Com. v. Stansbury, K.

J-S25042-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KAREEM J. STANSBURY : : Appellant : No. 3134 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006485-2014 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KAREEM J. STANSBURY : : Appellant : No. 245 EDA 2026 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 6, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006484-2014 BEFORE: SULLIVAN, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2026 In these consolidated appeals,1 Kareem J. Stansbury (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we affirm the order denying relief. ____________________________________________ 1 This Court consolidated Appellant’s cases sua sponte on February 6, 2026. J-S25042-26 This Court previously summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions in our decision affirming the dismissal of Appellant’s first PCRA petition as follows: Appellant drove up to a home in Philadelphia and fired shots at two individuals sitting on the porch: Abdul Scott, his brother, and Rachel Ostrow, a resident of the building. Appellant was charged with various crimes related to the incident at two separate docket numbers: one as to victim Scott (CP-51-CR-0006485-2014) and one as to victim Ostrow (CP-51-CR-0006484-2014). The two cases proceeded to a consolidated trial, at which Appellant exercised his right to represent himself. After a mistrial and a second trial, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and other firearm-related crimes. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five to seventy years of incarceration, followed by seven years of probation. Appellant's pro se direct appeal, involving both lower-court docket numbers, resulted in no relief. Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 190 A.3d 719 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 158 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 235 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2020).2 On November 5, 2019, Appellant filed an untimely, second PCRA petition, claiming that his sentence was illegal and asserting issues involving double jeopardy and due process. On September 14, 2021, Appellant filed a ____________________________________________ 2 Appellant had filed a timely pro se PCRA petition challenging, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence. Appointed counsel filed a no-merit letter and petition to withdraw under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), maintaining that the issues raised were previously litigated. The PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the denial of relief. Stansbury, supra, 219 A.3d at 162. -2- J-S25042-26 motion for leave to amend his pending petition, a proposed amended petition, and a memorandum of law. Appellant’s pleadings did not address any timeliness issue. The PCRA court did not grant Appellant leave to amend his petition, and dismissed it without a hearing. This Court affirmed the denial of relief, finding that the petition was untimely, without a statutory exception. Commonwealth v. Stansbury, Nos. 215 EDA 2023, 2023 WL 6001117 (Pa. Super. filed September 15, 2023) (unpublished memorandum). While litigation of Appellant’s second PCRA petition was pending, Appellant pursued relief in the federal courts. During this process, Appellant received information from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office regarding police officers that had investigated his case. On September 25, 2023, days after we affirmed the dismissal of his second PCRA petition, Appellant filed the PCRA petition underlying these appeals, asserting that police officers had engaged in misconduct while investigating his case. 3 The PCRA court initially filed a notice that it intended to dismiss the petition as untimely filed, without exception. Appellant contended that the governmental interference exception and the newly discovered fact exceptions applied, making his petition timely. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed Appellant’s petition on November 6, 2025. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the PCRA court filed a ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant also filed a variety of pro se motions, including a motion for bail pending PCRA relief, a motion seeking funding for experts, and several motions seeking to expedite the resolution of his PCRA petition. -3- J-S25042-26 memorandum on November 14, 2025, explaining that it dismissed the petition as untimely.4 Appellant has raised the following issues in his Brief to this Court: 1. Did the PCRA court err[] when it dismissed the petition as untimely under the government interference exception and the newly discovered fact exception, when the PCRA court conflated the timeliness analysis with a merits analysis in violation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holdings in Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848 (Pa. 2005) and Commonwealth v. Abu- Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2008). 2. Whether extraordinary circumstances exists, when the clerk’s office failed to properly docket the Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss resulting in the deprivation of a pretrial hearing and prejudice and the trial court relying on that mistake and not conducting a hearing or ruling on the motion to dismiss or conducting the two step speedy trial analysis which the previous panel in this case also failed to conduct. Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered page 3. “We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Min, 320 A.3d 727, 730 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). The scope of our review is “limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). We defer to the factual findings of the post-conviction court, which was tasked with hearing the evidence and ____________________________________________ 4 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a statement under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). -4- J-S25042-26 assessing witness credibility. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023). The PCRA court’s legal determinations, however, are subject to de novo review. Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012). Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first determine whether his petition was timely filed. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. The PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of the petition. In other words, Pennsylvania law makes clear [that] no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). Further, the PCRA provides three exceptions to the timeliness requirement: Generally, to obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one year after the sentence became final; the Appellant must allege and prove at least one of the three timeliness exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The Appellant must allege and prove: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; -5- J-S25042-26 (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The PCRA petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies to their case. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa. 2008). Any petition invoking a timeliness exception under this section “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, it is well-settled that “no court may disregard, alter, or create equitable exceptions to the timeliness requirement in order to reach the substance of a petitioner's arguments.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 324 A.3d 569, 576 (Pa. Super. 2024), appeal denied, 333 A.3d 304 (Pa. 2025). In the case at bar, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on April 17, 2018. Appellant’s judgment of sentence thus became final on May 17, 2018, when the thirty-day period for seeking review with our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (“a petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 310 A.3d 94, 103 (Pa. 2024) (holding that, for PCRA purposes, the appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final when the time expires for -6- J-S25042-26 seeking direct review of a judgment of sentence). Accordingly, Appellant had until May 17, 2019, to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (“Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final”). Appellant’s PCRA petition was filed on September 25, 2023, making it patently untimely. Appellant claims that both the governmental interference and the newly discovered fact exceptions apply to his PCRA petition such that it should be deemed timely and reviewed on the merits. In support of his claim of governmental interference, Appellant maintains that, during the litigation of his federal habeas corpus claim, via a letter dated September 9, 2022, he received a disclosure packet from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, informing him that Sergeant Todd Landherr, Officer Jesus Cruz, and Officer Ricardo Rosa had been identified as “officers who may have engaged in misconduct that necessitates disclosure.” See, Letter dated 9/9/2022 to Appellant, attached to his pro se PCRA petition as Exhibit A, filed September 25, 2023 (“Exhibit A”). Appellant also claims to have discovered that other officers in his case have appeared on a “do not call” list. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth had suppressed this evidence relating to the officers’ misconduct, amounting to a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which in turn establishes the governmental interference exception to the timeliness requirement. -7- J-S25042-26 Nowhere in his petition or his Brief to this Court does Appellant state when he received this information with any more specificity; accordingly, we use the September 9, 2022 date as the date of disclosure. See Natividad, 200 A.3d at 28 (finding that the date of the disclosure of the information to the petitioner, i.e., the date that the Commonwealth produced the information, is the proper date to use when determining if a petition was timely). We repeat that, for any claim regarding this letter to be timely raised, Appellant’s PCRA petition must have been filed within one year of his discovery of that information. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). However, we note that Appellant’s discovery occurred while his previous PCRA petition was pending on appeal. Because the prior petition was on appeal, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate issues related to the case. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000) (“[W]hen an appellant’s PCRA appeal is pending before a court, a subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until the resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition[.]”). See also Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 364 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (holding that “Lark precludes consideration of a subsequent petition from the time a PCRA order is appealed until no further review of that order is possible”). Appellant could not file a new PCRA petition based upon this new information until the prior appeal was complete. “Where a prior petition is pending on appeal, a subsequent petition must be filed within the time limits -8- J-S25042-26 set forth in Section 9545(b)(2) as measured from the date of the order that finally resolves the appeal in the prior petition, because that date is the first date the claim could be presented.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 963 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis added). Here, Appellant’s appeal of his prior petition became final when this Court affirmed the denial of relief on September 15, 2023. The PCRA petition under review was filed on September 25, 2023. As the petition was filed within one year of the resolution of Appellant’s prior appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding it untimely. Accordingly, we consider the merits of his claims on appeal.5 Brady violation Appellant has asserted that the Commonwealth’s failure to turn over evidence related to the misconduct of officers in his trial is a Brady violation. “It is well-settled [that] a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception.” Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa. 2019). To obtain relief under this theory, a petitioner “must plead and prove ____________________________________________ 5 Because we conclude that Appellant filed his PCRA petition within the prescribed time period, we acknowledge that we could remand for the PCRA court to address Appellant’s claims in the first instance. However, because we find Appellant’s claims are meritless, remand would be futile, and remand is therefore unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 805 (Pa. 2014) (noting that an appellate court need not remand when a remand would be futile). Moreover, we note that the PCRA court did not address the merits of Appellant’s claims; however, this Court may affirm the denial of PCRA relief on any legal basis supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021). -9- J-S25042-26 the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). An appellant must prove three things to establish a Brady violation, “(1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 84 (Pa. 2012). Brady imposes an affirmative duty on the Commonwealth to disclose to the defendant all favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment, even in the absence of a request for the same. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 638-39 (Pa. 2024). Brady material has also been held to include evidence that would impeach the credibility of a witness, i.e., evidence of dishonest acts, bias, motive, and any other evidence tending to affect witness credibility. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1130 (Pa. 2011). “In order to be entitled to a new trial for failure to disclose evidence affecting a witness’s credibility, the defendant must demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence.” Id. at 1130-31. Evidence of police misconduct in an unrelated case may be relevant for impeachment purposes. Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016). - 10 - J-S25042-26 Moreover, while impeachment evidence may attack the credibility of a primary witness against the accused and can be critical evidence that is material to a case, “mere conjecture … is not sufficient to establish a Brady violation.” Chmiel, supra, 30 A.3d at 1131. Defendants alleging a Brady violation face a high bar, as “[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 887 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant attached a letter from the District Attorney’s Office stating that Officers Ricardo Rosa, Jesus Cruz, and then-Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Todd Landherr “may have engaged in misconduct that necessitates disclosure.” See Exhibit A. The offensive material related to Officer Cruz involves Facebook posts which purportedly exhibit racial bias. However, Officer Jesus Cruz did not testify at Appellant’s trial. Thus, the credibility of this officer was not directly determinative of Appellant’s guilt. Appellant’s brief does not even mention Officer Cruz at all, or explain how he was involved in the investigation into his case. In sum, Appellant fails to develop an argument that the Commonwealth concealed any evidence regarding this officer prior to his trial and has not demonstrated how misconduct evidence concerning Officer Cruz was material - 11 - J-S25042-26 to his defense; accordingly, there can be no Brady violation related to this officer. Chmiel, supra. Officer Ricardo Rosa did testify at Appellant’s trial as he was the first officer to respond to the 911 call. See N.T. Trial (Jury), 5/25/16, at 201-221. According to Exhibit A, Officer Rosa was under investigation stemming from testimony provided in an unrelated case that occurred on December 6, 2019. Appellant was convicted on May 27, 2016. Appellant does not explain how the officer’s alleged misconduct in December 2019 impacted his 2016 conviction; in fact, like with Officer Cruz or any of the officers included in the disclosure letter, he utterly fails to argue how Officer Rosa committed misconduct in this case. More importantly, even if Officer Rosa provided false testimony in December 2019, this information could not have been in the hands of the Commonwealth prior to Appellant’s trial. There was simply no information for the Commonwealth to disclose relevant to the officer in 2016 or earlier. Accordingly, any claim of prejudice related to this officer is mere speculation and conjecture, which cannot prove a Brady violation. Chmiel, supra. Finally with respect to the officers in the disclosure notice, Lieutenant Todd Landherr testified at Appellant’s trial that he was the second officer on the scene. N.T. Jury Trial Vol. 2, 5/26/16, at 44-61. According to the disclosure notice, Lieutenant Landherr was the subject of an “ongoing Internal Affairs investigation” as of September 9, 2022. See Exhibit A. Appellant - 12 - J-S25042-26 provides no details of this investigation, does not relate it to the facts of his own case, and makes no claim that the investigation concerns events from the time of his arrest and conviction in 2016. As there is no evidence that the Commonwealth knew of any potential misconduct by the officer during the period encompassing the investigation into Appellant’s case and his trial, Appellant’s claim must fail. The duty to disclose evidence under Brady is limited to information in the possession of the government bringing the prosecution; Appellant has failed to prove, by reference to the record, that evidence of Lieutenant’s alleged misconduct was withheld or suppressed by the Commonwealth. There is no Brady violation here. Chmiel, supra. Appellant also mentions a “do not call” list that he has obtained which included officers “Goodwin and Welsh.”6, 7 We note that no officer named Goodwin testified at Appellant’s trial; thus, Appellant cannot demonstrate how any misconduct related to him was material to his defense, and no Brady violation can be maintained. Chmiel, supra. With respect to officer Gregory Welsh, he was a firearms expert who testified at Appellant’s trial about the general workings of handguns. N.T. Jury Trial, Vol. 2, at 112-128. However, ____________________________________________ 6 Appellant does not provide the first name of Officer Goodwin, although the Commonwealth states that it is Joseph. The other officer is Gregory Welsh. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. 7 Appellant included a document entitled “Injustice Revealed” as Exhibit B to his PCRA petition, which lists the names of various police officers from Philadelphia who purportedly are the subject of criminal investigation or disciplinary actions. He does not explain how he obtained this document. - 13 - J-S25042-26 there is no listing of a “Gregory Welsh” in Exhibit B, the “do not call” list. Thus, Appellant’s claims related to this officer must also fail. Based upon the foregoing, Appellant has failed to establish a Brady violation related to these officers. We thus turn to his claim of newly- discovered evidence. After-discovered evidence Initially, we note that there is a distinction between the newly- discovered fact exception to the timeliness of a PCRA petition under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and a substantive after-discovered evidence claim. To establish the timeliness exception, a PCRA petitioner must establish that the facts upon which his claim is predicated were unknown to him and they could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016). Appellant correctly notes that this exception does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim. Id. Once jurisdiction has been properly invoked, however, the relevant inquiry changes. At that point, the PCRA provides relief if a petitioner can prove that “a claim alleging the unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). Appellant maintains that the information contained in Exhibits A and B require the grant of a new trial because they are after-discovered evidence. - 14 - J-S25042-26 He explains his reasoning as follows in his brief to this Court: The appellant avers that his petitions proved the newly discovered fact exception. Because the Commonwealth’s investigation into the police officers. And the officers priors unrelated misconducts. Were new facts since he was unaware that an investigation was opened and that the officers had a history of misconducts. Until 2022 during the federal habeas proceeding when the Commonwealth disclosed this information for the first time by letter. And that he could not have obtained this information earlier with the exercise of due diligence since he was denied access to the police files. Even if the appellant had to proves that he was unaware of the Commonwealth’s investigation. And the officers prior misconducts. That burden was met since he provided the PCRA court with a copy of the Commonwealth disclosure letter and federal response. Conceding that the evidence was suppressed and was favorable to the appellant. The evidence submitted demonstrated that the Commonwealth’s investigation and discovering of the officer’s misconducts was opened years after the appellant’s conviction became final. Unlike [Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2008)], where the appellant was aware of the records years before obtaining them. Here, the appellant was not aware of the investigation or prior misconducts. Therefore, the petition proved the newly discovered fact exception. Appellant’s Brief at 34-35 (verbatim). Appellant never explains more fully how the after-discovered evidence related here impacted the investigation or litigation of his own case. Once again, to justify the grant of a new trial on the basis of after- discovered evidence, “the evidence must have been discovered after the trial and must be such that it could not have been obtained at the trial by reasonable diligence, must not be cumulative or merely impeach credibility, and must be such as would likely compel a different result[.]” Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018). A petitioner must - 15 - J-S25042-26 establish each element of a four-part test to demonstrate that a new trial is warranted, and the lack of any of these factors will be fatal to the request for a new trial. Id. [T]his four-part test requires the petitioner to demonstrate [that] the new evidence: (1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. The test applies with full force to claims arising under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) of the PCRA. In addition, we have held the proposed new evidence must be producible and admissible. Id. (internal citations omitted). Because the failure to establish any one of the four prongs of the after- discovered evidence test results in a denial of the claim, we proceed to the third prong, which defeats Appellant’s arguments. We note that Appellant has utterly failed to relate any of his claims to the evidence in this case. Accordingly, we can discern no relevant purpose for this information to be admissible at his trial other than for impeachment purposes. This does not provide Appellant the relief he seeks. “[A] defendant seeking a new trial must demonstrate [that] he will not use the alleged after-discovered evidence solely to impeach the credibility of a witness.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 2010). See also Brown, supra (rejecting an after-discovered evidence claim related to police misconduct disclosures in unrelated criminal cases because the evidence merely impeached the officer’s credibility). Appellant fails to demonstrate that the evidence related to these - 16 - J-S25042-26 police officers would not be used solely for purposes of impeachment or that a different verdict would be a likely result if the evidence had been admitted at trial. Accordingly, while we agree that the PCRA court erred in finding that Appellant’s petition was untimely filed, Appellant has not established that he is entitled to a new trial based upon the disclosures herein. Rule 600 In the second issue raised in his Brief to this Court, Appellant asserts that he had filed a pro se motion to dismiss his case prior to his trial due to a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and his speedy trial rights, which was never docketed or ruled upon. Appellant argues that this was a breakdown in the processes of the court and that his charges should be dismissed due to this violation of his rights. However, in addition to the fact that this claim has no apparent connection to his timeliness exceptions, Appellant did not include this claim in his PCRA petition; thus, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (stating, “a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal” because “[p]ermitting a PCRA petitioner to append new claims to the appeal already on review would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA.”); Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 627 (Pa. 2015) (noting that claims raised outside of a court-authorized PCRA petition are subject to waiver). - 17 - J-S25042-26 After review, we conclude that the PCRA court erred by finding Appellant’s petition was untimely filed. Nonetheless, Appellant has failed to raise a meritorious claim. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief. Order affirmed. Date: 11/3/2026 - 18 -