State v. Crabtree
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA183278
JudgeEgan
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1118 November 18, 2026 9
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROY FILBERT CRABTREE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
21CR10987; A183278
Debra K. Vogt, Judge.
Submitted November 13, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Sarah De La Cruz, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
EGAN, J.
Affirmed.
10 State v. Crabtree
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 11
EGAN, J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for first-degree rape, ORS 163.375, and two counts of first-
degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427.1 On appeal, he assigns
error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss,
denial of his alternative motion for a mistrial, and denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-
degree rape. Defendant argues that the state violated its
statutory and constitutional discovery obligations by dis-
closing, during trial, a medical report generated following
the complainant’s examination at Kids FIRST, and that the
resulting prejudice required dismissal or, alternatively, a
mistrial. Defendant further argues that the evidence was
insufficient to permit a rational juror to find that his penis
penetrated the complainant’s vagina, as required for first-
degree rape. We conclude that the trial court erred in its
determination that there had been no discovery violation
under ORS 135.815 and ORS 135.845 but, because it rec-
ognized and took sufficient measures to mitigate prejudice
resulting from the late disclosure, that error was harmless.
The trial court was required to choose mitigating measures
short of granting defendant’s motions to dismiss or for a
mistrial when less severe mitigation measures sufficed to
cure the prejudice resulting from the error. Relatedly, we
conclude that there was no federal due process violation. We
further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
the rape conviction and the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The complainant, S, is defendant’s biological
great-granddaughter. During the years relevant to this
case, S spent time at defendant’s home while members of
her extended family cared for her. In early 2021, when S
was 12 years old, she disclosed to her adoptive grandmother
that defendant had sexually abused her when she was a
young child. Law enforcement referred the matter to Kids
FIRST, where S participated in a forensic interview and
1
Defendant was also tried but ultimately acquitted by the jury on a charge
of first-degree sodomy. ORS 163.405.
12 State v. Crabtree
later underwent a medical examination conducted by Dr. St.
Germain. Following the examination, St. Germain prepared
a report containing a summary of the forensic interview and
the results of the medical examination. St. Germain then
emailed the report to Detective Murray, the lead detective
on the case, but that email was lost due to a function of the
secure email system used to transmit the report.
The state charged defendant with one count of first-
degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree sexual abuse,
and one count of first-degree rape. Before trial, defendant
requested discovery, including any medical reports relating
to the investigation. The prosecutor responded that the state
did not possess any such reports. Just before trial began,
defendant’s attorney again asked about the existence of a
medical report and the prosecutor again responded that the
state did not have a medical report.
During the second day of trial, testimony revealed
for the first time that S had undergone a medical examina-
tion at Kids FIRST. The prosecutor immediately attempted
to obtain any existing report and, after quickly receiving it
from Kids FIRST, promptly disclosed it to defendant during
trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively,
for a mistrial, arguing that the report contained impeach-
ment material, exculpatory information, and information
that would have altered the defense’s trial strategy, and
entered a declaration reiterating those arguments.
The trial court found that neither the prosecutor nor
the investigating detective possessed the report before trial,
concluded that no discovery violation had occurred, and
denied defendant’s motions. Despite its ruling that there was
no discovery violation for lack of possession, the trial court
reviewed the report and acknowledged that the late disclo-
sure was prejudicial to defendant because the report con-
tained statements with possible witness impeachment value.
The trial court disagreed with defendant that the report
contained exculpatory information or revealed informa-
tion that newly required an expert witness because its con-
tents were largely duplicative of the forensic interview that
was already in evidence. To mitigate the prejudice caused
by the late disclosure, the trial court permitted additional
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 13
cross-examination of witnesses, allowed defendant to recall
witnesses who had already testified, and allowed defendant
to call St. Germain as a witness. The jury subsequently
acquitted defendant of first-degree sodomy but convicted
him of the remaining offenses. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Mistrial
In his first and second assignments of error, defen-
dant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motions
for a mistrial and, alternatively, to dismiss arising out of the
alleged discovery violation after the state produced the medi-
cal examination report mid-trial. Defendant argues that the
state’s failure to disclose the report before trial violated both
of the discovery statutes, ORS 135.815 and ORS 135.845,
and his right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373
US 83, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). According to
defendant, the report contained impeachment evidence,
exculpatory information, and information that would have
substantially altered the defense’s trial strategy, including
the decision whether to obtain expert witnesses. Defendant
argues that the discovery violation required the trial court
to grant dismissal or, at a minimum, a mistrial.
The state responds that the trial court correctly
determined that no discovery violation occurred because
neither the prosecutor nor the investigating detective pos-
sessed the report before trial. The state further argues that,
even assuming some deficiency in discovery, the trial court
acted within its discretion in fashioning an appropriate
remedy that eliminated any prejudice resulting from the
report’s late disclosure.
We begin with whether the state was in possession
or control of the medical report pretrial. We review the trial
court’s determination that there was no discovery violation
for errors of law, viewing the predicate facts in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Nistler, 268 Or
App 470, 487, 342 P3d 1035, rev den, 357 Or 551 (2015).
ORS 135.815 requires disclosure to the defense
of certain materials that are in the state’s “possession or
14 State v. Crabtree
control,” including “[a]ny reports or statements of experts,
made in connection with the particular case, including
results of physical or mental examinations” and “[a]ny mate-
rial or information that tends to * * * [e]xculpate the defen-
dant” or “[i]mpeach a person the district attorney intends to
call as a witness at trial.” ORS 135.815(1)(c), (g)(A), (g)(C).
The state is in “possession or control” of evidence if it is in
the state’s actual possession or if the evidence is in the state’s
constructive possession because it can obtain the informa-
tion by request and without judicial assistance. State v. Bray,
363 Or 226, 235-36, 422 P3d 250 (2018). That is true even if
the evidence is in the actual possession of a third party that
does not have investigative responsibilities; “when a defen-
dant makes a specific request for [such documents, the state]
must obtain and disclose them.” Id. Such disclosure should
occur “as soon as practicable following the filing of an indict-
ment or information in the circuit court,” ORS 135.845, and
“[i]f the existence of the material or information is not known
at that time, the disclosure shall be made upon discovery,”
ORS 135.815(2)(a)(B). ORS 135.845 imposes a continuing
obligation to disclose additional discoverable material that
comes into the state’s possession before or during trial.
In addition to the statutory requirement, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, criminal defendants have a
right of access to evidence that is in the state’s possession,
is “favorable to an accused,” and is “material either to guilt
or punishment.” Brady, 373 US at 87; State v. Cockrell, 284
Or App 674, 684-87, 395 P3d 612, rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017).
Evidence is “favorable to the accused” if it is “either directly
exculpatory or could be used to impeach a government wit-
ness.” Cockrell, 284 Or App at 685. The right to disclosure
is guaranteed, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution,” Brady, 373 US at 87, but, like Oregon’s
statutory scheme, the federal protection requires that the
information be in the government’s actual or constructive
possession, Lewis v. Miller, 350 Or App 482, 485, 594 P3d
417, rev den, 375 Or 579 (2026). The state is in constructive
possession under the Brady line of cases if the evidence “is
in the possession of others acting on the state’s behalf, such
as law enforcement officers.” Id.
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 15
The trial court found that the state did not pos-
sess the medical report before trial. The medical report was
drafted by St. Germain at Kids FIRST, who testified that
she emailed the report to Murray in March 2021. The trial
court found that neither the prosecutor nor Murray had the
report before trial, that Murray did not receive St. Germain’s
secure email transmitting the report, and that neither the
prosecutor nor Murray attended the multidisciplinary team
meeting at which the medical findings were discussed. The
court further found that, once the prosecutor learned during
trial that the report existed, both parties received it within
minutes of one another. Those findings are supported by evi-
dence in the record, including the prosecutor’s declaration,
Murray’s search of his email records, and testimony con-
cerning the secure email system that was used. Accordingly,
we are bound by those findings on appeal. State v. Lindquist,
141 Or App 84, 87-88, 917 P2d 510 (1996).
Even so, we disagree with the trial court’s determi-
nation that the state was not in possession of the report prior
to trial. Kids FIRST serves as Lane County’s Children’s
Advocacy Center (CAC). CACs are facilities to which chil-
dren are referred by law enforcement and the Oregon
Department of Human Services (ODHS) “to receive a thor-
ough child abuse assessment for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the child has been abused or neglected,” and
they facilitate “a coordinated, comprehensive and multidis-
ciplinary response to cases of child abuse.” ORS 418.782(3).
CACs are part of a statutorily mandated multidisciplinary
team—which includes law enforcement—that is created by
the district attorneys of each county in Oregon and whose
mission is to respond to and investigate child abuse allega-
tions, including by creating a plan to “ensure that each child
in the county who is a suspected victim of child abuse will
receive a medical assessment.” ORS 418.747(1), (12). ORS
418.795(2) provides that “[a] member agency of a county child
abuse multidisciplinary team or a member of the team,”
which includes district attorneys and law enforcement,
“may use or disclose protected health information without
obtaining an authorization from an individual or a personal
representative of the individual if use or disclosure is nec-
essary for public health purposes, including the prevention,
16 State v. Crabtree
investigation and treatment of child abuse.” Likewise, while
“[a]ll information and records acquired by a county child
abuse multidisciplinary team * * * are confidential,” they
may be disclosed “when necessary to carry out the purposes
of the child abuse investigation.” ORS 418.795(1).
Under that statutory scheme, a medical report cre-
ated at a CAC that summarizes a forensic interview and
details the findings of a subsequent medical examination
is in the constructive possession of the state because, as a
member of the multidisciplinary team, the district attor-
ney’s office can obtain the report upon request and without
judicial assistance, Bray, 363 Or 226, 235-36, and because—
in many instances, including in this case—CARES con-
ducts such examinations upon referral by law enforcement
or ODHS and therefore acts as a proxy for the state. See
State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P., 346 Or 592, 620, 215 P3d 847
(2009) (“Service as a proxy for the police appears to be a
primary function of CARES.”); State v. Mann, 329 Or App
279, 295, 540 P3d 582 (2023) (“[A]n interview conducted [at
a CAC] based on referral by police has, at the very least, a
dual purpose of providing medical care and assisting police
in investigating a possible criminal case under the [statu-
tory] scheme.”). For the same reason, the state was in con-
structive possession of the medical report under the federal
standard as well. Lewis, 350 Or App at 485.
Testimony at trial supports our conclusion that the
report was in the state’s constructive possession and should
have been obtained and disclosed upon defendant’s request.
The medical examiner, St. Germain, testified that, when a
child is referred to Kids FIRST, “the forensic interview is
most often done first,” which she observes along with law
enforcement personnel and others; “then [they] go to the
examination room” for a “head-to-toe” medical examination;
and, finally, “[the medical examiner] write[s] a report about
* * * the entire encounter and the results of all of that.” St.
Germain testified that, after the report is completed, it is
sent to ODHS and law enforcement, if they are involved.
St. Germain indicated that she sent the report to Murray
in March, the same month that the medical examination
occurred. Although the trial court found that Murray did not
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 17
receive the email due to complications arising out of email
security measures and that neither the district attorney
nor Murray were aware of the medical examination prior to
trial, the state still had “possession or control” of the report
because it was in the possession of Kids FIRST and avail-
able to the district attorney upon request and without the
need for judicial assistance. Bray, 363 Or at 235-36 (“When
the state has the authority to obtain documents in the hands
of third parties on request, it has the power to obtain those
documents on its own volition and without other outside
assistance and thereby has ‘control’ over them.”).
Viewing the predicate facts favorably to the trial
court’s decision, the record shows that Kids FIRST had pos-
session of the medical report prior to the trial and that the
report was accessible to the state without the need for judicial
assistance. The report was the report of an expert that was
the “result[ ] of [a] physical * * * examination[ ]” and contained
“material or information that tend[ed] to * * * [i]mpeach
a person the district attorney intend[ed] to call as a witness,”
ORS 135.815(1)(c), (g)(C), because the contents of the report
contradicted some of the statements made at trial by the
complainant’s grandmother. Therefore, the state had con-
structive “possession or control” of the medical report and
its failure to disclose the report to defendant upon request
was a discovery violation under ORS 135.815(1). The trial
court erred in deciding otherwise.
Even though the trial court erred, we will not reverse
if that error was harmless to defendant; under Oregon law,
an error is harmless if there is “little likelihood that the
particular error affected the verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or
19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003).
Despite the trial court’s conclusion that there was
no discovery violation, it nonetheless acknowledged that the
late disclosure prejudiced defendant and acted as though
there had been a discovery violation, taking measures to
mitigate any prejudice to defendant caused by the late dis-
closure. The trial court acknowledged that the report con-
tained material information, including information with
impeachment value. However, the trial court also found
that the contents of the report were largely duplicative of the
18 State v. Crabtree
evidence presented at trial, which included the video record-
ing of the forensic interview. The trial court decided that
any prejudice to defendant could be mitigated by allowing
defendant to call as a witness the author of the report, St.
Germain, and calling back for further cross-examination
the witness who had previously made statements inconsis-
tent with the report. Having done so, the trial court denied
defendant’s motions for a mistrial and to dismiss.
As the standards for harmlessness are different,
we begin by reviewing under state law whether the trial
court’s ameliorative efforts were sufficient to render its error
harmless. In considering whether the trial court’s error was
harmless, we find it useful to consider whether the rem-
edy it granted—despite its erroneous ruling—was a legally
sufficient remedy for a discovery violation. In other words,
despite ruling that there was no discovery violation, we must
decide whether the trial court nonetheless effectively reme-
died the violation that occurred. To that end, we evaluate
the trial court’s remedy through the lens of our line of case
law regarding the proper remedy for discovery violations.
Whether a discovery violation results in prejudice
is a legal question, on which we defer to the trial court’s
findings on predicate facts. State v. Pilon, 321 Or App 460,
473, 516 P3d 1181 (2022). Following a discovery violation,
trial courts have discretion whether to take curative steps
to ameliorate any resulting prejudice, including whether
to grant a mistrial or dismissal; accordingly, we review for
abuse of discretion. ORS 135.865; State v. Moss, 147 Or App
658, 663, 938 P2d 215, rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997). In review-
ing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we consider the
seriousness of the prejudice caused by the alleged violation
and the trial court’s chosen ameliorative steps, “with the
decisive issue being whether defendant’s ability to receive
a fair trial was impaired.” Maney v. Angelozzi, 285 Or App
596, 615, 397 P3d 567 (2017) (internal quotations and brack-
ets omitted). Prejudice to parties arising out of a failure to
disclose evidence depends on the extent of surprise and what
the party to whom disclosure should have been made would
have done differently to prepare for trial. Pilon, 321 Or App
at 474.
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 19
For discovery violations occurring during trial, the
prejudice inquiry focuses on the extent of surprise or delay
caused by the failure to disclose pretrial. Id. at 470. To cure
any prejudice, in addition to the option of granting a mis-
trial or motion to dismiss, the trial court “may order [the
state] to permit inspection of the material, or grant a con-
tinuance, or refuse to permit the witness to testify, or refuse
to receive in evidence the material not disclosed, or enter
such other order as it considers appropriate.” ORS 135.865.
Granting dismissal or a mistrial is a drastic remedy that
should be avoided if less severe remedies are sufficient to
mitigate prejudice resulting from a discovery violation.
State v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 159 Or App 64, 74, 977 P2d
400 (1999), aff’d by equally divided court, 335 Or 506 (2003),
cert den, 541 US 952 (2004) (so stating as to dismissal); see
also Pilon, 321 Or App at 471 (explaining that courts should
avoid exclusion of evidence if less drastic remedies suffice to
ameliorate prejudice).
In this case, defendant did not receive the report
until the second day of trial. Receiving evidence in the
middle of trial “is the kind of surprise that the discovery
statutes were enacted to prevent,” and the surprise alone
indicates that some prejudice was likely caused. Id. at 469.
Furthermore, in a case involving sexual abuse allegations,
a medical report following the examination of the alleged
victim can be the keystone of a defendant’s trial strategy.
Defendant argued that his trial strategy would have been
substantially different had he received the medical report
pretrial, in part, because he likely would have obtained
hymen and gender-identity experts.2
The trial court determined that gender identity was
irrelevant to whether the alleged abuse occurred and that
the medical report indicated that an intact hymen was not
conclusive as to whether penetration occurred. Further, the
trial court determined that the report was largely redundant
of the testimony of witnesses at trial. Based on those deter-
minations, the trial court concluded that prejudice could be
mitigated by defendant re-examining previous witnesses
2
The medical report contained information suggesting that the complainant
was, at the time of the medical examination, questioning their gender identity.
20 State v. Crabtree
about statements that were inconsistent with the report and
by calling St. Germain as a witness to examine her about the
medical examination and the contents of the report.
Reviewing the record, including the medical report,
we conclude that the trial court’s choice of mitigating efforts
sufficiently ameliorated any prejudice to defendant such that
the trial court could not have granted defendant’s motions
for dismissal and mistrial even if it had correctly recognized
that the state had violated its discovery obligations. We agree
with the trial court that the report largely reiterated the con-
tents of the forensic interview and witness testimony, con-
taining only minor inconsistencies that could be addressed
by examining witnesses. As to defendant’s argument that an
expert was required given the fact that the report indicated
that the complainant’s hymen remained intact, a request
for a continuance to obtain an expert would have been the
more appropriate request, rather than the drastic remedy of
dismissal or mistrial. See Vasquez-Hernandez, 159 Or App
at 74 (“[I]t is error for a trial court to impose the sanction of
dismissal for discovery violations under ORS 135.865 when
a lesser sanction will suffice.”); State v. Kersey, 54 Or App
944, 947, 636 P2d 1009 (1981) (holding that grant of con-
tinuance and denial of mistrial or dismissal was appropri-
ate after mid-trial disclosure of material evidence, stating
that “even where prejudice occurs, an order to disclose and
a reasonable continuance is generally the most appropriate
remedy.”); State v. Wesley, 326 Or App 500, 513-16, 533 P3d
786, rev den, 371 Or 511 (2023) (noting the trial court’s duty
to consider sanctions less severe than exclusion of evidence
disclosed mid-trial and holding that trial court was correct
to order exclusion when granting a continuance would have
“essentially * * * been a mistrial” because it was known that
one of the jurors was unavailable for an extension); State v.
Girard, 106 Or App 463, 468-70, 808 P2d 1017 (1991) (hold-
ing that the trial court should have considered whether
granting a continuance for pre-trial failure to disclose would
have allowed the party to obtain an expert before granting
the more drastic remedy of exclusion of testimony).
Given the circumstances of this case, including that
neither party was aware of the medical report pretrial and
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 21
that the medical examination was conducted several years
after the alleged abuse, lessening the import of the physical
findings, the trial court’s chosen mitigating measures were
sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by the late disclo-
sure. In the absence of a request for continuance, the less
severe, legally permissible remedies the trial court offered
sufficed to ameliorate any prejudice such that the trial court
could not have granted defendant’s motions for the drastic
remedies for dismissal or mistrial.
The trial court erred in concluding that there was
no discovery violation, but, under state law, that error was
harmless because, although there had been a violation, the
trial court took mitigating efforts to ensure that the prej-
udice to defendant arising out of the late disclosure was
ameliorated such that defendant was not deprived of a fair
trial, and, therefore, there is little likelihood that the error
affected the verdict.
Because we have determined that the statutory
error was harmless, we must now assess whether the late
disclosure of the medical report was a due process violation
under Brady. If a trial court’s error is a Brady violation—
depriving defendant of a fair trial—“there is no need for fur-
ther harmless-error review.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419,
435, 115 S Ct 1555, 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995).
Under Brady, to avoid a due process violation, the
state must disclose evidence that is “favorable to an accused”
and “material either to guilt or punishment.” 373 US at 87.
Evidence with impeachment value, such as the medical
report at issue in this case, is “favorable to an accused.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 US 667, 676, 105 S Ct 3375, 87
L Ed 2d 481 (1985). Failure to disclose such evidence is a
federal constitutional violation “only if the evidence is mate-
rial in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence
in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 678; Cockrell, 284 Or
App at 685 (state’s failure to disclose the evidence must be
prejudicial).
A trial is fair if the trial results “in a verdict worthy
of confidence.” Cockrell, 284 Or App at 686. Under Bagley,
“evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
22 State v. Crabtree
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” 473 US
at 682. If the evidence would not have “put the whole case
in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in
the verdict * * * it is not material, and its erroneous nondis-
closure does not justify relief.” Klein v. Martin, 607 US 213,
221-22, 146 S Ct 589, 223 L Ed 2d 484 (2026). Therefore,
“even if undisclosed evidence entirely discredits a prose-
cution witness, the failure to turn over the evidence is not
material if considerable other evidence links the defendant
to the crime and the record proves strong support that the
defendant would have been convicted anyway.” Id. at 222
(internal quotations omitted).
When assessing materiality, we may consider
whether the defendant had previously requested the undis-
closed evidence and “any adverse effect that the prosecutor’s
failure to respond might have had on the preparation or pre-
sentation of the defendant’s case.” Bagley, 473 US at 683. We
do so “with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstruction
in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and
the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled
by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” Id.
However, because the Brady analysis is concerned
with the right to due process, it does not necessarily require
disclosure of exculpatory material “before trial.” United
States v. Gordon, 844 F2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir 1988) (empha-
sis in original). Rather, “disclosure must be made at a time
when disclosure would be of value to the accused.” Id. (inter-
nal quotations omitted). In Gordon, there was no Brady
violation when the state turned over, during trial, evidence
that had been requested pretrial because the trial court
had allowed the defendants to recall two relevant witnesses
and introduce the late-disclosed documents as evidentiary
exhibits. Id. Therefore, we may consider whether defendant
“had substantial opportunity to use [the late-disclosed evi-
dence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed dis-
closure.” Id.
We have already considered whether the trial
court’s ameliorative steps were sufficient to cure any preju-
dice caused by the late disclosure and concluded they were.
Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 23
Therefore, just as any prejudice that could have resulted
from the statutory discovery violation was sufficiently cured
to render the error harmless because there was little likeli-
hood that the error affected the verdict, so too we conclude
that, due to those curative steps, there was no Brady viola-
tion because the late discovery did not prejudice defendant
such that there was a reasonable probability that the out-
come of the trial would have been different.
B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Having rejected defendant’s arguments concerning
the late disclosure of the medical report, we turn to defen-
dant’s remaining assignment of error, in which defendant
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree rape.
Defendant argues that the state’s evidence established, at
most, an attempt to penetrate S and was insufficient to
permit a rational juror to find the element of penetration
beyond a reasonable doubt.
We review the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal by viewing the evidence, together with all reason-
able inferences that may be drawn from it, in the light most
favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47,
63, 880 P2d 431 (1994).
As charged in this case, the state was required to
prove that defendant engaged in “sexual intercourse” with
S while she was under 12 years of age. ORS 163.375(1)(b).
“Sexual intercourse” occurs upon “any penetration, however
slight.” ORS 163.305(6).
Defendant emphasizes portions of S’s testimony
in which she stated that defendant “tried” to put his penis
inside her and argues that those statements describe only
an unsuccessful attempt. Considered in isolation, some por-
tions of S’s testimony were less than definitive concerning
penetration. Our review, however, is not limited to isolated
excerpts. Rather, we consider the evidence as a whole and
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the state. Cunningham, 320 Or at 63. Viewed in that light,
24 State v. Crabtree
the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to find
that penetration occurred. During her forensic interview, S
described defendant rubbing his penis against her genital
area and stated that defendant “put the tip in.” During the
medical examination, S told St. Germain that defendant’s
penis went “inside just a little.” At trial, although S testi-
fied that defendant “tried to put his penis inside” her and
acknowledged uncertainty concerning whether the contact
involved her vagina or buttocks, the jury was entitled to con-
sider that testimony together with her earlier descriptions of
the abuse and with the entirety of her testimony describing
defendant’s sexual conduct to arrive at its conclusion.
Defendant relies on cases distinguishing mere con-
tact with the external genitalia from penetration of the
vagina. State v. Hoover, 250 Or App 504, 507, 280 P3d 1061,
rev den, 352 Or 564 (2012) (concluding that “slight penetra-
tion of the vagina is sufficient” to support conviction); State
v. Joiner, 227 Or App 623, 206 P3d 1105 (2009) (accepting
a concession that the defendant’s finger remained outside
of the complainant’s vagina and that acquittal was appro-
priate). Those cases do not assist him. Here, the jury heard
evidence from which it could reasonably infer that defen-
dant’s penis entered S’s vagina, however slightly. Although
defendant urges competing inferences from the evidence,
the jury was not required to accept them. The evidence was
sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find penetration
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Affirmed.