Full Opinion

No. 1142 November 18, 2026 235 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHNATHON DAVID BOGOSIAN, Defendant-Appellant. Yamhill County Circuit Court 24CR07482; A185466 Ladd J. Wiles, Judge. Submitted October 7, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Kamins, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Pagán, Judge. KAMINS, P. J. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment deleting provision requiring payment of per diem fees; otherwise affirmed. 236 State v. Bogosian KAMINS, P. J. Defendant challenges his convictions for felony fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160; harassment, ORS 166.065; and felon in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270. He raises three assignments of error: (1) that the trial court plainly erred in failing to declare a mistrial after an officer commented on defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights, (2) that it plainly erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor improp- erly framed the burden of proof in closing argument, and (3) that it erred in ordering defendant to pay per diem fees that it did not announce at sentencing. The state concedes error on the third issue but otherwise defends the trial court’s decision not to grant a mistrial sua sponte on either ground stated above. We accept the state’s concession, but we are otherwise not persuaded that the trial court committed plain error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of a judgment deleting the per diem fees and otherwise affirm. Comment on Defendant’s Exercise of a Constitutional Right. Outside the presence of the jury, the state informed the court that it wanted to present evidence of defendant’s volunteered statements to Sergeant Eric Stoneberg after his arrest. But the state also wanted to avoid any refer- ence to defendant’s earlier invocation of his Miranda rights. The court admonished Stoneberg not to comment on defen- dant’s invocation and to “call a timeout” if such a com- ment was required by a given question. Stoneberg replied, “Understood.” Nevertheless, during direct examination, Stoneberg violated the trial court’s admonition: “[PROSECUTOR:] So after you had taken [defendant] into custody * * * did he make any statements on his own to you? “[STONEBERG:] Well, he said he didn’t want to talk to me originally after I Mirandized him. “[PROSECUTOR:] And did he make any statements later on, on his own volition? “[STONEBERG:] Yes, so he then said that [the com- plainant] attacked him and ripped his shirt.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 235 (2026) 237 Defendant did not object to that testimony, and the court did not give a curative instruction. Much later, after the court received the verdict, it expressed its displeasure at Stoneberg’s testimony, which it viewed as “almost a slap in the face.” It explained that, in the moment, it “may have granted a mistrial had there been the motion,” but in the absence of a motion and after time to reflect, the court admitted that “I probably shouldn’t have granted a mistrial.” It reasoned that a mistrial was not necessary because, in the context of Stoneberg’s testi- mony, defendant’s invocation was so quickly followed by his volunteered statements to Stoneberg that its prejudicial effect was blunted by the impression that defendant did not “mean[ ] it when he invoked.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred in failing to grant a mistrial. The state argues that Stoneberg’s testimony, taken in context, was not obvi- ously improper, nor was it sufficient to deny defendant a fair trial; therefore, it contends that the failure to sua sponte grant a mistrial did not rise to the level of plain error. “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000). We have discretion, however, to cor- rect a “plain” error. ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (stating requirements for an error to be “plain”). For the denial of a mistrial to rise to the level of plain error, it must be “beyond dispute” that the defendant was denied a fair trial. State v. Chitwood, 370 Or 305, 312, 518 P3d 903 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet that standard, the prejudice caused by the erroneously admitted evidence must have been incurable by an instruction to the jury. See State v. Perez, 373 Or 591, 606, 568 P3d 940 (2025) (addressing a prosecutor’s improper remarks during closing argument). Generally, it is impermissible to admit evidence of a defendant’s exercise of their constitutional rights “if it is done in a context whereupon inferences prejudicial to the defendant are likely to be drawn by the jury.’ ” State v. Moore, 352 Or App 15, 26-27, ___ P3d ___ (2026) (quoting State v. 238 State v. Bogosian Smallwood, 277 Or 503, 505-06, 561 P2d 600, cert den, 434 US 849 (1977)). But “[a] mistrial is not required where a jury is unlikely to draw an inference of guilt.” State v. Sanders, 342 Or App 414, 419, 576 P3d 1046, rev den, 374 Or 523 (2025). “A jury is unlikely to draw an adverse inference of guilt when the testimony involves an isolated and indirect reference that is merely incidental to some other focal point of discussion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, assuming that Stoneberg’s testimony was improper, we are not convinced that the prejudice it caused was incurable by jury instruction or that it denied defendant a fair trial. That is largely because, in very close succession, Stoneberg explained that defendant first “didn’t want to talk to me” and then later did talk to him. That description contained almost no context for either the initial invocation or the later change of heart, and by describing defendant’s statements immediately after referencing the invocation, whatever inference of guilt could be drawn by the invoca- tion was severely blunted. Accordingly, we are not convinced that the trial court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial. Prosecutor’s Comment on the Lack of Defense Evidence. Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial based on impermis- sible burden shifting in the following portion of the state’s closing argument: “You know what there’s no evidence of? Any injuries whatsoever on [defendant]. Zero. Nothing. Not one shred of an injury on him. And with that fantastical tale he spun, if he had so much as a broken fingernail, you can bet he would have said something about it. Nothing. Not one shred of an injury on him. You know, he says she’s grabbing him and pulling him and yanking him, there’s no scratch, like did he have scratches all down his chest? Nothing. Absolutely nothing.” Because defendant did not object to the statements when they were made, he requests plain-error review. Again, for a prosecutor’s statements in closing argu- ment to rise to the level of plain error, it must be “beyond dispute” that they “were so prejudicial as to have denied Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 235 (2026) 239 defendant a fair trial.” Chitwood, 370 Or at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet that standard, the state- ments, individually or collectively, must have been both obvi- ously improper and incurable. Perez, 373 Or at 606. A state- ment is obviously improper if its only possible interpretation made it an impermissible remark, whereas a statement was not obviously improper if it was susceptible to more than one interpretation, at least one of which was not impermissible. Id. at 607. Here, we agree with defendant that the statement was improper given that, so far as we are aware, the state produced no evidence regarding defendant’s lack of injury. Thus, the prosecutor’s reliance on an absence of evidence to draw an adverse inference could only be understood as an insinuation that defendant’s failure to produce that evi- dence undermined his theory of self-defense. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that the pros- ecutor’s improper statement could not be cured by a jury instruction. See State v. Dumdei, 337 Or App 246, 254, 562 P3d 634, rev den, 373 Or 736 (2025) (holding that prosecu- tor’s improper burden shifting argument could have been cured by a jury instruction where “the prosecutor did not link his improper statement with the correct burden of proof or any legal standards” and, instead, limited his “comments [to] factual matters”). Specifically, had defendant objected, the trial court could have reiterated that it is the state’s burden to disprove self-defense and that defendant had no burden to produce evidence in favor of his own defense. Such an instruction would have allowed defendant to emphasize the very theme of his closing argument, which highlighted law enforcement’s inadequate investigation into the com- plainant’s version of events. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s improper statement. Per Diem Fees. Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay “any required per diem fees.” That term appeared for the first time in the judgment. Defendant did not preserve the claim of error, but preser- vation is excused because defendant did not “have notice or 240 State v. Bogosian an opportunity” to object. State v. Tison, 292 Or App 369, 372, 424 P3d 823, rev den, 363 Or 744 (2018); accord State v. Cobat, 340 Or App 643, 649, 571 P3d 1136, rev den, 374 Or 419 (2025) (excusing preservation in similar circumstances). “A criminal defendant has the right to have their sentence announced in open court.” State v. Priester, 325 Or App 574, 581, 530 P3d 118, rev den, 371 Or 332 (2023). It was therefore error to include the per-diem-fees term in the judgment without announcing it at sentencing, as the state correctly concedes. See, e.g., State v. Hostman, 343 Or App 506, 513, 579 P3d 253 (2025) (holding that it was error to include previously unannounced per-diems-fee provision in sentencing judgment); State v. Barr, 331 Or App 242, 244, 545 P3d 772, rev den, 372 Or 720 (2024) (holding same). “As for disposition, the remedy for unannounced terms is usually resentencing.” State v. Avendano, 346 Or App 16, 20, 583 P3d 1080 (2025). We have previously explained, however, that it is appropriate to simply reverse the per-diem term where the trial court expressly waived any fines or fees at sentencing. Id. (agreeing with the parties that it was proper “to simply reverse that part of the judg- ment, because the trial court expressly stated at sentencing that it was waiving any fines or fees associated with the con- victions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Debruyne, 347 Or App 421, 423-24, 587 P3d 433 (2026) (same). In this case, a remand is unnecessary because the court stated at sentencing that it would “waive any addi- tional fines, fees, or assessments associated with these con- victions.” We reverse the portion of the judgment regarding payment of per diem fees. Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment delet- ing provision requiring payment of per diem fees; otherwise affirmed.