Com. v. Francis, L.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket3051 EDA 2025
JudgeBeck
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LORA MARIE FRANCIS :
:
Appellant : No. 3051 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 29, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000495-2025
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Lora Marie Francis (“Francis”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered by the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)
following her guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance (“DUI”) – highest rate of alcohol, accidents involving damage to an
attended vehicle or property, and driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked.1 On appeal, Francis argues that the trial court erred
by treating her prior conviction for DUI in West Virginia as a prior offense and
treating the instant conviction as her fourth or more in ten years for grading
and sentencing purposes. After careful consideration, we conclude that the
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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(c), 3743(a), 1543(b)(1)(iii).
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West Virginia statute is “substantially similar” to Pennsylvania’s DUI statute.
We therefore affirm Francis’ judgment of sentence.
Based upon the claim raised for our review, a full recitation of the facts
underlying Francis’ conviction is unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that on
the night of August 11, 2024, Francis was driving with a blood alcohol content
(“BAC”) of .164%, during which she struck and damaged a pickup truck.
The Commonwealth charged Francis with DUI – highest rate of alcohol
and numerous related offenses. Her DUI – highest rate of alcohol charge
under section 3802(c) was graded as a second-degree felony as her fourth
offense in the last ten years based upon her two prior convictions of DUI in
Centre County, Pennsylvania and a 2017 conviction of DUI in West Virginia
under W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2016).2 Pertinent to this appeal, an
individual who violates section 3802(c) and has three or more prior DUI
offenses commits a second-degree felony and is subject to enhanced penalties
under Pennsylvania’s graduated sentencing scheme for repeat offenders. See
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3803(b)(4.1)(ii), 3804(c)(3). Relatedly, section 3806 provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term
“prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction
for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication
of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of
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2 The record contains little to no details regarding Francis’ three prior DUI
convictions, including neither the dates of the offenses nor the convictions.
She nonetheless conceded that she committed these past offenses. See
Motion, 4/2/2025, ¶¶ 7-17.
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Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary
disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any
of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
(2) an offense under former section 3731;
(3) an offense substantially similar to an offense under
paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or
(4) any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph (1),
(2) or (3).
(b) Timing.--
(1) For purposes of … 3804 (relating to penalties) …, the prior
offense must have occurred:
(i) within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for
which the defendant is being sentenced; or
(ii) on or after the date of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a), (b)(1) (emphasis added).
On April 2, 2025, Francis filed a motion in which she requested that the
trial court declare that her West Virginia DUI conviction did not constitute a
prior offense under section 3806. Therein, she contended that W. Va. Code §
17C-5-2(e) (2016) was not substantially similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI statute,
and she therefore had only two prior DUI offenses for purposes of grading and
sentencing. See Motion, 4/2/2025, ¶¶ 7-17. On June 23, 2025, the trial court
denied the motion.
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On August 26, 2025, Francis entered a negotiated plea to the above-
referenced offenses. On October 29, 2025, the trial court treated Francis’ DUI
– highest rate of alcohol conviction as her fourth or subsequent offense for
grading and sentencing purposes under sections 3803(b)(4.1)(ii), 3804(c)(3),
and 3806(a)(3), and (b)(1) of the Vehicle Code and sentenced Francis to
twenty to forty months of incarceration on that charge. The court also
sentenced her to a concurrent term of six to twelve months of incarceration
for driving while her operating privilege was suspended or revoked.
Francis timely appealed to this Court. She presents the following issue
for review:
Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion
in determining that the [DUI] offense for which [Francis] was
sentenced on October 29, 2025 was a fourth offense within ten
years because her prior offense for [DUI] in violation of [W. Va.
Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2016)] was not substantially similar to 75
Pa.C.S.[] § 3802(c) and therefore cannot be considered a prior
offense under 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3806?
Francis’ Brief at 4.
Francis’ claim, challenging the grading of her DUI – highest rate of
alcohol conviction, implicates the legality of her sentence. Commonwealth
v. Dourlain, 315 A.3d 868, 872 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). “For
issues challenging the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de
novo, and the scope of our review is plenary.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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Additionally, because Francis’ claim requires us to interpret statutory
language, we must abide by the Statutory Construction Act. 3
Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2022). The paramount
principle of the Statutory Construction Act is that “[t]he object of all
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The General
Assembly’s intent is first and foremost to be discerned through the plain
language of the statutory provision in question. Commonwealth v.
Coleman, 285 A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)
(“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).
“Therefore, when the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they will
be given effect consistent with their plain and common meaning.” Gamby,
283 A.3d at 306. Courts must also interpret and apply the statute as it is
written, and we must not “insert words into a statute that are plainly not
there.” Commonwealth v. Green, 291 A.3d 317, 327 (Pa. 2023) (citation
and brackets omitted).
Pennsylvania DUI Law
For a DUI offense in another jurisdiction to constitute a “prior offense”
pursuant to section 3806, the offense must be “substantially similar” to an
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3 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
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offense under section 3802. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a)(1), (3). This analysis
requires us to look beyond the words of the statutes at issue and examine the
scope of the prohibited conduct, as defined by the respective legislatures and
state courts. Dourlain, 315 A.3d at 873 (citing Scott v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 291, 298 (Pa.
2002)); see also id. at 874-77. If an out-of-state statute solely punishes
conduct that is not criminalized by Pennsylvania’s DUI law, the two will not be
found to be substantially similar. See id. at 877 (holding Ohio’s “physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence” statute was not substantially
similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI statute because it “punishe[d] conduct that
would not be a crime under Pennsylvania’s DUI statute”).
Pennsylvania’s DUI statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General impairment.--
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing
a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
(2) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing
a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol
concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least
0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours after the
individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical
control of the movement of the vehicle.
(b) High rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, operate
or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after
imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol
concentration in the individual's blood or breath is at least 0.10%
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but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has
driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
(c) Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is 0.16%
or higher within two hours after the individual has driven,
operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of
the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)-(c). Consistent in each subsection of the DUI statute is
the requirement that the individual “drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle.” Id.; see also Dourlain, 315 A.3d at
874.
Our Supreme Court has distilled the phrase “to drive, operate, or be in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle,” to mean that a person
must have driven the vehicle while intoxicated to be guilty of DUI under
section 3802. Bold v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 320
A.3d 1185 (Pa. 2024). In Bold, a police officer found the defendant in an
intoxicated state in the driver’s seat of a stationary and legally parked vehicle
with the engine running and the headlights illuminated. Id. at 1187. Although
the officer admitted that he had no evidence that the defendant had driven
the vehicle while intoxicated, he arrested him and took him to a nearby
hospital where the defendant refused to consent to a blood draw. Id. at 1187-
88. Because of this refusal, the defendant was subject to a driver’s license
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suspension. Id. at 1187; see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.4 The defendant
appealed the suspension, which the trial court overturned, finding no evidence
that the defendant was “in control of the movement of the vehicle at any time
before he was arrested for [DUI].” Bold, 320 A.3d at 1188. An en banc panel
of the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated
the suspension. Id. at 1189.
Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to clarify the definition
of the phrase “to drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle” in the DUI statute, and whether vehicle movement is
required for application of sections 1547 and 3802 of the Vehicle Code. Id.
at 1187, 1191-95. The Court recognized the presumption against finding
statutory language to be surplusage but found the terms “driving,”
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4 Section 1547 provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this
Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or
more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a
controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual
physical control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of
section 1543(b)(1.1) (relating to driving while operating privilege
is suspended or revoked), 3802 (relating to driving under
influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or 3808(a)(2)
(relating to illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with
ignition interlock).
75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a).
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“operating,” and “actual physical control of the movement,” to be similar in
meaning. Id. at 1193-96. The Supreme Court explained, for example, that
the term “‘operates’ plainly encompasses ‘driving’ and arguably subsumes
‘actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle’ as well. Once a [vehicle]
moves under a person’s control, it clearly has been operated.” Id. at 1194.
Additionally, the Court explained that “the title of section 3802 refers only to
driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance, even as its body
adds operation and actual physical control of the movement to the mix.” Id.
The Supreme Court therefore reasoned that “[t]he use of the word
‘actual’ as well as the definite article in ‘the movement’ at least suggest that
the driver actually has to have done something, that there was an actual
movement near in time to the police encounter—or at least reasonable
grounds to suspect such actual movement.” Id. at 1193. In short, the Court
held that “the Vehicle Code’s provisions pertaining to DUI aim to deter one
hazardous behavior that imperils public safety and one only: driving under the
influence,” and thus “the statute must be interpreted in service of its clear
intention to deter, detect, and punish intoxicated driving.” Id. at 1197-98
(explaining that “control of the movement [of a vehicle] requires some
suspicion of driving, commonly understood”), 1201 (emphasis in original).
Because the officer conceded that he had no reason to believe that the
defendant had been driving while intoxicated, the Court concluded that the
defendant should not have been subject to a license suspension under section
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1547. Id. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Commonwealth Court’s
decision. Id.
West Virginia’s DUI Statute
The statutory provision under which Francis was previously convicted in
West Virginia provided, in pertinent part:
Any person who drives a vehicle in this state: (i) while he or she
is in an impaired state or (ii) while he or she is in an impaired
state but has an alcohol concentration in his or her blood of less
than fifteen hundredths of one percent by weight, is guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in
jail for up to six months and shall be fined not less than $100 nor
more than $500: Provided, That a person sentenced pursuant to
this subsection shall receive credit for any period of actual
confinement he or she served upon arrest for the subject offense.
W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2016) (effective June 10, 2016 to June 2, 2019)
(emphasis in original). The provision further provides that “‘impaired state’
means a person … [i]s under the influence of alcohol … or … [h]as an alcohol
concentration in his or her blood of eight hundredths of one percent or more,
by weight.” Id. § 17C-5-2(a)(1)(A), (E). Thus, this provision prohibited a
person from driving a vehicle while intoxicated or with a BAC of .08% or more
but less than .15%. See § 17C-5-2(e).
Although the statute does not define the term “drives” and the caselaw
from West Virginia regarding the term is scant, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia has stated that under section 17C-5-2,
movement of a vehicle is an essential element of the statutory
requirement, [but] the mere movement of a vehicle does not
necessarily, in every circumstance, constitute a ‘driving’ of the
vehicle. To ‘drive’ a vehicle necessarily implies a driver or
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operator and an affirmative or positive action on the part of the
driver. A mere movement of the vehicle might occur without any
affirmative act by a driver, or, in fact by any person. If a vehicle
is moved by some power beyond the control of the driver, or by
accident, it is not such an affirmative or positive action on the part
of the driver as will constitute a driving of a vehicle within the
meaning of the statute.
State v. Taft, 102 S.E.2d 152, 154 (W. Va. 1958). Additionally, West Virginia
law
does not require that a police officer actually see or observe a
person move, drive, or operate a motor vehicle while the officer is
physically present before the officer can charge that person with
DUI under this statute, so long as all the surrounding
circumstances indicate the vehicle could not otherwise be located
where it is unless it was driven there by that person.
Montgomery v. State Police, 600 S.E.2d 223, 229 (W. Va. 2004) (citation
omitted).
Francis’ Arguments
Francis argues that West Virginia’s DUI statute is not substantially
similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI statute for two reasons. First, she contends that
“the Pennsylvania [s]tatute punishes conduct that would not necessarily be
an offense under applicable West Virginia law.” Francis’ Brief at 15. Francis
asserts that the Pennsylvania DUI statute “requires, at a minimum, some
evidence that an intoxicated motorist exercised control over the movement of
a vehicle which can occur while a vehicle is not moving,” while “the West
Virgina [s]tatute specifically sets forth the term ‘drives’ and, without a
definition of that term appearing in the [s]tatute, is suggestive of a motorist
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actively doing something to move a vehicle from one physical location to
another.” Id.
Second, Francis contends that the Pennsylvania DUI statute contains an
element that is not present in the West Virginia statute. Id. at 13-16.
Specifically, she points to section 3802(c), which “prohibits driving, operating
or being in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle” where the
individuals’ BAC “is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual
has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of
the vehicle.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). In contrast, the West Virginia
statute contains no time restriction regarding measuring an individual’s BAC
after having driven a vehicle. Id. at 15. Francis therefore contends that West
Virginia’s statute punishes conduct that would not be a crime in Pennsylvania,
as an individual could drive a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania at a time when
their BAC was above the legal limit and there was no proof that that their BAC
exceeded the legal limit within two hours of driving. Id. at 16.
Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court determined that Francis’ West Virginia DUI conviction
constituted a “prior offense” for purposes of sentencing under section 3806.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/2025, at 4-5. The court explained that Francis “was
convicted in West Virginia under a statute that prohibited a person from
driving while under the influence of alcohol or with a BAC of .08% or higher
but less than 0.15%,” and thus, “[c]learly, this West Virginia statute is
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designed to prevent persons from driving while incapable of safe driving due
to alcohol intoxication.” Id. at 4. The trial court therefore found that as
section “3802(a)(1) and the West Virginia statute prohibit comparable
conduct, the two statutes are substantially similar.” Id.
Regarding Pennsylvania’s requirement that the defendant’s BAC be
measured within two hours after the individual has driven, the trial court found
it “irrelevant that West Virginia did not require the blood to be drawn within
two hours of driving, as both statutes are designed to prevent a person from
driving while impaired due to alcohol consumption.” Id. The court explained
that the “fact that Pennsylvania includes an additional requirement regarding
the timing of blood alcohol testing is a distinction without legal significance,”
as the “West Virginia statute at issue directly addresses the same public safety
concerns as Pennsylvania’s general impairment and highest BAC offenses.”
Id. at 4-5.
Analysis
Reviewing the Pennsylvania and West Virginia DUI statutes and how the
courts of each state have interpreted the operative language of each provision,
the scope of the conduct that West Virginia’s DUI statute prohibits is nearly
identical to what Pennsylvania’s DUI statute prohibits. Compare 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3802, with W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(e) (2016); see also Bold, 320 A.3d at
1193-96, 1201; Taft, 102 S.E.2d at 154. Put simply, both statutes punish an
individual for having driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of
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alcohol. Id. Thus, this is not a case where the West Virginia statute punishes
conduct that would not be a crime in Pennsylvania. See Dourlain, 315 A.3d
at 877.
In support of her position, Francis relies on Commonwealth v. Leib,
588 A.2d 922 (Pa. Super. 1991). In that case, this Court stated,
The crime of driving under the influence can be committed not
only by a person who drives but also by one who “operates” or is
“in actual physical control” of the movement of a vehicle. A person
does not drive unless he actually has the vehicle in motion,
however, a person may operate or be in actual physical control of
the movement of a standing vehicle. These terms are more
comprehensive than the term drive. (They cover certain
situations where a person under the influence is a threat to public
safety even though he is not driving at the time.) Thus[,] a person
operates a vehicle if he is in actual physical control of either the
machinery of the motor vehicle or the movement of the vehicle
itself.
Id. at 926 (citation omitted).
Francis’ reliance on Leib is misplaced. First, section 3806 requires only
that Pennsylvania encompass the conduct prohibited by the other jurisdiction’s
statute, not the other way around. To the extent that Pennsylvania’s statute
had previously been interpreted to punish driving under the influence as well
as other conduct not encompassed by West Virginia’s statute, it is of no
moment, because Francis’ conduct of driving under the influence of alcohol in
West Virginia is also a crime under Pennsylvania’s DUI law. As the conduct
for which she was convicted in West Virginia also would have constituted DUI
if committed in Pennsylvania, the two are substantially similar.
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Additionally, our Supreme Court’s decision in Bold overrules this aspect
of Leib. Leib predates Bold, which, as discussed above, set forth intervening
authority from our Supreme Court clarifying the conduct that the Pennsylvania
DUI statute prohibits. While generally “[i]t is beyond the power of a Superior
Court panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court,” an exception
exists “in circumstances where intervening authority by our Supreme Court
calls into question a previous decision of this Court.” Commonwealth v.
Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 700 (Pa. Super. 2021). Tellingly, Francis does not
cite Bold in her appellate brief and thus does not explain how Leib could
remain good law following Bold. We therefore find Francis’ reliance on Leib
unavailing.
As to Francis’ argument regarding Pennsylvania’s two-hour rule as a
differentiator between the Pennsylvania and West Virginia statutes at issue,
we find her contention meritless. As stated above, the Pennsylvania DUI
statute states that for an individual to be guilty under section 3802(a)(2), (b),
or (c), there must be evidence that the individual’s BAC exceeded the limits
set forth in those provisions within two hours after the individual drove. See
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (a)(2), (b), (c). The two-hour rule, however, ultimately
affects only the grading and sentencing of the individual’s DUI offense. See
id. § 3803(a), (b). It has nothing to do with the conduct the statute seeks to
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prohibit, namely, driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 5
See id. § 3802; see also Bold, 320 A.3d at 1193-96, 1201.
Further, the two-hour rule is not absolute, as subsection (g) of section
3802 provides:
(g) Exception to two-hour rule.--Notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) or (h), where alcohol
or controlled substance concentration in an individual's blood or
breath is an element of the offense, evidence of such alcohol or
controlled substance concentration more than two hours after the
individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control
of the movement of the vehicle is sufficient to establish that
element of the offense under the following circumstances:
(1) where the Commonwealth shows good cause explaining
why the chemical test sample could not be obtained within
two hours; and
(2) where the Commonwealth establishes that the individual
did not imbibe any alcohol or utilize a controlled substance
between the time the individual was arrested and the time
the sample was obtained.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(g). Moreover, the two-hour rule does not apply to a
Pennsylvania DUI where the person is found to have been driving under the
influence of alcohol to the extent it renders the person “incapable of safely
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5 We note that under the West Virginia DUI statute, “[a] sample or specimen
taken to determine the alcohol concentration of a person’s blood, must be
taken within two hours from the time of the person’s arrest.” W. Va. Code §
17C-5-8(g)(1) (2026). Thus, West Virginia also has a two-hour rule. The sole
distinction between the Pennsylvania and West Virginia two-hour rules is that
the Pennsylvania statute requires the individual’s BAC to be measured within
two hours of driving, while the West Virginia statute requires the BAC to be
measured within two hours of arrest. Compare 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(2), (b),
(c), with W. Va. Code § 17C-5-8(g)(1) (2026).
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driving[.]” Id. § 3802(a)(1). In fact, no evidence of BAC is necessary to
support a conviction under subsection (a)(1).
Based on the foregoing, we decline to find that the two-hour rule renders
West Virginia’s DUI statute not substantially similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI
statute. Accordingly, we hold that West Virginia’s DUI offense, W. Va. Code
§ 17C-5-2(e) (2016), as interpreted and construed by its courts, is
substantially similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI offense.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err in determining that the West Virginia statute
at issue is substantially similar to Pennsylvania’s DUI statue. Thus, the trial
court likewise did not err in treating Francis’ prior conviction of DUI in West
Virginia as a prior offense pursuant to section 3806(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code
and grading Francis’ instant conviction of DUI as her fourth or subsequent
offense in ten years. Accordingly, we affirm Francis’ judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 11/18/2026
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