State v. Pena

510 November 12, 2026 No. 1088 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RHONDA PENA, aka Rhonda L. Pena, Defendant-Appellant. Malheur County Circuit Court 24CR53343; A187441 Erin K. Landis, Judge. Submitted September 24, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Neil F. Byl, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Affirmed. Cite as 354 Or App 510 (2026) 511 LAGESEN, C. J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction, entered after a conditional guilty plea, for one count of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.011. In her sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evi- dence deriving from a traffic stop. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the officer who stopped her had reasonable suspicion that she had committed the crime of DUII. We conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup- press for errors of law. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for a stop is a question of law that we review for legal error. State v. Musser, 253 Or App 178, 179, 289 P3d 340 (2012), aff’d, 356 Or 148 (2014). We are bound by the factual find- ings of the trial court provided there is sufficient evidence to support them. Id. We state the facts in accordance with that standard. Defendant was pulled over by Trooper Phillips of the Oregon State Police while driving on I-84. Phillips learned that a named informant had reported seeing the driver of the car stumbling and acting intoxicated before driving. Phillips observed defendant drive past him in a vehicle that matched the description and partial license plate number provided by the informant. While following defendant, Phillips observed her vehicle cross the fog line by a few inches before correct- ing. Shortly after Phillips turned on his dashcam, defen- dant’s vehicle drove on the center line. About a mile later, in a construction zone where the left lane was blocked by traf- fic barrels, Phillips observed defendant’s vehicle cross the line dividing the lanes and come within about ten inches of hitting the barrels, before braking and correcting. Phillips then pulled defendant over and initiated an investigation for DUII, which resulted in the charge against defendant. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evi- dence resulting from the stop, contending that Phillips lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for DUII and also 512 State v. Pena lacked probable cause to stop her for a traffic violation. The court denied the motion, ruling that Phillips did not have probable cause to stop defendant for a traffic violation but did have reasonable suspicion to stop her for a DUII investi- gation. Subsequently, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. Because the state does not cross-assign error to the trial court’s determination that Phillips lacked probable cause for a traffic violation, the sole question before us is whether the trial court was correct to conclude that Phillips had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to investigate a crime. Defendant does not contest the trial court’s deter- mination that Phillips subjectively believed that she was committing DUII; instead, defendant challenges the deter- mination that Phillips’s subjective belief was objectively rea- sonable under the circumstances. Defendant argues that, even if the informant’s report is deemed reliable, it was not a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion because the infor- mant only reported that they saw a person stumbling and that the informant believed the person was intoxicated, but stumbling can be caused by conditions other than intoxica- tion. Defendant argues further that her driving was not suf- ficiently erratic to create reasonable suspicion of DUII. The state argues that Phillips’s identification of defendant’s car as the vehicle specified in the informant’s report, combined with his observation of defendant’s lane departures, was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for DUII. The state argues further that, even without the informant’s report, defendant’s erratic driving was sufficient on its own to cre- ate reasonable suspicion. A peace officer may stop a person for purposes of investigation when the officer “reasonably suspects that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” ORS 131.615(1). “ ‘Reasonably suspects’ means that a peace offi- cer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts.” ORS 131.605(6). “[A]nalysis of [a] defendant’s rights under ORS 131.605-131.625 is substantially the same as analysis of his rights under the search and seizure Cite as 354 Or App 510 (2026) 513 provisions of the Oregon and Federal constitutions.” State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 497, 624 P2d 99 (1981). Under that analysis, the officer must hold a subjective belief that an individual has committed a crime, and that belief must be objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances. State v. Hames, 223 Or App 624, 628, 196 P3d 88 (2008). “If a police officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that a person has committed a crime, the officer has ‘reasonable suspicion’ and hence may stop the person for investigation.” Ehly, 317 Or at 80. Where an officer’s suspicion is based on an infor- mant’s report, the report must contain some indicia of reli- ability. Hames, 223 Or App at 628. We have identified three factors that are useful for determining reliability of an informant’s report: (1) whether the person giving the report is thereby exposed to criminal or civil liability; (2) whether the report is based on personal observation; and (3) whether the officer is able to corroborate the report with their own observations. Id. at 629. The first factor is satisfied if the informant provides law enforcement with their name. Id. The third factor may be satisfied where the officer observes illegal activity or “find[s] the person, the vehicle, and the location substantially as described by the informant.” Id. Given the great variety of informant reports, determination of reliability “rests on the particular circumstances in each case.” State v. Killion, 229 Or App 347, 356, 211 P3d 367, rev den, 347 Or 349 (2009). Applying those legal standards to the facts of this case, we agree with the trial court and the state that Phillips had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Taken as a whole, the report, Phillips’s identification of a vehicle matching the vehicle described in the report, and Phillips’s observations of defendant’s driving, made it reasonable for Phillips to suspect that defendant was committing the crime of DUII. First, Phillips reasonably relied on the informant’s report because the report had the necessary indicia of reli- ability. The informant gave their name and contact informa- tion. Their report was based on personal observation that 514 State v. Pena defendant was stumbling. The fact that Phillips was able to locate a vehicle matching the description, partial license plate number, and direction of travel reported by the infor- mant corroborated the report. See State v. Simpson, 245 Or App 152, 157, 261 P3d 90 (2011) (an anonymous report of hit and run was sufficiently corroborated when the officer located a car matching the model, color, and license plate number, within the vicinity of the reported accident scene, even though he had not yet verified that an accident had taken place); State v. Goss, 219 Or App 645, 651, 184 P3d 1155, rev den, 345 Or 94 (2008) (report of an intoxicated customer from a drive-in employee sufficiently corroborated when officer found the vehicle in the area reported and the defendant not far away); State v. Shumway, 124 Or App 131, 135, 861 P2d 384 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 459 (1994) (report from anonymous informant that the defendant had driven away from a park while being “very drunk” sufficiently cor- roborated because officer had observed the vehicle in the park earlier and then observed it returning to the park). Second, Phillips’s direct observation of defendant’s vehicle and driving provided further corroboration for the informant’s report, adding to the reasonableness of his belief that defendant was driving under the influence. See State v. Faulkner, 89 Or App 120, 123, 747 P2d 1011 (1987) (infor- mant’s report corroborated when officers observed a vehicle with matching license plate number, in the vicinity it had been reported to be heading, and “[the] defendant’s driving, although not illegal, was irregular”). Considering the cir- cumstances as a whole, Phillips had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for further investigation. In arguing otherwise, defendant appears to contend that it was not reasonable for Phillips to rely on the report because there can be many potential causes of stumbling, making the informant’s inference that defendant might have been intoxicated speculative and therefore not reason- able. Our case law, however, makes clear that the reason- ableness of the informant’s belief is immaterial to the ques- tion of reasonable suspicion. See Goss, 219 Or App at 652. Rather, that question turns on the information provided to the officer and the external indicia that the information is Cite as 354 Or App 510 (2026) 515 reliable. Id. Here, for the reasons identified above, Phillips’s direct observations of defendant’s driving provided suffi- cient indicia of the report’s reliability, such that the report and those observations, taken together, made Phillips’s sub- jective belief that defendant was committing the offense of DUII objectively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, Phillips had reasonable suspicion of DUII by the time he pulled defendant over. The trial court therefore did not err in deny- ing defendant’s motion to suppress. Affirmed.