Full Opinion

J-A05010-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ARTIE TILLMAN : : Appellant : No. 447 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 27, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003429-2023 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 29, 2026 Appellant Artie Tillman appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after his bench trial conviction of one count each of failure to register and failure to verify residence and be photographed 1 as mandated by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 2 Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm. ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4915.2(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively. The trial court acquitted Appellant of one count of failure to provide accurate registration information. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(3). 2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.11-9799.7. The first version of Megan’s Law was enacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1995. Act of Oct. 24, 1995, P.L. 1079, No. 24 (Spec. Sess. No. 1) (Megan’s Law I) (repealed). In Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 601 (Pa. 1999), our Supreme Court found Megan’s Law I to be unconstitutional, in part. The General Assembly then addressed the High Court’s concerns and enacted Megan’s Law II. See Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 74, No. 18 (as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9 (expired)). Subsequently, the General Assembly passed (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-A05010-26 The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows: At a jury waiver trial on October 25, 2024, the parties stipulated that Appellant [] was convicted of aggravated indecent assault in 1995. Appellant completed his sentence [in] 2001, at which time his lifetime sexual offender registration requirements began. Corporal David Shearn of the Pennsylvania State Police testified that in his role as the supervisor of the criminal investigation section he is tasked with serving as a liaison with the Megan’s Law section and as a custodian of Megan’s Law records. Corporal Shearn testified that registrants first fill out the required paperwork when they meet with their probation officer upon release. At that point, the registrant’s “status will be pending depending on what type of registrant they will have to become.” That paperwork is included in the State Police Megan’s Law records, along with a record of each time the registrant comes in to register, the registrant’s criminal history, and any correspondence sent to the registrant by the State Police. Corporal Shearn testified that when a registrant reports to register, a trooper fills out the form based on information provided by the registrant. The form is immediately uploaded into the system, as are any other updates received from the registrant. Any correspondence sent to the registrant is also uploaded into the system, but Corporal Shearn was unable to confirm whether it is uploaded automatically or manually. He did testify that the correspondence is uploaded “close in time” to when it is sent to the registrant. Corporal Shearn also testified that registrants are supposed to review the form during their registration interview, and that it is the registrant’s responsibility to contact the Megan’s Law registry if they believe there are any errors in their information. ____________________________________________ Megan’s Law III. Act of Nov. 24, 2004, P.L. 1243, No. 152. While Megan’s Law III did not “completely repeal and replace Megan’s Law II,” it did make “significant changes” to it. Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 725 n.4 (Pa. 2017). Our Supreme Court subsequently invalidated Megan’s Law III, holding that its enactment violated the single-subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) see also Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1197 (Pa. 2017). Megan’s Law III was replaced with SORNA. Act of Dec. 20, 2011, P.L. 446, No. 111, (as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.11- 9799.75. -2- J-A05010-26 Corporal Shearn confirmed that Appellant is a Megan’s Law registrant, and that he reviewed Appellant’s records in connection with this case. Appellant first registered on February 1, 2001. The form completed on that date indicates that Appellant is subject to lifetime reporting. Appellant received annual notices reminding him to register until 2012. In that year, Appellant was sent a notification that due to changes in the law, he was now classified as a Tier III offender, still subject to lifetime reporting, and required to register every 3 months instead of every 12. Appellant registered as required every year from 2001 to 2012. Appellant’s address did not change during that time. Appellant continued to report and register as required. In 2018, the State Police sent Appellant a letter telling him he needed to report between February and May 2018 to comply with additional changes in the law. That notice was sent to Appellant's address of record, and he reported as required. N.T. 10/25/2024, 25:9- 26:6. Appellant's registration paperwork from 2001 until 2018 stated that he was subject to lifetime registration. When Appellant appeared for registration in 2018, one of the forms he was provided at the end of the registration interview stated that he was subject to a 15-year registration requirement and was required to report every 12 months. The 2018 form also listed Appellant’s offender status as “active pending review,” which Corporal Shearn explained, over objection from defense counsel, mean[s] that "[t]he Pennsylvania State Police was actively reviewing [Appellant’s] record at that time to see if he still fell within where he needed to be within the registration.” Corporal Shearn testified that Appellant would have received “the whole packet” of forms during his registration interview, not only one form. On January 22, 2019, the State Police sent Appellant an annual registration notice. Appellant did not appear during his registration window. Corporal Shearn testified that there was nothing in the record to suggest that Appellant received an official communication from the State Police telling him that his reporting requirements had changed. In February 2019, the State Police sent a letter to the Philadelphia [Police Department’s] Special Victims Unit requesting their assistance in investigating Appellant’s failure to appear, including whether Appellant had changed his address. In March 2019, the State Police sent another reporting notice to Appellant. The notice stated that -3- J-A05010-26 Appellant was subject to lifetime registration and reporting. Appellant did not report. The State Police continued to send annual reporting notices to Appellant, but he did not appear to register or contact the State Police regarding his registration. Corporal Shearn confirmed that the 2019 notice was the only paperwork in Appellant’s record that listed him as a 15-year registrant, and that to his knowledge all other notices and paperwork listed Appellant as a lifetime [registrant]. Nothing in Appellant’s record indicated that he ever contacted the Megan’s Law division regarding his registration information or any change of address. Appellant testified that he reported as required for 18 years. For the first 10 years, the paperwork told him “it was simply a tier of one [to] ten years,” and then “close to the tenth year, they hand me another piece of paper saying lifetime,” and finally, in 2018, the paperwork indicated that he was subject to a 15-year registration requirement. According to Appellant, the officer conducting the registration interview was unable or unwilling to answer any questions about the paperwork. Appellant indicated that no one had ever explained Megan’s Law to him, “[t]hey just told me to do it, and I had no choice but to do it.” Shortly after his 2018 registration interview, Appellant moved, and his previous address remained vacant until a few months before trial. Appellant acknowledged that the paperwork provided following registration stated that: It's your responsibility as a sex offender to review and verify all information on this form and ensure it is correct. You should immediately bring any errors to the attention of the registering official before leaving the registration site. A failure to provide complete and accurate information when registering will... subject you to arrest and felony prosecution pursuant to 18 PA. C.S § 4915.1. He also testified that when he appeared to register, the officer would simply ask him if anything had changed and then complete the form, but “[t]hey didn't say here, sir, go over to the side and read this first before you sign anything . . . And I may not have read it because everything became routine.” Appellant testified that he did not report after 2018 because he thought his reporting requirements had ended based on the paperwork he received that year. Appellant did not have copies of any of his paperwork because it was lost in a house fire in 2023. -4- J-A05010-26 Appellant was arrested on April 22, 2023 and charged with failure to register, failure to verify residence or be photographed, and failure to provide accurate registration information. Following a jury waiver trial before [the trial court] on October 25, 2024, [the trial court] found Appellant guilty of failure to register and failure to verify residence/be photographed, and not guilty of failure to provide accurate registration information. On January 27, 2025, [the trial court] sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 5 years of probation. On February 11, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On February 25, 2025, this Court issued an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 1925(b), requiring Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal within 21 days. On March 13, 2025, Appellant filed a request for an extension of time to file a concise statement until all notes of testimony were available, which [the trial court] granted on March 14, 2025. Appellant filed a concise statement on April 11, 2025, in which he asserts the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of both charges, [the trial court] erred in allowing Corporal Shearn to testify about the meaning of the phrase “actively pending review,” and that, as applied to Appellant, the lifetime registration requirements and his convictions for violating those requirements violate his right to due process because they deprive him of his fundamental right to reputation. Trial Ct. Op., 5/29/25, at 1-5 (citations omitted). Appellant raises the following issue for our appellate review: Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant] of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(2), where the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was still subject to sex offender registration requirements, and it therefore failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly failed to comply with those requirements? Appellant’s Brief at 5. On appeal, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant his convictions of failure to register and failure to verify residence and be photographed. See generally id. at 20-41. -5- J-A05010-26 Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant failed to comply with his SORNA registration requirements despite knowing that he was required to do so. See id. at 20. Additionally, Appellant alleges that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knew that the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) still designated Appellant to be a lifetime registrant. See id. at 23. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are governed by the following standard: A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted and formatting altered). To sustain its burden of proof, the Commonwealth is not required to establish guilt to a mathematical certainty, and it “may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 359 A.3d 450, 454 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). -6- J-A05010-26 Section 4915.2 of the Crimes Code provides, in relevant part: (a) Offense defined.--An individual who is subject to registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a), (a.1) or (b) (relating to registration) or who was subject to registration under former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9793 (relating to registration of certain offenders for ten years) commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to: * * * (2) verify the individual’s residence . . . as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60 (relating to verification of residence) .... 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(2). Further, Section 9799.56 of SORNA provides, in relevant part: [(1)](iii) For purposes of registration, offenders and sexually violent predators shall provide the Pennsylvania State Police with all current or intended residences, all information concerning current or intended employment and all information concerning current or intended enrollment as a student. (2) Offenders and sexually violent predators shall inform the Pennsylvania State Police within three business days of: (i) A change of residence or establishment of an additional residence or residences. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(i). Section 9799.53 of SORNA defines “residence,” in relevant part, as “[a] location where an individual resides or is domiciled or intends to be domiciled for 30 consecutive days or more during a calendar year.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.53(“Residence”)(a). Our Supreme Court has stated: Each subsection of [Section 4915.2(a)] contains two elements. The first element identifies the action that the sexual offender failed to perform. . . . [S]ubsection (a)(2) applies when a sexual -7- J-A05010-26 offender “knowingly” fails to verify his or her residence . . . . The second element lists the statutory sections that impose the registration and verification requirements. In other words, the statute includes both the action that the sexual offender was required to take and the statutory provision mandating that action. . . . [T]he latter portion of Subsection (a)(2), “as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60,” identifies the provision of SORNA that requires a sexual offender to “verify [his or her] residence . . . .” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 329 A.3d 1129, 1137 (Pa. 2025); see also Commonwealth v. Walter, 1338 WDA 2024, 1339 WDA 2024, 1340 WDA 2024, 2025 WL 3539096 at *6-7 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 10, 2025) (unpublished mem.)3 (applying Roberts). The Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant first registered with the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), on February 1, 2001. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 19. The forms completed and signed by Appellant were in a Megan’s Law packet that PSP updates during the registration term. See id. at 19-21. The documents indicate that he is subject to lifetime reporting as a Megan’s Law registrant and that he must comply with all duties, procedures, and conditions as a Megan’s Law registrant. See id. at 34-36, 42-43; see also Roberts, 329 A.3d at 1140. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that, like the defendant in Roberts, Appellant was consistently informed of his lifetime registration status by PSP from 2001 to 2018; and that he received, and signed, paperwork each time he appeared before PSP informing him that it was his responsibility to timely register and verify his personal information. N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at ____________________________________________ 3 We may cite to unpublished memoranda filed by this Court after May 1, 2019 as persuasive authority. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). -8- J-A05010-26 23-25. Indeed, Appellant’s record with PSP’s Megan’s Law division consisted of over 200 pages.4 See id. at 17-18; 26-27. With each signature, Appellant acknowledged that he read and understood the content of these forms, and that he was required to comply with SORNA for the remainder of his life. Further, Appellant acknowledged by signing these forms that it was his responsibility to raise any questions he might have about the accuracy of his registration status. See id. at 24–25, 44. Appellant testified that, up until 2018, he understood that he was subject to lifetime reporting requirements. See id. at 52-53. Appellant then received one form, out of several, in 2018 that apparently, erroneously, stated he was subject to a 15-year reporting requirement. See id. at 52-53, 72. The 2018 form also listed Appellant’s offender status as “active pending review.” Id. at 27-28. Corporal Shearn explained, over objection from defense counsel, that PSP was actively reviewing Appellant’s record at that time to see if “he still fell within where he needed to be within the registration.” Id. at 27-28. Appellant, however, did not receive an official notification from PSP that his registration requirements had terminated. See id. at 30. Appellant testified that he moved shortly after he reported to PSP in 2018, and that he did not contact PSP’s Megan’s Law division to inform PSP of his change of address because he believed that he was no longer required to register. See id. at 35, 72-73. PSP sent notice in 2019 to Appellant’s last ____________________________________________ 4 The trial court admitted Appellant’s record with PSP’s Megan’s Law division into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 18. -9- J-A05010-26 known address informing him of his required lifetime reporting under SORNA, but Appellant did not report. See id. at 32-34. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested for failure to comply with SORNA registration requirements. See id. at 30-37. On this record, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Appellant knowingly failed to register and or update his address and no relief is due. See Bryant, 359 A.3d at 454; James, 297 A.3d at 764. Concerning the charge of failure to verify his address, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant was informed of the requirement to notify PSP of any change to his address and that PSP never received any change of address information from Appellant. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 60-61. As discussed, the Commonwealth also presented evidence showing that Appellant was aware of his lifetime registration status over a 19-year period. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 19-25. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that Appellant knowingly failed to notify the State Police of his change of address and no relief is due. See Bryant, 359 A.3d at 454; James, 297 A.3d at 764. On this record, the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of knowing failure to register under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(2). Appellant received, signed, and acknowledged receipt of his initial Megan’s Law packet in 2001 that informed him of his lifetime registration status under Megan’s Law and his mandatory obligation to comply with all duties and conditions as a sex offender registrant. From 2001 to 2018, he appeared in person before PSP and signed - 10 - J-A05010-26 paperwork that repeatedly informed of his continuing lifetime registration obligation. In 2018, PSP erroneously sent a form to Appellant stating he was subject to a 15-year reporting requirement. This 2018 form listed Appellant’s offender status as “active pending review” and clarified that PSP was actively reviewing Appellant’s record at that time in order to confirm his correct registration period. PSP never sent notice to Appellant that his sex offender registration obligations had terminated. We agree with the Commonwealth that, essentially, every single notice Appellant received for 19 years confirmed his lifetime registration requirement. Then, in 2018, he saw one apparent typo on one form indicating a 15-year reporting requirement, at which point Appellant “took it and ran with it.” See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 81; see also Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. Importantly, the same form indicated that Appellant’s status was “active pending review,” so Appellant was on notice that PSP was reviewing his reporting requirement status. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/24, at 27. Therefore, the Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly failed to comply with his lifetime registration and reporting requirements and no relief is due. See Roberts, 329 A.3d at 1139-40 (holding that evidence was sufficient to convict for failure to register and failure to verify residence where the appellant's initial registration packet and subsequent registration forms reminded him of his registration requirements and penalties for violation). - 11 - J-A05010-26 For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judge Sullivan joins the memorandum. Judge Kunselman files a dissenting statement. Date: 10/29/2026 - 12 -