Full Opinion

No. 1121 November 18, 2026 63 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSHUA OMAR MONDRAGON, aka Joshua Mondragon, Defendant-Appellant. Deschutes County Circuit Court 24CR34856; A186442 Beth M. Bagley, Judge. Argued and submitted August 5, 2026. Kelsey Townsend, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. 64 State v. Mondragon SHORR, P. J. In this criminal case, defendant appeals from a supplemental judgment imposing $1,048.42 in restitution, entered after defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal mischief. Defendant challenges only $638.76 of the total restitution. That amount represents the victim’s lost wages for two days of court proceedings that the victim attended or attempted to attend: a grand jury proceeding that was canceled and an arraignment proceeding. In his first two assignments, defendant asserts that the imposi- tion of restitution for those lost wages was improper because the victim’s attendance was not “reasonably necessary.” We conclude that the court did not err by imposing restitution for the two days of lost wages. In his third assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to obtain defendant’s written waiver of his right to a jury trial as to restitution, and by not providing such a trial. We conclude that the court did not err and reject each of defen- dant’s arguments. We therefore affirm. We review a restitution order for errors of law and are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them. State v. McClelland, 278 Or App 138, 141, 372 P3d 614, rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016). “[W]e presume that a trial court implicitly resolves factual disputes consistently with its ultimate conclusion where those facts are necessary to its conclusion and supported by the record.” State v. Pool, 338 Or App 19, 20, 565 P3d 73 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review the evidence supporting the trial court’s restitution order in the light most favorable to the state.” State v. Skeen, 309 Or App 288, 290, 481 P3d 402 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of second-degree criminal mischief for damaging the victim’s vehicle. At the contested restitution hearing, defendant agreed to the deductible costs to repair the damaged vehicle as well as four hours of the victim’s lost wages to obtain a quote for the repair. Defendant objected to the state’s request for restitution for three full days of lost wages for June 14, August 6, and Cite as 355 Or App 63 (2026) 65 August 8, 2024. The victim took the day off work on June 14, 2024, to get a quote for damages that defendant caused to the victim’s vehicle. The victim again took the entire day off work on August 6, 2024, because of a subpoena to appear at a grand jury, which the victim learned was canceled two hours before he arrived. Finally, the victim took the day off work on August 8, 2024, to attend defendant’s arraignment to request a no contact order stay in effect. The victim sub- mitted a letter from his employer that showed his lost wages from June 14 were $310.06, and for August 6 and August 8 were $319.38 per day. The victim took the full day off each of those days because his office had a policy that he could only take full days off. At the restitution hearing, defendant argued that he should not be responsible for the lost wages for the two court hearings in August because the victim’s presence was not reasonably necessary. The trial court ordered restitution for the full day on June 14 for the victim to get a quote for the damage to the vehicle. The court then ordered restitu- tion for the full day of August 6 because the victim was sub- ject to a subpoena, which made his attendance necessary. Finally, the court ordered restitution for August 8 because it was reasonable for the victim to believe he was required to appear based on information received from the district attorney through the office’s victim advocate department. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the resti- tution award for the lost wages that were incurred by the victim while getting a quote for the damaged vehicle on June 14. He does assign error to the award of restitution for the victim’s lost wages that were incurred by the victim to attend the two hearings in August. Defendant’s argument against restitution for the victim’s lost wages to appear at those two hearings is that the victim’s attendance was not reasonably necessary, and so the trial court erred in award- ing lost wages. Under ORS 137.106(2)(a), a crime victim is enti- tled to restitution for economic damages as determined by the court. The state has the burden of proving “(1) criminal activities, (2) economic damages, and (3) a causal relationship between the two.” Skeen, 309 Or App at 291 (quoting State 66 State v. Mondragon v. Plagmann/Samora, 304 Or App 785, 787-88, 469 P3d 288 (2020)). For restitution purposes, “economic damages” means “objectively verifiable monetary losses” as defined in ORS 31.705, but it “does not include future impairment of earning capacity.” ORS 137.103(2)(a). Objectively verifiable monetary losses include “monetary losses that a victim could recover if the victim were a plaintiff in a civil action against the defen- dant.” State v. Islam, 359 Or 796, 801, 377 P3d 533 (2016) (cit- ing State v. Ramos, 358 Or 581, 593-94, 368 P3d 446 (2016)). The use of the term “economic damages,” and the purpose of the restitution statute “as a substitute for a civil proceeding, make civil law concepts relevant” when deter- mining which costs are recoverable through restitution. Ramos, 358 Or at 594. Civil law concepts typically bar a party from recovering their litigation costs from the other side under the American Rule, which provides that par- ties are responsible for their own attorney fees and costs absent a statute or contract providing otherwise. Id. at 600. However, the state can still seek restitution for fees and costs that a victim incurs by participating “in the under- lying criminal prosecution.” Id. at 603. Restitution for lost wages incurred by participating in the criminal case does not violate the American Rule because “restitution is a crim- inal sanction that is sought by the state, not by the victim.” State v. Kirschner, 358 Or 605, 610, 368 P3d 21 (2016). There are some limitations on which expenses can be recovered through restitution. In Ramos, the court relied upon the Restatement (First) of Torts section 914 (1939), to explain that restitution can be sought to recover for “rea- sonably necessary loss of time” in the same way that par- ties to a civil action can recover “attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in separate litigation.” Ramos, 358 Or at 601 (emphasis added). That rationale allows the state to seek restitution for recovery of a victim’s lost wages when that victim is required to attend a hearing in a defendant’s trial.1 Kirschner, 358 Or at 609 (affirming the award of lost wages when a victim was subpoenaed to testify as a witness for the state). A victim can also receive restitution for attending 1 The state must also establish “that those costs ‘resulted from’ a defendant’s criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable.” Kirschner, 358 Or at 610. Cite as 355 Or App 63 (2026) 67 a judicial proceeding caused by the defendant’s conduct if their resulting lost wages are “reasonably necessary,” even if the victim was not subpoenaed to testify. State v. Nichols, 306 Or App 189, 198-99, 473 P3d 1145 (2020). Here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for the lost wages of the victim, who took the day off to comply with a subpoena for a grand jury proceeding on August 6, 2024, even though it was canceled. The fact that the grand jury proceeding was can- celed on short notice does not prevent the state from seeking restitution for lost wages when the victim was subpoenaed to provide testimony and took the day off work to attend. While there is a responsibility on the prosecutor to inform parties when hearings are canceled and to avoid imposing unnecessary costs on victims, defendant has not framed this challenge to address that issue.2 Instead, defendant is claim- ing that there is a categorical rule that if a proceeding is canceled, then the victim’s participation is unnecessary, and the state cannot seek restitution for lost wages. We decline to adopt that type of categorical rule in this case. Here, the victim testified that he received a sub- poena to appear at grand jury. He also testified that the grand jury was canceled two hours before he was supposed to arrive, but he had already taken the day off work. It is instructive that the court in Kirschner recognized that the victim in that case “lost wages because he was required to respond to [a] subpoena.” 358 Or at 609. In this case, the victim was required to respond to a subpoena and took the necessary action of taking the day off work to attend the grand jury proceeding. While a court date being canceled could be relevant to determining if it is proper to award lost wages to a victim, it does not warrant a bright line rule. The victim’s lost wages were a reasonably necessary loss of time attributable to the criminal activities of the defendant. Turning to the second assignment of error, the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for 2 Defendant did not preserve any arguments about causation or foreseeabil- ity around the lost wages, and conceded at oral argument they were making a purely legal argument about the effect of a canceled proceeding, so we do not address those. 68 State v. Mondragon lost wages that the victim incurred by speaking at defen- dant’s arraignment on August 8, 2024. The victim in this case testified that he missed work because he had been told he needed to be present. As a result, he appeared at the arraignment and provided a statement. At that arraignment, the trial court continued the conditional release of defendant and added a no contact provision. Because the victim spoke at the hearing, and had been told to appear, he is entitled to restitution for lost wages because it was “reasonably necessary” for him to attend. See Nichols, 306 Or App at 199-200. In defendant’s third assignment of error, he asserts that he was entitled to a jury determination of restitution pursuant to the Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 17, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That issue was not preserved, and defendant asks us to review for plain error based on his belief that this issue would be resolved in his favor by the time this case was decided. That is not the case, and both arguments— based on the Oregon Constitution and the United States Constitution—have been rejected by us recently. State v. Myers, 349 Or App 80, 90-91, 591 P3d 1197, rev allowed, 375 Or 748 (2026) (concluding that there is no right to a jury trial for restitution under the state or federal constitution);3 State v. Rich, 349 Or App 48, 68-70, 591 P3d 1241 (2026) (same). Therefore, the trial court did not plainly err. Affirmed. 3 While the Supreme Court recently allowed review in Myers to address this very question, “plain error” is determined by “reference to the law existing at the time the appeal is decided.” State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 137, 57 P3d 970 (2002).