Com. v. Saccucci, M.

J-A11041-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARIO WILLIAM SACCUCCI : : Appellant : No. 1571 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000712-2024 BEFORE: BECK, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2026 Mario William Saccucci (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his plea to one count of harassment, graded as a summary offense. Appellant’s counsel, Michael J. Light, II, Esq. (“Attorney Light” or “counsel”), has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). We initially denied Attorney Light’s petition to withdraw based on a technical deficiency in his brief and ordered him to submit a compliant Anders brief or a merits brief. Attorney Light has renewed his request to withdraw and filed a new Anders brief. After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. In our prior memorandum, we set forth the history of this case as follows: J-A11041-26 On April 30, 2024, Lebanon City Police Department Officer Adam Rusz filed a criminal complaint. Because no factual summary was presented during the plea proceedings, we rely on the affidavit of probable cause. According to that document, Appellant went to the Lebanon County Courthouse on April 10, 2024, and filed a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) petition against his ex-wife, Lauren Saccucci. Appellant listed his address as 329 Acorn Circle in Lebanon. Lauren informed Officer Rusz “that this address was not [his] residence” and that Appellant “resides in Litiz[, Pennsylvania].” Officer Rusz visited the listed address and learned from the occupants that Appellant “never lived at this address and that [Appellant] was there one time.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/30/24, at 1. The form Appellant signed required the applicant to verify that the facts and statements are true and correct, and that “any false statements are made subject to the Penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.” Id. at 1 (quoting form signed by Appellant). The complaint filed one count under that statute, graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree. Appellant failed to appear for the preliminary hearing and a warrant was issued. The charge was held for court in his absence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 543(D)(3)(a) (authorizing preliminary hearing to proceed without defendant upon finding absence is without cause and after notice). Appellant failed to appear for several proceedings, resulting in bench warrants and several instances of apprehension. On November 7, 2024, Appellant waived formal arraignment and applied for court-appointed counsel. Attorney Light entered his appearance. The matter was postponed several times and on October 15, 2025, the Commonwealth submitted an amended criminal information charging Appellant with one count of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3), graded as a summary offense. Amended Criminal Information, 10/15/25. That same day, Appellant entered a guilty plea. The trial court read the statutory language and asked Appellant, “Do you understand that charge?” N.T., 10/15/25, at 2. Appellant replied, “I understand it, yes.” Id. The court asked, “And are you pleading guilty because you committed that offense, that [s]ummary offense?” Id. at 3. Appellant answered, “I’m pleading guilty because I feel this is my best course of action.” Id. The trial court did not ask for a factual summary from the Commonwealth or discuss the allegations. The trial court explained that the applicable -2- J-A11041-26 maximum sentence was 90 days’ incarceration or probation, or a fine of up to $300. Id. Attorney Light stated, “The only thing, Your Honor, is … a potential for some credit” due to his incarceration for his failures to appear. Id. Attorney Light stated he had requested records from the correctional facility to determine how many days Appellant spent in jail but “[Appellant] does not have any credit according to their records.” Id. Attorney Light then requested “a fine in this matter[.]” Id. The trial court sentenced Appellant to “pay a fine of $300.” Id. at 4. Following a brief discussion of where orders would be sent and how payments would be made, Appellant personally interjected. [APPELLANT]: Your Honor, just in light with the credit there, apparently there’s no record of it. There was two or three days – THE COURT: Do you want me to sentence you to jail or give you probation? [APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay good, because that’s the only way that comes in here. [APPELLANT]: That’s the only time that comes into play? THE COURT: That’s when it comes into play. [APPELLANT]: Okay. THE COURT: I didn’t sentence you to jail time so there’s no need for credit. Id. at 5-6. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal accompanied by a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement raising two issues: (1) the sentence was illegal under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760 (governing time credit for time spent in custody), and (2) Appellant “was coerced of [sic] accepting a fine in lieu of more jail time.” Concise Statement, 11/10/25. The trial court examined the record and calculated that, due to Appellant being detained at various times on his warrants he “may have been eligible for four days [of] time credit.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/25, at 4. The court concluded that this issue was -3- J-A11041-26 meritless because “considering the sentence imposed here was a fine with no jail time, time credit is not applicable.” Id. Addressing the coercion claim, the trial court pointed out that Attorney Light requested that the trial court impose a fine, and “the record is void of any evidence to support the … claim that he was coerced into accepting the fine in lieu of jail time.” Id. at 5. Commonwealth v. Saccucci, 1571 MDA 2025, 2026 WL 2057817, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed July 16, 2026) (non-precedential memorandum). Attorney Light sought to withdraw, but we concluded that the Anders brief was “non-compliant. Specifically, the brief fails to establish that Attorney Light independently reviewed the record. Reviewing all the materials, it appears that counsel only examined the issues Appellant personally wished to pursue.” Id. at *3. We thus denied the petition to withdraw and directed Attorney Light to file a compliant Anders brief or an advocate’s brief. On August 14, 2026, Attorney Light filed the instant Anders brief and accompanying petition to withdraw. We must again determine whether Attorney Light has complied with the law governing requests to withdraw on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted) (noting that, when appointed counsel files an Anders brief, we “may not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s request to withdraw.”). The withdrawal process entails both procedural and substantive requirements, and we begin with the former. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). -4- J-A11041-26 In order to be permitted to withdraw, counsel must meet three procedural requirements: 1) petition for leave to withdraw and state that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the Anders brief to the defendant; and 3) inform the defendant that he has the right to retain private counsel or raise, pro se, additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s attention. Commonwealth v. Strasser, 134 A.3d 1062, 1065 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Counsel filed a petition to withdraw certifying that he “reviewed the entire case independently and believes there are no issues for this Honorable Court to decide,” and concluded that “the entire appeal, including Appellant’s issues are meritless and/or frivolous.” Petition to Withdraw, 8/14/26, at ¶ 4; Anders Brief at 4 (“Undersigned counsel reviewed the entire record, including the affidavit of probable cause, the entire discovery packet, and the transcript of plea and sentencing hearing and believes the entire appeal is frivolous and without merit.”). Attorney Light attached a copy of the Anders brief to a letter informing Appellant of his rights to retain private counsel or raise pro se issues for our consideration.1 See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 749 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that counsel must inform client of their rights and append a copy of the letter to the petition). We find that Attorney Light satisfied the procedural requirements under Anders. ____________________________________________ 1Attorney Light also complied with this requirement in his first petition to withdraw. Appellant has not responded on either occasion. -5- J-A11041-26 We now examine whether the Anders brief meets the substantive requirements established by our Supreme Court. Counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). The brief satisfies these requirements. Counsel details the factual and procedural background of the case, refers to the record where warranted, concludes that any appeal would be frivolous, and examines caselaw pertinent to the issues that could be raised on appeal, including the issues Appellant personally identified. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel has complied with the minimum requirements of Anders and Santiago. We now proceed to examine the merits of the appeal, beginning with the issues identified by counsel. See Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (explaining that “we must give Anders a most generous reading and review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with consideration first of issues raised by counsel”). The brief presents two issues, both of which pertain to the trial court’s decision to impose a fine. The first issue is whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760, which governs the application of time credit. The relevant provision states: -6- J-A11041-26 Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1). The Anders brief concludes that the issue is frivolous because Appellant’s sanction was a $300 fine and the statute applies “only [to] sentences for which jail is imposed.” Anders Brief at 6. We agree. The statutory text requires application of time credit “against the maximum term and any minimum term,” which is facially inapplicable where the only penalty imposed is a fine.2 Appellant was not entitled to any time credit and the sentence is not illegal. The second issue identified by counsel addresses Appellant’s “contention . . . that he was coerced in accepting the fine in lieu of more jail time.” Id. at 8. The basis for this claim is that Attorney Light informed the trial court there may be some time credit due to Appellant’s incarceration for his failures to appear. Attorney Light then stated he had requested records from the correctional facility to determine how many days Appellant had spent in jail but “[Appellant] does not have any credit according to their records.” N.T., 10/15/25, at 3. Attorney Light then requested “a fine in this matter[.]” Id. ____________________________________________ 2 It appears that Appellant does not actually contend that the trial court was required to apply time credit towards his fine. Rather, he hoped that the trial court would consider his time in jail as sufficiently punitive. -7- J-A11041-26 The trial court sentenced Appellant to “pay a fine of $300.” Id. at 4. Shortly thereafter, Appellant personally interjected. [APPELLANT]: Your Honor, just in light with the credit there, apparently there’s no record of it. There was two or three days – THE COURT: Do you want me to sentence you to jail or give you probation? [APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay good, because that’s the only way that comes in here. [APPELLANT]: That’s the only time that comes into play? THE COURT: That’s when it comes into play. [APPELLANT]: Okay. THE COURT: I didn’t sentence you to jail time so there’s no need for credit. Id. at 5-6. It is not clear why Appellant believed this amounts to coercion, but in any event the record establishes that Attorney Light requested that the trial court impose a fine, which was a tactical choice that counsel “believed was appropriate” in connection with the plea. Anders Brief at 9. Therefore, the trial court did not “coerce” Appellant to accept a fine; he, through his counsel, requested that sanction. As a result, this claim of trial court coercion is frivolous. Finally, Attorney Light also addresses a footnote in our memorandum denying the initial petition to withdraw, wherein we noted that the plea colloquy contained no factual recitation. We stated: “We do not suggest that -8- J-A11041-26 this claim is worthy of a merits brief; we highlight that point only to reiterate the value (and necessity) of, inter alia, conducting a complete review of the record.” Saccucci, 2026 WL 2057817, at *4 n.4. Attorney Light concluded that any claim challenging the validity of the plea was frivolous, because it “was entered into by a negotiated plea between the Commonwealth and Appellant[,] and Appellant was advised of the first amended information.” Anders Brief at 9. We agree that the claim is frivolous in that a challenge to the plea, if successful, would result in invalidating an agreement that Appellant wished to accept upon consultation with plea counsel.3 Moreover, Appellant failed to preserve the claim for review because he did not raise a challenge to the plea ____________________________________________ 3 In Commonwealth v. Ranker, we observed: It is not clear that an attorney could object to a defective colloquy based on an allegation the facts are insufficient to justify a plea that the defendant wishes to take. “[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal[.]” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Commonwealth v. Ranker, 1162 WDA 2024, 2026 WL 1067504 at *5 n.4 (Pa. Super. filed April 20, 2026) (non-precedential memorandum). We expressed skepticism that “an attorney may unilaterally override a defendant’s desire to take a plea bargain if the prosecutor’s factual summary is inadequate.” Furthermore, in this case there is no indication Appellant has any desire to undo the guilty plea itself and proceed to trial on the original charge. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (authorizing citation to non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value). -9- J-A11041-26 colloquy in post-sentence motions.4 See Commonwealth v. D’Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that a challenge to a guilty plea based on the failure to present sufficient evidence was waived “because trial counsel failed to preserve the issue by objecting at the sentence colloquy or otherwise raising the issue at the sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence motion”). We now “conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. Our review of the record establishes no additional nonfrivolous preserved issues. To the extent that Appellant’s complaints are based on counsel’s decision to request a fine, i.e., a claim of plea counsel ineffectiveness, we note that Appellant is statutorily ineligible for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act.5 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining that “[b]y specifically limiting its scope to those sentences involving imprisonment, probation or parole, the PCRA does not provide relief to those ____________________________________________ 4 There is no right to post-sentence motions in summary cases where the appellant received a de novo trial on appeal from a magistrate district judge’s disposition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D). Here, the conviction did not result from a de novo trial following appeal and Appellant therefore was permitted to file post-sentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Chaffer, 1760 EDA 2025, 2026 WL 1470135 at *2 n.4 (Pa. Super. filed May 26, 2026) (non- precedential memorandum) (concluding that Rule 720(D) did not apply to a case originally charged as a misdemeanor). We deem Chaffer persuasive. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). 5 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 – 9546. - 10 - J-A11041-26 petitioners whose only sentence is a fine”). The Supreme Court has authorized courts to entertain ineffectiveness claims during post-sentence motions in such cases, Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 362 (Pa. 2018), but those claims must still be presented to the trial court for consideration in the first instance. Furthermore, Attorney Light cannot raise his own ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, --- A.3d ----, 2026 WL 2045463, *3 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2026) (noting that an attorney “is barred from arguing his own ineffective assistance”). Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/27/2026 - 11 -