State v. Hickman

308 October 28, 2026 No. 1052 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HANNAH MARIE HICKMAN, Defendant-Appellant. Deschutes County Circuit Court 23CR48101; A186669 Michelle A. McIver, Judge. Submitted September 24, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Elena C. Stross, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 308 (2026) 309 O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010(4), and raises two assignments of error. In her first assignment, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. In her second assign- ment, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered her to pay per diem fees. For the reasons below, we affirm. We first conclude that defendant’s second assign- ment of error regarding per diem fees is moot. The state moved to amend the judgment of conviction to remove the per diem fees and the trial court entered an amended judg- ment that removed the fees. Thus, our decision on the sec- ond assignment will have no practical effect on the rights of the parties and we do not reach it. Dept. of Human Services v. G. D. W., 353 Or 25, 32, 292 P3d 548 (2012) (“As a general rule, a case becomes moot when the court’s decision no lon- ger will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.”). As to the first assignment of error, we review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for legal error and are bound by the court’s factual findings if there is constitu- tionally sufficient evidence to support them. State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640, 643, 497 P3d 710 (2021). Where the court did not make express findings, and there is evidence from which the court could have found a fact in more than one way, we presume that the court decided the facts consistently with its ultimate conclusion. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). In this nonprecedential opinion, we discuss the facts and procedural history only as necessary for the par- ties to understand our resolution of defendant’s assignment of error. Defendant makes two arguments in her first assignment of error. First, defendant argues that she was in compelling circumstances prior to being given Miranda warnings. Second, she argues that the state failed to prove that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights because she was “on the phone” when they were read 310 State v. Hickman to her, and when asked if the rights had been read to her, she responded, “sure.” Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution pro- vides, in part, that no person “shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” It requires an officer to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating a suspect when the suspect is in full custody or is in “com- pelling circumstances.” State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 349, 397 P3d 536 (2017). A court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine whether circumstances are compelling enough to require Miranda warnings. State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 640-41, 136 P3d 22 (2006). Under our existing case law, “routine traffic stops,” by themselves, are not “sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warn- ings.” Nelson, 285 Or App at 351 (citing State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 67, 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003)). “[A] defendant’s statements obtained during a cus- todial interrogation are admissible only if the state proves that the defendant was given Miranda warnings and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights under the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 200, 475 P3d 420 (2020) (emphasis in original). After watching the entire video recording of the encounter between defendant and police, the trial court made factual findings and determined that defendant was not in compelling circumstances before officers read her Miranda rights and that after officers read her Miranda rights, she knowingly and voluntarily waived them. We conclude that the trial court did not err when it made those determina- tions. Under our existing case law, defendant was not in compelling circumstances before officers read her Miranda rights. The circumstances show a “routine” traffic stop that did not create compelling circumstances. Nelson 285 Or App at 351. We note, however, that the Supreme Court recently granted review in State v. Moran, 349 Or App 181 (nonprec- edential memorandum opinion), rev allowed, 375 Or 579 (2026), in which the defendant appears to present similar arguments as defendant in this case. As to a knowing and voluntary waiver, the trial court made several express findings that defendant “was Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 308 (2026) 311 clearly listening and attentive” when she was read her Miranda rights. The trial court also found that in response to being asked if defendant had been provided with Miranda warnings, she “clearly, unambiguously nodd[ed] her head up and down in the affirmative” and answered, “sure.” We have reviewed the record and conclude that it supports the trial court’s findings. Those facts satisfy the constitu- tional requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction. Affirmed.