State v. Arreguin

478 November 4, 2026 No. 1082 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MELODY ELENA ARREGUIN, Defendant-Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 23CR07390; A185003 Audrey J. Broyles, Judge. Argued and submitted December 17, 2025. Jason E. Thompson argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Thompson Law, LLC. Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 478 (2026) 479 AOYAGI, P. J. Defendant was convicted of first-degree man- slaughter, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of intoxicants, after causing a car crash that resulted in the death of another driver. On appeal, she raises four assign- ments of error, all relating to the manslaughter conviction, which was based on defendant having caused the victim’s death by acting “recklessly under circumstances manifest- ing extreme indifference to the value of human life.” ORS 163.118(1)(a). She claims error in (1) the denial of her pre- trial motion for an election, (2) the denial of her midtrial motion for an election, (3) the entry of a conviction despite legally insufficient evidence that she acted under circum- stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and (4) the imposition of an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence. As explained below, we affirm. Background. One night, defendant drove while intoxicated through Aumsville. She followed other cars too closely, swerved around them to pass, and almost hit other cars, including coming within inches of hitting an SUV. She reached up to 103 mph on a stretch of road with a posted 40-mph speed limit. Then, slowing to 85 mph, she drove around a curve with a 35-mph advisory speed, crossed the center line, and collided with an oncoming vehicle, instantly killing the driver. An expert estimated that defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time was between .18 and .205 percent. Defendant was unconscious after the accident. When she awoke, she displayed great remorse. Defendant was criminally charged and convicted after a bench trial. She was sentenced to 120 months in prison on the man- slaughter conviction. Election. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial and midtrial motions for an election on the manslaughter count. The premise of the motions was that, to provide defendant with constitutionally sufficient notice of the allegations against her, the state needed to elect the specific acts on which it intended to rely to prove extreme indifference to human life. The state maintains that the trial court correctly denied the motions, because an election was not necessary or appropriate here. We review for legal error 480 State v. Arreguin whether an election was required. See State v. Magana, 212 Or App 553, 565, 159 P3d 1163, rev den, 343 Or 363 (2007). Generally, an election is warranted when the alle- gations or evidence would allow for more convictions than there are criminal charges, such that there is a need to know which acts the state is seeking convictions for. See State v. Bravo-Chavez, 343 Or App 326, 337-38, 578 P3d 725, rev den, 374 Or 437 (2025) (trial court properly required elec- tion where discovery revealed many more potential crimes than criminal charges). Here, we agree with the state that no election was necessary. One person died as the result of defendant’s actions, and defendant was charged with one count of first-degree manslaughter based on his death. To prove the crime as charged, the state had to prove “circum- stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,” and defendant is correct that any number of facts could be relevant to proving that element. See State v. Giron-Cortez, 372 Or 729, 742, 557 P3d 505 (2024) (for purposes of the extreme-indifference element, “the circum- stances before, during, and after the resulting injury or death” are relevant). But that many facts are relevant to prove an element of an offense that essentially turns on the totality of the circumstances does not mean that the state must elect the specific facts that it deems relevant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for election. Extreme Indifference. Defendant next contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the extreme-in- difference element. She raised the same issue in closing argument, which was the functional equivalent of moving for a judgment of acquittal, so the issue is preserved. State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 454 n 1, 365 P3d 116 (2015). Our task therefore is to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essen- tial element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). As clarified at oral argument, the parties’ dispute turns largely on whether defendant’s driving in the minutes Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 478 (2026) 481 leading up to the crash was enough, on its own, to prove that defendant caused the victim’s death by acting “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” ORS 163.118(1)(a). Defendant argues that it was not. She points to various appellate opin- ions discussing preexisting facts, such as a defendant’s criminal history or prior involvement with alcohol or drug treatment, or post-accident facts, such as a defendant’s lack of remorse or interference with rescue or treatment efforts, and the lack of any comparable evidence here. The state counters that an act can be so inherently dangerous to human life that the act itself is sufficient to prove the extreme-indifference element—and cites this case, in which defendant was extremely intoxicated, drove at an extremely high rate of speed, narrowly missed other cars, and repeat- edly left her lane of travel, as such a situation. In the state’s view, evidence of criminal history, lack of remorse, and the like is relevant but not essential to proving the extreme-in- difference element. We agree with the state. The Supreme Court has construed the extreme-indifference element to encompass reckless conduct that is extraordinarily dangerous and pres- ents a high risk of causing the death of another person— it goes “well beyond ordinary reckless[ness]” and refers to the “ ‘highest’ or ‘greatest’ lack of concern that a person’s conduct could result in the death of a human being.” Giron- Cortez, 372 Or at 740-41. But the manifestation of extreme indifference may arise from the circumstances of the con- duct itself. Id. For example, to use a hypothetical from the legislative history, shooting a gun across a seldom-used road is reckless but likely not enough to prove extreme indiffer- ence, whereas shooting a gun across a highway in an urban or highly populated area is reckless and probably enough to prove extreme indifference given the very high risk of kill- ing someone. Id. at 748. The act of shooting is the same, but the circumstances manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life in the latter situation in a way that they do not in the former. Of course, other circumstances before, during, and after the crime may also be relevant. Id. at 742. But, as we read Giron-Cortez, the reckless commission of extraordinarily dangerous conduct carrying a high risk 482 State v. Arreguin of causing the death of another person can itself be legally sufficient to prove the extreme-indifference element of first- degree manslaughter. Here, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to go to the factfinder. The degree of defendant’s intoxica- tion, the extreme rate of speed, the near-misses of other cars, and the repeated lane departures were legally suffi- cient circumstances to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. The fact that defendant had no prior convictions for driving under the influence of intoxicants and the fact that she was extremely remorseful when she awoke after the crash are relevant facts that the factfinder could consider in deciding whether it was persuaded on the extreme-indifference element. But those facts do not render the state’s evidence legally insufficient on this record. We therefore reject the third assignment of error. Sentence Proportionality. In her final assignment of error, defendant argues that her 120-month prison sen- tence for first-degree manslaughter is unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that “[c]ruel and unusual pun- ishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.” A punishment violates Article I, section 16, only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to “shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.” State v. McCombs, 330 Or App 545, 563, 544 P3d 390, rev den, 372 Or 718 (2024) (inter- nal quotation marks and brackets omitted). That occurs “only in rare circumstances.” State v. Horseman, 294 Or App 398, 408, 432 P3d 258 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 723 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, is a legal question. State v. Gonzalez, 373 Or 248, 254, 564 P3d 109 (2025). We conduct a three-part analysis to answer that question. State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or 46, 58, 217 P3d 659 (2009). First, we compare the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense. Id.; see also State v. Lara-Vasquez, 310 Or App 99, 105, 484 P3d 369, rev den, 368 Or 561 (2021) (relevant considerations include “the general Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 478 (2026) 483 definition of the crime, the specific circumstances and facts of defendant’s conduct, characteristics of defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, the relationship between defendant and the victim, and other case-specific factors”). Second, we compare the penalties imposed for other, related crimes. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. Third, we consider the defendant’s criminal history. Id. Applying that three-part analysis here, we conclude that defendant’s 120-month sentence is not unconstitution- ally disproportionate under Article I, section 16. Defendant’s conduct fits squarely within the definition of the crime, and no case-specific factors make it significantly less grave than usual. See State v. Parker, 259 Or App 547, 550, 314 P3d 980 (2013), rev den, 355 Or 380 (2014) (that the defendant’s conduct fell “somewhere in the middle of [the] spectrum” of conduct prohibited by the criminal offense weighed against a finding of disproportionality). Defendant compares her punishment to that for attempted murder, but we find that argument unpersuasive, given that the victim in this case died. See Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 65 (considering the penalties imposed for crimes with “similar characteristics to the crime at issue”). Finally, defendant has no prior crim- inal record, which weighs in her favor, but that fact alone is insufficient to establish constitutional disproportionality. State v. Shaw, 233 Or App 427, 439, 225 P3d 855, rev den, 348 Or 415 (2010). We reject the fourth assignment of error. Affirmed.