Com. v. Geist, S.

J-S36008-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SEBASTIAN JAMES GEIST : : Appellant : No. 172 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000270-2024 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Sebastian James Geist (Appellant) appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of one count each of aggravated assault of a child less than six years of age, aggravated assault of a child less than thirteen years of age, endangering the welfare of children (EWOC) as a third-degree felony, and EWOC as a first-degree misdemeanor.1 After careful review, we affirm. We summarize the underlying facts, gleaned from the trial record, as follows. Appellant and Reagan Woodruff (Woodruff) (collectively, Parents) are the biological parents of the victim (Child), an infant boy who was seven weeks ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(8), (a)(9); 4304(a)(1). J-S36008-26 old at the time of the alleged offenses. N.T., 6/17-18/25, at 40-41. Parents and Child resided together, along with Parents’ one-year-old child. Id. at 89. Woodruff also had a two-year-old child, who resided in Parents’ home (sometimes hereinafter, “the home”), though not exclusively, as Woodruff shared custody with the two-year-old’s father. Id. at 48, 328, 333-34. Additionally, Ariel Workman (Ms. Workman), Appellant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of a three-year-old child with Appellant, resided in the home. Id. at 59, 76, 262-63, 323, 337. Ms. Workman’s mother had primary custody of Ms. Workman’s three-year-old, but that child also spent time in Parents’ home. Id. at 262-63, 286-87. On December 19, 2023, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Parents brought Child to the emergency room at Evangelical Community Hospital (Evangelical) in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Id. at 82. Amber Thomas (Nurse Thomas), a registered nurse at Evangelical, testified that Child “had obvious trauma to the [left] leg.” Id. at 162. Nurse Thomas described Child’s leg as “super swollen, and very firm and warm to the touch. Obvious trauma. It wasn’t something you could miss.” Id. at 163. Kevin McNamara, M.D. (Dr. McNamara), an emergency room physician at Evangelical, testified that an x- ray of Child showed a fractured left femur. Id. at 176-77. Nurse Thomas testified Appellant told her “that [Child] had injured his left leg, that [Appellant] had noticed earlier in the morning, that [Child] had swelling in his left leg, so they brought him in.” Id. at 161. Appellant said -2- J-S36008-26 Child’s “leg had gotten stuck in the crib when [Appellant] went to pull him out. And [Appellant] had heard a pop.” Id. at 162. Dr. McNamara similarly testified that Appellant reported Child “had gotten himself stuck in the slats of the crib with the leg,” and when Child was “pulled out from that, … there was a pop.” Id. at 182. Nurse Thomas testified Appellant’s story was a “red flag.” Id. at 162. Dr. McNamara explained that seven-week-old infants cannot “really move too much on their own,” and “wouldn’t be able to maneuver themselves … to get their leg stuck in the side of the crib.” Id. at 183. Dr. McNamara testified that he reported Child’s injury to Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (CYS), and additionally ordered a CT scan. Id. at 181. Child’s CT scan revealed a skull fracture. Id. Later the same evening, Child was transferred via ambulance to Geisinger Medical Center (Geisinger), an “equipped facility” for pediatric trauma injuries. Id. at 167; see also id. at 213. Marita Lind, M.D. (Dr. Lind), a pediatrician and board-certified specialist in child abuse, testified that she treated Child at Geisinger. Id. at 207, 212. Dr. Lind described Child’s leg injury as a “spiral fracture” of the left femur, which, she explained, “is caused when there is a twisting force applied along the bone.” Id. at 216; see also id. at 255 (Dr. Lind testifying that a spiral femur fracture “would occur if the leg was gripped and twisted forcefully”). Dr. Lind testified that after Child’s leg was broken, any movement of the leg would have caused pain and prompted Child to cry. Id. at 255-56, 259. -3- J-S36008-26 Dr. Lind described Child’s head injury as “a parietal skull fracture” on the right side of the skull. Id. at 220; see also id. at 223-24 (Dr. Lind describing the skull fracture as “a large fracture” and “a long, linear fracture”). Dr. Lind observed no bruising or swelling in connection with the skull fracture. Id. at 254. Dr. Lind described both the femur and skull fractures as “acute.” Id. at 241. She explained that, on December 19, 2023, neither fracture had begun to heal, and she therefore estimated both fractures had occurred within the previous ten days. Id. at 241-42, 254. Dr. Lind testified she spoke with Parents at Geisinger on December 19, 2023. Id. at 228. According to Dr. Lind, Woodruff “said they noticed [Child’s] leg was not normal when they woke up [that day], which was around” 11:00 a.m., while Appellant “said that they had noticed it wasn’t right when they were shopping [later in the day] and that they had gone right to the hospital after noticing it.” Id. at 229. Appellant explained to Dr. Lind, “and demonstrated with his arms[,] that [Child’s] leg had been in between the slats of the crib, but [Appellant] was very clear that the leg didn’t touch the crib.” Id. Appellant “demonstrated how he very gently moved [Child] and told [Dr. Lind] that the leg didn’t get pulled on.” Id. Dr. Lind testified that Appellant “was really clear … that there was no pressure or tension put on the leg.” Id. at 231. Unlike his report to the medical staff at Evangelical, Appellant did not tell Dr. Lind “that there had been a pop when” Appellant removed Child’s leg -4- J-S36008-26 from the crib slats. Id. Rather, Dr. Lind testified that neither Appellant nor Woodruff “told of any trauma or traumatic event.” Id. Dr. Lind echoed Dr. McNamara’s testimony that a seven-week-old infant would not be able to move on its own and get its leg stuck in the crib slats. Id. Crystal Malmgren (Ms. Malmgren), a CYS caseworker, testified that she responded to a ChildLine report regarding Child on December 19, 2023, and spoke to Parents at the home that night. Id. at 39-40, 44. Milton Borough Police Officer Chad Lehman (Officer Lehman) accompanied Ms. Malmgren to Parents’ home. Id. at 53-58. Ms. Malmgren testified Appellant told her that, during the previous night, Child’s leg was stuck in the bars of the crib and, when Appellant tried to remove Child’s leg, Appellant heard a pop. Id. at 45. Officer Lehman testified that Child’s crib was in Parents’ bedroom, and Woodruff said she was sleeping during the event Appellant described. Id. at 56-57. Ms. Malmgren testified Parents mentioned that a “wild” three-year-old lived in the home, and Officer Lehman indicated Parents said they were not sure what happened, but they implied the “wild” three-year-old may have injured Child. Id. at 45, 56. But see id. at 230 (Dr. Lind testifying Parents told her that only Parents, Child, and their one-year-old had been at the home that weekend). Milton Borough Police Officer Daniel Zettelmoyer (Officer Zettelmoyer) testified that he investigated Parents’ home on December 21, 2023. Id. at 75-76. Appellant told Officer Zettelmoyer that, around 2:00 a.m. on -5- J-S36008-26 December 19, Child was crying, and Appellant found Child’s leg stuck in the crib slats. Id. at 79. Appellant said he guided Child’s leg out of the crib slats, whereupon he heard a pop; but afterwards, Child ceased crying and, after Appellant gave Child a bottle, Child went back to sleep. Id. at 79-80; see also id. at 79 (Officer Zettelmoyer testifying Woodruff agreed this occurred around 2:00 a.m. on December 19). Milton Borough Police Sergeant Todd Ulrich (Sergeant Ulrich), who handles major child abuse investigations, testified that he asked Woodruff to come to the police station for an interview on December 23, 2023. Id. at 98- 99. Though Sergeant Ulrich had only expected Woodruff, he explained that both Parents appeared at the police station, and Appellant indicated he “was hoping to make this quick” because he “wanted to get back to work.” Id. at 99. Sergeant Ulrich proceeded to conduct a recorded interview with Woodruff, while Milton Borough Police Chief Curt Zettlemoyer (Chief Zettlemoyer) separately conducted a recorded interview with Appellant. Id. at 99, 303-04. In her interview, Woodruff initially gave an account of the timing of Child’s leg injury consistent with Parents’ earlier accounts. Id. at 101-02. However, Woodruff then showed Sergeant Ulrich a text message exchange between Parents from December 18, 2023 (a day earlier than they previously claimed they noticed Child’s leg injury), wherein they discussed Child’s leg injury and their plans to take Child to the hospital. Id. at 103-06. In the messages, Woodruff complained that Appellant had talked with Denise -6- J-S36008-26 Whipple (Ms. Whipple), Appellant’s father’s paramour, about Child’s injury. Id. at 105. Woodruff texted Appellant, “If you’re going to tell [Ms. Whipple] anything, stop fucking exaggerating. [Child] doesn’t scream all night. He doesn’t freak out when you touch his leg. He still moves it, at least I have seen him move it since it happened.” Id. Upon viewing these text messages, Sergeant Ulrich advised Woodruff that he knew she was lying about the timing of Child’s leg injury. Id. at 107. Woodruff then acknowledged the injury occurred three or four days earlier than she previously claimed. Id. She gave the same explanation regarding Child’s leg getting stuck in the crib slats, and stated Parents did not take Child to the hospital because they “didn’t think it was that bad.” Id. at 109.2 Meanwhile, in his interview with Chief Zettlemoyer, Appellant gave an account similar to his previous accounts. Id. at 305-08. Appellant claimed Child woke up crying around 2:00 a.m. on December 19, 2023, and Child’s ____________________________________________ 2 At trial, Ms. Whipple testified that on December 16, 2023, she attended a birthday party for Woodruff’s two-year-old child. N.T., 6/17-18/25, at 328. Ms. Whipple stated she held Child during the party; Child was crying; and Appellant told her Child’s leg was sore. Id. at 329. Ms. Whipple further testified she visited Parents’ home on December 18, 2023. Id. at 331, 339. According to Ms. Whipple, she observed Child’s leg was very swollen and insisted Child needed to go to the hospital. Id. at 331. Parents both stated they did not know what happened to Child, but indicated they would take Child to the hospital that day. Id. at 332. Ms. Whipple further testified she encountered Parents at a grocery store the next day, December 19, 2023. Id. at 333. Parents indicated they had not taken Child to the hospital because Woodruff had issues with her two-year-old’s father and had been on the phone all night. Id. at 333-34. Ms. Whipple told Parents they would get in trouble for child neglect if they did not take Child to the hospital that day. Id. at 334. -7- J-S36008-26 leg was wedged between the crib slats. Id. at 305-06. Appellant stated he placed his hands under Child’s backside and on Child’s foot, and pushed Child’s leg back into the crib, whereupon he heard a popping sound. Id. at 306. However, Appellant indicated he did not notice any injury to Child’s leg at that time. Id. at 307. He stated he noticed Child’s leg swelling in the afternoon of December 19 and, after the swelling worsened later that afternoon, Parents took Child to the hospital. Id. at 307-08. During Appellant’s interview, Sergeant Ulrich advised Chief Zettlemoyer that Woodruff had just acknowledged Parents knew about Child’s leg injury several days earlier than they had previously claimed. Id. at 308. Upon being confronted with this information, Appellant admitted the injury occurred several days earlier, but gave the same account about the Child’s leg getting stuck in the crib slats. Id. at 309. According to Chief Zettlemoyer, when he advised Appellant that medical personnel had indicated the injury could not have occurred as Appellant described, Appellant “changed his story again.” Id. Appellant “stated that he had picked [Child] up rather abruptly, describ[ing] it as pulling [Child] up and, in the process, twisting [Child’s] upper torso while [Child’s] upper leg was stuck between the slats of the crib, and that is when [Appellant] heard the popping sound.” Id. at 309-10 (punctuation modified). Appellant further “expressed that when the children cry and he can’t stop them from crying[,] he gets extremely frustrated.” Id. at 311. Appellant -8- J-S36008-26 “described an incident where … [h]e picked [Child] up and described taking his hands around [Child’s] ribcage … and squeezing, and he described it as harder than he probably should have[,] out of being frustrated because he was unable to stop [Child] from crying.” Id.3 On December 23, 2023, the Commonwealth arrested Appellant and charged him with the above offenses.4 Sergeant Ulrich testified that, in early January 2024, Woodruff appeared at the police station with Ms. Workman. Id. at 109. Woodruff showed Sergeant Ulrich a text message exchange between Parents, dated December 15, 2023, at 6:31 a.m. Id. at 110; see also Exhibit C3. The messages stated, in pertinent part, as follows: [Woodruff:] … what the fuck was the point of bringing me a screaming fucking baby at 7am and letting him lay there and scream?? Idk what the fuck you did to him last night but he’s been screaming non[]stop for the last 45 minutes. … And of course you go to fucking work early. …. [Appellant:] He’s been screaming like that since 2 idk why but I changed him, fed him, cuddled him, burped him. I haven’t slept at all I’ve been staring at the ceiling all night trying to figure out ____________________________________________ 3 Dr. Lind testified that Child underwent an MRI at Geisinger on December 19, 2023, which “raised a concern that there were rib fractures.” N.T., 6/17- 18/25, at 221. However, Dr. Lind explained that an MRI is “not a test designed for bones.” Id. at 222. She indicated Child underwent a “skeletal survey” two weeks later, which did not confirm any rib fractures. Id. at 222. Dr. Lind testified that, because rib fractures were never confirmed, “they are not part of [her] diagnostic assessment.” Id. at 243. Appellant’s criminal charges relate only to Child’s skull and femur injuries. See id. at 355-56. 4 The Commonwealth also charged Woodruff with two counts of EWOC. -9- J-S36008-26 what to do. I even took him to the boys room so he didn’t wake y’all up. …. [Appellant:] When I first got out of bed with him his leg was in the rungs of the crib. Exhibit C3; see also N.T., 6/17-18/25, at 110-13 (Sergeant Ulrich reading the text exchange). Sergeant Ulrich testified that, in April or May 2024, Woodruff’s father sent screenshots of purported text messages to the Milton Borough Police Department email address. Id. at 126, 153-54. The messages purported to be an exchange between Appellant and Ms. Workman, wherein Ms. Workman confessed to causing Child’s injuries. Id. at 126. Sergeant Ulrich testified that he was “never [able to] authenticate where these messages came from.” Id. at 129; see also id. at 158 (Sergeant Ulrich testifying, “I can’t even authenticate what type of message this was, and what platform. It could have been social media or it could—I have nothing to substantiate this conversation”). As Sergeant Ulrich related, Ms. Workman purportedly messaged Appellant as follows: So I have had a secret for quite some time now and looking at you every day is making it harder to keep a secret…. … The night you guys went to help Zeb with his car [and] I was alone with the kids, something happened and I hate that it did. … [Parents’ one-year- old] and [Child] were screaming and crying and I got so frustrated that I picked [Child] up and squeezed him. And then took him upstairs. - 10 - J-S36008-26 Id. at 126-27 (Sergeant Ulrich reading the purported messages). After Appellant reacted with outrage, Ms. Workman purportedly further stated, I’m sorry[.] I never meant to hurt him but I was so frustrated and I couldn’t take it anymore. But that’s not all. … The 19th, when you guys went to Weis [grocery store] before you took me to urgent care and took [Child] to the hospital for his leg, he was screaming and I bent his leg until it popped. And then you told me it was broken and I felt so bad about it. I didn’t want to go to jail. So I never said anything to anyone. Id. at 127. Appellant purportedly responded as follows: I was in jail for three fucking months crying myself to sleep every goddam day because nobody would fuckin believe me that I’m not the one that hurt that little boy and would never hurt any child ever. And you of all people are the one that fucking did it to him? You ruined my fucking life and you’re just now telling me? What the fuck kind of piece of shit does that? I lost my fucking family because of you. I lost my friends because of you. … I can’t even fuckin look at you right now. I really fucking can’t. You absolutely fucking disgust me. Id. at 127-28. Sergeant Ulrich testified that, after he received the purported messages, he interviewed Ms. Workman. Id. at 129. Ms. Workman “denied ever seeing these messages, [and] denied sending these messages.” Id. at 130. She allowed Sergeant Ulrich to examine her phone, and the messages were not on Ms. Workman’s phone. Id. Instead, Sergeant Ulrich observed messages between Ms. Workman and Appellant, dated after the purported messages, “which were very cordial in nature.” Id. Sergeant Ulrich further testified that, at the time he interviewed Ms. Workman, Appellant continued to reside with Ms. Workman. Id. Finally, Sergeant Ulrich observed that, in the purported - 11 - J-S36008-26 messages, Ms. Workman claimed to have injured Child’s leg on “the 19th,” but “[t]he investigation ha[d] already revealed that these injuries were present well before the 19th.” Id. Ms. Workman testified that she moved into Parents’ home in August 2023. Id. at 262, 284. Ms. Workman stated that, while living in the home, she did not take care of Child “very often,” because Child “was a newborn that was not mine.” Id. at 264. Ms. Workman testified that she may have been alone with Child about three times in the week or two preceding December 19, 2023, for no more than fifteen minutes each time. Id. at 280, 282. Ms. Workman stated that on the night of December 18, 2023, Parents told her “something was wrong” regarding Child, but “didn’t specify what was wrong.” Id. at 265-66, 291. Ms. Workman testified she did not see Child at that time. Id. at 266. Ms. Workman further testified that, in January 2024, she moved out of Parents’ home. Id. at 271. Thereafter, because his bail conditions barred him from residing with Woodruff, Appellant moved into Ms. Workman’s new residence, and stayed in her bedroom. Id. at 271, 277. Ms. Workman testified that Appellant knew the “pass code” for her phone, and she had “watched him get into [her] phone.” Id. at 271-72. Ms. Workman indicated that, “[a]bout a week or two after [the purported messages] were apparently made,” Appellant “brought [the messages] up to” Ms. Workman, but did not show them to her. Id. at 272; see also id. at 274. After mentioning the - 12 - J-S36008-26 purported messages to Ms. Workman, Appellant “acted like nothing happened,” and continued residing with her. Id. at 274-75. Ms. Workman testified she did not see the purported messages until Sergeant Ulrich showed them to her. Id. at 273. Ms. Workman stated that, upon seeing the messages, she “was very confused and upset.” Id. She maintained she never sent the messages and, as she had “nothing to hide,” she allowed Sergeant Ulrich to search her phone. Id. Ms. Workman further asserted that the purported messages do not “sound[] like the way I talk or text.” Id. She testified that she did not know whether the messages “came directly from [her] phone or not,” but stated that Appellant could have used her phone to send the messages and then deleted them. Id. at 278-79.5 On June 17-18, 2025, Appellant and Woodruff were jointly tried before a jury. Pertinently, on June 18, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to introduce ____________________________________________ 5 At trial, Appellant relied on Ms. Workman’s purported confession, and additionally suggested that the three-year-old child of Appellant and Ms. Workman caused Child’s injuries. Appellant introduced “nanny cam” footage from Parents’ home, dated November 22, 2023, which depicted the three- year-old hitting Child in the chest and head with a sippy cup. See N.T., 6/17- 18/25, at 143-44, 232-34. Dr. Lind watched this footage, and explained that the events depicted could not have caused Child’s skull fracture, as the three- year-old did not strike Child in the part of his head where the fracture occurred. Id. at 232-34. Moreover, Dr. Lind opined that the skull fracture occurred within ten days prior to December 19, 2023, and noted Child presented with no injuries at a regular pediatric appointment on December 5, 2023. Id. at 225-26, 241-42, 254; see also id. at 250-51 (addressing a hypothetical posed by Appellant’s counsel, Dr. Lind opined that a three-year- old punching, kicking, and stomping on Child could cause a skull fracture, but not a spiral femur fracture). - 13 - J-S36008-26 evidence that, in August 2023, Ms. Workman “was charged with abuse and neglect of animals, including keeping a frozen dead cat in her freezer.” Appellant’s Motion to Admit Animal Abuse and Neglect in a Child Abuse and Neglect Case to Establish a Third Party Liability Defense (motion to admit), 6/18/25, ¶ 1. In his motion to admit, Appellant averred, in relevant part, as follows: 3. Pennsylvania allows evidence with “legitimate tendency” to show third-party guilt as exculpatory when the exclusion of such evidence potentially deprives the defendant of potentially exculpatory evidence that points to another perpetrator. Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021).6 4. Animal abuse and neglect including guilty plea is admissible [t]o show intent, identity, or common plan, a neglect/cruelty pattern, not mere character. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). 5. Per Pa.R.E. 403 [t]he animal abuse, neglect, and conviction therefore directly implicates the other parties in similar/like kind sadistic activity including keeping a dead cat in the freezer, is exculpatory to [Appellant], and provides for no undue speculation or uncalled for adverse inferences in the similar and concomitant child abuse and neglect case. WHEREFORE, [Appellant] requests the [c]ourt admit the evidence of []animal neglect and abuse including conviction for abuse and neglect of dogs and cats and having a dead cat in the freezer to have a legitimate tendency to show third party guilt. Motion to Admit, 6/18/25, ¶¶ 3-5 (grammar and punctuation in original; footnote and brackets added). ____________________________________________ 6 The purportedly quoted phrase, “legitimate tendency,” does not appear in Yale. See generally Yale, supra. - 14 - J-S36008-26 Appellant’s motion to admit included, as an attachment, a criminal complaint dated August 4, 2023, which charged Ms. Workman with one count each of neglect of animals (third-degree misdemeanor), cruelty to animals (summary offense), and disorderly conduct (summary offense).7 Id., Attachment (Police Criminal Complaint (CR-419-23), 8/4/23, at 2). The affidavit of probable cause averred that the property managers of a duplex called police to report that one of the rental units “was destroyed on the inside and … there was a dead cat []in the freezer.” Id., Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1. The property managers reported Ms. Workman “used to live in the” unit, but had been evicted earlier that day, following an eviction hearing for which she failed to appear. Id. The property managers reported “that inside the house there was a dead cat in the freezer, a dog that was not being taken care of, and two cats. The [property managers] further explaine[d] that the inside was not in good condition and it was trashed.” Id. Upon entering the unit, police officers ____________________________________________ 7 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5532(a)(2) (“A person commits an offense if the person fails to provide for the basic needs of each animal to which the person has a duty of care, whether belonging to himself or otherwise, including … [a]ccess to clean and sanitary shelter and protection from the weather. The shelter must be sufficient to permit the animal to retain body heat and keep the animal dry”), 5533(a) (“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly illtreats, overloads, beats, abandons or abuses an animal”), 5503(a)(4) (“A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he … creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor”). - 15 - J-S36008-26 saw that the downstairs was in disarray: trash covered a majority of the floor and up the stairs leading to the second floor. On the floor was animal feces all throughout the downstairs. [The officers] had to be careful as to where [they] stepped to avoid it. [The officers] saw a litter box that did not look to have been cleaned recently. The smell overpowered [the officers] and [they] could not check the residence. [The officers] retrieved the cat from the freezer and [] exited the residence. The cat was wrapped in a maroon hoodie. Id. The officers also provided the property managers with “information on how to get the dog and two cats out of the conditions they were currently in.” Id. According to the affidavit of probable cause, an officer then located Ms. Workman at her place of employment. Id. at 2. When “asked about the dead cat in the freezer,” Ms. Workman “stated that the cat had a seizure and she wanted to get it cremated,” but was unable to do so because she did not have a vehicle. Id. Regarding the deplorable condition of the unit, Ms. Workman stated that her ex-boyfriend (not Appellant), who had also lived there, “was abusive and … trashed some of the residence.” Id. With respect to the neglect of animals charge, the criminal complaint averred Ms. Workman “did not provide a dog and two cats [with] clean and sanitary shelter,” but “left the animals inside the residence as the conditions inside the residence were deplorable.” Id., Police Criminal Complaint at 2. Regarding the cruelty to animals charge, the complaint averred Ms. Workman “knowingly and recklessly abandoned a dog and two cats inside [the residence].” Id. As for disorderly conduct, the complaint averred Ms. - 16 - J-S36008-26 Workman “caused alarm [to] the neighbors and property managers by having a dead cat in the freezer,” and “also had the residence in such deplorable conditions and abandoned one dog and two cats inside. The floor was covered in trash and feces.” Id. Though the instant record does not confirm the disposition of Ms. Workman’s charges, Appellant’s motion to admit suggested she entered a guilty plea. Motion to Admit, 6/18/25, ¶ 3. On June 18, 2025, just before Ms. Workman began her trial testimony, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to admit on the record, stating as follows: I made the decision regarding [Appellant’s] motion to allow the prior crimes evidence of a potential Commonwealth witness, [Ms.] Workman[,] … regarding animal neglect. I reviewed the caselaw and I find that although it has a slight possibility of being relevant, … there is no connection really between [animal neglect and] aggravated assault [of Child, or the EWOC charges based on] failure to bring [C]hild to the hospital with regard to the serious injury [C]hild had…. I find that … the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by [the] danger of unfair prejudice to the [Commonwealth,] misleading the jury, and confusing the issues. I find it is not admissible … on that basis [under Pa.R.E.] 403. N.T., 6/17-18/25, at 260-61. The trial court also filed a written order denying the motion to admit. See Order, 6/18/25. At the trial’s conclusion, the jury convicted both Appellant and Woodruff on all counts. On August 18, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 6-15 years’ imprisonment. - 17 - J-S36008-26 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging, inter alia, the trial court’s ruling on his motion to admit, arguing as follows: The [c]ourt abused its discretion by excluding impeachment evidence concerning … [Ms.] Workman, including prior charges for neglect of animals, disorderly conduct, and cruelty to animals. This evidence was directly relevant to credibility and bias. The [c]ourt erred in excluding impeachment evidence concerning … [Ms.] Workman, which was critical to assessing her credibility and potential bias. Specifically, prior to trial, [Ms.] Workman had been criminally charged with neglect and cruelty to animals for leaving multiple small pets to die at her residence, including a deceased cat discovered in her refrigerator. These charges predated her cohabitation with [Parents.] The jury was entitled to hear this evidence because it directly implicated her credibility, judgment, and truthfulness…. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding [Ms.] Workman’s history of neglect paralleled the allegations in this case, in which a one-month-old small child was discovered with a broken leg after [Ms.] Workman left the bedroom where she had the opportunity and ability to inflict this cruel injury. By excluding this impeachment evidence, the [c]ourt prevented the defense from presenting a full picture of [Ms.] Workman’s character and potential motive to deflect responsibility. Further, [Appellant] was denied thereby the opportunity to demonstrate the motivation[,] scheme and plan of [Ms.] Workman was likely to injure the [C]hild and then to blame it on [Woodruff,] thereby giving [Ms.] Workman the opportunity to reunite with [Appellant] romantically. Post-Sentence Motion, 8/22/25, ¶ 8.8 On September 15, 2025, following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. See Order, 9/15/25. ____________________________________________ 8 The record contains no indication that, prior to the filing of his post-sentence motion, Appellant characterized the animal neglect evidence as “impeachment evidence,” or argued that it was relevant to show Ms. Workman’s “credibility,” “judgment,” “truthfulness,” “potential bias,” “potential motive to deflect responsibility,” or her alleged scheme to blame Woodruff for Child’s injuries to (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 18 - J-S36008-26 Appellant thereafter appealed to this Court,9 and he presents the following questions for our review: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed legal error by excluding evidence concerning [Ms.] Workman’s prior animal cruelty conviction and related animal neglect facts, including the “cat in the freezer,” where Appellant offered the evidence not as propensity evidence, but as relevant to third-party culpability, credibility, motive to deny, impeachment, and context evidence central to the defense? 2. Whether, in the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the [animal neglect] evidence wholesale[,] rather than permitting limited cross-examination with an appropriate limiting instruction restricting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to credibility, motive, context, and third-party culpability? Appellant’s Brief at 8. ____________________________________________ facilitate a romantic reunion with Appellant. Post-Sentence Motion, 8/22/25, ¶ 8. Regarding the latter, our review confirms the trial court made no ruling barring Appellant from exploring an alleged scheme by Ms. Workman to blame Woodruff for Child’s injuries and thereby enable Ms. Workman to reunite with Appellant romantically. At trial, Appellant did not ask Ms. Workman any questions regarding any such scheme, and his post-sentence motion makes no attempt to explain how the animal neglect evidence was relevant to that topic. 9 Appellant initially failed to file a timely notice of appeal.On December 11, 2025, he filed a petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, averring his counsel had timely prepared a notice of appeal but, due to a clerical mistake, failed to file it. Petition for Leave to Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, 12/11/25, ¶¶ 1-6. On January 27, 2026, with the Commonwealth’s consent, the court granted the petition. See Order, 1/27/26. The same day, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), though the trial court had not ordered him to file a concise statement. Also on January 27, 2026, the trial court filed a statement in lieu of opinion under Rule 1925(a), indicating its reliance on its June 18, 2025, order denying Appellant’s motion to admit. - 19 - J-S36008-26 We address Appellant’s issues together, as they are closely related. In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in excluding the animal neglect evidence. Id. at 16-26. Appellant maintains the trial court incorrectly treated the proffered evidence as “prior crimes” or “bad acts” evidence under Pa.R.E. 404(b).10 Id. at 17, 19-20. Relying on Yale, Appellant argues that “defense evidence offered to show third-party culpability is governed by Pa.R.E. 401 and [] 403.”11 Id. at 14 (citing Yale, 249 A.3d 1001). ____________________________________________ 10 Rule 404(b) (“Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts”) provides as follows: (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. (3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial. Pa.R.E. 404(b). 11 Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401; see also Pa.R.E. 402 (providing that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”). Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 20 - J-S36008-26 Appellant asserts the trial court failed to perform the … first step [of the required analysis]: identifying the purpose for which the evidence was offered. The court treated the evidence as if the only possible purpose was improper character or propensity. That was legal error. Before a court can conduct meaningful Rule 403 balancing, it must determine what the evidence is being offered to prove. Evidence offered for propensity presents one type of prejudice problem. Evidence offered to show bias, motive, credibility, or third-party culpability presents a different analysis. Without identifying the permissible purpose, the court could not properly measure probative value against unfair prejudice. Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant argues the excluded evidence concerning [Ms.] Workman’s animal cruelty conviction and the “cat in the freezer” facts was not offered as propensity evidence. Appellant did not offer it to prove that because [Ms.] Workman mistreated an animal, she therefore injured [Child]. The evidence was offered to show third-party culpability, credibility, motive to deny responsibility, motive to deflect blame, and context for the defense theory that the Commonwealth failed to account for another adult in the home. Id. at 17. Appellant contends the trial court’s error was not harmless, arguing this “was a circumstantial and credibility-driven case in which the jury’s assess