Full Opinion

No. 1111 November 12, 2026 731 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGELA KAY MELTON, Defendant-Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 24CR43669; A187605 Monte S. Campbell, Judge. Submitted October 7, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Jose Garcia-Fuerte, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JACQUOT, J. Affirmed. 732 State v. Melton JACQUOT, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for second-degree disorderly conduct.1 Defendant was sentenced to 18 months of supervised probation. In her sole assign- ment of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on second-degree disorderly conduct. Defendant specifically argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that her behavior was “violent, tumultuous, or threatening,” and that her behavior recklessly caused a “public inconve- nience, annoyance, or alarm.” As explained below, we affirm. Under ORS 166.025(1)(a), “[a] person commits the crime of disorderly conduct in the second degree if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person * * * [e]ngages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behav- ior[.]”2 On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that her physical conduct reck- lessly created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to members of the public beyond the responding police offi- cers. She argued the same issue in her MJOA in the trial court, so the claim of error is preserved and its preserva- tion is undisputed. The state maintains that the trial court properly denied the MJOA. On review of the denial of an MJOA, our task is to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accept- ing reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). To the extent inferences from circumstantial evidence are neces- sary to prove an element, it is a question of law what rea- sonable inferences may be made from the evidence. State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004). Reasonable 1 Defendant was also charged with second-degree criminal mischief but was acquitted on that charge. 2 The state charged defendant with “recklessly creat[ing] a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm[,]” and did not allege an intentional mental state. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 731 (2026) 733 inferences are allowed, but “speculation and guesswork are not.” Id. Applying that standard of review, we agree with the state that the evidence was legally sufficient to go to the fact- finder. Defendant appeared at M’s,3 apartment. M’s apart- ment was across the street from a motel and a restaurant. M’s neighbor testified that M came over to her apart- ment and was smoking a cigarette. M’s neighbor testified that she told M that she saw defendant walking toward M’s apartment. M’s neighbor testified that M closed his neigh- bor’s apartment door and remained in the apartment before eventually leaving. M then returned to his own apartment and M’s neighbor testified that she did not see M again. M’s neighbor testified that defendant then returned and began yelling M’s name and asking him to come out. She testified that she saw defendant banging on M’s win- dow and door. She testified that defendant was throwing M’s plants at the window and door and was “tearing a plant to pieces.” She also testified that she saw defendant throw a planter at M’s apartment, breaking it. One of the two responding officers, Officer Handfield, testified that they responded to a call from M around 6:00 p.m. Handfield testified that, when they arrived, he saw defendant sitting on the stairs that led to M’s apartment. Handfield testified that defendant began “hurriedly walking down the stairs and then [started] walking behind the apart- ment complex.” Handfield testified that he yelled to defen- dant that she was not free to leave. He testified that defen- dant did not stop walking, but that the officers caught up with her by a dumpster behind M’s apartment. He testified that that area is visible from the street as well as from the restaurant and hotel across the street from M’s apartment. Handfield testified that he grabbed defendant’s arm and tried to explain to her why they were talking to her. Defendant told the officers not to touch her and began yelling at them. Handfield gave defendant “a use of force warning that force would be used against her.” Defendant was taken to the ground and continued to physically struggle on the 3 Defendant testified that she and M “were together for 16 years.” 734 State v. Melton ground and yell. In Handfield’s body-camera footage, which was played for the court, defendant claimed that she had uri- nated in her pants. The footage shows that Handfield said “[t]hat’s fine[,]” and subsequently placed defendant in hand- cuffs. Handfield testified that he held defendant’s legs to keep her in place and then shifted defendant onto her side—into recovery position—so as not to interfere with her breathing. Handfield’s body-camera footage shows that defen- dant continued yelling and became violent and erratic while on the ground. The footage revealed that defendant yelled obscenities and homophobic slurs at the officers as she strug- gled with them and resisted being handcuffed. After the officers handcuffed her, defendant kicked at one of the offi- cers while he held her legs and then spat at him. The footage also showed defendant’s resistance to the officers’ attempts to remove from her hands the items she was holding—an alcoholic beverage, an electronic vape, and her cellphone. Defendant used a freed-up hand to attempt to grab keys from an officer. She then proceeded to eat the dirt off the ground and bang her head on the ground while handcuffed. The officers held defendant by her hair, which the court found was “to keep her from harming herself.” Defendant’s yelling and the officers’ attempts to restrain her continued for over 15 minutes. Defendant’s conduct in the parking lot of the apart- ment complex drew attention from other residents of the apartment complex and patrons at the restaurant across the street. A group of teenaged boys watched defendant and laughed; a small family was walking behind the complex and stopped to watch; and there was traffic on the road because it was a busier time of day. Handfield testified that the incident did not interfere with the traffic. The other offi- cer testified that at various times during the incident, he observed traffic slowing down. On appeal, defendant argues that her physical conduct did not recklessly create a risk of inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to members of the public beyond the responding police officers. Defendant argues that her con- duct mostly consisted of “ineffectual struggles with the restraining officers over the course of fifteen minutes, as Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 731 (2026) 735 well as one incident of her potentially spitting at (but miss- ing) the officer and one incident of kicking at (but failing to connect with) an officer.” Defendant argues that even if her conduct amounted to violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior, it did not create a risk of inconvenience, annoy- ance, or alarm to members of the broader public. She argues that, throughout the relevant time period, she was “firmly restrained by two police officers and was far away from most of the public.” She argues that “[h]er physical conduct did not inconvenience that broader public and had no reason- able chance of annoying or alarming the onlookers.” Defendant argues that, if anything created a spec- tacle, it could have been defendant’s speech and that it was her speech that caused people to stop, film, and laugh. Defendant argues that her speech cannot be the basis for her conviction and that there is a lack of evidence that her physical conduct specifically created a risk of annoying, inconveniencing, or alarming anyone other than the police officers who were restraining her. Accordingly, she argues that the state failed to carry its burden. In reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the state, as the standard of review requires, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of second- degree disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the state illustrated that defendant’s conduct was violent, tumultuous, and threatening. Defendant kicked and spat at the officers, physically resisted the officers’ attempts to remove the items from her hands, attempted to grab a set of keys from the officer, ate dirt off the ground, and banged her head on the ground. Throughout the encounter, defendant yelled profan- ities and expletives at the officers. Although communicative speech, by itself, cannot serve as the basis for a conviction of second-degree disorderly conduct, it can and must be viewed in combination with defendant’s conduct. State v. Davis, 303 Or App 90, 98, 462 P3d 295, rev den, 366 Or 827 (2020). When so viewed, defendant’s communicative speech shows that her actions were violent, tumultuous, and threatening. Second, defendant’s violent, tumultuous, and threat- ening conduct created a risk of public annoyance, inconve- nience, or alarm. As noted, the state charged defendant 736 State v. Melton with recklessly creating a risk of public annoyance, incon- venience, or alarm, which required the state to “adduce evi- dence that defendant consciously disregarded an unjustifi- able risk that [her] behavior would affect not just specific individuals, but the public in general.” State v. Love, 271 Or App 545, 553-54, 351 P3d 780 (2015). The state did so here. Defendant’s altercation with the responding police officers occurred in a public place: in the parking lot of an apart- ment complex next to a busy main road and near several businesses. That evidence permitted a rational factfinder to conclude that defendant disregarded a substantial risk that members of the public witnessed defendant’s behavior and had been inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed by her violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior. See Davis, 303 Or App at 100 (affirming defendant’s disorderly conduct con- viction when the defendant’s fight was outside of a nightclub next to several businesses and a road and drew a crowd). Defendant argues that her conduct did not create a public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm because her conduct was not directed at the general public and because there was no evidence that any of the spectating public were annoyed, inconvenienced, or alarmed by her conduct. However, as defendant acknowledges, the second-degree dis- orderly conduct statute “does not, by its terms, require proof of actual public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to any particular number of persons.” State v. Willy, 155 Or App 279, 283, 963 P2d 739 (1998). Instead, the statute only “requires proof that defendant[ ] either intended to cause one of those conditions or recklessly created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance or alarm to the public[.]” Id. at 283 (emphasis in original). The evidence of defendant’s conduct and its effect of drawing a crowd and affecting traffic is legally sufficient to show that defendant disregarded the risk of inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to the public. Cf. Love, 271 Or App at 555-56 (the defendant’s physical altercation did not affect the “public” because it happened inside of a private residence in front of “a small group of people, all known to each other[.]”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s MJOA. Affirmed.