Full Opinion

No. 1112 November 12, 2026 737 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVE B. WOOLDRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant. Polk County Circuit Court 23CR55245; A186062 Rafael A. Caso, Judge. Submitted September 24, 2026. Frances J. Gray filed the briefs for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Affirmed. 738 State v. Woolridge O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for three counts of first-degree sodomy, ORS 163.405; three counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 163.411; four counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427; and one count of incest, ORS 163.525. Defendant raises three assignments of error. We affirm. First Assignment of Error. In his first assignment of error, defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling that uncharged acts of sexual abuse were admissible as nonpro- pensity evidence. Even assuming that defendant adequately preserved the first assignment of error, the trial court did not err in admitting the uncharged misconduct. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly deter- mined that evidence of defendant’s uncharged sexual abuse of complainant, his daughter M, is relevant as nonpropen- sity evidence under OEC 404(3) to explain M’s delayed dis- closure of the charged offenses. State v. Zybach, 308 Or 96, 100, 775 P2d 318 (1989); State v. White, 293 Or App 62, 65, 426 P3d 203, adh’d to as modified on recons, 294 Or App 780 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 535 (2019). Second and Third Assignments of Error. In his second and third assignments of error, defendant makes a combined argument that challenges the entry of the convic- tions for two counts of first-degree sodomy, Counts 2 and 3. Defendant argues that the evidence was legally insuffi- cient on both counts to prove “sexual conduct” involving the complainant’s sex organ, an element of first-degree sodomy. Defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) in the trial court and therefore requests plain-error review. We conclude that the court did not plainly err. A person commits the crime of first-degree sod- omy, as charged here, when a person “engaged in oral or anal sexual intercourse with another person” and “the vic- tim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the actor.” ORS 163.405(1)(a). Here, the state’s theory at trial was that defendant engaged in oral sexual intercourse with M by forcible compulsion. “Oral sexual intercourse means sexual conduct between persons consisting of contact between the Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 737 (2026) 739 sex organs * * * of one person and mouth * * * of another.” ORS 163.305(3). Defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the sexual conduct element of the crime because the state failed to present sufficient evi- dence that defendant’s mouth contacted M’s vagina and that we should exercise our discretion to correct the plain error. The state disagrees on both points. “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000). However, we have discretion to con- sider a “plain” error. ORAP 5.45(1). An error is “plain” when it is an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reason- ably in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record with- out our having to choose among competing inferences. State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). Whether an error is “plain” is an issue of law. State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 167, 130 P3d 780 (2006). It is a matter of our discre- tion whether to correct a plain error that was not harmless. State v. Ortiz, 372 Or 658, 671-72, 554 P3d 796 (2024). The legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove the charged crime is a question of law, State v. Reynolds, 250 Or App 516, 520, 280 P3d 1046, rev den, 352 Or 666 (2012), and any error is necessarily apparent on the record. Therefore, whether the trial court committed a “plain” error necessar- ily turns on whether it is obvious and beyond reasonable dis- pute that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the crime. As when we review the denial of an MJOA, we must examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accept- ing reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). It is a matter of law what inferences a factfinder could reasonably make from the evidence, without engaging in impermissi- ble “speculation and guesswork.” State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004). Because our review is limited to plain error, for defendant to prevail, it must be obvious and not reasonably in dispute that no rational factfinder could find the essential elements proved on the existing record. 740 State v. Woolridge The state charged three counts of first-degree sod- omy, Counts 1, 2, and 3, using identical wording. At trial, the state presented evidence of three separate incidents of sexual abuse during the date range charged in the indict- ment, and it explained that each first-degree sodomy charge pertained to one of the three incidents. A factfinder could find on this record that defendant placed his mouth on M’s vagina during three separate incidents of forcible sexual abuse during the date range alleged in the indictment, including during the incidents identified as Counts 2 and 3. It is not obvious, and it is reasonably in dispute, that no rational factfinder could find that defendant subjected M to oral sexual intercourse. Defendant agrees that the evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of first-degree sodomy on Count 1. He argues that M’s testimony about the incidents that formed the basis for Counts 2 and 3 was less explicit and did not permit a reasonable inference that he put his mouth on M’s vagina during either incident. We disagree. The evidence permits a reasonable inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant subjected M to the same sexual contact during the incidents that form the basis of Counts 2 and 3 as defendant did during the incident that formed the basis for Count 1. At the least, in the plain-error context, it is not obvious or beyond dispute that the evidence was legally insufficient on Counts 2 and 3. Any error is not plain, so we reject defendant’s second and third assignments of error. Affirmed.