Full Opinion

J-S33016-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TANIA A.A. BOOZER, : : Appellant : No. 2675 EDA 2024 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005854-2012 BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2026 Appellant, Tania A.A. Boozer, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed her first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. The Commonwealth charged Appellant and Abdullah Muhammad with first degree murder and criminal conspiracy in connection with the murder of Appellant’s husband, James Hayward (“Victim”). Mr. Muhammad was tried and convicted in 2014. A jury trial commenced in Appellant’s case on January 12, 2016. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of the following. Appellant and Victim were married and lived in the same residence with their ____________________________________________ 1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S33016-26 children and Appellant’s sister, Sonjan Frederick. Victim was incarcerated on January 13, 2009. Appellant met Mr. Muhammad at work, and they entered into a romantic relationship. Appellant asked Ms. Frederick to purchase a gun for Mr. Muhammad. Ms. Frederick did so on February 26, 2009, purchasing and registering a Smith and Wesson firearm in her name. She gave the firearm to Mr. Muhammad after the transaction. In March or April of 2009, upon Appellant’s request, Ms. Frederick signed papers to transfer ownership of a Springfield Armory firearm from Mr. Muhammad’s wife to herself. Again, Ms. Frederick gave this firearm to Mr. Muhammad after the transaction. On June 8, 2009, Appellant purchased an accidental death and dismemberment policy from Stonebridge Life Insurance Company, which covered herself, Victim and their children. On July 8, 2009, Victim was released from prison and moved back into the residence with Appellant. On July 8, 2009, Ms. Frederick also participated in a third firearm transaction for Mr. Muhammad. Ms. Frederick went to the store with Mr. Muhammad and attempted to trade in the Smith and Wesson firearm for a smaller revolver. During this transaction, Ms. Frederick did not pass the background check, and the Smith and Wesson firearm was confiscated at the store. Mr. Muhammad owned and regularly drove a gold Dodge Durango. On the morning of July 14, 2009, Ms. Frederick left Appellant’s residence to drop her daughter at daycare. Mr. Muhammad pulled up in his gold Durango and gave her a ride. When she returned to the residence, Ms. Frederick told Appellant that she saw Mr. Muhammad. Subsequently, Appellant and Ms. -2- J-S33016-26 Frederick left the residence, and Mr. Muhammad picked them up in the gold Durango. During the car ride, Mr. Muhammad asked Appellant where Victim would be that day. Appellant told Mr. Muhammad that Victim was planning to go to PennDOT and child support court. Mr. Muhammad put on a black skull cap and gloves. He also said that he was “going to get this n*****, meaning [Victim] and then he pulled out a gun from under the driver’s seat.” (N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 107). Thereafter, Mr. Muhammad dropped off Appellant and Ms. Frederick at the bus stop. While waiting at the bus stop, Appellant called Victim and told him to get up. She then told Victim to go to PennDOT to get his identification card so that he could go to child support court. Victim went to the PennDOT located on Levick Street. Victim left the PennDOT at 10:58 a.m. At approximately 11:00 a.m., near Oxford Avenue approximately one block away from the PennDOT, multiple witnesses reported seeing multiple shots being fired at Victim from a tan or gold Durango. The Durango pulled off after firing multiple shots. Victim was struck by two bullets and died as a result of his injuries. While they were still waiting at the bus station, Appellant and Ms. Frederick saw the gold Durango speed past them on the street. When the bus did not come, Appellant and Ms. Frederick walked home. They turned on the news which reported that an unidentified man had been shot in the area. Upon hearing this, Appellant stated that she needed to plan a funeral. While discussing funeral costs, Appellant stated that she had accidental death insurance and they called Stonebridge Life Insurance Company to inquire -3- J-S33016-26 whether gunshots were covered by the policy. Later that evening, detectives informed Appellant of Victim’s death. Victim’s family members gathered at the house upon hearing the news, but Appellant did not tell anyone about what happened with Mr. Muhammad that morning. When Ms. Frederick spoke to Appellant about it, Appellant told her that they could not tell anyone because they would get charged with conspiracy. 2 Appellant also did not tell law enforcement about Mr. Muhammad when she was initially questioned after Victim’s death. Appellant subsequently filed a claim for Victim’s death under the accidental death and dismemberment policy and received a $100,000 payout from the policy. Shortly thereafter, Appellant moved to Virginia for a period of time while her minor children continued to live in the Philadelphia residence with Ms. Frederick. The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Lonnie Jackson. Mr. Jackson has children with Appellant’s daughter, Charlene Myles, and is familiar with the family. At Appellant’s trial, Mr. Jackson denied knowing any details about Victim’s murder. Nevertheless, Mr. Jackson acknowledged that he gave a signed statement to detectives on November 11, 2011 after he was ____________________________________________ 2 Most of these facts were supplied by Ms. Frederick’s testimony.Ms. Frederick was charged with and pled guilty to firearms offenses in relation to her participation in the fraudulent firearms transactions with Mr. Muhammad. Prior to sentencing, Ms. Frederick agreed to a proffer agreement in which she agreed to provide and testify to information regarding Victim’s death in return for consideration for her sentence. She gave a signed statement to detectives providing the facts recited above. She further testified on multiple occasions to the facts recited above. At Appellant’s trial, Ms. Frederick initially stated that Appellant was not involved in Victim’s death but was impeached by her prior statements and testimony. -4- J-S33016-26 arrested for assaulting Ms. Myles. In that statement, Mr. Jackson reported that a few days after Victim’s death, he saw Appellant crying. Appellant told Mr. Jackson that she sent Victim to PennDOT and got him killed. Appellant also stated that she was worried that the detectives were closing in on her and talked about moving to Virginia. Mr. Jackson testified that he was intoxicated when he gave this statement. Mr. Jackson further stated that he lied when he gave the statement because he was angry that Appellant had called the police to report his assault of Ms. Myles. The Commonwealth presented testimony from detectives who stated that Lonnie Jackson did not appear intoxicated when he gave his statement and Ms. Myles was the only individual who reported the assault to law enforcement. Appellant testified in her own defense. Appellant acknowledged that she had an intimate relationship with Mr. Muhammad but stated that it was not serious and she had no intention of separating from her husband. On the morning of Victim’s murder, Appellant stated that she was upset that Mr. Muhammad was near her house because she did not want Victim to know about their relationship. When she and Ms. Frederick got into Mr. Muhammad’s car, Appellant argued with him for showing up near her house when Victim was home. Appellant stated that while they were generally talking about everyone’s plans for the day, she mentioned Victim’s plans for the day to Mr. Muhammad. Appellant denied that Mr. Muhammad pulled out a gun or made any threats while she was in the car with him. Appellant testified that she did not initially tell law enforcement about her relationship -5- J-S33016-26 with Mr. Muhammad and his gold Durango because she was embarrassed that she had participated in an extramarital relationship. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Appellant about a proffer session that occurred on February 28, 2014, prior to Mr. Muhammad’s trial, during which Appellant agreed to provide information and testify against Mr. Muhammad in return for consideration in her case. Specifically, the prosecutor inquired whether Appellant stated during the proffer session that Mr. Muhammad had confessed to her that he hurt Victim. Appellant denied saying this during the proffer session. She further stated: No sooner did I begin to say what happened that day, because they didn’t like what I was saying, they started getting an attitude. He started telling me about the insurance policies. I said to him I never had insurance on my husband. The [prosecutor] said to me, “You sure you didn’t have insurance on your husband?” I’m positive I didn’t have life insurance on my husband. The proffer session was done because they didn't like the answers I was giving them. (N.T. Trial, 1/20/16, at 13). Additionally, the following exchange took place: [Prosecutor]: In the proffer session, didn’t you say that you visited [Mr.] Muhammad in jail in Ohio after he got locked up and at that point he told you that he did this to your husband? [Appellant]: I don’t remember saying none of that because we never wrote nothing down in the proffer session. [Prosecutor]: No, we didn’t, that’s right. Does that mean that you think you can deny what you said in the proffer session? [Appellant]: I’m not saying that. I’m telling you all what happened at the proffer session. Like I said, after I started talking about the day my husband was murdered, again, the -6- J-S33016-26 [prosecutor] and the detectives didn’t like what I was saying and Detective Crone … got nasty and said the proffer session is over. (Id. at 15). After the defense rested, the Commonwealth recalled Detective David Schmidt on rebuttal in response to Appellant’s testimony. Detective Schmidt testified that he was present during the February 28, 2014 proffer session with Appellant. The following exchange took place: [Prosecutor]: She denied having any sort of life insurance policy on [Victim]? [Detective Schmidt]: Correct. [Prosecutor]: She said that she could be a confession witness in the Muhammad trial? [Detective Schmidt]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: That [Mr.] Muhammad basically confessed to her when she visited him in Ohio in prison? [Detective Schmidt]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Did the proffer session end? [Detective Schmidt]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: Who ended it? [Detective Schmidt]: Myself and my partner, Detective Crone. [Prosecutor]: Why is that? [Detective Schmidt]: It was at the point -- at that point we knew there was an insurance policy on the decedent and based on [Appellant’s] statement of no insurance being on the decedent, she only had the $100,000 on herself, in our -7- J-S33016-26 opinion, she was being untruthful, so we ended it. * * * [Detective Schmidt]: I knew she was being untruthful at that point based just on the information that we already had, paperwork to back that up. (Id. at 185-87). During closing arguments, Appellant’s counsel argued that Lonnie Jackson’s statement to law enforcement regarding Appellant’s admission to participating in Victim’s murder was not credible. Specifically, counsel argued that Mr. Jackson used information he had learned from being around the family to fabricate a statement implicating Appellant because he was angry at Appellant. In response, the prosecutor argued: When Lonnie Jackson came forward in this case, let’s be real. He came forward because he wanted to get out of his own trouble. That’s why he came forward. He didn’t come forward because he was spiteful at [Appellant] who never called 911 on him. Disproved that pretty easily. He came forward because he wanted to get out of his own case. This happens from time to time. Again, doesn’t happen every day. But when it does happen, much like when [Appellant] did it in her proffer, we do it skeptically. We don’t necessarily take that information and run with it. There are three things you have to look at when you look at what we call a “he told me so” or “she told me so” statement, a confession witness that comes forward: You have to look at the timing of when the person came forward. You have to look at the details that they provided as to when they came forward. And you have to see what that person said was corroborated. So let's start with the first thing. Because we don’t just take these statements, say, “Okay.” Sometimes, if it’s not -8- J-S33016-26 credible, the detectives don’t even write it down, like the proffer session. Other times, if it’s not corroborated, I’m not going to present it because we don’t believe [that] it’s true testimony. (N.T. Trial, 1/21/16, at 121-22). The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. On January 22, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a direct appeal but subsequently withdrew the appeal on July 21, 2020. On May 25, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se motion which, in part, challenged the legality of her sentence. Appellant subsequently retained counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on August 31, 2022, which argued that Appellant’s pro se filing from May 25, 2021 served as a timely PCRA petition.3 The amended PCRA petition raised various claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On May 15, 2024, the court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On July 22, 2024, the court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. Subsequently, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court. 4 On March 3, ____________________________________________ 3 In its response, the Commonwealth conceded the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. 4 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2024, which was beyond the 30-day limit to file a timely appeal from the court’s July 22, 2024 order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA. Nevertheless, the docket does not indicate the (Footnote Continued Next Page) -9- J-S33016-26 2025, Appellant filed a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant raises the following issues for our review: Did the PCRA court err by dismissing [Appellant’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the lead detective’s improper opinion testimony about her credibility? Did the PCRA court err by dismissing [Appellant’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements that personally vouched for the credibility of a police statement that was recanted by the witness during trial? (Appellant’s Brief at 3). In her issues combined, Appellant argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to improper opinion testimony and argument regarding her credibility and the credibility of the Commonwealth witnesses. Specifically, Appellant asserts that Detective Schmidt offered ____________________________________________ manner in which this order was served upon Appellant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4) (stating: “When the [PCRA] petition is dismissed without a hearing, the judge promptly shall issue an order to that effect and shall advise the defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the right to appeal from the final order disposing of the petition and of the time limits within which the appeal must be filed”). Further, on September 5, 2024, Appellant sent a letter indicating that she had not received a copy of the order dismissing her PCRA petition and requested that a copy be sent to her. On this record, we conclude that there was a breakdown in the operations of the court and thus, we decline to quash Appellant’s appeal as untimely. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa.Super. 2007) (explaining that while time limitations for taking appeals are strictly construed, this Court has concluded that breakdown occurs in instances where trial court fails to advise or misadvises defendants of their appeal rights when required to do so). - 10 - J-S33016-26 impermissible opinion testimony about Appellant’s credibility when he stated that he ended the proffer session with Appellant because he believed Appellant was not being truthful. Appellant further asserts that the prosecutor improperly personally vouched for Mr. Jackson’s testimony by stating that he would not have presented Mr. Jackson’s testimony if he did not believe that it was true. Appellant claims that trial counsel did not have a reasonable strategic basis for failing to object to the improper testimony and argument. Appellant insists she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure because Appellant’s defense hinged entirely on the credibility of her testimony versus the credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Appellant concludes that the PCRA court erred in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective, and this Court should vacate the order dismissing her PCRA petition. We disagree. Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). All of Appellant’s issues implicate the ineffective assistance of counsel. “Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.” - 11 - J-S33016-26 Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020). [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, In assessing the credibility of a witness, jurors must rely on their ordinary experiences of life, common knowledge of the tendencies of human behavior, and observations of the witness’ character and demeanor. Because the truthfulness of a witness is solely within the province of the jury, expert testimony cannot be used to bolster the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Minerd, 562 Pa. 46, 55, 753 A.2d 225, 230 (2000) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “a party may produce evidence to rebut testimony that he or she has elicited from an opponent’s witness on cross- examination[.]” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 565 Pa. 504, 520, 776 A.2d 958, 967 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1101, 122 S.Ct. 2303, 152 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2002). Rebuttal evidence is properly admitted if it “casts doubt on the - 12 - J-S33016-26 credibility and veracity of the appellant’s testimony and brings before the jury a valid issue of credibility which is material to the resolution” of conflicts between witness testimony. Commonwealth v. Wright, 454 A.2d 122, 125 (Pa.Super. 1982). Further, our Supreme Court has stated: It is settled that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief as to the credibility of the defendant or other witnesses. However, the prosecutor may comment on the credibility of witnesses. Further, a prosecutor is allowed to respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor. If defense counsel has attacked the credibility of witnesses in closing, the prosecutor may present argument addressing the witnesses’ credibility. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 813 A.2d 761, 768 (2002) (rejecting defense contention that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of prosecution witnesses since “[t]he prosecutor was reviewing the testimony of several prosecution witnesses after [defense] counsel had attacked their testimony, in an effort to counter the argument of defense counsel”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 527 Pa. 118, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s comments stating that a defendant had lied were neither unfair nor prejudicial when given in response to the comments of defense counsel in relation to the credibility of witnesses, and when they were supported by the evidence). Commonwealth v. D. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 620, 889 A.2d 501, 544-45 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 848, 127 S.Ct. 101, 166 L.Ed.2d 82 (2006) (some citations omitted). Instantly, the PCRA court determined that there was no arguable merit to either of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Specifically, Detective Schmidt’s testimony that he ended the proffer session with - 13 - J-S33016-26 Appellant because he believed that she was not being truthful was offered as rebuttal testimony after Appellant testified. Appellant testified that the detectives ended the proffer session because they did not like what she was saying. In rebuttal, Detective Schmidt testified that Appellant stated during the proffer session that she did not take out an insurance policy that covered Victim. Because Detective Schmidt had paperwork that evidenced that such a policy existed, Detective Schmidt ended the proffer session because he believed Appellant was not being truthful. Detective Schmidt did not offer opinion testimony about Appellant’s general credibility. Rather, he offered limited rebuttal testimony in direct response to Appellant’s testimony about the reason why the proffer session was concluded. See Weiss, supra; Wright, supra. On this record, we agree with the PCRA court that there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s first claim. See Sandusky, supra. Regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument, Appellant highlights one sentence of the prosecutor’s argument in which he stated, “if it’s not corroborated, I’m not going to present it because we don’t believe [that] it’s true testimony.” (N.T. Trial, 1/21/16, at 122). Appellant claims that by this statement, the prosecutor effectively expressed his personal belief in the veracity of Mr. Jackson’s statement to police. Nevertheless, Appellant’s assertion fails when examined in the full context of the prosecutor’s closing argument. Appellant’s counsel argued that Mr. Jackson fabricated his statement to - 14 - J-S33016-26 police because he was angry at Appellant. In response, the prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Jackson may have had a selfish motivation for giving his statement and as such, law enforcement scrutinizes such testimony carefully. Thereafter, the prosecutor reviewed certain criteria of credibility that law enforcement looks for when determining whether to proceed with a statement offered under such conditions. In explaining this process, the prosecutor made the hypothetical statement that if a statement “is not corroborated, I’m not going to present it because we don’t believe [that] it’s true testimony.” Id. The prosecutor then went over the evidence to argue that Mr. Jackson’s testimony met certain criteria of credibility and urged the jury to judge Mr. Jackson’s credibility based on these factors. In context, we cannot say the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal belief regarding Mr. Jackson’s credibility. Rather, the prosecutor reasonably responded to Appellant’s counsel’s argument that Mr. Jackson fabricated his statement to police. See Chmiel, supra. On this record, we agree with the PCRA court that there is no arguable merit to either of Appellant’s claims on appeal. See Sandusky, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. Order affirmed. Date: 10/20/2026 - 15 -