Com. v. Quintana, A.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket517 MDA 2026
JudgeMurray
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ADRIAN JUNIOR QUINTANA :
:
Appellant : No. 517 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 27, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-54-CR-0000359-2022
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2026
Adrian Junior Quintana (Appellant) appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the
judgment of sentence imposed following his jury convictions of statutory
sexual assault – defendant 11 or more years older, corruption of minors –
sexual acts, and indecent assault – complainant less than 16 years of age.1
Appellant raises a sole challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his
convictions. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court previously set forth the relevant factual history as follows:
J.P.[, who was 15 years old at the time of trial,] testified that she
had known [Appellant] since she was eight or nine years old, and
that he had been her mother’s [(A.T.)] husband. Sometime after
the family moved to Schuylkill County, the adults separated, with
J.P. and her siblings … living with [A.T.] in Minersville, and
[Appellant] residing in Cumbola. Both of the municipalities [are]
within Schuylkill County.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3126(a)(8).
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J.P. testified that she was [13] years old when she visited
[Appellant] at his home on June 6, 2021, because she wanted to
see and spend time with him. [A.T.] drove J.P. to [Appellant’s]
home around [5:00 p.m.] After having dinner with [Appellant],
J.P. stated that she and [Appellant] smoked marijuana. [J.P.]
then felt tired and drowsy, and sat down on [Appellant’s] bed,
which was in the living room of the home, to look at her phone.
Thereafter, according to J.P., [Appellant] pushed her shoulders
down, held her hands by the wrists above her head with his one
hand, pulled [down] her jogging shorts[ and] underwear, and his
own shorts down with his other hand, and then penetrated her
vagina with his penis. J.P. testified that she was, “like, in shock
to, like, why he was doing this.” She also felt as if she “couldn’t
do anything,” after having smoked the marijuana. Nevertheless,
J.P. told [Appellant] to get off of her because she did not like how
“it felt,” and he complied. Although J.P. retrieved her phone, she
did not call for help because she was scared, and did not “know
what would happen.” J.P. and [Appellant] did not converse about
the incident, with the exception that [Appellant] told [J.P.] not to
“say anything.” Subsequently, [Appellant] walked into another
room, only to return later with marijuana[,] which they again both
smoked. J.P. and [Appellant] spent the night in [Appellant’s] bed
facing [] opposite directions.
According to J.P., she was retrieved the next morning by
[A.T. J.P.] did not tell her mother what had happened because
she did not want to talk about it, and was afraid she would get in
trouble. Thereafter, J.P. testified, she remained in contact with
[Appellant] via video calls on June 12, 18, and 23, 2021. During
each call, [Appellant] asked “to see it,” which J.P. understood to
mean her vagina. J.P. complied by using her phone. However,
during the June 23, 2021[,] call, [A.T.] walked into her room while
J.P. was wearing no pants and had her phone positioned between
her legs. [A.T.] became upset, grabbed the phone, immediately
contacted [Appellant], “flip[ped] out” at him, and called the police.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/24, at 2-3; see also id. at 4 (“A.T. took a
[screenshot] of the incoming phone call information on the phone[,] which
indicated a phone call from [Appellant] was received at 12:02 a.m. on June
23, 2021, and that it had lasted for [33] minutes.”).
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Law enforcement responded to A.T.’s 911 call. After speaking with both
A.T. and J.P., the responding officers advised A.T. to take J.P. to the hospital,
and then to visit the police station to complete a written statement. See
Police Criminal Complaint, 1/12/22, Affidavit of Probable Cause at 2. J.P. later
completed an interview at UPMC Pinnacle Children’s Resource Center (CRC
Interview).
The trial court described what next transpired:
J.P. testified that [A.T.] took her to the hospital that
evening, and then to a gynecologist [the following] morning.
Upon arriving at the parking lot of the doctor’s office, and after
being told that the doctor would determine whether anything “was
broken inside” of her, J.P. started to cry, and told [A.T.] that
[Appellant] had raped her. Prior to doing so, J.P. had denied to
the police, hospital personnel, and [A.T.] that anything had
happened to her because, she stated, she was scared about what
would happen.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/24, at 3.
J.P. subsequently completed a written statement, detailing the events
of the night she spent at Appellant’s house on June 6, 2021, and her FaceTime
calls with Appellant in the weeks that followed. On January 12, 2022, police
filed a criminal complaint against Appellant, charging him with rape and
related offenses.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 14, 2023. J.P., A.T.,
and one of the responding law enforcement officers testified at trial.
Additionally, the Commonwealth and Appellant each offered the testimony of
experts in the field of child sexual abuse.
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A jury convicted Appellant of the above-described offenses. The trial
court directed the completion of a pre-sentence investigation report.2 On
December 27, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 6 to
12 years’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ probation. The court also
ordered Appellant to pay the costs of prosecution; to complete sexual
offender, drug and alcohol, and mental health evaluations; and to have no
contact with J.P. Further, the trial court notified Appellant of his lifetime
registration requirements as a Tier III sexual offender.
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely
direct appeal, challenging the weight of the evidence supporting his
convictions. This Court concluded that Appellant had failed to preserve his
weight claim before the trial court, and affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Quintana, 331 A.3d 615, 45 MDA 2024
(Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished judgment order) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)
(requiring a weight claim to be preserved orally on the record prior to
sentencing, in a written pre-sentence motion, or in a post-sentence motion)).
On August 15, 2025, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely petition for review
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. In
____________________________________________
2 The trial court also ordered Appellant to undergo an evaluation by the Sexual
Offenders Assessment Board. At the start of the sentencing hearing, the
assistant district attorney stated, “The Commonwealth is not seeking that
[Appellant] be found to be a sexually violent predator….” N.T. (sentencing),
12/27/23, at 8.
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part, Appellant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve
his weight claim for appellate review. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who
filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf. After a hearing, the
PCRA court granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and reinstated Appellant’s right
to file a post-sentence motion and direct appeal, nunc pro tunc.
Appellant, through counsel, filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion
challenging the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. The
Commonwealth filed a response. On February 26, 2024, the trial court denied
Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This nunc pro tunc appeal followed.
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3
Appellant now raises the following issue for review:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred in denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion[,] where it is clear from the
record that the verdict issued was rendered unreliable, tainted,
questionable, and contrary to the weight of the evidence by the
trial testimony of Commonwealth witnesses, J.P. and [A.T.], as
their testimony was replete with inconsistencies, lies, half-truths,
and so contrary to their original statements and prior testimony,
as to render the entirety of their testimony incredible, … including,
but not necessarily limited to: whether or not J.P. wanted to go to
Appellant’s home; whether J.P. smoked marijuana alone or with
Appellant; and whether [A.T.] created sexual abuse testimony
____________________________________________
3 The trial court issued a statement indicating its reliance on its February 26,
2026, opinion, which it filed in connection with its denial of Appellant’s nunc
pro tunc post-sentence motion. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/1/26; Trial
Court Opinion, 2/26/26.
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that she failed to include in her request for a [P]rotection [F]rom
[A]buse [(PFA)] order against Appellant?4
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (footnote added; original footnote omitted; some
punctuation modified).
Appellant argues the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
See id. at 18-24. Appellant claims that both J.P. and A.T. “had credibility
issues,” and their testimony was tainted. Id. at 21. Appellant cites purported
inconsistencies in J.P.’s testimony:
• J.P. indicated during her CRC Interview that she saw
Appellant’s penis, but she later stated that she did not see
Appellant’s penis; and
• Regarding the June 23, 2021, incident in which A.T. walked into
J.P.’s bedroom, J.P. stated on direct examination that A.T. first
checked J.P.’s call log via the Snapchat application, but she
stated on cross-examination that Appellant was still visible on
her phone screen when A.T. entered her bedroom.
Id. at 21-22.
Additionally, Appellant argues that A.T.’s testimony should not have
been afforded any weight, as she has “clear animosity” toward Appellant. Id.
at 22. Appellant points to A.T.’s description of her relationship with Appellant
as “toxic.” Id. at 23; see also id. (indicating that A.T. and Appellant were
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4 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122. During trial, A.T. confirmed that she had
obtained an emergency PFA order following a verbal altercation with Appellant
on May 7, 2021. N.T. (Trial), 9/14/23, at 148-50. A.T. also testified that on
June 25, 2021 (two days after she discovered J.P. on FaceTime with
Appellant), she sought a temporary PFA order to protect her and her children
from Appellant. Id. at 153. A.T. did not mention the incidents between
Appellant and J.P. in the temporary PFA request. Id.
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both criminally charged after a physical altercation).5 Appellant also
emphasizes that A.T. did not mention the incidents between J.P. and Appellant
in the application for a temporary PFA, which A.T. completed two days after
finding J.P. partially naked while on FaceTime with Appellant. Id. at 23-24.
Further, Appellant points to the lack of physical evidence. Id. at 24.
Our standard of review is well settled:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. An abuse of discretion is
not merely an error in judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
Commonwealth v. Douglas, 346 A.3d 825, 831 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation,
quotation marks, and paragraph break omitted); id. (“A trial court’s denial of
a post-sentence motion based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least
assailable of its rulings.” (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted));
see also Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(“A reversal of a verdict is not necessary unless it is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” (citation omitted)). “The weight
of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all,
none, or some of the evidence[,] and to determine the credibility of the
____________________________________________
5 At trial, A.T. acknowledged that both she and Appellant were charged with
disorderly conduct on June 3, 2021 (three days prior to J.P. spending the night
at Appellant’s house), arising out of a verbal and physical altercation. N.T.,
9/14/23, at 151-52.
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witnesses. Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are
matters for the finder of fact.” Commonwealth v. Salinas, 307 A.3d 790,
795 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In its initial opinion, the trial court detailed the relevant trial testimony,
and concluded the verdict was not so contrary to the weight of the evidence
as to shock its sense of justice. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/24, at 5.
Concerning Appellant’s attempts to challenge the credibility of J.P. and A.T.,
the trial court stated the following:
[Appellant] attempted to show, through cross-examination, that
J.P. may have made certain statements previously that conflicted,
in part, with her trial testimony. However, no such alleged
statements (with the exception of her initial denials to police,
hospital personnel, and [A.T.]) were corroborated, and,
importantly, did not contradict her testimony that she had
been sexually assaulted on June 6, 2021[,] by [Appellant].
[Appellant] also attempted to show that A.T. held animus toward
him. However, A.T. openly acknowledged that their relationship
had been “toxic,” but that she, nevertheless, wanted J.P. to
continue to see [Appellant] due to the nature of their close bond.
Id. at 5 n.3 (emphasis added).
In its February 26, 2026, opinion, the trial court elaborated on its
reasoning as follows:
[Appellant] bases his claim for relief on certain differences
between aspects of [J.P.’s] trial testimony and prior unsworn
statements she purportedly made, together with the fact that
[A.T.] and [Appellant] had a “toxic” relationship. In his motion,
[Appellant] first relies upon J.P.’s testimony during cross-
examination wherein she was asked about statements she
allegedly made during [the CRC Interview]. Notably, J.P. testified
that she did not remember all of the inquiries made to[,] or the
answers given by[,] her during the interview.
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With respect to specific portions of J.P.’s testimony,
[Appellant] observes that on cross-examination, defense counsel
at trial indicated to J.P. that she had told the forensic interviewer
that she had seen [Appellant’s] penis and that he had placed a
condom on it before he had assaulted her. During direct
testimony when asked[,] “When his shorts came down to his
knees, what, if anything did you see?,” J.P. responded, “I don’t
really see anything because I didn’t want to, like, look.” N.T.,
9/14/23, at 41. On cross-examination, the following occurred:
Q: Do you remember in the CRC [I]nterview when
they asked you if you saw [Appellant’s] penis?
A: If I did?
Q: Yes. Do you remember the interviewer asking you
that?
A: No.
Q: So then I guess you wouldn’t remember saying not
only did you see his penis but you had the time to see
that he had a condom on his penis; do you remember
that?
A: Yea, I do. But I didn’t see if he would, like, open a
wrapper, put it on, or if he had it on before.
Q: Okay. So today you testified you didn’t see his
penis. Now you’re saying that you saw his penis. And
back then you saw that he—you said you saw his penis
and that he had a condom on it. So which is it, did
you see his penis or did you not see his penis[?]
A: I don’t know if he had a condom on.
Q: That’s not the question I asked. I asked, did you
see his penis[,] or did you not see his penis?
A: No.
Id. at 73.
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[Appellant] also cites to J.P.’s testimony that when [A.T.]
caught her on the phone on June 23, 2021, [A.T.] had opened
J.P.’s Snapchat app, checked the call log, and saw that [Appellant]
was listed as the top contact. On cross-examination, [Appellant]
contends, J.P. told the forensic interviewer that [Appellant] was
on the screen of the phone when [A.T.] entered J.P.’s room. The
record reflects, however, that during questioning about the
subject, J.P. actually stated that she was not saying “something
different[]” than what she told the forensic interviewer because
she did not “remember really.” Id. at 87. Notably, during cross-
examination, J.P. was not shown a written or video record of the
interview[,] and the forensic interviewer was not called as a
witness.[FN] Additionally, it is not evident how J.P.’s testimony
contradicts the alleged statements she previously made.
FN [Appellant] was not found guilty of any charge related to [his]
phone contact with J.P. Consequently, the relevance of alleged
discrepancies between J.P.’s testimony and her prior statements
about the phone incident vis-à-vis the charges upon which
[Appellant] was found guilty has not been specified by [Appellant].
Finally, in his [post-sentence] motion[ Appellant] raises the
fact that [A.T.] held great animus toward [Appellant]. However,
A.T. openly acknowledged at trial that her relationship with
[Appellant] had been “toxic,” but that she, nevertheless, wanted
J.P. to continue to see [Appellant] due to the nature of their close
bond. [Appellant] claims that on July 25, 2021, A.T. filed a
petition for a [PFA] against [Appellant] but did not include in the
petition any allegations about [Appellant’s] phone contact with
J.P. When cross-examined about why she did not include
allegations about J.P. in her petition, A.T. testified that allegations
about J.P. were irrelevant to A.T.’s allegations of abuse against
herself by [Appellant]. Moreover[,] A.T. testified that in obtaining
the [PFA] order she had her children named as protected parties.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/26, at 5-7 (citation format modified). Additionally,
the trial court emphasized that A.T. did not witness the crimes for which
Appellant was convicted. Id. at 9 n.2.
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Appellant exclusively challenges the credibility of J.P.’s and A.T.’s
testimony. Appellant does not identify any testimony or evidence which he
believes should be afforded greater weight. We further reiterate the trial
court’s sentiment that, even if J.P. made certain inconsistent statements
concerning specific details of the events, she never wavered in her claims that
Appellant sexually assaulted her.
We decline Appellant’s invitation to act as fact finder, reweigh the
evidence, and disturb the jury’s credibility findings based on a cold record.
See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Pa. Super.
2021) (“[I]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment
based on a cold record for that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded
[] evidence is exclusively for the fact finder, whose findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record.”) (citations omitted).
The verdict is not “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice.” Roane, 204 A.3d at 1001; see also Commonwealth v. Smith,
146 A.3d 257, 265 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that, in order for an appellant
to prevail on a weight challenge, he must establish that the evidence
supporting a conviction is “so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict
shocks the conscience of the court” (citation omitted)). As we discern no
abuse of the trial court’s discretion in rejecting Appellant’s weight challenge,
his sole claim is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/2/2026
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