Full Opinion

No. 1131 November 18, 2026 151 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANDY DONALD LARSON, Defendant-Appellant. Columbia County Circuit Court 20CR70261; A184419 Michael T. Clarke, Judge. Argued and submitted January 7, 2026. Peter G. Klym, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Gregory Rios, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. 152 State v. Larson HELLMAN, J. Defendant appeals an amended judgment and, in a single assignment of error, raises three arguments as to why the trial court erred when it imposed $11,267.09 in res- titution. First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting restitution at all because the state’s motion requesting restitution did not include “a statement that doc- umentation supporting the requested amount of restitution has been provided to the defendant” as ORS 137.106(1)(b)(A) requires.1 Second, defendant argues that he was entitled to a restitution hearing before the trial court determined the amount of his restitution liability because his email to court staff satisfied his obligation under ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B) to file an objection to the motion for restitution at least 15 days before the scheduled restitution hearing. Third, defendant argues that under ORS 137.106(1)(b)(C), once the trial court scheduled a restitution hearing, it could not cancel it absent a stipulation from the parties. We conclude that defendant’s first and third argu- ments are unpreserved, and, given that defendant has not requested plain error review, we do not review them for plain error. We further conclude that defendant’s email to court staff did not amount to filing an objection within the meaning of ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B) because the email was not a document that was delivered to the court clerk for placement in the official court record. We therefore con- clude that defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court erred when it imposed restitution without holding a hearing. In reaching our conclusions, we reject the state’s argument that defendant’s appeal is unreviewable because defendant stipulated “to restitution” in his plea agreement. A general stipulation “to restitution” is not a stipulation to any amount of restitution the state later requests, and the record in this case demonstrates that the plea agreement permitted defendant to challenge the amount of restitution requested by the state. Although the appeal is reviewable, we affirm. 1 The legislature amended ORS 137.106 in 2025, after the events in this case. See Or Laws 2025, ch 360, § 3. However, because those amendments do not affect our analysis, we refer to the current version of the statute in this opinion. Cite as 355 Or App 151 (2026) 153 I. BACKGROUND The relevant facts are undisputed. The state charged defendant with unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), posses- sion of a stolen vehicle, and unlawful entry into a motor vehi- cle, based on allegations that he entered the victim’s van and took it without the victim’s consent. The case later resolved by a plea agreement. In exchange for defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to UUV, the state agreed to dismiss the other counts in the indictment and to recommend a downward dis- positional departure sentence on the UUV charge. The plea agreement also contained a provision that defendant under- stood the state would recommend that the parties “stipulate to restitution (state to submit in 90 days)[.]” At the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court went through the terms of defendant’s plea petition. In doing so, the trial court explained to defendant that the restitu- tion term meant that “[y]ou would stipulate to restitution, meaning that you would agree you would pay whatever the restitution amount was. However, if you disagree with the specific amount of restitution[,] and the State would have ninety days to submit that request, then you could object to it[,] and the Court would have a hearing * * *.” After explain- ing a few more terms of the agreement, the trial court asked, “Does that all sound like your agreement with the State?” Defendant said it did. The state did not object to that sum- mary of the agreement, and when, at the end of the hearing, the trial court asked the state if it had anything further, the state said no. The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction for UUV. Thereafter, the state timely filed a motion for resti- tution in the amount of $11,267.09. Defense counsel asked the state for an itemized list accounting for that sum, and, after receiving more information from the state, defense counsel notified the state that she would be objecting to the amount. Defense counsel emailed court staff, noting that defendant contested the reasonableness of the proposed amount of restitution and requesting a hearing on the mat- ter of restitution. The next day, the trial court scheduled a restitution hearing for February 2024, approximately two months out. However, the trial court ultimately did not 154 State v. Larson hold that hearing. Instead, a few days before the hearing was scheduled to take place, the court cancelled the res- titution hearing and signed an order imposing restitution in the amount of $11,267.09. The trial court then entered an amended judgment, which included the $11,267.09 in restitution. In response, defendant filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of restitution, which included an objec- tion to the amount of restitution imposed. In that motion, defendant contended that he was entitled to a hearing on the matter of restitution because he had “properly provided notice to the Court that he objected to the [state’s] restitution pro- posal” when his counsel emailed court staff. In so arguing, defendant cited ORS 137.106(5) for the proposition that “if the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant to be heard on such issue at the time of sentencing or at the time the court determines the amount of restitution.”2 Defendant took the position that his counsel’s email to court staff com- plied with that requirement because “[t]he statute is silent as to the manner in which the hearing must be requested.” The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion. At that hearing, the trial court explained its understand- ing that ORS 137.106 had been amended in 2022 to add, among other things, ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B), which required defendant to file an objection to the state’s motion for resti- tution at least fifteen days prior to the scheduled hearing.3 The trial court explained that “looking in the docket or in the file here,” it did not “see any objections filed.” The trial court concluded “there was no objection filed” and explained that the hearing was cancelled for that reason. 2 Defendant’s reliance on ORS 137.106(5) did not account for the fact that the legislature had amended ORS 137.106 in 2022. See Or Laws 2022, ch 57, § 1. The 2022 amendments included adding a new first section, such that the language defendant attributed to ORS 137.106(5) could instead be found at ORS 137.106(6). See ORS 137.106 (6) (“If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount or distri- bution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant to be heard on such issue at the time * * * the court determines the amount of restitution.”). 3 ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B) states, “Upon receipt of a motion described in sub- paragraph (A) of this paragraph, the court shall set a hearing. If the defendant objects to the motion, the objection must be filed at least 15 days prior to the hearing and must contain a description of the nature of the objection.” Cite as 355 Or App 151 (2026) 155 In response to defendant’s arguments, the trial court noted that defendant’s motion was based on cases interpret- ing prior versions of ORS 137.106 and that, with the amend- ments, “the legislature was working to make some changes,” which resulted in “new statutory language” with additional requirements for filing objections and setting hearings. The trial court ultimately concluded that defendant had failed to timely file an objection to the request for restitution and denied defendant’s motion. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS We begin with the state’s reviewability argument. Under ORS 138.105(9), we have “no authority to review any part of a sentence resulting from a stipulated sentencing agreement between the state and the defendant.” The state takes the position that the amount of restitution was part of the “stipulated sentencing agreement” and that we therefore do not have authority to review defendant’s arguments on appeal; defendant disagrees. “The meaning of a plea agree- ment presents us with a legal question[.]” State v. Shepherd, 346 Or App 242, 253, ___ P3d ___ (2025). Whether defendant’s argument is reviewable depends on the meaning of the plea agreement’s term “stipu- late to restitution (state to submit in 90 days).” To determine the meaning of that term, we employ contract principles because “[c]ontract law generally controls the interpreta- tion of plea agreements.” State v. Minor, 297 Or App 461, 466, 443 P3d 695 (2019). Thus, “[w]e begin by examining the text of the disputed provision in the context of the entire plea agreement.” Id. “Whether a contractual provision is ambiguous is a legal question; if the provision is unambig- uous, the unambiguous meaning of the provision controls.” Id. When we interpret terms in a plea agreement, we are also mindful that a plea agreement arises in a criminal case and that “statutory and constitutional rights that apply in a criminal prosecution at times may override contractual principles.” Shepherd, 346 Or App at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted); see State v. Walsh, 373 Or 714, 725, 570 P3d 617 (2025) (“Contract law is not necessarily the beginning or the end of the analysis because criminal cases involve constitutional and statutory rights not ordinarily found in 156 State v. Larson contracts between private parties, and those rights at times may override contractual principles.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). The state argues on appeal that defendant’s appeal is not reviewable because the term “stipulate to restitution (state to submit in 90 days)” means that defendant stipu- lated to pay whatever amount of restitution the state sub- mitted within the next 90 days. But we do not read that term in isolation. Instead, we consider it in the context of the trial court’s statements to defendant at the change-of- plea hearing. See Walsh, 373 Or at 729 (considering the trial court and the parties’ discussion at the sentencing hearing as bearing on “whether [the] defendant’s plea had been ‘vol- untary and intelligently’ made with knowledge of the conse- quences of his plea” (quoting ORS 135.390(1))). As part of the trial court’s discussion with defen- dant about the plea agreement and the consequences of his plea, the trial court explained, without objection from the state, that under the agreement, “if you disagree with the specific amount of restitution * * *, then you could object to it and the Court would have a hearing.” We therefore conclude that the term “stipulate to restitution (state to submit in 90 days)” unambiguously did not include a stipulation to the amount of restitution. As a result, the amount of restitution was not a part of a “stipulated sentencing agreement” under ORS 138.105(9), and defendant is able to appeal the amount of the trial court’s restitution award. Because defendant’s appeal is reviewable, we turn to the merits. “We review a trial court’s legal conclusions regard- ing restitution for legal error. In so doing, we are bound by the trial court’s findings if they are supported by any evi- dence in the record.” State v. Moore, 307 Or App 649, 651, 478 P3d 587 (2020), rev den, 367 Or 827 (2021) (citation omitted). As an initial matter, defendant did not argue below that the state’s request for restitution did not comply with ORS 137.106(1)(b)(A). Nor did he argue that the trial court lacked authority to cancel the hearing because ORS 137.106(1)(b)(C) permits cancellation only upon stipulation Cite as 355 Or App 151 (2026) 157 of the parties.4 Indeed, the issues in this case arose because defendant’s trial counsel does not appear to have realized that the 2022 amendments to ORS 137.106 worked a fun- damental change in restitution law. As a result, trial coun- sel did not raise any arguments grounded in the statutory text of ORS 137.106, as amended. Therefore, defendant’s arguments on appeal are unpreserved. State v. Ardizzone, 270 Or App 666, 672, 349 P3d 597, rev den, 358 Or 145 (2015) (“To preserve a claim of error, the party must pro- vide the trial court with an explanation of [their] objection that is specific enough to afford the court an opportunity to analyze any alleged error.”). We do not ordinarily review for plain error without a specific request to do so, which defendant has not made here. See ORAP 5.45(7); Ardizzone, 270 Or App at 673 (“[W]e ordinarily will not proceed to the question of plain error unless an appellant has explicitly asked us to do so.”). Accordingly, we do not consider those arguments further. Turning to defendant’s preserved argument, defen- dant argues that the trial court erred when it cancelled the scheduled restitution hearing and imposed $11,267.09 in res- titution, because defendant timely filed an objection to the state’s requested restitution amount. Defendant’s argument involves a question of statutory interpretation. Specifically, it requires us to determine the meaning of the term “filed” in the phrase “the objection must be filed at least 15 days prior to the hearing and must contain a description of the nature of the objection” contained in ORS 137.106(1)(b)(B).5 When interpreting a statute, we examine its text and con- text and, where useful, any pertinent legislative history to 4 We observe that, in light of the state’s ultimate burden to prove restitution, e.g., State v. Parsons, 287 Or App 351, 356-57, 403 P3d 497, adh’d to as modified on recons, 288 Or App 449, 403 P3d 834 (2017), rev den, 362 Or 545 (2018), there is a possible interpretation of ORS 137.106(1)(a)-(c) and (6) that requires a trial court to hold a restitution hearing even if the defendant does not file an objection as required under ORS 137.106(b)(B). However, because this assignment of error is unpreserved, and because defendant did not request plain error review, we have no occasion in this opinion to determine the full scope of the trial court’s authority to cancel restitution hearings after they have been set. 5 Neither party addressed how to properly define the statutory term “filed”; however, if the correct interpretation of a statute is necessary for our analysis, we are “responsible for identifying the correct [statutory] interpretation, whether or not asserted by the parties.” Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997). 158 State v. Larson determine the legislature’s intent. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Although ORS 137.106 does not define what is required for a defendant to be deemed to have “filed” an objection, the term “filed” has “a well-defined legal mean- ing.” Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 78, 948 P2d 722 (1997). As a general rule, when there is a well-defined legal meaning of a term, we use that meaning when we interpret a statute. Id. To “file” a document is “[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record.” Black’s Law Dictionary 768 (12th ed 2024). As the Supreme Court explained, a document is “filed” “when [the] document is given to a clerk with the intention that it be filed;” that is, placed in the official court record. Hoke, 326 Or at 78; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 769 (12th ed 2024) (defining “filing” as “[t]he act or an instance of sub- mitting or lodging a document with a court clerk or record custodian). We are presented with no argument as to why “file” would not have that well-defined legal meaning in the context of ORS 137.106, and we conclude that it does. Under that definition, defendant’s informal email to members of the court staff, in which he contested the reasonableness of the amount requested and requested a hearing, was not a “filed” objection. There is no indication that the email was sent to a court clerk for placement in the official court record or that defendant intended that the email become part of the official court record. Instead, as the trial court found, the official trial court record does not include any objection to restitution on the part of defendant, let alone one that was filed within fifteen days of the court’s scheduled hearing. Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred is premised on his assertion that he timely filed an objection to the state’s motion for restitution. That is, in his preserved argument, defendant does not put forth any other reason why the trial court could not impose $11,267.09 in restitution without holding a hearing. Because defendant’s underlying factual assertion is incorrect, and because his preserved legal argument depends on that fact being true, defendant Cite as 355 Or App 151 (2026) 159 has not provided us with any legal basis to conclude that the trial court erred. 6 Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. 6 In so holding, we do not affirmatively decide that the trial court was correct when it cancelled the restitution hearing in defendant’s case; only that defendant has not presented us with a preserved and legally viable argument as to why there is reversible error. As we observed in footnote 4, above, this opinion does not provide an opportunity for us to determine the correct interpretation of ORS 137.106 as it relates to the process for setting, cancelling, and holding restitution hearings.