Full Opinion

186 November 18, 2026 No. 1135 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRADLEY SCOTT CHREST, aka Bradley Chrest, aka Bradley S. Chrest, Defendant-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 19CR59464; A184889 Eric L. Dahlin, Judge. Submitted July 29, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Erik Blumenthal, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 186 (2026) 187 EGAN, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered following a jury trial, for three counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of third-degree sexual abuse. We affirm. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial after a witness testified to the complainant’s credibility. In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges on former jeopardy grounds because, in his first trial, the prosecutor knowingly asked a question that was likely to elicit imper- missible vouching testimony and acted with at least indif- ference to causing a mistrial. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and that therefore retrial was not barred under either the state or the federal protections against double jeopardy. In his second assignment of error, defendant con- tends that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of previous uncharged conduct involving the complainant. Defendant argues, first, that State v. McKay, 309 Or 305, 787 P2d 479 (1990), in which the Supreme Court held that evidence of prior sexual conduct between a defendant and victim is admissible to demonstrate the sexual predisposi- tion defendant had for the particular victim should be recon- sidered, and second, that the evidence was unfairly prejudi- cial under OEC 403. We reject defendant’s first argument because we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence after OEC 403 balancing. Double Jeopardy. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice on former jeopardy grounds. “We review for errors of law the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The factual findings underlying the trial court’s ruling are reviewed for any evidence.” State v. Garner, 234 Or App 486, 491, 228 P3d 710, rev den, 348 Or 621 (2010) (citation omitted). We 188 State v. Chrest state the underlying facts consistent with that standard of review. At defendant’s first trial, the prosecutor asked a witness, who was an adult protective services investigator and a mandatory reporter, why she made a report to Child Protective Services and the police after she heard about the complainant’s statements. The witness responded “I work in abuse, and—and I’m an investigator, and I—I understand. I believed her—it was—” The trial court sustained defen- dant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. Immediately thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, defendant moved for a mistrial. The parties and the court agreed that the testimony was vouching and dis- cussed whether it would be curable with a jury instruction. During that discussion, the prosecutor represented to the court that she had instructed the witness that morning that she was not to provide her opinion and that one of the rules she has to follow as a witness is not to testify as to her belief in the credibility of the complainant’s disclosure. The pros- ecutor explained that the purpose of her question was to elicit testimony that the witness made the reports because she was a mandatory reporter, and defendant explained that he had not objected to the question because he had expected that answer as well. The court stated that it did not “disbelieve at all [the prosecutor’s] statement that she instructed her witness not to do what her witness just did. So I—just [so] that the record’s clear, I don’t put any fault on her.” Ultimately, the court concluded that the error would not be curable with a jury instruction and granted the mis- trial, explaining that it appeared that the witness deliber- ately disregarded the prosecutor’s instructions, and that the court “ascribe[s] no ill intent whatsoever to [the prosecutor].” Defendant later moved to dismiss the charges on the ground of former jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion on the basis of the court’s previous finding that the prosecutor had no ill intent and that there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Under Article I, section 12, retrial is barred when prosecutorial misconduct necessitates a mistrial and the prosecutor “acted with knowledge of the improper and prej- udicial nature of the conduct and with at least indifference Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 186 (2026) 189 to the resulting mistrial.” State v. Kimsey, 182 Or App 193, 203, 47 P3d 916 (2002) (emphases in original). Under the Fifth Amendment, retrial is barred only if the prosecutor engaged in conduct “intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Under both standards, the dispositive issue is whether the prosecutor had the requisite intent. State v. Mays, 269 Or App 599, 617, 346 P3d 535, rev den, 358 Or 146 (2015). Defendant now argues that the trial court lacked a sufficient record to find that the state adequately admon- ished its witness and also that the record compels a find- ing that the prosecutor knew that the witness believed the complainant and that that was the only reason to elicit the witness’s reasons for reporting the allegations. Even if that is arguably one permissible inference from the record, we must affirm if there is any evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings. At the first trial, on the basis of the prosecutor’s statements to the court, the trial court spe- cifically found that the prosecutor did not engage in miscon- duct and that she did not intend to elicit the challenged tes- timony, and it expressly found the prosecutor’s explanation credible. Those findings were adopted by the court when it denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. Because those findings are supported by the record, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. Other-acts Evidence. In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of uncharged conduct that occurred in Scappoose, specifically evidence that defendant would come into complainant’s room at night, pick her up out of bed, and touch her genitals, as well as unspecified allegations regarding his conduct during a hiking trip. The charges at issue concerned conduct that occurred in Gresham, when the complainant was twelve-to-fifteen years old, in which defendant touched the complainant’s breasts, upper thighs, and buttocks, and caused her to touch his genital area. On appeal, defendant argues that the other-acts evidence was not admissible under OEC 404 and that the Supreme Court’s holding in McKay, 309 Or at 308, that evidence of prior sexual conduct between a defendant and the victim is 190 State v. Chrest admissible to demonstrate the sexual predisposition defen- dant had for the particular victim, was wrongly decided; that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403; and that the admission of that evidence violated defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. “We review for legal error a trial court’s admission of uncharged misconduct evidence under OEC 404(3). We review the trial court’s determination under OEC 403 for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Le, 327 Or App 129, 135, 534 P3d 1097, rev den, 371 Or 715 (2023) (citation and brackets omitted). Whether admission of evidence violates a defen- dant’s due process right to a fundamentally fair trial is a question of law. State v. Baughman, 361 Or 386, 402, 393 P3d 1132 (2017). The Supreme Court has held that evidence of uncharged incidents of sexual contact between the defendant and the victim in the case is “admissible to demonstrate the sexual predisposition this defendant had for this particular victim, that is, to show the sexual inclination of defendant towards the victim, not that he had a character trait or pro- pensity to engage in sexual misconduct generally.” McKay, 309 Or at 308. Defendant argues that McKay was wrongly decided; he contends that proof of defendant’s “sexual pre- disposition” toward a particular victim is propensity evi- dence used to show that defendant acted in conformity with that character trait. However, because the McKay theory of admissibility as to sexual predisposition toward a specific victim remains good law, the trial court did not err in ruling that the evidence was admissible. See, e.g. Le, 327 Or App at 135-36 (rejecting similar argument); State v. De Leon Say, 319 Or App 271, 272-73, 510 P3d 979, rev den, 370 Or 303 (2022) (same). As to the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was admissible under OEC 403, the state argued that, in addition to the theory of relevance articulated in McKay, the evidence was also relevant to provide important context for the victim’s understanding of the charged conduct as sex- ual, to explain why she delayed reporting the conduct, and to prove that defendant’s touching had a sexual purpose. See State v. Zybach, 308 Or 96, 100, 775 P2d 318 (1989) Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 186 (2026) 191 (evidence of prior sexual conduct between a defendant and a child victim may be admissible to explain the nature of the relationship and delayed disclosure by the child). Defendant argued that “character evidence by its nature is unduly prejudicial,” but did not identify before the trial court any other specific feature of the evidence that would make its admission unduly prejudicial. Given the arguments before the trial court at the time defendant made his motion, State v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 283 Or App 800, 804, 391 P3d 811, rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017) (we review the denial of a motion in limine based on the record before the trial court when it issued its ruling), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; for the same reason, the admission of that evidence did not violate due process. Affirmed.