Full Opinion

J-S34006-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DYLAN PETER DUNBAR : : Appellant : No. 1460 WDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-MD-0000834-2024 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DYLAN PETER DUNBAR : : Appellant : No. 410 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 28, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-MD-0000810-2025 BEFORE: KING, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 3, 2026 Appellant, Dylan Peter Dunbar, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial conviction for indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”) and the revocation of his probation.1 We affirm. ____________________________________________ 1 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a). J-S34006-26 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On January 13, 2025, Appellant was charged with ICC for violating a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. The affidavit of probable cause alleged that Cheyenne Wysocki (“Victim”),2 Appellant’s ex-girlfriend, had an active PFA order against Appellant that took effect on September 25, 2023, and did not expire until September 25, 2025. It further specified that a custody order entered on December 12, 2023 permitted Appellant to communicate with Victim via a communication app called “AppClose” for the sole purpose of discussing matters regarding their two children. The affidavit alleged that between December 1, 2024 and January 13, 2025, Appellant repeatedly sent harassing messages to Victim on AppClose that did not pertain to their children in violation of the PFA order and custody order. The trial court held a bench trial on October 14, 2025. Victim testified that she used to be in a romantic relationship with Appellant and had two children with him. In September of 2023, Victim obtained a PFA order against Appellant which was in effect until September 25, 2025. Victim testified that Appellant was previously convicted of violating this PFA order in July of 2024 for repeatedly sending her harassing messages through AppClose, which they are supposed to use to discuss matters relating to their children. After this, Appellant started repeatedly messaging her on AppClose again in December of 2024. Victim estimated that Appellant had sent her at least one hundred ____________________________________________ 2 The affidavit of probable cause refers to Victim by her maiden name, Cheyenne Liska. -2- J-S34006-26 messages on AppClose from December 1, 2024 to January 13, 2025, when she reported the messages to the police. Victim summarized the nature of the messages as follows: Calling me a child abuser, um, just calling me names, saying I’m a liar, that I’m a narcissist. That, um ─ just there was one message saying that he wouldn’t have sex with me if I was the last woman on earth. Just really not necessary things to say. And there’s just paragraphs, and paragraphs, and paragraphs of it. (N.T. Trial, 10/14/25, at 7). Victim also read two messages that Appellant sent as examples of the type of messages she received: [Victim]: Um, it just says: Calls can be recorded as a result. It is very easy to document previous harassment and interference that was getting severely worse and, as the videos will show, involved many parties, false pretenses, and lies. They will resume today [as] normal and will be and always be recorded for harassment, abuse, and false accusations that have been also a barrier to me as a father. Also, I’d like to address your latest string of false accusation[s]. Seeing you in federal court, sweetheart. I should remind you, slander and [defamation] are very easy to prove, and you’ve openly lied about everything. Marital assets are fair game for damages when slander and [defamation] are concerned. And I don’t think a jury is going to have a problem with that when they see the videos of you having fun and your boyfriend during custody calls for the past year. In fact, I think we are going to have just as much fun as you and him did when they award those assets, same amount of smugness and everything, with a heart emoji and kissy face. I’d tell you happy mother’s day but mothers don’t abuse their children and partner repeatedly, then lie about it publicly and privately in [an] attempt to alienate the children’s fathers. That’s the action of someone with deep- seeded mental disorders like the ones you’ve previously told -3- J-S34006-26 me you have. I don’t have anything to do with you. I keep receipts for all the claims. Try me. And then, just more. I mean, just paragraphs, and paragraphs of things to that nature. * * * [Prosecutor]: Is there one [message] that starts with the harassment? [Victim]: Oh yes. The harassment you’re experiencing will end when I have solid reassurance you aren’t abusing my children, allowing them to be abused, or sending them places that has or is likely going to happen, for abuse. It will also end when you choose to not be a malicious factor in custody issues, then turn around and immediately and premeditatedly bear false witness upon all maliciousness. (Id. at 9-10). Victim further testified that she sees these messages every day when she looks at her phone and they cause distress. Victim testified that she got the PFA order to stop such harassment. Trooper Colton Zundel testified that he reviewed the messages that Appellant sent to Victim when Victim reported the messages to the police. He testified that Appellant was only supposed to use “the court-appointed app … to have communication about the children and not other matters within life.” (Id. at 16). Trooper Zundel stated that the messages he reviewed were clearly not about the children but pertained to grievances between Appellant and Victim and other personal matters. Trooper Zundel reported that Appellant sent “dozens, if not close to a hundred, messages” to Victim that -4- J-S34006-26 were not about the children and were harassing in nature. (Id. at 18). Appellant testified that he understood that he was only to use AppClose “to communicate about pertinent issues concerning [his] children and their upraising … and [their] shared custody circumstances.” (Id. at 27). Appellant stated that he believed all the messages he sent to Victim concerned the safety and wellbeing of his children, specifically his concerns that they were being cared for by individuals who might abuse them. Appellant explained that he messaged Victim about the “harassment” she’s experiencing because Victim “allege[s] harassment any time [Appellant] address[es] pertinent issue[s] with the children so she doesn’t have to communicate with [him].” (Id. at 31). During cross examination, Appellant acknowledged that he previously appeared in court in September of 2024 and was convicted of ICC for sending harassing messages to Victim through AppClose. Appellant acknowledged that he raised similar allegations against Victim in those messages but argued that he had not had an opportunity to address his concerns. The court found Appellant guilty of ICC on October 14, 2025. That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to three to six months’ incarceration for his ICC conviction. The court further found that Appellant violated his probation3 and resentenced him to six months of probation, to be served consecutively. Appellant filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal on ____________________________________________ 3 At the time of his current ICC conviction, Appellant was serving a sentence of probation, imposed for his prior ICC conviction. -5- J-S34006-26 November 13, 2025 at both dockets. That same day, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw, asserting that Appellant had communicated to counsel that he believed counsel provided ineffective assistance. On November 20, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After holding a hearing on the motion, the court permitted trial counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel to represent Appellant on appeal. The court further granted Appellant an extension of time to file a concise statement, and Appellant timely complied on January 12, 2026. On May 19, 2026, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in finding Appellant guilty of … indirect criminal contempt despite the Commonwealth’s failure to offer any evidence of necessary elements of such offense. 2. Whether the court below erred in failing to find [Appellant’s] trial counsel to be ineffective despite his conviction and sentence being the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, which, in the circumstances of this particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. (Appellant’s Brief at 5). In his first issue, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to introduce the PFA order into evidence for the court to evaluate the language of the order. Appellant further asserts that the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence that Appellant had notice of the order. Appellant argues -6- J-S34006-26 that “a court must assess the language of the order itself … to determine whether it is definite, clear, and specific.” (Id. at 9). Appellant concludes that the court erred determining the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for ICC when the Commonwealth failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate that the order was definite and clear and that Appellant had notice of the order. We disagree. When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: The standard we apply…is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. This standard is equally applicable in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, rather than direct, provided that the combination of evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 872-73 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc), appeal denied, 617 Pa. 637, 54 A.3d 348 (2012) (citations, quotation marks, -7- J-S34006-26 and emphasis omitted). Further, “when reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is given to the discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, we are confined to a determination of whether the facts support the trial court decision.” Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa.Super. 2002) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 681 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa.Super. 1996), aff’d, 554 Pa. 465, 721 A.2d 1072 (1998)). “We will reverse a trial court’s determination only when there has been a plain abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. Commonwealth v. Griffiths, 15 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 671, 863 A.2d 1143 (2004)). The ICC statute provides, in relevant part: § 6114. Contempt for violation of order or agreement (a) General rule.--Where the police, sheriff or the plaintiff have filed charges of indirect criminal contempt against a defendant for violation of a protection order issued under this chapter, a foreign protection order or a court-approved consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in indirect criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with the law. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a). This Court has explained: Where a PFA order is involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the -8- J-S34006-26 protective order. A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of an order or decree of court occurred outside the presence of the court. To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). “[T]o convict a defendant of indirect criminal contempt for violating a PFA order, the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the violation, the defendant had actual knowledge of the PFA order, regardless of how the defendant gained this knowledge.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 674 Pa. 425, 442, 283 A.3d 196, 207 (2022). “[A] defendant must simply have notice of the order, regardless of whether that notice is obtained: (1) by service of the PFA order; (2) verbally from anyone; or (3) by other scenarios that can establish that the defendant had knowledge of the order.” Id. at 422, 283 A.3d at 206. Instantly, the trial court acknowledged that the Commonwealth did not present direct evidence of the language of the PFA order at issue. Nevertheless, the court determined that the witness testimony, including Appellant’s own admissions, was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that the PFA order clearly and specifically prohibited Appellant from communicating with Victim except to discuss matters related to their children -9- J-S34006-26 and that Appellant had actual notice of this order. The record supports the court’s conclusion. Specifically, Victim testified that she had an active PFA order against Appellant that did not expire until September 25, 2025. She testified that Appellant had previously been convicted of ICC for violating this same PFA order for sending her harassing messages that did not pertain to their children. She further testified that Appellant continued to send harassing messages that do not pertain to their children, which is the type of behavior that she obtained the PFA order to prevent. Similarly, Trooper Zundel testified that Appellant was not permitted to send messages to Victim that did not pertain to their children. Additionally, Appellant acknowledged that he knew he was only permitted to message Victim “to communicate about pertinent issues concerning [his] children and their upraising … and [their] shared custody circumstances.” (N.T. Trial at 27). While testifying, Appellant did not dispute that a PFA order restricted him from communicating with Victim but argued that the messages he sent fell within that restriction and pertained to their children. Further, during cross-examination, Appellant acknowledged that he had previously appeared in court for an ICC charge for violating this same PFA order. Viewing the testimony together, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in determining that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that an active PFA order clearly and specifically prohibited Appellant - 10 - J-S34006-26 from communicating with Victim except to discuss matters relating to their children. See Orr, supra; Kolansky, supra. Further, based on Appellant’s admissions that he understood the restrictions imposed by the PFA order and that he had previously appeared in court for violating the same order, we discern no error with the court’s conclusion that Appellant had actual notice of the order. See Stevenson, supra. As such, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his ICC conviction.4 In his second issue, Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during Appellant’s trial, which ultimately led to his conviction. Appellant argues that although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are typically reserved for collateral review, a court may consider such claims when there is good cause and Appellant expressly, knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to assert these claims under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Appellant asserts that there is good cause to consider Appellant’s claims because Appellant is serving a short sentence that makes PCRA review impossible. Appellant concludes that the court erred by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to address Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and this Court should remand for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Generally, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant does not assert that the evidence was insufficient as to the third and fourth elements of ICC. As such, we do not discuss them. - 11 - J-S34006-26 to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-[sentence] motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 620, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (2013). Three exceptions have been recognized to the general rule that ineffective assistance claims may not be raised in a direct appeal: (i) in extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; (ii) where the defendant asserts multiple ineffective assistance claims, shows good cause for direct review of those claims, and expressly waives his entitlement to PCRA review before the trial court; and (iii) where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review. Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 233 A.3d 880, 887 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, ineffectiveness claims may be raised on direct appeal only if: (1) the appellant raised his claim(s) in a post-sentence motion; (2) an evidentiary hearing was held on the claim(s); and (3) a record devoted to the claim(s) has been developed. Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1004 (Pa.Super. 2006). Here, Appellant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a post-sentence motion, present evidence to support his claims at an evidentiary hearing, or otherwise develop a record at the trial court level for our review. See Leverette, supra. Although Appellant claims that the court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing where Appellant could present his claims, our review of the record demonstrates that Appellant did not raise - 12 - J-S34006-26 his specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel before the trial court prior to the filing of his Rule 1925(b) concise statement.5 Further, Appellant did not expressly waive his right to PCRA review before the trial court. See Rosenthal, supra. As such, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review or that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims. See Rosenthal, supra; Leverette, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________ 5 In his motion to withdraw as counsel, Appellant’s trial counsel averred that Appellant believed trial counsel was ineffective. Nevertheless, the motion did not indicate any specific claims that Appellant wished to raise. Additionally, the record indicates that the court scheduled a hearing for December 8, 2025 to address the motion to withdraw and ordered that Appellant be present at the hearing. (See Order, filed 11/19/25). Nevertheless, the transcript of this hearing is not included in the certified record, and Appellant does not assert that he raised his specific ineffectiveness claims or requested an evidentiary hearing regarding same at this hearing. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 663, 916 A.2d 632 (2007) (reaffirming that it is unequivocally appellant’s responsibility to ensure that record certified on appeal is complete such that it contains all materials necessary for this Court to perform its duty). Importantly, this hearing took place after Appellant filed his notice of appeal to this Court. The first time that Appellant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel appear in the record is in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. On this record, we cannot say Appellant is entitled to review of his ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. See Leverette, supra. - 13 - J-S34006-26 DATE: 11/03/2026 - 14 -