State v. Salo

No. 1080 November 4, 2026 467 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SARAH REBECCA SALO, Defendant-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 22CR50709; A183921 Melvin Oden-Orr, Judge. Argued and submitted April 7, 2026. David Sherbo-Huggins, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. 468 State v. Salo AOYAGI, P. J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for giv- ing false information to a peace officer, ORS 162.385. As charged here, a person commits that offense by “knowingly us[ing] or giv[ing] a false or fictitious name * * * or date of birth to any peace officer when * * * [t]he peace officer is issuing or serving the person a citation.” ORS 162.385(1)(a). In her sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in entering the conviction because the evi- dence was legally insufficient to prove that the name she gave to the police officer—Alejandra Prado-Campa—was false or fictitious. The state maintains that the evidence was legally sufficient. We agree with the state and therefore affirm. The charge was tried to the court, and defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence in closing argument, which was equivalent to moving for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA). State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 454 n 1, 365 P3d 116 (2015). We therefore apply the stan- dard of review for the denial of an MJOA, which requires us to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accept- ing reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63, 880 P2d 431 (1994), cert den, 514 US 1005 (1995). To the extent inferences from circumstantial evidence are necessary to prove an element, it is a question of law what inferences may be made. State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004). Reasonable inferences are allowed, but “speculation and guesswork are not.” Id. Applying that standard of review, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to go to the factfinder. The police officer testified (1) that defendant gave her name as Alejandra Prado-Campa, as well as providing a birth- date; (2) that he ran that name in the system and was able to access a photo of that person, and it did not look like defendant; and (3) that, at the time of trial, he knew who Sarah Salo was and recognized her sitting in the courtroom. That evidence was enough to prove beyond a reasonable Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 467 (2026) 469 doubt that defendant’s name was Sarah Salo, not Alejandra Prado-Campa. In arguing to the contrary, defendant relies pri- marily on her successful hearsay objection to another piece of testimony by the police officer, regarding jail staff ascer- taining defendant’s real identity. She argues that the trial court’s ruling on that objection should be understood to have resulted in the striking not only of the officer’s statement regarding jail staff but also his earlier statement that he knew who Sarah Salo was and his in-court identification. We are unpersuaded. As we read the record, the objection was limited to the jail-staff statement, so its sustaining resulted only in the striking of that statement. Moreover, we disagree with defendant that the two pieces of evidence were so obviously linked that the court must have intended to strike both. It is possible that the officer’s assertion that he knew who Sarah Salo was and his in-court identification of her was derived entirely from what jail staff told him. But it is equally possible that it was based on personal knowl- edge acquired in the time period between the citation and trial. If defendant believed that the officer lacked the per- sonal knowledge necessary to identify defendant by name, she could have asked him the basis for his knowledge in aid of objection or on cross-examination and, if appropriate, moved to strike the identification. The hearsay ruling, how- ever, cannot reasonably be interpreted to have resulted in the striking of the officer’s earlier statement and in-court identification. The evidence admitted was legally sufficient to prove the offense, and the trial court did not err in entering the conviction. Affirmed.