State v. Dill
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 4, 2026
DocketA185758
JudgeLagesen
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
428 November 4, 2026 No. 1066
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SPENCER ALLEN DILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
22CR30229; A185758
David F. Rees, Judge. (Judgment dated September 27,
2024)
Melvin Oden-Orr, Judge. (Judgment dated October 29,
2025)
Submitted September 11, 2026.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Laura A. Frickert, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the brief for respondent.
Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.*
LAGESEN, C. J.
Reversed and remanded.
______________
* Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 428 (2026) 429
LAGESEN, C. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment revoking probation
for failure to complete substance-abuse treatment and impos-
ing a sentence of 37 months’ incarceration, and an amended
judgment that added a 23-month term of post-prison super-
vision (PPS) to defendant’s sentence. He assigns error to the
trial court’s admission of the testimony of two witnesses by
simultaneous remote transmission and to the imposition of
PPS outside his presence. We reverse and remand.
The trial court permitted two witnesses testify
remotely at defendant’s probation revocation hearing.
Defendant objected to the remote testimony below, but
only on constitutional grounds; he did not argue that ORS
131.045 prohibited remote testimony without his agreement.
However, we “decide[ ] cases on sub-constitutional grounds,
where available, even though litigants argue only consti-
tutional error.” State v. Conger, 319 Or 484, 490, 878 P2d
1089 (1994). In view of that principle, the state concedes that
defendant’s objection to remote testimony would have made
it apparent to the trial court that defendant did not “agree
to [the witnesses’] appearance by simultaneous electronic
transmission” as required by ORS 131.045(2)(b) and that
the trial court erred by permitting the state’s witnesses to
appear electronically over defendant’s objection. See State v.
Smith, 344 Or App 111, 113-14, 580 P3d 339 (2025) (“Under
ORS 131.045(2)(b), the parties and the court are required to
agree to an appearance via simultaneous electronic trans-
mission. Here, defendant did not agree to H’s testimony by
simultaneous electronic transmission. ORS 131.045 thus
prohibited her remote testimony.”). We agree with and
accept the state’s concession. Because the statute provides a
complete answer to the issue raised in these assignments of
error, we do not reach defendant’s constitutional arguments.
See id. at 112 (declining to reach “the constitutional issues
present in this case because ORS 131.045 provides ‘a com-
plete answer’ to the issue presented on appeal”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The state further concedes that the error in per-
mitting remote testimony was not harmless and requires
reversal of the judgment revoking defendant’s probation.
430 State v. Dill
We agree that the credibility of the witnesses who testi-
fied remotely in this case played a significant role in the
trial court’s decision to revoke, given that those witnesses
provided the only evidence against defendant regarding
the allegations that were the basis of the court’s decision
to revoke probation. Under those circumstances, the deci-
sion to permit remote testimony and the consequences that
decision had on the trial court’s ability to evaluate the wit-
nesses’ demeanor likely affected the trial court’s decision to
revoke. We therefore reverse the probation revocation order
and remand the case to the trial court.
In light of that decision, we need not reach defen-
dant’s second assignment of error, that the trial court
plainly erred when it imposed a term of post-prison super-
vision for the first time in the judgment and outside defen-
dant’s presence.
Reversed and remanded.