Com. v. Rivera, H.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket404 MDA 2026
JudgeSullivan
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HECTOR MANUEL RIVERA :
:
Appellant : No. 404 MDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 9, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0003163-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Hector Manuel Rivera (“Rivera”) appeals from order dismissing his
timely first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1
Rivera contends his direct appeal counsel’s failure to preserve a discretionary
aspect of sentencing claim constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se
and the PCRA court erred in dismissing his claim because he failed to plead or
prove actual prejudice. Because counsel’s omissions did not result in a
complete deprivation of Rivera’s direct appeal rights, and Rivera neither
pleaded nor proved actual prejudice, we affirm.
The facts underlying Rivera’s conviction are not pertinent to this Court’s
decision, and a brief summary of the relevant procedural history follows. A
jury convicted Rivera of multiple counts of trafficking in individuals,
involuntary servitude, prostitution, conspiracy, delivery of a controlled
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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substance, and related offenses. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 312 A.3d
366, 369, 371 (Pa. Super. 2024). In May 2023, the trial court sentenced
Rivera to an aggregate term of thirty-three-and-one-half to sixty-seven years
of imprisonment. See id. at 371. Upon Rivera’s timely post sentence motion,
the court merged some of the sentences, but the total sentence remained the
same. See id.
Rivera took a direct appeal and raised two claims, one based on the trial
court’s admission of expert testimony and another based on the discretionary
aspects of sentencing. See id. This Court addressed the evidentiary claim,
rejected Rivera’s arguments, and denied relief on that claim. See id. at 376.
As to his sentencing claim, this Court found the issue waived. See id. at 377.2
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in March 2024, and Rivera did
not seek allowance of appeal. Rivera was represented by the same counsel
(“prior counsel”) through trial, sentencing, and the direct appeal.
In November 2024, Rivera timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition claiming, in relevant
part, prior counsel was ineffective for waiving Rivera’s right to be heard on his
sentencing claim, in particular the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive
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2 The Court noted that although Rivera preserved a discretionary aspect of
sentencing claim in his post-sentence motion and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
statement, the argument section of his brief raised a different claim, which he
did not preserve. See Rivera, 312 A.3d at 377. Accordingly, this Court did
not review the merits of Rivera’s sentencing claim. See id.
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sentences. See Amended PCRA Petition, 12/4/25, at ¶12(a).3 The amended
petition did not assert that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been
different if prior counsel preserved Rivera’s sentencing claim. Instead, Rivera
cited Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999), for the
proposition that an unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal
constitutes the ineffective assistance of counsel per se. See id. at ¶ 19. The
Commonwealth filed a response noting that Rivera did not plead or show this
Court would have granted relief on the sentencing claim. See
Commonwealth’s Response, 12/16/25, at 10.
In January 2026, the PCRA court heard legal arguments on the amended
petition. At the hearing, Rivera asserted he suffered prejudice because this
Court did not review the merits of his sentencing claim in his direct appeal,
and he offered no argument or evidence that the outcome of his direct appeal
would have been different. See N.T., 1/9/26, at 8-9. The court issued a
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition as meritless. The
PCRA court noted that Rivera did not show how prior counsel’s omissions with
respect to the waiver of the sentencing claim resulted in prejudice. See Rule
907 Notice, 4/14/26, at 10-11. Rivera did not respond, and the court
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3 Rivera also raised a claim that prior counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to
preserve a weight of the evidence claim in a post-sentence motion. See
Amended PCRA Petition, 12/4/25, at ¶12(b). Rivera has abandoned this claim
on appeal. See Rivera’s Brief at 4 n.1.
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dismissed the petition on February 9, 2026. Rivera timely appealed, and both
he and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
Rivera presents the following issues for review:
Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in denying [Rivera’s] PCRA
petition] where [prior] counsel failed to protect [Rivera’s] right to
appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence—specifically the
consecutive imposition of sentence—as [prior] counsel failed to
raise this specific sentencing claim in his Rule 2119(f) statement
despite arguing it in his [direct appeal] brief, thereby foreclosing
upon appellate review thereof?
Rivera’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).
This Court’s standard for reviewing the dismissal of PCRA relief is well
settled:
Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any
credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court's
legal conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). The “identification and application of the proper
legal principles” on which to review the PCRA court’s decision present
questions of law subject to plenary review. Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923
A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
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4 The PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion relied on the reasons stated in its
Rule 907 notice.
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Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
PCRA petitioner must demonstrate:
(1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no
reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and
(3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's
error. . . . Counsel is presumed to be effective; accordingly, to
succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness[,] the petitioner must
advance sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). To establish prejudice in the appellate
representation context, “the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s deficient performance.” Commonwealth v.
Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014). A failure to satisfy any prong of
the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. See
Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).
However, “[i]n certain limited circumstances, including the actual or
constructive denial of counsel, prejudice may be so plain that the cost of
litigating the issue of prejudice is unjustified, and a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel per se is warranted.” See Commonwealth v. Rosado,
150 A.3d 425, 429 (Pa. 2016) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984)); see also Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Pa.
2009) (holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel per se, if
established, presumes prejudice without requiring the petitioner to
demonstrate actual prejudice). Errors by counsel that completely foreclose
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appellate review constitute ineffectiveness per se. See Rosado, 150 A.3d at
433.
As noted above, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel per se apply
in narrow circumstances, and our Supreme Court has referred to the
presumption of prejudice as an “exception” to the general rule requiring a
PCRA petition to prove prejudice. Reed, 971 A.2d at 1226-27 (Pa. 2009)
(noting that an extension of presumed prejudice “to cases involving a defect
in an appellate brief essentially would transform the exception into a rule, as
many appellate briefs contain at least one arguable defect”). Our Supreme
Court has further stated, “[M]aintaining the distinction between errors causing
waiver of all claims and those failing to preserve particular claims
appropriately prevented the exceptional doctrine of ineffective assistance of
counsel per se from engulfing the general rule that an accused must
demonstrate that counsel’s errors caused him prejudice.” Rosado, 150 A.3d
at 431-32 (emphasis in original) (citing Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d
795, 801 (Pa. 2005)); see Commonwealth v. Pulanco, 954 A.2d 639, 641-
42 (Pa. Super. 2008) (concluding that a PCRA court erred in reinstating a
PCRA petitioner’s direct appeal rights by granting leave to file an amended
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc when this Court already addressed
some issues in the petitioner’s direct appeal); accord Commonwealth v.
Martinez, 271 & 272 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 3172354, at *1, 3 (Pa. Super. Nov.
13, 2025) (non-precedential memorandum) (rejecting a claim of
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ineffectiveness per se when counsel preserved one issue for review but waived
a second issue in a direct appeal), appeal denied, 357 A.3d 1205 (Pa. 2026).
Rivera contends prior counsel’s failure to preserve his sentencing claim
in his direct appeal brief constituted ineffectiveness per se such that he was
entitled to a presumption of prejudice. See Rivera’s Brief at 14. Rivera thus
claims the PCRA court erred in dismissing his claim based on his failure to
plead prejudice. See id. at 19.
Rivera’s arguments lack merit. In the present case, prior counsel’s error
did not result in the waiver of all claims in Rivera’s direct appeal. See Rivera,
312 A.3d at 376-77 (addressing, in the direct appeal, Rivera’s evidentiary
issue on the merits but declining to review his sentencing claim). Therefore,
Rivera’s invocation of a per se claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in
his direct appeal was misplaced, and the presumption of prejudice did not
apply to prior counsel’s failure to preserve a particular issue, i.e. Rivera’s
sentencing claim, for review. See Rosado, 150 A.3d at 431-32; Pulanco,
954 A.2d at 641-42; Martinez, 2025 WL 3172354, at *3.5 Rather, Rivera
had to plead and prove prejudice—that the there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different
but for prior counsel’s deficient performance—and Rivera’s failure to do so
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5 To the extent Rivera relies on Commonwealth v. Fink, 24 A.3d 426 (Pa.
Super. 2011), and Commonwealth v Franklin, 823 A.2d 906 (Pa. Super.
2003), see Rivera’s Brief at 14-15, those cases are inapt. In those cases,
counsels’ omissions resulted in the waiver of all issues in the direct appeals.
See Fink, 24 A.3d at 429; Franklin, 823 A.2d at 908.
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required the PCRA court to reject of his claim. See Blakeney, 108 A.3d at
750; Martin, 5 A.3d at 183. Thus, the PCRA court did not err when dismissing
Rivera’s claim that prior counsel was ineffective per se in his direct appeal.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/2026
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