Full Opinion

J-S20003-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RODERICK BUTLER : : Appellant : No. 2616 EDA 2024 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002765-2022 BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2026 Appellant Roderick Butler appeals from the judgment of sentence following his conviction of one count of simple possession of a controlled substance and two summary offenses. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a continuance so that Appellant could obtain private counsel. We affirm. In the underlying criminal case, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with, inter alia, simple possession of a controlled substance, driving with a suspended license, and driving an unregistered vehicle. 1 Appellant’s mandatory arraignment was scheduled for June 29, 2022, at which time he ____________________________________________ 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(a), and 1301(a), respectively. The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with one count each of persons not to possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a license. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a); 6106(a). The jury acquitted Appellant of carrying firearms not to be carried without a license and the Commonwealth ultimately withdrew the persons not to possess firearms charge. J-S20003-26 waived arraignment. On January 31, 2023, the trial court entered an order scheduling Appellant’s case for call of the criminal trial list on March 1, 2023. At call of the criminal trial list, the trial court entered an order scheduling the case for a two-day trial on June 7-8, 2023. On June 7, 2023, the trial court convened for jury selection. Appellant’s counsel, Prince Yakubu, Esq., of the Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office, advised the trial court that, “because certain motions were not filed, [Appellant] does not wish to proceed today and wishes for more time to hire [a] private attorney so that the motions he wants to be filed can be filed.” N.T. Trial, 6/7/23, at 3-4. The trial court set forth the following on the record: [Appellant], this case has been on our schedule[] for a while now. And it is not -- how should I say? It is not rare for a client to have a different perspective on the way [he] wants to proceed versus how his attorney may want to proceed. So that is not rare. That happens often. But we have 55 people downstairs who were brought in today to try -- who were brought in. And out of the 55, 14 will be selected, 12 jurors and two alternates. Countless hours have been utilized to prepare not only for your attorneys, but for my staff as well. Now, you can proceed pro se, also what’s called self-represented, or Attorney Yakubu can go forward, but this case is going to be tried today. So it’s up to you how you want to proceed. The reasoning behind your decision to [not] want to proceed is not a justification for us to continue this matter. This is the day of trial. We’re going to try this case today. So here are your options. Your options are try the case with the assistance of Attorney Yakubu; represent yourself if you decide to do so; or plead guilty. They are your choices, but we are going to proceed today with this trial. -2- J-S20003-26 What I’m going to do, I’m going to give you a few more minutes if you wish to talk to Attorney Yakubu and then we’re bringing in the jury. Id. at 5-6. Following a recess, Appellant indicated that he wished to proceed pro se and the trial court conducted a Grazier2 hearing. Following the Grazier hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant waived his right to counsel and appointed Attorney Yakubu to serve as stand-by counsel. Prior to starting the jury trial but after the jury was impaneled and sworn in, Appellant presented two oral motions: a motion alleging that the Commonwealth had failed to bring him to trial within 365 days in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and a motion to suppress evidence. The trial court denied both motions, finding Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to be waived and his motion to suppress meritless. See N.T. Trial, 6/8/23, at 4-6. Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of simple possession of a controlled substance and the trial court convicted Appellant of the two summary Vehicle Code offenses. On August 28, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve months’ probation.3 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 27, 2024. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On March ____________________________________________ 2 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 3 At sentencing, Appellant indicated that he wanted to be represented by the Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office. Attorney Yakubu resumed his representation of Appellant. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 8/28/24, at 2. -3- J-S20003-26 3, 2025, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Appellant filed an application with this Court seeking to remand the case with instructions for the trial court to file a supplemental opinion addressing the sole issue Appellant sought to raise on appeal, and on April 4, 2025, we entered an order granting Appellant’s application and directing the trial court to file a supplemental opinion within thirty days. See Order, 4/4/25. On September 5, 2025, having not received the trial court’s supplemental opinion, we directed the trial court to comply with the terms of the April 4, 2025 order within sixty days. See Order, 9/5/25. The trial court filed a supplemental opinion on November 5, 2025. Appellant raises the following issue for our review: Did the [trial] court err in denying [Appellant’s] request for a continuance, at the first trial listing of the case, so that he could obtain private counsel? Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his oral motion for a continuance. See id. at 13. Specifically, Appellant argues that there is no evidence of record that Appellant’s case had previously been listed for trial or that Appellant had requested any prior continuances in the life of the case. Id. at 15. Appellant further alleges that the trial court “failed to balance [Appellant’s] right to counsel with the need for expeditious administration of justice.” Id. at 16. “The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an -4- J-S20003-26 abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Boxley, 948 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 91 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 766 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court notes that Rule 106(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the following: A motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the proceeding. A later motion shall be entertained only when the opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or the interests of justice require it. Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D). In Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court considered a trial court’s denial of a day-of-trial request for a continuance so that a defendant could proceed pro se. Brooks, 104 A.3d at 467. At the time that jury selection was to begin, the defendant in Brooks requested to proceed pro se and “for a continuance in order to prepare his defense.” Id. The trial court “concluded that the [continuance] request was a delaying tactic, and denied a continuance.” Id. On appeal, the Brooks Court reached the following conclusion: -5- J-S20003-26 This Court has recognized that a request to proceed pro se must be made in a timely fashion, and not for purposes of delay, and the request must be clear and unequivocal. See [Commonwealth v. Davido, 868 A.2d 431, 438-40 (Pa. 2005)] (although timely, made well before trial was scheduled to begin, defendant’s request to proceed pro se was equivocal; defendant had asked for new counsel and stated that his request to proceed pro se was his “only alternative” if new counsel was denied, but on [the] first day of trial defendant agreed to proceed with current counsel). Accord [Commonwealth v. Staton, 12 A.3d 277, 283 (Pa. 2010)] (discussing timeliness in context of asserted right to self-representation on appeal; noting that request for self- representation occurred after substantial delay, and as appointed counsel was prepared to file timely appellate brief); [Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d 849, 863 (Pa. 1998)] (discussing timeliness in context of request for self-representation for purposes of penalty phase of capital trial; noting that courts have refused continuances based on need to minimize disruptions, avoid inconvenience and delay, maintain continuity, and avoid confusing jury). Obviously, defendants should not be permitted to unreasonably “clog the machinery of justice” or hamper and delay the effort to administer justice effectively. [Commonwealth v. McAleer, 748 A.2d 670, 674 (Pa. 2000)], (quoting Commonwealth v. Baines, 389 A.2d 68, 70 (Pa. 1978)). Brooks, 104 A.3d at 474-75 (some formatting altered). Here, the trial court justified its decision to deny Appellant’s request for a continuance as follows: [The trial court] did not err or abuse [its] discretion and [Appellant] was not prejudiced when, on the morning of trial, [the trial court] denied his pro se motion for continuance to seek counsel different from the Public Defender who represented him throughout the case to raise issues the Public Defender wouldn’t because, as the [trial court] confirmed after hearing, they were fruitless and didn’t have any merits[.] Nor did [Appellant’s] Public Defender express any need or request himself for a continuance to prepare further for trial. -6- J-S20003-26 Nothing about [Appellant’s] case suggests a last-minute exigency arose that made him aware of a need to replace appointed counsel with new counsel to file motions that already would have been late by the day of trial. Nor can [Appellant] show prejudice from the [trial court’s] denial of a continuance. His sole stated reason for wanting a continuance to pursue new counsel was not that his appointed lawyer was unprepared to proceed, but that he had refused to raise, as groundless, the pretrial issues [Appellant] wanted raised. Trial Ct. Op., 11/5/25, at 27-28 (some formatting altered). Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Appellant’s untimely request for a continuance. See Boxley, 948 A.2d at 746; Ross, 57 A.3d at 91. As noted by the trial court, Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of a continuance. Indeed, the pre-trial motions that Appellant wanted his counsel to raise were ultimately deemed meritless by the trial court. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Brooks, 104 A.3d at 474-75. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 10/20/2026 -7-