Full Opinion

110 November 18, 2026 No. 1126 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN ROBERT BREWER, Defendant-Respondent. Linn County Circuit Court 24CR20677; A186651 (Control) STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JENA MARIE DOWNARD, aka Gena M. Downard, Defendant-Respondent. Linn County Circuit Court 24CR20687; A186652 Thomas McHill, Judge. Argued and submitted September 8, 2026. Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Daniel C. Bennett, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. KAMINS, J. Portion of order granting defendants’ motion to suppress evidence seized following the search of the house reversed; remanded for further proceedings; otherwise affirmed. Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 111 112 State v. Brewer / Downard KAMINS, J. The state appeals a pretrial order suppressing evi- dence seized in warranted searches of a residence and two vehicles, arguing that, contrary to the trial court’s deter- mination, the search warrants were properly supported by probable cause. See ORS 138.045(1)(d) (providing for state’s appeal from pretrial order suppressing evidence in a crim- inal case).1 Defendants respond that the record does not include a search warrant return or otherwise reveal the excluded evidence and that that absence prevents the state from establishing that any error was prejudicial and that the case is justiciable. On the merits, defendants argue that the search warrants were not supported by probable cause because the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of a key confidential informant and because the information in the affidavit was stale. As discussed more fully below, the lack of a search warrant return is not fatal to the state’s ability to establish harm in this case, nor does it make this case nonjusticiable. On the merits, we agree with the state that the affidavit established probable cause to search the residence. However, we disagree that the affidavit established probable cause to search one of the vehicles (a Toyota 4Runner). We express no opinion regarding the warrant to search the other vehicle (a Chevrolet Tahoe) because it was never searched. We there- fore reverse the portion of the order suppressing evidence seized following the search of the house, and remand for fur- ther proceedings. I. FACTS On April 19, 2024, an Oregon State Police detec- tive applied for a warrant to search defendants’ residence, a Toyota 4Runner, and a Chevrolet Tahoe. Because our task on appeal is to evaluate whether the facts in the warrant applica- tion established that it was more likely than not that evidence would be found the residence and the two vehicles, we recount the information included in the affidavit in some detail. 1 For purposes of the appeal of the pretrial order, the state consolidated its cases against defendants Brewer and Downard. Downard joined Brewer’s motion to suppress in the court below. Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 113 Thirteen months earlier, in March 2023, Linn Interagency Narcotics Enforcement Taskforce began an investigation into drug trafficking in the mid-Willamette Valley. The investigation involved numerous informants, locations, and vehicles; the use of GPS tracking devices and aerial drone surveillance; and three controlled buys con- ducted with a confidential informant (“CI”). The investiga- tion revolved around a man named Wamsley, whom the police knew to be a drug dealer selling fentanyl and methamphet- amine. Wamsley lived at the Super 8 Motel in Corvallis and drove several vehicles, including a black Chevrolet Tahoe. In December 2023, two police detectives met with a CI who said that they had personally purchased fentanyl from defendants and that defendants regularly sold fentanyl and methamphetamine out of their residence, their Toyota 4Runner, and their Chevrolet Express van. In January 2024, police conducting surveillance observed Wamsley go to defendants’ house and observed defendants drive their 4Runner to the Super 8 where Wamsley lived. The police subsequently used the CI to conduct three controlled buys at defendants’ house. The first one took place in January 2024. The CI contacted defendants by phone, and at first, defendants told the CI they were still waiting for their source of supply. Police surveilling defen- dants’ house then saw Wamsley arrive, go into the house, and leave. Shortly thereafter, defendants informed the CI that they had obtained the drugs, and the CI completed the buy. The second controlled buy occurred in “late January” 2024. The CI again purchased controlled substances from one or both defendants inside their house shortly after Wamsley had been there. In February 2024, the police saw Wamsley mov- ing belongings into defendants’ house and observed him there much more often. The police therefore suspected that Wamsley had moved in with defendants, which a CI con- firmed shortly thereafter. The third controlled buy occurred at defendants’ house in “early April” 2024. During the first two weeks of 114 State v. Brewer / Downard April, police continued to see Wamsley coming and going from the property. On one occasion during that time frame, police observed short-term intermittent traffic at the house shortly after Wamsley arrived there. On another occasion during that time frame, they saw Wamsley push a motorcycle to a differ- ent part of the property and cover it with a tarp, and they saw him going underneath a different tarp that concealed items on a trailer in the driveway. Police also observed defendant Downard coming and going from the residence for short dura- tions of time at “odd hours of the night” during those weeks. On April 18, 2024, Wamsley died of a suspected drug overdose at a motel. Police searched the motel room and the car Wamsley had driven there (a Mercedes) but could not locate his supply of controlled substances. The next day, the police applied for, and the trial court granted, search war- rants for defendants’ house, the 4Runner, and the Tahoe. After the police executed the search warrants, the state charged defendants with fentanyl and methamphet- amine offenses. Both defendants moved to suppress all evi- dence obtained during the warranted searches, arguing that the affidavit did not establish probable cause. The trial court received defendants’ written motion, heard arguments from both parties, and then issued a letter opinion granting defendants’ motion to suppress. II. ANALYSIS A. Harm and Justiciability As a threshold matter, defendants contend that the state cannot meet its burden to establish harm, nor show that this case is justiciable, because the record does not con- tain a search warrant return or offer of proof.2 We disagree. The state has a statutory right to appeal a pretrial order suppressing evidence and need not demonstrate harm to a nonexistent verdict at the pretrial stage. ORS 138.045(1)(d); 2 To the extent defendants argue that the state’s claim of error is unreview- able, we disagree. This court has authority to review the state’s appeal of a pre- trial order suppressing evidence pursuant to ORS 138.045(1)(d). Id. (“The state may take an appeal from the circuit court * * * to the Court of Appeals from: * * * [a]n order made prior to trial suppressing evidence[.]”). And there is no stat- ute limiting our authority to review probable cause determinations, which is the issue in this appeal. Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 115 see also State v. Pfortmiller, 53 Or App 394, 399, 632 P2d 459, rev den, 291 Or 893 (1981) (“The state’s right to appeal in a criminal case is by nature interlocutory. Once the case against the defendant proceeds to trial, the state has no right to appeal any adverse ruling suppressing evidence.”). Moreover, defendants’ argument that the record does not establish that any evidence was actually subject to suppres- sion is not well taken. Defendants are the ones who moved to suppress evidence (without more specificity) in the trial court; on appeal, defendants will not be heard to suggest there was nothing they sought to suppress. Defendants further argue that without more detail in the record regarding what evidence was excluded, this appeal is moot because the state cannot prove that the appeal pertains to a live case or controversy that will ulti- mately affect the rights of the parties.3 See Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 510-15, 355 P3d 866 (2015) (discussing well- established rule that Oregon appellate courts will not con- sider cases that are moot); State v. K. J. B., 362 Or 777, 785, 416 P3d 291 (2018) (“Generally speaking, a case becomes moot when a court’s decision ‘will no longer have a practi- cal effect on the rights of the parties.’ ” (Quoting Brownstone Homes Condo. Assn v. Brownstone Forest Hts., LLC, 358 Or 26, 30, 361 P3d 1 (2015).)). The state does not have the burden to establish non-mootness on appeal, as defendants’ argument would suggest, because the burden to establish mootness rests with the party moving for dismissal. K. J. B., 362 Or at 785. In any event, any controversy surrounding the Tahoe is moot because it was never searched and the warrant expired. But otherwise, this court’s decision will have the practical effect of determining whether the state may present evidence in its case against defendants, mak- ing the controversy very much alive. We therefore proceed to the merits. B. Probable Cause The trial court determined that the search warrants were not supported by probable cause because the affidavit 3 At oral argument, defendants clarified that their justiciability argument was about mootness in particular. 116 State v. Brewer / Downard did not establish the reliability of the key CI and because the information in the affidavit suggesting that controlled substances would be present was stale. The state assigns error to that ruling, disagreeing with each aspect of it. Under Oregon law, an application for a search war- rant “shall be supported by one or more affidavits particu- larly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that objects of the search are in the places, or in the pos- session of the individuals, to be searched.” ORS 133.545(6); see also, Or Const, Art I, § 9 (“[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by an oath, or affirma- tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”). A judge reviewing the application and the supporting affidavits must issue a search warrant if “there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things specified in the application.” ORS 133.555(2). Probable cause exists “when the facts set out in the affidavit would lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 264, 192 P3d 1283, adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473, 198 P3d 937 (2008) (internal citations omitted). “ ‘Probably’ means more likely than not.” State v. Foster, 233 Or App 135, 141, 225 P3d 380 (2010), aff’d, 350 Or 161, 252 P3d 292 (2011) (internal cita- tion omitted). Because we are in the same position as a trial court ruling on a motion to suppress that challenges a magis- trate’s issuance of a warrant, we do not defer to the trial court’s findings or conclusions. Castilleja, 345 Or at 266. “[W]e resolve doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the pref- erence for warrants.” State v. Henderson, 341 Or 219, 225, 142 P3d 58 (2006). There were three warrants in this case: one for defendants’ house, one for the Tahoe, and one for the 4Runner. There must be probable cause as to each spe- cific place searched. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 307 Or App 226, 235-36, 476 P3d 100 (2020) (evidence of drug dealing in a shipping container did not establish probable cause to search house on the same property); State v. Webber, 281 Or App 342, 358, 348 P3d 951 (2016) (evidence of drug dealing Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 117 from the defendant’s car did not establish probable cause to search his home); State v. Wilson, 178 Or App 163, 170-71, 35 P3d 1111 (2001) (evidence of a controlled buy at a third party’s residence did not establish probable cause to search the defendant’s residence). We do not address the Tahoe because it was never searched. Before analyzing whether probable cause existed as to the house and the 4Runner, we discuss the issues com- mon to both locations; the warrants were all based on the same affidavit and the parties offered integrated arguments both below and on appeal. 1. Reliability of the confidential informant (CI) The state contends that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the facts in the affidavit establish the CI’s reli- ability. We agree. When an affidavit includes information from a CI, the affidavit must set forth facts bearing on the CI’s reliability and basis of knowledge. ORS 133.545(6). To establish reliability, the affidavit must show that the CI has a demonstrated character for truthfulness or show “circum- stances assuring that the particular information is indeed trustworthy on a specific occasion.” State v. Alvarez, 308 Or 143, 147, 776 P2d 1283 (1989); see also State v. Carlile, 290 Or 161, 164, 619 P2d 1280 (1980) (explaining the reliability inquiry). To establish basis of knowledge, the affidavit must “disclose, as far as possible, the means by which the infor- mation was obtained.” ORS 133.545(6). If an affidavit does not establish the CI’s reliability and basis of knowledge, that CI’s statements must be stricken from the affidavit before conducting the probable cause evaluation. State v. Cotter, 125 Or App 210, 212, 864 P2d 875 (1993). Here, the affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to establish the CI’s reliability and basis of knowledge. The affidavit states that the CI had personally purchased fen- tanyl from defendants. See State v. Gaskill, 340 Or App 459, 465, 571 P3d 769 (2025) (basis of knowledge satisfied if the affidavit demonstrates that the informant obtained his knowledge firsthand); State v. Wilson/Helms, 83 Or App 616, 621, 733 P2d 54, rev den, 303 Or 172 (1987) (same). Based on that firsthand experience, the CI provided several 118 State v. Brewer / Downard pieces of information: defendants’ address, that defendants obtained fentanyl and methamphetamine from Wamsley, and that defendants were selling fentanyl and methamphet- amine from their residence and delivering them using their 4Runner. The police corroborated that information through the three controlled buys conducted with the CI, which is sufficient to establish the CI’s reliability because it demon- strates the CI’s truthful character as well as the trustwor- thiness of the particular information the CI provided. See, e.g., Gaskill, 340 Or App at 465 (participation in two con- trolled buys sufficient to establish CI’s reliability); Wilson/ Helms, 83 Or App at 622 (participation in a single controlled buy sufficient to establish reliability). Therefore, the court may consider the information supplied by the CI as part of the probable cause determination. 2. Staleness The trial court also concluded that the informa- tion in the affidavit was too old to establish probable cause. The trial court reasoned that since the last controlled buy occurred in “early April,” it was unlikely that highly incul- patory, highly mobile drug evidence would still be located inside defendants’ house two to three weeks later when the police applied for the search warrants. The trial court did not explain its ruling regarding the 4Runner. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court placed undue weight on the timing of the last controlled buy because the police had strong reason to believe that the house and the vehicles were being used to facilitate ongo- ing drug sales, and that information did not become stale between the last controlled buy and the time of Wamsley’s death. Defendants respond that because Wamsley was the lead figure in the broader drug trafficking investigation, his death rendered any previous connection between drug evi- dence and the house and vehicles stale. Staleness is a “shorthand description of the analysis about whether or not the evidence sought will be there after the length of time since the event described in the affidavit occurred.” State v. Young, 108 Or App 196, 204, 816 P2d 612 Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 119 (1991), rev den, 314 Or 392 (1992). We evaluate the staleness of evidence in an affidavit because “probable cause must exist at the time that the order is issued.” State v. Mituniewicz, 186 Or App 95, 104, 62 P3d 417, rev den, 335 Or 578 (2003). The probability of evidence being in a location generally lessens over time. State v. Gustafson, 300 Or App 438, 466, 452 P3d 962 (2019), rev den, 366 Or 493, cert den, 59 US 1109 (2020). However, “[e]vidence that conduct has continued over time can support an inference that it was ongoing at the time the warrant was issued.” State v. Chase, 219 Or App 387, 393, 182 P3d 274 (2008). The following five factors are relevant to the staleness analysis: (1) the length of time; (2) the per- ishability versus the durability of the item; (3) the mobility of the evidence; (4) the nonexplicitly inculpatory character of the evidence; and (5) the propensity of an individual suspect or general class of offenders to maintain and retain posses- sion of such evidence. State v. Ulizzi, 246 Or App 430, 438- 39, 266 P3d 139 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 649 (2012); see also State v. Baker, 350 Or App 710, 716-719, 593 P3d 678 (2026) (describing case law on each factor). We turn to whether the evidence relating to the house was stale. The information in the affidavit read- ily supports an inference of ongoing drug activity in the house throughout the year preceding the warrant applica- tion. Over the course of their investigation, police received reports from multiple informants that Wamsley, Downard, and Brewer sold drugs, and that at least the latter two did so from defendants’ house. Consistent with that, during the four months leading up to Wamsley’s death, the police observed numerous individuals coming and going from the house for very brief transactions. By March 2024, three sus- pected drug dealers lived there. Even more critically, police conducted three controlled buys at defendants’ house in January and early April 2024. During the first two to three weeks of April 2024, police continued to observe indications of a continuing enterprise, including short-term intermit- tent traffic at the house, Wamsley concealing items under tarps on vehicles, and very late-night, short-duration com- ings and goings. Thus, even though the last controlled buy occurred two to three weeks before the warrant was issued, the demonstrated pattern of drug activity occurring at the 120 State v. Brewer / Downard house over many months appeared to continue. See Gaskill, 340 Or App at 466-67 (no staleness where most recent con- trolled buy at dealer’s house occurred two weeks before war- rant was issued and police observed intermittent short-term traffic in the meantime); Chase, 219 Or App at 393-94 (no staleness where three months after last of five controlled buys at dealer’s house, a person was seen patrolling the premises with an assault rifle several days prior to warrant application); cf. State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 116-19, 93 P3d 815 (2004) (information stale where evidence suggested the defendant had sold controlled substances from his house 16 months prior, but recent evidence of the defendant’s dis- tribution activities did not connect to the house itself). The information in the affidavit furnishes a reasonable infer- ence that evidence of the possession, use, and/or sale of drugs would probably be located inside defendants’ house on April 19, 2024—the day after Wamsley’s death—and thus, the warrant to search the house was supported by probable cause. Regarding the 4Runner, however, the information in the affidavit is too sparse to supply probable cause. There are only three pieces of information in the affidavit con- necting the 4Runner to drug activity: a statement by the CI that defendants use their 4Runner to deliver controlled sub- stances; a detective’s observation that Downard was com- ing and going from her house in the 4Runner “at odd hours of the night” during the first two weeks of April 2024; and the affiant’s statement that he knows from his training and experience that people who sell controlled substances often keep a supply of substances in their vehicle, along with other materials used for packaging and distributing those sub- stances. That information is insufficient to establish that evidence of possession or delivery would probably be found inside the 4Runner on April 19, 2024, because it does not establish that the 4Runner was a site of drug-dealing activ- ity near that date. Much like there is not probable cause to search a suspected drug dealer’s house simply because it is a suspected drug dealer’s house, there is not probable cause to search a suspected drug dealer’s car simply because it is a suspected drug dealer’s car. See Nelson, 307 Or App at 234 (explaining that “[w]e have expressly rejected a blanket rule Cite as 355 Or App 110 (2026) 121 that if there is probable cause to suspect that a person has committed a crime, an officer need only cite his or her train- ing and experience to establish probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime will be found at the person’s home” and concluding that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search the defendant’s house because no facts connected the defendant’s drug-dealing activity with the house itself (internal citation omitted)); cf. State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 527-29, 295 P3d 158 (2013) (concluding that the affidavit established probable cause to search the defen- dant’s vehicle, but not his house, where the defendant had driven directly from his house to meet someone and sell a small amount of methamphetamine from his vehicle on three recent occasions). For those reasons, we conclude that the affidavit established probable cause to search defendants’ house but not the 4Runner. We therefore reverse the part of the order suppressing evidence found in the house and affirm the part suppressing evidence found in the 4Runner. Portion of order granting defendants’ motion to suppress evidence seized following the search of the house reversed; remanded for further proceedings; otherwise affirmed.