State v. Clauson

296 October 28, 2026 No. 1049 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CALEB DEE CLAUSON, Defendant-Appellant. Crook County Circuit Court 24CR00702; A184190 Annette C. Hillman, Judge. Submitted September 24, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Anne K. Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 296 (2026) 297 O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree robbery with a firearm, ORS 164.415; unlawful possession of body armor with a firearm, ORS 166.643; and menacing, ORS 163.190. The court sentenced defendant to 90 months in prison for first-degree robbery, 60 months in prison concurrent with the robbery sentence on the convic- tion for unlawful possession of body armor, and 180 days in prison concurrent with the two other sentences on the menacing conviction, resulting in an aggregate prison sen- tence of 90 months. On appeal, defendant challenges the sentence as unconstitutionally disproportionate in violation of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As explained below, we affirm. Article 1, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Article I, section 16, provides that “[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.” A punishment violates Article I, section 16, only in the rare circumstance that it is so disproportionate to the offense that it “shocks the moral sense of all reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.” State v. McCombs, 330 Or App 545, 563, 544 P3d 390, rev den, 372 Or 718 (2024) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or 46, 58, 217 P3d 659 (2009) (discussing the Article I, section 16, standard). Importantly, “[a] sentence may be harsh without being unconstitution- ally disproportionate.” State v. Lara-Vasquez, 310 Or App 99, 110, 484 P3d 369, rev den, 368 Or 561 (2021). Whether a sen- tence is unconstitutionally disproportionate is a legal ques- tion, so we review for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by evidence in the record. State v. Gonzalez, 373 Or 248, 254, 564 P3d 109 (2025). In reviewing a disproportionality challenge under Article I, section 16, we conduct a three-part analysis. First, we compare the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. In assessing the gravity of the offense, relevant considerations include “the 298 State v. Clauson general definition of the crime, the specific circumstances and facts of [the] defendant’s conduct, characteristics of [the] defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, the rela- tionship between [the] defendant and the victim, and other case-specific factors.” Lara-Vasquez, 310 Or App at 105. Second, we compare the penalties imposed for other, related crimes. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. Third, we consider the defendant’s criminal history. Id. Having considered each of the relevant factors, we conclude that the sentencing court did not impose an uncon- stitutionally disproportionate sentence under Article I, sec- tion 16. As to the first factor, comparing the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offense, that factor does not demonstrate disproportionality. Defendant’s conduct falls squarely within the range of conduct that the legislature intended to criminalize when it set the penalties for this offense. State v. Parker, 259 Or App 547, 550, 314 P3d 980 (2013), rev den, 355 Or 380 (2014); State v. Horseman, 294 Or App 398, 412, 432 P3d 258 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 723 (2019). A person commits first-degree robbery with a firearm in violation of ORS 164.415(1)(a) if they commit third-degree robbery, ORS 164.395, and they are “armed with a deadly weapon.” ORS 164.415(1)(a). A person commits third-degree robbery if “in the course of committing or attempting to commit theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle as defined in ORS 164.135 the person uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent of: “(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to retention thereof immediately after the taking; or “(b) Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid in the commission of the theft or unautho- rized use of a vehicle.” ORS 164.395. Defendant committed third-degree robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. He threatened to use the firearm to prevent the victim from stopping the theft. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 296 (2026) 299 That is squarely within the range of conduct punished by first-degree robbery, ORS 164.415(1)(a). As to the second factor, comparing the penalties imposed for other, related crimes, that factor also does not demonstrate disproportionality. “If the penalties for more ‘serious’ crimes than the crime at issue result in less severe sentences, that is an indication that the challenged pen- alty may be disproportionate.” Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 63. Defendant points to offenses that he argues are more serious and that require 90-month prison sentences. Even assuming for the sake of argument that defendant has identified related and more serious offenses, the fact that those offenses also require a 90-month prison sentence does not establish disproportionality. See State v. Johnson, 244 Or App 574, 585, 260 P3d 782 (2011) (explaining that the Article I, section 16, analysis asks whether a more serious offense carries a less severe punishment). As to the third factor, defendant’s prior criminal history, defendant argues that he has “minimal” criminal history and points out that his criminal history score is in the second-lowest category on the felony sentencing guide- lines. The state responds that defendant was on pretrial release for other charged offenses when he committed the instant offenses, and that we should consider the pending charges when evaluating the third factor. Even if we were to agree with defendant that his criminal history is mini- mal, a defendant’s lack of criminal history is not enough on its own to overcome the other factors. “Although criminal history is one factor that could, along with the other factors, demonstrate that a penalty is disproportionate under the circumstances of a particular case, the lack of prior convic- tions alone has never been sufficient to render an otherwise constitutional penalty disproportionate under Article I, sec- tion 16.” State v. Shaw, 233 Or App 427, 439, 225 P3d 855, rev den, 348 Or 415 (2010). Having reviewed the facts of this case—including that defendant was visibly armed and wearing body armor during the robbery, and he gestured toward a holstered pis- tol and threatened the victim that he would take out the pistol—and having considered the Rodriguez/Buck factors, 300 State v. Clauson we are unpersuaded that this is one of those “rare circum- stances” in which defendant’s sentence is constitutionally disproportionate. See Horseman, 294 Or App at 408 (explain- ing that a sentence is disproportionate only if it “shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable people” and that “judicial review of the constitutionality of penalties will only in rare circumstances result in a holding of unconstitutional dis- proportionality” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it is cruel and unusual. See US Const, Amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). Defendant does not present any argument as to why an Eighth Amendment analysis provides for a different result from an Article I, sec- tion 16, analysis. Moreover, analysis of the three Rodriguez/ Buck factors under Article I, section 16, provides a sufficient basis to decide whether a defendant’s sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. McCombs, 330 Or App at 565. Therefore, based on our analysis above, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an uncon- stitutionally disproportionate sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Affirmed.