State v. Mondragon
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA186442
JudgeShorr
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1121 November 18, 2026 63
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA OMAR MONDRAGON,
aka Joshua Mondragon,
Defendant-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
24CR34856; A186442
Beth M. Bagley, Judge.
Argued and submitted August 5, 2026.
Kelsey Townsend, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Affirmed.
64 State v. Mondragon
SHORR, P. J.
In this criminal case, defendant appeals from a
supplemental judgment imposing $1,048.42 in restitution,
entered after defendant was convicted of second-degree
criminal mischief. Defendant challenges only $638.76 of
the total restitution. That amount represents the victim’s
lost wages for two days of court proceedings that the victim
attended or attempted to attend: a grand jury proceeding
that was canceled and an arraignment proceeding. In his
first two assignments, defendant asserts that the imposi-
tion of restitution for those lost wages was improper because
the victim’s attendance was not “reasonably necessary.” We
conclude that the court did not err by imposing restitution
for the two days of lost wages. In his third assignment of
error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing
to obtain defendant’s written waiver of his right to a jury
trial as to restitution, and by not providing such a trial. We
conclude that the court did not err and reject each of defen-
dant’s arguments. We therefore affirm.
We review a restitution order for errors of law and
are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is any
evidence in the record to support them. State v. McClelland,
278 Or App 138, 141, 372 P3d 614, rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016).
“[W]e presume that a trial court implicitly resolves factual
disputes consistently with its ultimate conclusion where
those facts are necessary to its conclusion and supported
by the record.” State v. Pool, 338 Or App 19, 20, 565 P3d
73 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review
the evidence supporting the trial court’s restitution order in
the light most favorable to the state.” State v. Skeen, 309 Or
App 288, 290, 481 P3d 402 (2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant
pleaded guilty to a single count of second-degree criminal
mischief for damaging the victim’s vehicle. At the contested
restitution hearing, defendant agreed to the deductible
costs to repair the damaged vehicle as well as four hours
of the victim’s lost wages to obtain a quote for the repair.
Defendant objected to the state’s request for restitution
for three full days of lost wages for June 14, August 6, and
Cite as 355 Or App 63 (2026) 65
August 8, 2024. The victim took the day off work on June
14, 2024, to get a quote for damages that defendant caused
to the victim’s vehicle. The victim again took the entire day
off work on August 6, 2024, because of a subpoena to appear
at a grand jury, which the victim learned was canceled two
hours before he arrived. Finally, the victim took the day off
work on August 8, 2024, to attend defendant’s arraignment
to request a no contact order stay in effect. The victim sub-
mitted a letter from his employer that showed his lost wages
from June 14 were $310.06, and for August 6 and August 8
were $319.38 per day. The victim took the full day off each of
those days because his office had a policy that he could only
take full days off.
At the restitution hearing, defendant argued that
he should not be responsible for the lost wages for the two
court hearings in August because the victim’s presence was
not reasonably necessary. The trial court ordered restitution
for the full day on June 14 for the victim to get a quote for
the damage to the vehicle. The court then ordered restitu-
tion for the full day of August 6 because the victim was sub-
ject to a subpoena, which made his attendance necessary.
Finally, the court ordered restitution for August 8 because
it was reasonable for the victim to believe he was required
to appear based on information received from the district
attorney through the office’s victim advocate department.
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the resti-
tution award for the lost wages that were incurred by the
victim while getting a quote for the damaged vehicle on
June 14. He does assign error to the award of restitution for
the victim’s lost wages that were incurred by the victim to
attend the two hearings in August. Defendant’s argument
against restitution for the victim’s lost wages to appear at
those two hearings is that the victim’s attendance was not
reasonably necessary, and so the trial court erred in award-
ing lost wages.
Under ORS 137.106(2)(a), a crime victim is enti-
tled to restitution for economic damages as determined by
the court. The state has the burden of proving “(1) criminal
activities, (2) economic damages, and (3) a causal relationship
between the two.” Skeen, 309 Or App at 291 (quoting State
66 State v. Mondragon
v. Plagmann/Samora, 304 Or App 785, 787-88, 469 P3d 288
(2020)). For restitution purposes, “economic damages” means
“objectively verifiable monetary losses” as defined in ORS
31.705, but it “does not include future impairment of earning
capacity.” ORS 137.103(2)(a). Objectively verifiable monetary
losses include “monetary losses that a victim could recover if
the victim were a plaintiff in a civil action against the defen-
dant.” State v. Islam, 359 Or 796, 801, 377 P3d 533 (2016) (cit-
ing State v. Ramos, 358 Or 581, 593-94, 368 P3d 446 (2016)).
The use of the term “economic damages,” and the
purpose of the restitution statute “as a substitute for a civil
proceeding, make civil law concepts relevant” when deter-
mining which costs are recoverable through restitution.
Ramos, 358 Or at 594. Civil law concepts typically bar a
party from recovering their litigation costs from the other
side under the American Rule, which provides that par-
ties are responsible for their own attorney fees and costs
absent a statute or contract providing otherwise. Id. at 600.
However, the state can still seek restitution for fees and
costs that a victim incurs by participating “in the under-
lying criminal prosecution.” Id. at 603. Restitution for lost
wages incurred by participating in the criminal case does
not violate the American Rule because “restitution is a crim-
inal sanction that is sought by the state, not by the victim.”
State v. Kirschner, 358 Or 605, 610, 368 P3d 21 (2016).
There are some limitations on which expenses can
be recovered through restitution. In Ramos, the court relied
upon the Restatement (First) of Torts section 914 (1939), to
explain that restitution can be sought to recover for “rea-
sonably necessary loss of time” in the same way that par-
ties to a civil action can recover “attorney fees and litigation
costs incurred in separate litigation.” Ramos, 358 Or at 601
(emphasis added). That rationale allows the state to seek
restitution for recovery of a victim’s lost wages when that
victim is required to attend a hearing in a defendant’s trial.1
Kirschner, 358 Or at 609 (affirming the award of lost wages
when a victim was subpoenaed to testify as a witness for
the state). A victim can also receive restitution for attending
1
The state must also establish “that those costs ‘resulted from’ a defendant’s
criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable.” Kirschner, 358 Or at 610.
Cite as 355 Or App 63 (2026) 67
a judicial proceeding caused by the defendant’s conduct if
their resulting lost wages are “reasonably necessary,” even
if the victim was not subpoenaed to testify. State v. Nichols,
306 Or App 189, 198-99, 473 P3d 1145 (2020).
Here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
ordering defendant to pay restitution for the lost wages of the
victim, who took the day off to comply with a subpoena for a
grand jury proceeding on August 6, 2024, even though it was
canceled. The fact that the grand jury proceeding was can-
celed on short notice does not prevent the state from seeking
restitution for lost wages when the victim was subpoenaed
to provide testimony and took the day off work to attend.
While there is a responsibility on the prosecutor to inform
parties when hearings are canceled and to avoid imposing
unnecessary costs on victims, defendant has not framed this
challenge to address that issue.2 Instead, defendant is claim-
ing that there is a categorical rule that if a proceeding is
canceled, then the victim’s participation is unnecessary, and
the state cannot seek restitution for lost wages. We decline to
adopt that type of categorical rule in this case.
Here, the victim testified that he received a sub-
poena to appear at grand jury. He also testified that the
grand jury was canceled two hours before he was supposed
to arrive, but he had already taken the day off work. It is
instructive that the court in Kirschner recognized that the
victim in that case “lost wages because he was required to
respond to [a] subpoena.” 358 Or at 609. In this case, the
victim was required to respond to a subpoena and took the
necessary action of taking the day off work to attend the
grand jury proceeding. While a court date being canceled
could be relevant to determining if it is proper to award lost
wages to a victim, it does not warrant a bright line rule. The
victim’s lost wages were a reasonably necessary loss of time
attributable to the criminal activities of the defendant.
Turning to the second assignment of error, the trial
court did not err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for
2
Defendant did not preserve any arguments about causation or foreseeabil-
ity around the lost wages, and conceded at oral argument they were making a
purely legal argument about the effect of a canceled proceeding, so we do not
address those.
68 State v. Mondragon
lost wages that the victim incurred by speaking at defen-
dant’s arraignment on August 8, 2024.
The victim in this case testified that he missed
work because he had been told he needed to be present. As
a result, he appeared at the arraignment and provided a
statement. At that arraignment, the trial court continued
the conditional release of defendant and added a no contact
provision. Because the victim spoke at the hearing, and had
been told to appear, he is entitled to restitution for lost wages
because it was “reasonably necessary” for him to attend. See
Nichols, 306 Or App at 199-200.
In defendant’s third assignment of error, he asserts
that he was entitled to a jury determination of restitution
pursuant to the Oregon Constitution, Article I, section
17, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. That issue was not preserved, and defendant
asks us to review for plain error based on his belief that this
issue would be resolved in his favor by the time this case
was decided. That is not the case, and both arguments—
based on the Oregon Constitution and the United States
Constitution—have been rejected by us recently. State v.
Myers, 349 Or App 80, 90-91, 591 P3d 1197, rev allowed, 375
Or 748 (2026) (concluding that there is no right to a jury
trial for restitution under the state or federal constitution);3
State v. Rich, 349 Or App 48, 68-70, 591 P3d 1241 (2026)
(same). Therefore, the trial court did not plainly err.
Affirmed.
3
While the Supreme Court recently allowed review in Myers to address this
very question, “plain error” is determined by “reference to the law existing at the
time the appeal is decided.” State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 137, 57 P3d 970 (2002).