicable
authority, and pertinent analysis results in the waiver of his claims”);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2008) (an
- 13 -
J-S27045-26
“[a]ppellant’s failure to properly develop [a] claim and to set forth applicable
case law to advance it renders th[e] issue [] waived”).
Ineffectiveness Claim for Failing to Request Jury Instruction as to the
Testimony of Nija Pasture and Nicole Walton:
Marsh argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
jury instruction to give the testimony of Nija Pasture and Nicole Walton
“special scrutiny.” Marsh’s Br. at 40. He asserts that both witnesses testified
for the Commonwealth and “[e]ach were charged for their involvement in this
case and agreed to cooperate under pain of prosecution or parole violations,
or both.” Id. Marsh maintains that counsel should have requested
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction § 4.06, which
instructs the jury to give certain testimony special scrutiny. Id.
When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction:
[W]e must review the jury charge as a whole to determine
if it is fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in
phrasing its jury instructions, and can choose its own words
as long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately
presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court
commits an abuse of discretion only when there is an
inaccurate statement of the law.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). Moreover,
[a] jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge
as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to
mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A
charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably
misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission
which is tantamount to fundamental error. Consequently,
- 14 -
J-S27045-26
the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury
instructions.
Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury Instructions
themselves are not binding and do not alter the discretion afforded trial courts
in crafting jury instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are
guides only.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014).
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction § 4.06
provides as follows:
4.06 Certain Testimony Subject to Special Scrutiny
You should examine closely and carefully and receive with
caution the testimony of [name of witness] [any witness] if
you find that [he] [she] [was previously hypnotized]
[admitted that [he] [she] committed perjury at another
trial] [give specific situation].
Pa. SSJI (Crim) § 4.06 (2024). The Subcommittee Note to Section 4.06 states:
This instruction may be appropriate when the court wishes
to caution the jury about testimony that falls into a category
subject to special scrutiny, e.g., previously hypnotized
witness, admitted perjurer, and, possibly, child witness. It
should not be used with a category for which this manual
gives a more specific instruction (e.g., accomplice
testimony, informant).
Id. at Subcommittee Note.
Here, the record belies Marsh’s claim that Walton was given immunity
for her testimony. Walton specifically testified, and the Commonwealth
agreed, that Walton was not given any deals by the Commonwealth. See N.T.,
9/24/14, at 127-29. As to Pasture’s testimony, Marsh fails to show he was
prejudiced by the lack of a special scrutiny instruction. At trial, Pasture
- 15 -
J-S27045-26
testified that she had not received a deal from the Commonwealth but
anticipated getting a deal at her sentencing for her involvement in this case.
See N.T., 9/25/14, at 113-14. The jury was thus made aware of Pasture’s
cooperation with the Commonwealth. Moreover, the trial court instructed the
jury to judge the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, to consider
whether a witness had an interest in the outcome of the case, and to consider
whether bias, prejudice, or other motive affected a witness’s testimony. See
N.T., 9/29/14, at 76-78. Further, there was extensive evidence against Marsh
implicating him in the murder, including phone tracking information, co-
conspirator statements, Marsh’s blood at the door, and consciousness of guilt.
Marsh fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability the outcome
of the trial would have been different had a special scrutiny instruction been
given. No relief is due.3
____________________________________________
3 Marsh cites Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 639 A.2d 9, 13 (Pa 1994), in
support of his argument that counsel should have asked for a special scrutiny
instruction. However, Chmiel involved a different jury instruction – the
corrupt and polluted source instruction involving accomplices. See Pa. SSJI
(Crim) § 4.01 (2024). “[I]n any case where an accomplice implicates the
defendant, the judge should tell the jury that the accomplice is a corrupt and
polluted source whose testimony should be viewed with great caution.”
Chmiel, 639 A.2d at 13. The corrupt and polluted source charge “is designed
specifically to address situations where one accomplice testifies against the
other to obtain favorable treatment.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d
873, 906 (Pa. 2011).
In any event, the corrupt and polluted source charge would not have
been applicable because Pasture and Walton were not accomplices to the
crime. There was no allegation that either witness was involved in the crime.
Rather, their only involvement occurred after the robbery and murder when
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 16 -
J-S27045-26
Ineffectiveness Claim for Failing to Request Curative Instruction After Non-
Party Made Statement in the Gallery:
As set forth previously, after Marsh’s counsel finished cross-examining
Pasture, a lawyer sitting in the courtroom as a spectator said to Marsh’s
counsel, “Why did you cross[-]examine her? She didn’t hurt you.” N.T.,
9/25/14, at 136-37. The statement was made as the jury was about to exit
the courtroom for a lunch break and was transcribed by the court reporter.
Id. After the recess, Marsh’s counsel made a motion for a mistrial. The
following exchange transpired:
[Defense Counsel]: Prior to the conclusion before we broke
for lunch, Mr. Joe Santaguida, who was obviously not
testifying, was sitting in the front row, made a comment to
me in front of the jurors which I believe the jurors heard
because they all turned and looked at Mr. Santaguida, “Why
did you question her? She didn’t hurt you,” the implication
being that now I messed up the case and she did hurt me.
THE COURT: Well, I don’t know if the jurors did hear. I saw
them standing up but I was watching the jurors going out.
I think they were almost out. But, you know, okay. But
continue. I don’t want to interrupt you.
____________________________________________
they hindered the apprehension of Marsh. See, e.g., N.T., 3/9/22, at 19-20
(PCRA counsel acknowledging that Pasture and Walton were only charged with
hindering apprehension, were not accomplices, and there was no allegation
by the Commonwealth that they were involved in the perpetration of the
crime). “It is clear that jury instructions regarding particular crimes or
defenses are not warranted where the facts of the case do not support those
instructions.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 692 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa.
1997). Thus, Marsh’s counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
request a jury instruction that was inapplicable. See Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 299-300 (Pa. 2011) (“Counsel will not be held ineffective
for failing to request an instruction to which his client was not entitled”).
- 17 -
J-S27045-26
[Defense Counsel]: So I’m moving for a mistrial based on
that, Judge.
THE COURT: And that’s denied.
Id. at 139.
Marsh argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
curative instruction. He emphasizes that “Pennsylvania courts have made it a
practice to proffer a curative instruction when such an outburst is observed
by the jury.” Marsh’s Br. at 43 (citing Commonwealth. v. Philistin, 774 A.2d
741, 743 (Pa. 2001)). Marsh argues that a curative instruction would have
abated the prejudice he suffered by the outburst. Id. at 44. In his view,
“[c]ounsel had no reasonable strategic justification for his failure to request a
curative instruction, and there is a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if the required prejudice-diffusing steps had been taken.” Id. at 44-
45.
“The trial court has discretion to determine whether a party was
prejudiced by a spectator’s conduct.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d
24, 47 (Pa. 2011). “The trial court may implement any appropriate remedy
requested, including offering a remedial instruction, removing the responsible
spectator, or declaring a mistrial.” Id. “[U]nless the unavoidable effect of the
incident is to deny the defendant a fair trial, there is no error.” Philistin, 774
A.2d at 743 (citation omitted).
At the PCRA hearing, Marsh’s trial counsel explained his reason for not
requesting a curative instruction:
- 18 -
J-S27045-26
[PCRA Counsel]: Did you have any -- you moved for a
mistrial after that -- I will call it an outburst, and I do not
mean that in a derisive sense -- is there any reason why you
did not ask for a curative instruction after the mistrial was
denied?
[Trial Counsel]: I do remember this. I do not know if the
jurors were paying attention to him for one. I know that the
jurors were standing up and moving out of the room [at]
the time he said something. I do not know that I felt again
that I wanted to emphasize something that Mr. Santaguida
said. Jurors do not know him or what his rol[e] was. For me
to then bring it back and make it something important,
especially since he was criticizing me, I didn’t want to do
that.
N.T., 3/9/22, at 23-24.
Upon review, we find that trial counsel had a reasonable and strategic
basis for not requesting a curative instruction. It was unclear whether the jury
heard the spectator’s statement and trial counsel did not want to draw
attention to the statement. This claim fails.
Ineffectiveness Claim for Failing to Object to Prosecutorial Argument:
Marsh argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or
request a curative instruction after the Commonwealth made an improper
argument to the jury during its closing argument. Marsh’s Br. at 45. Marsh
asserts that the Commonwealth violated the “golden rule” when it asked the
jury to imagine themselves in the shoes of the victims. Id. Marsh points out
that “[s]uch exercises have been determined as a matter of law to be
improperly prejudicial to defendants as they seek to elicit jury response based
on emotionality and sympathy, rather than consideration of the facts in
evidence.” Id. Marsh argues that the Commonwealth’s statement was
- 19 -
J-S27045-26
significant because “the nature of the charges against [him], and the facts of
the case, created an unusually high risk of jurors confusing sympathy and
empathy for the victim with evidence of [his] guilt.” Id. at 46-47. He further
asserts that “the prejudice suffered by [him] was significant because of the
timing and context of the prosecution’s violation” and that “[b]y taking
advantage of the primacy effect, the prosecution flavored its entire closing
with prejudice when it elected to begin its closing with improper argument.”
Id. at 47. According to Marsh, “[a] curative instruction should have been given
to the jury to reinforce their duty to rule on the facts, not on sympathy,” and
counsel was ineffective for failing to request one. Id.
“Our review of a prosecutor’s comment and an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a defendant
received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d
606, 615 (Pa.Super. 2016). “[T]he prosecution is accorded reasonable
latitude, may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to the
jury, and may advance arguments supported by the evidence or use
inferences that can reasonably be derived therefrom.” Id. “A prosecutor has
great discretion during closing argument and is free to present his or her
closing arguments with logical force and vigor” as long as “there is a
reasonable basis in the record for the prosecutor’s comments.”
Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1273 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up).
“Challenged prosecutor comments must be considered in the context in which
they were made.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 517 (Pa.
- 20 -
J-S27045-26
2004) (citation omitted). A prosecutor’s comments do not constitute
reversible error “unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to
prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and a hostility toward
the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and
render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d 489, 498
(Pa.Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
Further, “even if the alleged statements by the prosecutor may have
been improper, we have held that not every intemperate or uncalled for
remark by a prosecutor requires a new trial.” Robinson, 864 A.2d at 517
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the
error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict, then the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the contested portion of the Commonwealth’s closing argument is
as follows:
We sit here in a clean, antiseptic courtroom, with bright
lights, staffed with professionals who are here every[day]
organized and doing the same thing, and the evidence is
presented to you in a neat way, and the court reporter takes
everything down and there’s a sheriff in the room and
everybody is safe. And that’s how you received the evidence
and that’s how it has to be, because if you allowed yourself
to feel and to see and to experience what that family
experienced, you wouldn’t be able to handle it. Neither
would I.
So I’m just going to ask you for the briefest of moments,
not for l