State v. Asghari

710 November 12, 2026 No. 1106 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SALAHUDIN ASGHARI, Defendant-Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 25VI30217; A188604 Clara L. Rigmaiden, Judge. Submitted October 22, 2026. Edgar Diaz filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Megan Mizuta, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 710 (2026) 711 AOYAGI, P. J. Defendant was found to have committed the traffic offense of violating a speed limit, ORS 811.111. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred because the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the offense. He argues that the officer’s testimony was too vague to establish the appli- cable speed limit as 60 miles per hour, that the officer’s testi- mony was too vague to establish that defendant was driving a truck tractor with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 8,000 pounds, that the state failed to lay an adequate foundation for the reliability of the equipment used to mea- sure defendant’s rate of speed, and that the officer failed to address in his testimony whether defendant was driving at a similar speed as other vehicles and in line with “prevailing traffic conditions.” The state responds that defendant’s claim of error is unpreserved, that he has not requested plain-error review, and that there is no plain error in any event. The state is correct in all three regards. In the trial court, defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evi- dence or make any of the arguments that he now makes on appeal, so only plain-error review is available.1 Defendant has not requested plain-error review, on which basis alone we could decline to provide it. ORAP 5.45(7) (“The court may decline to exercise its discretion to consider plain error absent a request explaining the reasons that the court should con- sider the error.”); State v. Atwood, 332 Or App 495, 498 n 2, 549 P3d 51 (2024) (“[W]e normally will not exercise [our] dis- cretion in the absence of an explicit request for plain-error review and concomitant plain-error arguments.”). And, in any event, no plain error occurred in this case. As relevant here, a person commits the offense of violating a speed limit if the person drives “a truck trac- tor with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 8,000 1 “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000). However, we have discretion to consider a “plain” error. ORAP 5.45(1). An error is “plain” when it is an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record without our having to choose among competing inferences. State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). Whether an error is “plain” is an issue of law. State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 167, 130 P3d 780 (2006). It is a matter of our discretion whether to correct a plain error that was not harmless. State v. Ortiz, 372 Or 658, 671-72, 554 P3d 796 (2024). 712 State v. Asghari pounds” “at a speed greater than 55 miles per hour on any highway * * * or, if a different speed is posted under ORS 810.180, at a speed greater than the posted speed[.]” ORS 811.111(1)(b)(A). The legal sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, which we answer “by examining the evi- dence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the violation had been proved by a pre- ponderance of the evidence.” State v. Guynn, 302 Or App 78, 79, 459 P3d 900, rev den, 366 Or 493 (2020) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). That includes allowing for reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). Here, allowing for reasonable inferences, it is not obvious that the officer’s testimony was insufficient to prove the applicable speed limit or what type of vehicle defendant was driving, and the state reasonably disputes both points. As for the state allegedly failing to lay an adequate foun- dation for the reliability of the officer’s speed-measuring equipment, that is a challenge to the admission of evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence admitted, so there are a number of procedural problems with how it is presented. In any event, the foundation laid was not obviously inadequate, and the state reasonably disputes that it was. Finally, we agree with the state that it is legally irrelevant whether other vehicles nearby were also exceeding the speed limit at the time. Affirmed.