Full Opinion

No. 1118 November 18, 2026 9 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROY FILBERT CRABTREE, Defendant-Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 21CR10987; A183278 Debra K. Vogt, Judge. Submitted November 13, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Sarah De La Cruz, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed. 10 State v. Crabtree Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 11 EGAN, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree rape, ORS 163.375, and two counts of first- degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427.1 On appeal, he assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, denial of his alternative motion for a mistrial, and denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first- degree rape. Defendant argues that the state violated its statutory and constitutional discovery obligations by dis- closing, during trial, a medical report generated following the complainant’s examination at Kids FIRST, and that the resulting prejudice required dismissal or, alternatively, a mistrial. Defendant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit a rational juror to find that his penis penetrated the complainant’s vagina, as required for first- degree rape. We conclude that the trial court erred in its determination that there had been no discovery violation under ORS 135.815 and ORS 135.845 but, because it rec- ognized and took sufficient measures to mitigate prejudice resulting from the late disclosure, that error was harmless. The trial court was required to choose mitigating measures short of granting defendant’s motions to dismiss or for a mistrial when less severe mitigation measures sufficed to cure the prejudice resulting from the error. Relatedly, we conclude that there was no federal due process violation. We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND The complainant, S, is defendant’s biological great-granddaughter. During the years relevant to this case, S spent time at defendant’s home while members of her extended family cared for her. In early 2021, when S was 12 years old, she disclosed to her adoptive grandmother that defendant had sexually abused her when she was a young child. Law enforcement referred the matter to Kids FIRST, where S participated in a forensic interview and 1 Defendant was also tried but ultimately acquitted by the jury on a charge of first-degree sodomy. ORS 163.405. 12 State v. Crabtree later underwent a medical examination conducted by Dr. St. Germain. Following the examination, St. Germain prepared a report containing a summary of the forensic interview and the results of the medical examination. St. Germain then emailed the report to Detective Murray, the lead detective on the case, but that email was lost due to a function of the secure email system used to transmit the report. The state charged defendant with one count of first- degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and one count of first-degree rape. Before trial, defendant requested discovery, including any medical reports relating to the investigation. The prosecutor responded that the state did not possess any such reports. Just before trial began, defendant’s attorney again asked about the existence of a medical report and the prosecutor again responded that the state did not have a medical report. During the second day of trial, testimony revealed for the first time that S had undergone a medical examina- tion at Kids FIRST. The prosecutor immediately attempted to obtain any existing report and, after quickly receiving it from Kids FIRST, promptly disclosed it to defendant during trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively, for a mistrial, arguing that the report contained impeach- ment material, exculpatory information, and information that would have altered the defense’s trial strategy, and entered a declaration reiterating those arguments. The trial court found that neither the prosecutor nor the investigating detective possessed the report before trial, concluded that no discovery violation had occurred, and denied defendant’s motions. Despite its ruling that there was no discovery violation for lack of possession, the trial court reviewed the report and acknowledged that the late disclo- sure was prejudicial to defendant because the report con- tained statements with possible witness impeachment value. The trial court disagreed with defendant that the report contained exculpatory information or revealed informa- tion that newly required an expert witness because its con- tents were largely duplicative of the forensic interview that was already in evidence. To mitigate the prejudice caused by the late disclosure, the trial court permitted additional Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 13 cross-examination of witnesses, allowed defendant to recall witnesses who had already testified, and allowed defendant to call St. Germain as a witness. The jury subsequently acquitted defendant of first-degree sodomy but convicted him of the remaining offenses. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Mistrial In his first and second assignments of error, defen- dant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial and, alternatively, to dismiss arising out of the alleged discovery violation after the state produced the medi- cal examination report mid-trial. Defendant argues that the state’s failure to disclose the report before trial violated both of the discovery statutes, ORS 135.815 and ORS 135.845, and his right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). According to defendant, the report contained impeachment evidence, exculpatory information, and information that would have substantially altered the defense’s trial strategy, including the decision whether to obtain expert witnesses. Defendant argues that the discovery violation required the trial court to grant dismissal or, at a minimum, a mistrial. The state responds that the trial court correctly determined that no discovery violation occurred because neither the prosecutor nor the investigating detective pos- sessed the report before trial. The state further argues that, even assuming some deficiency in discovery, the trial court acted within its discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy that eliminated any prejudice resulting from the report’s late disclosure. We begin with whether the state was in possession or control of the medical report pretrial. We review the trial court’s determination that there was no discovery violation for errors of law, viewing the predicate facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Nistler, 268 Or App 470, 487, 342 P3d 1035, rev den, 357 Or 551 (2015). ORS 135.815 requires disclosure to the defense of certain materials that are in the state’s “possession or 14 State v. Crabtree control,” including “[a]ny reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations” and “[a]ny mate- rial or information that tends to * * * [e]xculpate the defen- dant” or “[i]mpeach a person the district attorney intends to call as a witness at trial.” ORS 135.815(1)(c), (g)(A), (g)(C). The state is in “possession or control” of evidence if it is in the state’s actual possession or if the evidence is in the state’s constructive possession because it can obtain the informa- tion by request and without judicial assistance. State v. Bray, 363 Or 226, 235-36, 422 P3d 250 (2018). That is true even if the evidence is in the actual possession of a third party that does not have investigative responsibilities; “when a defen- dant makes a specific request for [such documents, the state] must obtain and disclose them.” Id. Such disclosure should occur “as soon as practicable following the filing of an indict- ment or information in the circuit court,” ORS 135.845, and “[i]f the existence of the material or information is not known at that time, the disclosure shall be made upon discovery,” ORS 135.815(2)(a)(B). ORS 135.845 imposes a continuing obligation to disclose additional discoverable material that comes into the state’s possession before or during trial. In addition to the statutory requirement, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, criminal defendants have a right of access to evidence that is in the state’s possession, is “favorable to an accused,” and is “material either to guilt or punishment.” Brady, 373 US at 87; State v. Cockrell, 284 Or App 674, 684-87, 395 P3d 612, rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017). Evidence is “favorable to the accused” if it is “either directly exculpatory or could be used to impeach a government wit- ness.” Cockrell, 284 Or App at 685. The right to disclosure is guaranteed, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” Brady, 373 US at 87, but, like Oregon’s statutory scheme, the federal protection requires that the information be in the government’s actual or constructive possession, Lewis v. Miller, 350 Or App 482, 485, 594 P3d 417, rev den, 375 Or 579 (2026). The state is in constructive possession under the Brady line of cases if the evidence “is in the possession of others acting on the state’s behalf, such as law enforcement officers.” Id. Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 15 The trial court found that the state did not pos- sess the medical report before trial. The medical report was drafted by St. Germain at Kids FIRST, who testified that she emailed the report to Murray in March 2021. The trial court found that neither the prosecutor nor Murray had the report before trial, that Murray did not receive St. Germain’s secure email transmitting the report, and that neither the prosecutor nor Murray attended the multidisciplinary team meeting at which the medical findings were discussed. The court further found that, once the prosecutor learned during trial that the report existed, both parties received it within minutes of one another. Those findings are supported by evi- dence in the record, including the prosecutor’s declaration, Murray’s search of his email records, and testimony con- cerning the secure email system that was used. Accordingly, we are bound by those findings on appeal. State v. Lindquist, 141 Or App 84, 87-88, 917 P2d 510 (1996). Even so, we disagree with the trial court’s determi- nation that the state was not in possession of the report prior to trial. Kids FIRST serves as Lane County’s Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC). CACs are facilities to which chil- dren are referred by law enforcement and the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) “to receive a thor- ough child abuse assessment for the purpose of determin- ing whether the child has been abused or neglected,” and they facilitate “a coordinated, comprehensive and multidis- ciplinary response to cases of child abuse.” ORS 418.782(3). CACs are part of a statutorily mandated multidisciplinary team—which includes law enforcement—that is created by the district attorneys of each county in Oregon and whose mission is to respond to and investigate child abuse allega- tions, including by creating a plan to “ensure that each child in the county who is a suspected victim of child abuse will receive a medical assessment.” ORS 418.747(1), (12). ORS 418.795(2) provides that “[a] member agency of a county child abuse multidisciplinary team or a member of the team,” which includes district attorneys and law enforcement, “may use or disclose protected health information without obtaining an authorization from an individual or a personal representative of the individual if use or disclosure is nec- essary for public health purposes, including the prevention, 16 State v. Crabtree investigation and treatment of child abuse.” Likewise, while “[a]ll information and records acquired by a county child abuse multidisciplinary team * * * are confidential,” they may be disclosed “when necessary to carry out the purposes of the child abuse investigation.” ORS 418.795(1). Under that statutory scheme, a medical report cre- ated at a CAC that summarizes a forensic interview and details the findings of a subsequent medical examination is in the constructive possession of the state because, as a member of the multidisciplinary team, the district attor- ney’s office can obtain the report upon request and without judicial assistance, Bray, 363 Or 226, 235-36, and because— in many instances, including in this case—CARES con- ducts such examinations upon referral by law enforcement or ODHS and therefore acts as a proxy for the state. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. S. P., 346 Or 592, 620, 215 P3d 847 (2009) (“Service as a proxy for the police appears to be a primary function of CARES.”); State v. Mann, 329 Or App 279, 295, 540 P3d 582 (2023) (“[A]n interview conducted [at a CAC] based on referral by police has, at the very least, a dual purpose of providing medical care and assisting police in investigating a possible criminal case under the [statu- tory] scheme.”). For the same reason, the state was in con- structive possession of the medical report under the federal standard as well. Lewis, 350 Or App at 485. Testimony at trial supports our conclusion that the report was in the state’s constructive possession and should have been obtained and disclosed upon defendant’s request. The medical examiner, St. Germain, testified that, when a child is referred to Kids FIRST, “the forensic interview is most often done first,” which she observes along with law enforcement personnel and others; “then [they] go to the examination room” for a “head-to-toe” medical examination; and, finally, “[the medical examiner] write[s] a report about * * * the entire encounter and the results of all of that.” St. Germain testified that, after the report is completed, it is sent to ODHS and law enforcement, if they are involved. St. Germain indicated that she sent the report to Murray in March, the same month that the medical examination occurred. Although the trial court found that Murray did not Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 17 receive the email due to complications arising out of email security measures and that neither the district attorney nor Murray were aware of the medical examination prior to trial, the state still had “possession or control” of the report because it was in the possession of Kids FIRST and avail- able to the district attorney upon request and without the need for judicial assistance. Bray, 363 Or at 235-36 (“When the state has the authority to obtain documents in the hands of third parties on request, it has the power to obtain those documents on its own volition and without other outside assistance and thereby has ‘control’ over them.”). Viewing the predicate facts favorably to the trial court’s decision, the record shows that Kids FIRST had pos- session of the medical report prior to the trial and that the report was accessible to the state without the need for judicial assistance. The report was the report of an expert that was the “result[ ] of [a] physical * * * examination[ ]” and contained “material or information that tend[ed] to * * * [i]mpeach a person the district attorney intend[ed] to call as a witness,” ORS 135.815(1)(c), (g)(C), because the contents of the report contradicted some of the statements made at trial by the complainant’s grandmother. Therefore, the state had con- structive “possession or control” of the medical report and its failure to disclose the report to defendant upon request was a discovery violation under ORS 135.815(1). The trial court erred in deciding otherwise. Even though the trial court erred, we will not reverse if that error was harmless to defendant; under Oregon law, an error is harmless if there is “little likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). Despite the trial court’s conclusion that there was no discovery violation, it nonetheless acknowledged that the late disclosure prejudiced defendant and acted as though there had been a discovery violation, taking measures to mitigate any prejudice to defendant caused by the late dis- closure. The trial court acknowledged that the report con- tained material information, including information with impeachment value. However, the trial court also found that the contents of the report were largely duplicative of the 18 State v. Crabtree evidence presented at trial, which included the video record- ing of the forensic interview. The trial court decided that any prejudice to defendant could be mitigated by allowing defendant to call as a witness the author of the report, St. Germain, and calling back for further cross-examination the witness who had previously made statements inconsis- tent with the report. Having done so, the trial court denied defendant’s motions for a mistrial and to dismiss. As the standards for harmlessness are different, we begin by reviewing under state law whether the trial court’s ameliorative efforts were sufficient to render its error harmless. In considering whether the trial court’s error was harmless, we find it useful to consider whether the rem- edy it granted—despite its erroneous ruling—was a legally sufficient remedy for a discovery violation. In other words, despite ruling that there was no discovery violation, we must decide whether the trial court nonetheless effectively reme- died the violation that occurred. To that end, we evaluate the trial court’s remedy through the lens of our line of case law regarding the proper remedy for discovery violations. Whether a discovery violation results in prejudice is a legal question, on which we defer to the trial court’s findings on predicate facts. State v. Pilon, 321 Or App 460, 473, 516 P3d 1181 (2022). Following a discovery violation, trial courts have discretion whether to take curative steps to ameliorate any resulting prejudice, including whether to grant a mistrial or dismissal; accordingly, we review for abuse of discretion. ORS 135.865; State v. Moss, 147 Or App 658, 663, 938 P2d 215, rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997). In review- ing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we consider the seriousness of the prejudice caused by the alleged violation and the trial court’s chosen ameliorative steps, “with the decisive issue being whether defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial was impaired.” Maney v. Angelozzi, 285 Or App 596, 615, 397 P3d 567 (2017) (internal quotations and brack- ets omitted). Prejudice to parties arising out of a failure to disclose evidence depends on the extent of surprise and what the party to whom disclosure should have been made would have done differently to prepare for trial. Pilon, 321 Or App at 474. Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 19 For discovery violations occurring during trial, the prejudice inquiry focuses on the extent of surprise or delay caused by the failure to disclose pretrial. Id. at 470. To cure any prejudice, in addition to the option of granting a mis- trial or motion to dismiss, the trial court “may order [the state] to permit inspection of the material, or grant a con- tinuance, or refuse to permit the witness to testify, or refuse to receive in evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such other order as it considers appropriate.” ORS 135.865. Granting dismissal or a mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be avoided if less severe remedies are sufficient to mitigate prejudice resulting from a discovery violation. State v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 159 Or App 64, 74, 977 P2d 400 (1999), aff’d by equally divided court, 335 Or 506 (2003), cert den, 541 US 952 (2004) (so stating as to dismissal); see also Pilon, 321 Or App at 471 (explaining that courts should avoid exclusion of evidence if less drastic remedies suffice to ameliorate prejudice). In this case, defendant did not receive the report until the second day of trial. Receiving evidence in the middle of trial “is the kind of surprise that the discovery statutes were enacted to prevent,” and the surprise alone indicates that some prejudice was likely caused. Id. at 469. Furthermore, in a case involving sexual abuse allegations, a medical report following the examination of the alleged victim can be the keystone of a defendant’s trial strategy. Defendant argued that his trial strategy would have been substantially different had he received the medical report pretrial, in part, because he likely would have obtained hymen and gender-identity experts.2 The trial court determined that gender identity was irrelevant to whether the alleged abuse occurred and that the medical report indicated that an intact hymen was not conclusive as to whether penetration occurred. Further, the trial court determined that the report was largely redundant of the testimony of witnesses at trial. Based on those deter- minations, the trial court concluded that prejudice could be mitigated by defendant re-examining previous witnesses 2 The medical report contained information suggesting that the complainant was, at the time of the medical examination, questioning their gender identity. 20 State v. Crabtree about statements that were inconsistent with the report and by calling St. Germain as a witness to examine her about the medical examination and the contents of the report. Reviewing the record, including the medical report, we conclude that the trial court’s choice of mitigating efforts sufficiently ameliorated any prejudice to defendant such that the trial court could not have granted defendant’s motions for dismissal and mistrial even if it had correctly recognized that the state had violated its discovery obligations. We agree with the trial court that the report largely reiterated the con- tents of the forensic interview and witness testimony, con- taining only minor inconsistencies that could be addressed by examining witnesses. As to defendant’s argument that an expert was required given the fact that the report indicated that the complainant’s hymen remained intact, a request for a continuance to obtain an expert would have been the more appropriate request, rather than the drastic remedy of dismissal or mistrial. See Vasquez-Hernandez, 159 Or App at 74 (“[I]t is error for a trial court to impose the sanction of dismissal for discovery violations under ORS 135.865 when a lesser sanction will suffice.”); State v. Kersey, 54 Or App 944, 947, 636 P2d 1009 (1981) (holding that grant of con- tinuance and denial of mistrial or dismissal was appropri- ate after mid-trial disclosure of material evidence, stating that “even where prejudice occurs, an order to disclose and a reasonable continuance is generally the most appropriate remedy.”); State v. Wesley, 326 Or App 500, 513-16, 533 P3d 786, rev den, 371 Or 511 (2023) (noting the trial court’s duty to consider sanctions less severe than exclusion of evidence disclosed mid-trial and holding that trial court was correct to order exclusion when granting a continuance would have “essentially * * * been a mistrial” because it was known that one of the jurors was unavailable for an extension); State v. Girard, 106 Or App 463, 468-70, 808 P2d 1017 (1991) (hold- ing that the trial court should have considered whether granting a continuance for pre-trial failure to disclose would have allowed the party to obtain an expert before granting the more drastic remedy of exclusion of testimony). Given the circumstances of this case, including that neither party was aware of the medical report pretrial and Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 21 that the medical examination was conducted several years after the alleged abuse, lessening the import of the physical findings, the trial court’s chosen mitigating measures were sufficient to cure any prejudice caused by the late disclo- sure. In the absence of a request for continuance, the less severe, legally permissible remedies the trial court offered sufficed to ameliorate any prejudice such that the trial court could not have granted defendant’s motions for the drastic remedies for dismissal or mistrial. The trial court erred in concluding that there was no discovery violation, but, under state law, that error was harmless because, although there had been a violation, the trial court took mitigating efforts to ensure that the prej- udice to defendant arising out of the late disclosure was ameliorated such that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, and, therefore, there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. Because we have determined that the statutory error was harmless, we must now assess whether the late disclosure of the medical report was a due process violation under Brady. If a trial court’s error is a Brady violation— depriving defendant of a fair trial—“there is no need for fur- ther harmless-error review.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419, 435, 115 S Ct 1555, 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995). Under Brady, to avoid a due process violation, the state must disclose evidence that is “favorable to an accused” and “material either to guilt or punishment.” 373 US at 87. Evidence with impeachment value, such as the medical report at issue in this case, is “favorable to an accused.” United States v. Bagley, 473 US 667, 676, 105 S Ct 3375, 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985). Failure to disclose such evidence is a federal constitutional violation “only if the evidence is mate- rial in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 678; Cockrell, 284 Or App at 685 (state’s failure to disclose the evidence must be prejudicial). A trial is fair if the trial results “in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Cockrell, 284 Or App at 686. Under Bagley, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 22 State v. Crabtree that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 473 US at 682. If the evidence would not have “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict * * * it is not material, and its erroneous nondis- closure does not justify relief.” Klein v. Martin, 607 US 213, 221-22, 146 S Ct 589, 223 L Ed 2d 484 (2026). Therefore, “even if undisclosed evidence entirely discredits a prose- cution witness, the failure to turn over the evidence is not material if considerable other evidence links the defendant to the crime and the record proves strong support that the defendant would have been convicted anyway.” Id. at 222 (internal quotations omitted). When assessing materiality, we may consider whether the defendant had previously requested the undis- closed evidence and “any adverse effect that the prosecutor’s failure to respond might have had on the preparation or pre- sentation of the defendant’s case.” Bagley, 473 US at 683. We do so “with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstruction in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” Id. However, because the Brady analysis is concerned with the right to due process, it does not necessarily require disclosure of exculpatory material “before trial.” United States v. Gordon, 844 F2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir 1988) (empha- sis in original). Rather, “disclosure must be made at a time when disclosure would be of value to the accused.” Id. (inter- nal quotations omitted). In Gordon, there was no Brady violation when the state turned over, during trial, evidence that had been requested pretrial because the trial court had allowed the defendants to recall two relevant witnesses and introduce the late-disclosed documents as evidentiary exhibits. Id. Therefore, we may consider whether defendant “had substantial opportunity to use [the late-disclosed evi- dence] and to cure any prejudice caused by the delayed dis- closure.” Id. We have already considered whether the trial court’s ameliorative steps were sufficient to cure any preju- dice caused by the late disclosure and concluded they were. Cite as 355 Or App 9 (2026) 23 Therefore, just as any prejudice that could have resulted from the statutory discovery violation was sufficiently cured to render the error harmless because there was little likeli- hood that the error affected the verdict, so too we conclude that, due to those curative steps, there was no Brady viola- tion because the late discovery did not prejudice defendant such that there was a reasonable probability that the out- come of the trial would have been different. B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Having rejected defendant’s arguments concerning the late disclosure of the medical report, we turn to defen- dant’s remaining assignment of error, in which defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of first-degree rape. Defendant argues that the state’s evidence established, at most, an attempt to penetrate S and was insufficient to permit a rational juror to find the element of penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal by viewing the evidence, together with all reason- able inferences that may be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994). As charged in this case, the state was required to prove that defendant engaged in “sexual intercourse” with S while she was under 12 years of age. ORS 163.375(1)(b). “Sexual intercourse” occurs upon “any penetration, however slight.” ORS 163.305(6). Defendant emphasizes portions of S’s testimony in which she stated that defendant “tried” to put his penis inside her and argues that those statements describe only an unsuccessful attempt. Considered in isolation, some por- tions of S’s testimony were less than definitive concerning penetration. Our review, however, is not limited to isolated excerpts. Rather, we consider the evidence as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state. Cunningham, 320 Or at 63. Viewed in that light, 24 State v. Crabtree the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to find that penetration occurred. During her forensic interview, S described defendant rubbing his penis against her genital area and stated that defendant “put the tip in.” During the medical examination, S told St. Germain that defendant’s penis went “inside just a little.” At trial, although S testi- fied that defendant “tried to put his penis inside” her and acknowledged uncertainty concerning whether the contact involved her vagina or buttocks, the jury was entitled to con- sider that testimony together with her earlier descriptions of the abuse and with the entirety of her testimony describing defendant’s sexual conduct to arrive at its conclusion. Defendant relies on cases distinguishing mere con- tact with the external genitalia from penetration of the vagina. State v. Hoover, 250 Or App 504, 507, 280 P3d 1061, rev den, 352 Or 564 (2012) (concluding that “slight penetra- tion of the vagina is sufficient” to support conviction); State v. Joiner, 227 Or App 623, 206 P3d 1105 (2009) (accepting a concession that the defendant’s finger remained outside of the complainant’s vagina and that acquittal was appro- priate). Those cases do not assist him. Here, the jury heard evidence from which it could reasonably infer that defen- dant’s penis entered S’s vagina, however slightly. Although defendant urges competing inferences from the evidence, the jury was not required to accept them. The evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Affirmed.