Com. v. Robinson, M.

J-S27027-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARQUIS J. ROBINSON : : Appellant : No. 1326 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011709-2016 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MARQUIS J. ROBINSON : : Appellant : No. 1327 EDA 2025 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004367-2017 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 In this consolidated appeal,1 Appellant, Marquis J. Robinson, appeals pro se from the May 8, 2025 orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed Appellant’s petition filed pursuant to the ____________________________________________ 1 On December 8, 2025, this Court, in a per curiam order, consolidated sua sponte Appellant’s appeals docketed with this Court at 1326 EDA 2025 and 1327 EDA 2025. Per Curiam Order, 12/8/25. J-S27027-26 Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, at trial court dockets CP-51-CR-0011709-2016 (“CR-11709”) and CP-51-CR-0004367-2017 (“CR-4367”). We affirm. In a consolidated bench trial,2 Appellant was convicted on May 2, 2018, at CR-11709, of murder of the third degree, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, unlawful restraint, possessing instruments of crime, false imprisonment, and corruption of minors in connection with the brutal beating and ultimate death of Joyce Quaweay (“Ms. Quaweay”). 3 At CR-4367, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault – child less than 13 years of age, simple assault, criminal conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, corruption of minors, and recklessly endangering another person in connection with the physical abuse of A.A.-W, a minor.4 On July 20, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 55 to 130 years’ incarceration.5 ____________________________________________ 2 Upon motion by the Commonwealth, the trial court consolidated Appellant’s two criminal cases, CR-11709 and CR-4367, and consolidated Appellant’s cases with the criminal case brought against Appellant’s co-defendant, Aaron Wright (“Wright”). 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), 903, 2902(a)(1), 907(a), 2903(a), and 6301(a)(1)(i), respectively. 418 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(9), 2701(a), 903, 907(a), 2902(b)(1), 2903(b), 6301(a)(1)(i), and 2705, respectively. 5 At CR-11709, Appellant was sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for his conviction of murder in the third degree. The trial court imposed the following terms of incarceration on Appellant’s remaining convictions with -2- J-S27027-26 This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgments of sentence on May 12, 2021, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s request for discretionary review on November 30, 2021. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 256 A.3d 20, 2021 WL 1906410 (Pa. Super. filed May 12, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 268 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). As such, Appellant’s judgments of sentence became final on February 28, 2022, upon the expiration of time in which to seek discretionary review with the Supreme Court of the United States. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review including discretionary review in the Supreme ____________________________________________ each sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed for his murder in the third degree conviction: criminal conspiracy – five to 20 years’ incarceration, unlawful restraint – 2½ to five years’ incarceration, possessing instruments of crime – 2½ to five years’ incarceration, and corruption of minors – 2½ to five years’ incarceration. Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction merged for the purpose of sentencing with his murder in the third degree conviction, and the trial court imposed no further penalty on Appellant’s false imprisonment conviction. At CR-4367, Appellant was sentenced to ten to 20 years’ incarceration for his aggravated assault conviction. The trial court imposed the following terms of incarceration on Appellant’s remaining convictions with each sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on his aggravated assault conviction: criminal conspiracy – five to 20 years’ incarceration, possessing instruments of crime – 2½ to five years’ incarceration, and unlawful restraint – five to ten years’ incarceration. The trial court imposed no further penalty on Appellant’s convictions of false imprisonment, corruption of minors, and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant’s conviction of simple assault merged for the purpose of sentencing with his aggravated assault conviction. The sentences imposed at CR-4367 were set to run consecutively to the sentences imposed at CR-11709. As such, Appellant’s aggregate sentence was 55 to 130 years’ incarceration. -3- J-S27027-26 Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review”); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating, “A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”). On November 22, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first.6 On December 1, 2022, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. On January 3, 2023, Appellant filed pro se a motion to dismiss his appointed PCRA counsel and proceed pro se. After conducting a Grazier7 hearing, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s motion on March 3, 2023. On May 31, 2023, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, as well as a brief in support of his petition. Appellant filed a supplemental petition on January 22, 2024. On August 11, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed an amended petition on October 17, 2024, and a corrected amended petition on December 30, 2024. On March 6, 2025, the PCRA court provided Appellant notice, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, of its intent to dismiss his petition without an ____________________________________________ 6 For purpose of our discussion, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, as well as all subsequent documents were filed at both CR-11709 and CR-4367, unless otherwise noted. 7 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). -4- J-S27027-26 evidentiary hearing. On April 21, 2025, Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 notice. On May 8, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. On May 16, 2025, Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at CR-11709 and CR-4367 that challenged the orders dismissing his petition for collateral relief. On May 27, 2025, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file, within 21 days, a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Appellant did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement within the 21-day period. On June 27, 2025, the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. On July 7, 2025, Appellant filed a motion that requested additional time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement on the ground that the May 27, 2025 order directing him to file a Rule 1925(b) statement was not delivered to him and, instead, was returned to the PCRA court because of an “incorrect coding” issue. On July 31, 2025, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s motion and entered another order directing Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement within 21 days. On August 20, 2025, Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. On August 28, 2025, the PCRA court filed an amended Rule 1925(a) opinion that stated, inter alia, it relied upon the explanation as set forth in its Rule 907 notice to support the dismissal of Appellant’s petition. On appeal, Appellant raises several claims asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. In particular, Appellant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) investigate, discover, and pursue possible claims that the Commonwealth violated the disclosure mandates of Brady v. -5- J-S27027-26 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) challenge Appellant’s sentence as being illegal; (3) assert a violation of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; (4) request that the trial court conduct a colloquy, at the time of trial, to determine whether, or not, Appellant was adequately represented by trial counsel; (5) challenge the ambiguity and inconsistent working of the criminal indictment; and (6) claim there was an “unnecessary delay” in Appellant’s preliminary arraignment. Relatedly, Appellant raises several layered claims asserting that direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the performance of trial counsel. See Appellant’s Brief at 1-48.8 Our scope and standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is well-settled. Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great ____________________________________________ 8 Appellant’s pro se brief fails to comply with the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding appellate briefs. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (listing the separate sections that are to be contained in an appellate brief). In particular, Appellant failed to set forth a statement of questions involved that concisely stated the issues he sought to be resolved followed by a summary of the argument and an argument section “divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2116; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2118; Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Nonetheless, we will proceed to consider the merits of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims. -6- J-S27027-26 deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014). “It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective[.]” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from counsel’s act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). “A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). “In determining whether counsel’s action was reasonable, we do not question whether there were other more logical courses of action which counsel could have pursued[. R]ather, we must examine whether counsel’s decision[] had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). Moreover, “a chosen strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven that an alternative not chosen offered a -7- J-S27027-26 potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 1998). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he or she demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [acts or omissions], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009). Brady Violation Appellant asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and pursue what Appellant believes was a violation under Brady, supra. Appellant’s Brief at 1-6. Appellant further asserts that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for the failure to raise a claim regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in pursuing a Brady claim. Id. at 6-8. In order to resolve Appellant’s claims, we examine the merit of the underlying claim, namely the alleged Brady violation. If the underlying Brady claim is without merit, then Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance pertaining to trial counsel and direct appeal counsel are without arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 31 (Pa. 2008) (stating, when “the underlying Brady claims fail, any derivative ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks arguable merit”). “Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, [the Commonwealth] has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an impeachment nature.” -8- J-S27027-26 Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 607 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 829 (2014). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove three elements: first, that the evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; second, that the prosecution suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and third, that the evidence is material. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Commonwealth v. Brown, 358 A.3d 469, 505 (Pa. 2026) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also Roney, 79 A.3d at 607. “The burden rests with the [defendant] to prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the [Commonwealth].” Roney, 79 A.3d at 607 (citation and original quotation marks omitted). Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is not exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the [Commonwealth] to disclose “every fruitless lead” considered during a criminal investigation. The duty to disclose is limited to information in the possession of the government bringing the prosecution, [including] exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the government bringing the prosecution. Roney, 79 A.3d at 608 (citations and some quotation marks omitted). Appellant believes that a Brady violation occurred based upon his review of police interviews of certain individuals, namely Tyreesa Alsop (“Ms. Alsop”) and Earline Wright, both of whom, at one time, lived with Appellant -9- J-S27027-26 and Wright in the residence where the incident took place. Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant claims that, in her police statement, Ms. Alsop stated that Wright told her Ms. Quaweay “pulled” a handgun on him. Appellant also claims that the police statement provided by Earline Wright references Wright’s handgun. Id. Appellant submits that Wright’s handgun, and two handguns Appellant claims Ms. Quaweay possessed, were not listed on the police inventory log of items recovered from the crime scene on the day of the incident. Id. Appellant believes that the Commonwealth withheld a complete record of the handguns recovered from the crime scene. Id. In dismissing Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court stated that, in reference to Appellant’s Brady claim, [Appellant] failed to provide any supporting evidence related to the [Commonwealth] or police having knowledge about these alleged firearms. Additionally, the Commonwealth [] claimed that [Wright’s handgun, and the two handguns allegedly possessed by Ms. Quaweay] were never recovered [from the crime scene. 9] Due to this lack of evidence, [Appellant] fails the first prong of the Brady analysis. [Appellant] failed to show that the Commonwealth suppressed any evidence. While [Appellant] claims, without evidence, that the Commonwealth had these items, he failed to support this claim with evidence or even indicate how he would know that the items were recovered but not placed on the property receipt. Without evidence proving that the Commonwealth recovered or even knew about these items, ____________________________________________ 9 In its motion to dismiss Appellant’s petition, the Commonwealth responded that, as part of pre-trial discovery, it turned over to the defense a property receipt listing nine firearms that were recovered from the residence during the crime-scene investigation. Motion to Dismiss, 8/11/24, at 14. - 10 - J-S27027-26 [Appellant’s] Brady violation claim is underdeveloped and thus waived. Even if [Appellant] proved that the Commonwealth knew about these particular [handguns], his Brady violation claims would still fail. [Appellant] failed to articulate how these allegedly recovered items would have been relevant to his defense. Further, [Appellant] failed to describe any prejudice he suffered at trial as a result of this specific alleged failure to recover or document the items. PCRA Court Rule 907 Notice, 3/6/25, at 15-16 (footnotes and citations omitted). Upon review, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that Appellant failed to present evidence that the Commonwealth knew certain handguns had been recovered from the crime scene but were omitted from the property receipt and, ultimately, concealed from Appellant. Appellant relies exclusively on Ms. Alsop’s police statement to suggest that Wright’s handgun was recovered from the crime scene and subsequently suppressed by the Commonwealth. Appellant, however, offered no evidence showing that Ms. Alsop’s statement regarding Ms. Quaweay’s alleged possession of Wright’s handgun was based upon Ms. Alsop’s personal knowledge and information, rather than repetition of extrajudicial claims that Wright previously relayed to her. Appellant also contends that the Commonwealth failed to disclose that the police recovered two handguns allegedly owned by Ms. Quaweay. Appellant, however, presented no evidence that Ms. Quaweay even owned two handguns. Moreover, Appellant failed to explain how Ms. Quaweay’s possession of the handguns would have favored the defense, either as - 11 - J-S27027-26 exculpatory evidence or as a basis for impeachment, or how such evidence would have increased the likelihood of a different outcome. 10 Therefore, Appellant failed to establish a claim under Brady. As such, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims based upon an alleged Brady violation are without arguable merit. Illegal Sentence Claims Appellant asserts that the sentences imposed by the trial court for his convictions of criminal conspiracy and possession of instruments of crime at CR-11709 and CR-4369 were illegal under Section 906 of the Crimes Code, which prohibits multiple convictions of certain inchoate crimes. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the illegal sentence claims in a post-sentencing proceeding and that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for the failure to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Section 906 of the Crimes Code states that “[a] person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation[,] or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to ____________________________________________ 10Appellant makes a bald assertion that the evidence was favorable to the defense “due to [the] mitigating/exculpatory nature of the situation.” Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant further suggests, by means of a hypothetical question regarding what would have happened if Ms. Quaweay had gained access to her own handguns, that the existence of the handguns, and Ms. Quaweay’s alleged possession of the handguns, justified her brutal beating by Appellant and Wright. It is unfathomable how the victim brandishing a handgun towards Wright justified circumstances in which Appellant and Wright secured Ms. Quaweay to a workout bench and beat her with, inter alia, police batons, until she stopped breathing. - 12 - J-S27027-26 culminate in the commission of the same crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906. 11 Although possession of an instrument of crime is an inchoate crime, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907, it is specifically excluded from Section 906. Commonwealth v. Ly, 599 A.2d 613, 545 (Pa. 1991) (explaining that, possession of an instrument of crime was specifically excluded by the General Assembly from Section 906 when it was amended in 1986 and became effective in 1987). As such, Appellant’s underlying illegality of sentence claims lack merit. Therefore, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims regarding the illegality of his judgments of sentence were without arguable merit. Rule 600 Violation Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a potential violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as protected by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Appellant further asserts that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on this issue. In pertinent part, Rule 600 requires a “[t]rial in a [criminal] case[,] in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant[, to] commence within ____________________________________________ 11 When first enacted in 1973, Section 906 stated “[a] person may not be convicted of more than one offense defined by this chapter (inchoate crimes) for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 364 A.2d 886, 888 (Pa. 1976); see also 1972, Dec. 6, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1. - 13 - J-S27027-26 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”12 Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). “For purpose of [Rule 600], periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth [] failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Lear, 325 A.3d 552 (Pa. 2024) recently explained the mechanics of a Rule 600 calculation. [T]he first sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) expresses the general rule[.] Rule 600 establishes two requirements that must be met for delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay must be caused by the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth must have failed to exercise due diligence. [W]here delay is not caused by the Commonwealth or delay caused by the Commonwealth is not the result of lack of diligence, it must be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline.[] The second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) then explains that “any other periods of delay” - meaning any periods of delay not caused by the Commonwealth or not resulting from the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence - are excludable and are removed from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline. Id. at 560 (citations, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). “[T]he causation analysis precedes the due diligence inquiry, and it is only when the Commonwealth both caused the delay and lacked due diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule 600 ____________________________________________ 12 For purpose of Rule 600, “trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial [court] calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(1). - 14 - J-S27027-26 calculation.” Id. at 560-561 n.7. “[A]ny delay caused by the need to reschedule a trial because of a continuance attributable to the defense constitutes excludable time, even if the defendant was prepared to go to trial at an earlier date.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 331 A.3d 43, 46-47 (Pa. Super. 2025) (original quotation marks omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc), appeal denied, 343 A.3d 727 (Pa. 2025). “Stated in the most general terms, when the Commonwealth causes delay [and fails to exercise due diligence], the Rule 600 clock continues to tick; when the defendant causes the delay, the clock stops.”13 Commonwealth v. Morgan, 239 A.3d 1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Lear, 325 A.3d at 560; Walker, 331 A.3d at 46. Finally, “time attributable to the normal progression of a case simply is not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600” and, as such, there is no need to question the causation of the passage of time. 14 Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 324-325 (Pa. 2017) (stating that, the concept of “delay” in Rule ____________________________________________ 13 “Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Walker, 331 A.3d at 46, citing Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241-1242 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 14 “[J]udicial delay [(delay as a result of a trial court’s congested calendar or other scheduling problems)] in conjunction with some period of delay caused by the Commonwealth” may be excluded from the Rule 600 calculation but only after the trial court determines that the Commonwealth “met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case[.]” Lear, 325 A.3d at 562; see also Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 618 (Pa. 2021). - 15 - J-S27027-26 600 “refers to the passage of a period of time that is outside of the ordinary, routine[,] and expected passage of time” in a criminal case); see also Harth, 252 A.3d at 616; Walker, 331 A.3d at 47. “Failure to meet the rule’s prompt- trial requirement constitutes grounds for dismissal.” Mills, 162 A.3d at 324; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1) (stating, “[w]hen a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in [Rule 600(A)(2)], at any time before trial, the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated”). In calculating whether the Rule 600 prompt-trial requirements have been satisfied, 365 days is added to the date on which the complaint was filed. The resulting date is commonly referred to as the “mechanical run date.” Once the mechanical run date is determined, the mechanical run date, under certain circumstances, is extended to calculate what is commonly referred to as the “adjusted run date.” If a defendant’s trial has not commenced by the adjusted run date, then Rule 600 has been violated and the defendant is entitled to a dismissal of the charges. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1); see also Mills, 162 A.3d at 324. At CR-4367, the criminal indictment was filed against Appellant on May 17, 2017.15 Therefore, the mechanical run date was May 17, 2018. Appellant ____________________________________________ 15At both CR-4367 and CR-11709, criminal proceedings against Appellant were not initiated by the filing of a criminal complaint, as is utilized currently - 16 - J-S27027-26 was brought to trial on May 2, 2018. As such, there was no violation of Rule 600. At CR-11709, the criminal indictment was filed against Appellant on December 15, 2016. Therefore, the mechanical run date was December 15, 2017. In calculating the adjusted run date, Appellant requested several ____________________________________________ in most criminal cases. Instead, a grand jury was convened and subsequently returned an indictment against Appellant that accused him of the aforementioned crimes. The indictment was presented to the supervising judge, who approved the indictment and authorized the Commonwealth to file a criminal information against Appellant. The criminal indictment was then filed as a matter of public record. It was at this moment that Appellant was accused of committing certain crimes as set forth in the indictment and “confronted with the prosecutorial forces of organized society” for which he had to “begin to deal with the consequences of those forces.” See Commonwealth v. Silver, 357 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1976) (stating that, Rule 600 is concerned with the moment when the defendant is immersed “in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law” and is “confronted with the prosecutorial forces of organized society” for which he or she “must begin to deal with the consequences of those forces”); see also Commonwealth v. Mallon, 315 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 1986) (stating, “[u]pon the filing of an indicting grand jury’s presentment, a defendant is subject to arrest and prosecution”). In other words, upon filing of the indictment, Appellant was subject to criminal prosecution. As discussed supra, Rule 600 requires a trial to commence within 365 days from the date the complaint is filed. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). The official comments to Rule 600 state that a “complaint” “includes special documents used in lieu of a complaint to initiate criminal proceedings in extraordinary circumstances[.]” See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 at Comments. Here, the indictment that was presented by the grand jury, approved by the supervising judge, and filed against Appellant served as the “special document” used to initiate criminal proceedings against Appellant. As such, we use the date on which the indictment was filed against Appellant for purpose of calculating a potential violation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 311 (Pa. 1980) (using the date the indictment was filed for purpose of determining whether, or not, Rule 600 was violated). - 17 - J-S27027-26 continuances that resulted in the exclusion of 212 days for purpose of Rule 600.16 As such, Appellant’s adjusted run date was Monday, July 16, 2018.17 Appellant was brought to trial on May 2, 2018. Consequently, we discern no violation of Rule 600. Appellant’s underlying claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as protected by Rule 600, was violated lacks merit. Therefore, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims based on an alleged Rule 600 violation were without arguable merit. Request for New Counsel Next, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the trial court to conduct a record colloquy when Appellant requested new counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 16-22. In turn, Appellant also asserts that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. As our Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1070-1071 (Pa. 2012), ____________________________________________ 16 The periods of time excluded from the Rule 600 calculation due to continuance requests by Appellant were January 24, 2017, to May 31, 2017, and June 21, 2017, to September 14, 2017. These periods of time totaled 212 days. 17 See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that, whenever the last day of any period of time referred to in a statute “shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation”). - 18 - J-S27027-26 A motion for change of counsel by a defendant for whom counsel has been appointed shall not be granted except for substantial reasons. To satisfy this standard, a defendant must demonstrate that he [or she] has an irreconcilable difference with counsel that precludes counsel from representing him [or her]. The decision of whether to appoint new counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Neither the Rules of Criminal Procedure nor our case law requires a defendant be afforded a hearing every time he [or she] requests a change of counsel[.] Id. at 1070-1071 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 267 (Pa. 2008) (stating, “[a] hearing on a motion for new counsel is not required where the defendant provides only a general averment of inadequate representation”). At the start of Appellant’s bench trial, the following exchange occurred: [Trial Court: Appellant], I understand you filed motions. I’m not sure I have those motions. [Commonwealth:] I don't believe they were actually filed. I don't know whether or not they made it into the system. [Trial Counsel:] They’re not filed. One was transmitted to me and one to [the Commonwealth]. The essence of the motion is that [Appellant] has asked to represent himself with standby counsel. [Appellant:] At the time I filed the motion[,] I did want to represent myself pro se. However, I would like to change counsel. [Trial Court:] That’s not going to happen. [Your current counsel] is ready to proceed. You’re asking me on the day of trial to have a new attorney. I will not grant that. Are you going to keep [your current counsel]? [Appellant:] Yes. - 19 - J-S27027-26 [Trial Court:] Very good. N.T., 4/30/18, at 6-7. Based on this discussion, Appellant did not ask to represent himself pro se but, rather, requested the appointment of new counsel. Therefore, Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on his request for new counsel. 18 Keaton, 45 A.3d at 1070-1071; see also Collins, 957 A.2d at 267. Because Appellant was not entitled to a hearing, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request one.19 As such, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims involving his request for new counsel were without arguable merit. Amended Indictment ____________________________________________ 18 Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the trial court undertake a record colloquy to determine the basis of his request for the appointment of new counsel. The trial court is required to conduct a colloquy when a defendant seeks to proceed pro se. In the case sub judice, Appellant requested the appointment of new counsel and, therefore, the trial court was not required to conduct a colloquy. 19 Appellant’s characterization of the failure to request a hearing as amounting to a structural error is misplaced. A violation of an individual’s right to conduct his or her own defense is considered to be a structural error. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 307 A.3d 754, 777 (Pa. 2024). In the case sub judice, the trial court denied Appellant’s request for the appointment of new counsel. The trial court then asked Appellant if he wished to proceed pro se or continue to be represented by trial counsel. Appellant responded that he would continue to be represented by trial counsel. As such, Appellant’s constitutional right to conduct his own defense was not violated because Appellant was offered the opportunity to proceed pro se, but declined to go forward with self-representation. - 20 - J-S27027-26 Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constructive amendment of his criminal indictment or information at CR-11709 whereby the charge of murder of the first degree under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a) was replaced with the charge of murder of the third degree under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). App