Bennett v. Nelson

214 October 28, 2026 No. 1035 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON AIRON BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shane NELSON, Sheriff of Deschutes County, Defendant-Respondent. Deschutes County Circuit Court 24CV36220; A186161 Alicia N. Sykora, Judge. Submitted March 19, 2026. Margaret Huntington and Equal Justice Law filed the brief for appellant. Appellant filed the supplemental brief pro se. Stephanie Marshall filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Reversed and remanded with instructions to discharge plaintiff from his confinement resulting from his arrest under the extradition warrant. Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 215 216 Bennett v. Nelson HELLMAN, J. Plaintiff appeals a judgment denying both his coun- seled and pro se writs of habeas corpus to prevent his extra- dition under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), codified in Oregon under ORS 133.743 to 133.857, for alleged crimes in the state of Louisiana. In a single assignment of error relating to the counseled petition, he argues that Louisiana’s extradition documents were facially flawed under the non-fugitive extradition provision of the UCEA, codified as ORS 133.767, because they did not include an allegation that plaintiff intended for his conduct in Oregon to result in a crime in Louisiana. Plaintiff also raises a pro se assignment of error challenging the trial court’s denial of both of his petitions, arguing that the documents are facially flawed due to the missing allegation and that the documents fail to substan- tially charge him with a crime. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s petitions because Louisiana’s extradition docu- ments were facially flawed due to their failure to properly allege that plaintiff was an extraditable person under ORS 133.767. Accordingly, we reverse. BACKGROUND The relevant facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was arrested in Oregon in May 2024, for reasons unrelated to the Louisiana crimes at issue in this case. A few weeks later, Louisiana sought to extradite him for alleged crimes under Louisiana law. Extradition is the process whereby one juris- diction (the demanding state) can seek custody of an individ- ual currently residing in another jurisdiction (the asylum state), usually for purposes of pursuing criminal charges against the individual. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 US 270, 289, 22 S Ct 484, 46 L Ed 534 (1902) (“Extradition may be suffi- ciently defined to be the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish [them], demands the surrender.”). Within the United States, extradition between states is governed by Article IV, section Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 217 2, of the United States Constitution and, when adopted (as here), the UCEA. The UCEA establishes a standard admin- istrative process for extradition, Hudson v. Moran, 760 F2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir 1985), and is currently codified as ORS 133.743 to 133.857. In July 2024, Louisiana issued a requisition for plaintiff’s extradition to Oregon’s Governor Tina Kotek. The Louisiana requisition stated that plaintiff was charged in Louisiana with indecent behavior with a juvenile and com- puter aided solicitation of a minor under Louisiana law and that “the accused was present in [Louisiana] at the time of the commission of said crime, and fled from the justice of [Louisiana], and has taken refuge, and is currently in custody of the Deschutes County Sheriff’s Office in Bend, Oregon.” The application for requisition further set out the statutory definition for each crime and alleged that the crimes were “committed in the Parish of Livingston on or about April 1, 2024 - April 25, 2024.” The documents accompanying the requisition included the affidavit for the Louisiana arrest warrant, which set out the following factual allegations against plaintiff. Plaintiff was alleged to have communicated with a 15-year-old girl, K, through Snapchat in a sexually explicit manner. Plaintiff, who went by “Scott” and had the Snapchat account name “ddlgadultmale,” was allegedly aware that K was a student in school because he talked to her about school and asked her about her “LEAP test.” The affidavit included messages that “Scott” sent to K that were “extremely sexual in nature.” However, the affidavit does not expressly allege that plaintiff knew K’s age. Additionally, neither the affida- vit nor the other extradition documents allege that plain- tiff knew that K was located in Louisiana at the time he sent her the messages, or that he intended for his conduct to result in a crime in Louisiana. Later in July, plaintiff, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to prevent his extra- dition to Louisiana. In that petition, plaintiff argued that he was in Oregon, not Louisiana, when the alleged crimes occurred in Louisiana. Consequently, plaintiff argued that he could not be considered a “fugitive” from Louisiana and 218 Bennett v. Nelson that extradition was impermissible on that basis. See ORS 133.747 (“[I]t is the duty of the Governor of [Oregon] to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state * * * who has fled from justice and is found in [Oregon.]”). Instead, plaintiff argued, he could only be extra- dited as a “non-fugitive” under ORS 133.767, which provides for extradition of a person who “was not in [the demanding] state at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom.” Plaintiff further argued that the Louisiana requisition and supporting documents were facially insuf- ficient to support extradition under ORS 133.767 because the documents failed to allege that plaintiff “committ[ed] an act in [Oregon] * * * intentionally resulting in a crime” in Louisiana as required under that statute. The trial court permitted plaintiff to file a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his extradition and raised several other issues involving Miranda rights, identity, and conditions of confinement claims. In August 2024, Governor Kotek signed a warrant authorizing plaintiff’s extradition to Louisiana. The warrant stated that plaintiff was charged with indecent behavior with a juvenile and computer aided solicitation of a minor under Louisiana law and that he was “a fugitive from the justice thereof and has taken refuge in the State of Oregon, or hav- ing committed an act in Oregon intentionally resulting in the said crimes in the other state and is now in Oregon.” In October 2024, Louisiana sent a revised req- uisition stating that “elements of the crime committed by [plaintiff] took place in the State of Louisiana; however, the accused is not in the State of Louisiana but is a fugitive from justice in Louisiana and is currently in the custody of the Deschutes County Sheriff’s Office in Bend, Oregon.” Louisiana did not revise any of the remaining documents. Governor Kotek did not issue an amended governor’s war- rant based on the revised requisition. The trial court held a hearing on both of plaintiff’s petitions in September and October of 2024. The parties stipulated that plaintiff “was in the State of Oregon when the crimes the state of Louisiana has alleged occurred,” and Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 219 agreed that Louisiana was seeking extradition under the “non-fugitive” exception outlined in ORS 133.767. The court denied both petitions, concluding: “Now, there is a line between putting a person on notice, which is a defect that’s not inartful pleading, but the court having reviewed the documents both sets of Exhibits 1 and 2 does believe that the plaintiff * * * has been put on notice as to the crimes charged, where they’re charged, and that he is alleged to have intentionally engaged in this conduct. It is true that there may be some more technical aspects as to intent and that being the other person versus him and whose sexual gratification may be aroused, but the court does not wish to delve too deeply into the charges because this is on a habeas petition and specifically we’re address- ing [plaintiff’s attorney’s] note.” This appeal followed. ANALYSIS We review a trial court’s denial of habeas relief for errors of law. Curry v. Grill, 125 Or App 507, 509, 866 P2d 1237 (1993). As explained above, extradition is the procedure by which a demanding state can obtain custody of an individ- ual who is charged with a crime in that state but presently resides in a different state. See Terlinden, 184 US at 289. Extradition is purely an administrative process that does not involve an assessment of the merits of the demanding state’s criminal allegations. See ORS 133.823 (“The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which the accused is charged may not be inquired into by the Governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition * * * shall have been presented to the Governor[.]”). As such, extradi- tion is meant to be a simple, straightforward, and easy to follow process. See Naisbitt v. Raichl, 141 Or App 205, 208, 917 P2d 59 (1996) (“Interstate extradition is intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Article IV, section 2, of the United States Constitution.”). Indeed, the existence of the UCEA demonstrates that the process can be reduced to a series of agreed-upon administrative steps to balance the competing interests at stake. 220 Bennett v. Nelson Once the asylum state’s governor issues an extra- dition warrant, the accused may challenge the validity of the extradition proceedings through application for a writ of habeas corpus in the asylum state. Knowles v. Gladden, 227 Or 408, 413, 362 P2d 763 (1961), cert den, 368 US 999 (1962). In keeping with the straightforward nature of the extradition process, a court considering a habeas corpus challenge to extradition is limited to reviewing whether “(1) the documents supporting extradition are facially flawed; (2) the plaintiff has been charged with a crime in the demand- ing state; (3) the plaintiff is, in fact, the person named on the request; and (4) the plaintiff is a fugitive.” Betschart v. Spinden, 172 Or App 668, 672, 20 P3d 202, rev den, 332 Or 326 (2001). There are two pathways to extradition. The first is for an individual who is a “fugitive,” that is, someone “who commits a crime within a state and withdraws [themself] from such jurisdiction without waiting to abide the conse- quences of such act.” Ex parte Montoya, 170 Or 499, 502, 135 P2d 281 (1943). That pathway is mandatory, as in the asylum state must extradite the fugitive, and is derived from Article IV, section 2, of the United States Constitution. The second pathway, established through the UCEA, allows for the discretionary extradition of a “non-fugitive,” that is, someone who has allegedly committed a crime against the laws of the demanding state through acts done outside of that state. ORS 133.767. In the context of that “non-fugitive” extradition statute, the court examines whether the plaintiff is an “extraditable person” as defined in the statute, rather than whether the plaintiff is a fugitive. In re Mahler, 177 NJ Super 337, 355, 426 A2d 1021, 1030 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1981). On appeal, plaintiff raises the same argument from below that “non-fugitive” extradition under ORS 133.767 requires the demanding state to allege in the documents supporting extradition that the accused committed acts in the asylum or other state that they intended to result in a crime in the demanding state. That argument presents a question of statutory construction, which we analyze using our well-established method of examining the text and Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 221 context of the statute, as well as any helpful legislative his- tory proffered by the parties. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Oregon’s extradition statutes, including ORS 133.767, “shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectu- ate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” ORS 133.853. Because ORS 133.767 contains essentially the same relevant language from section 6 of the UCEA,1 other jurisdictions’ interpretations of that section are persuasive. See Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga 42, 46 n 8, 453 SE2d 698, 702 n 8 (1995) (“In order to effectuate the uniform act’s gen- eral purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it, judicial decisions from other states interpreting their codification of the uniform law are particularly per- suasive.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)). ORS 133.767 states, in relevant part: “The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state in the man- ner provided in ORS 133.763 with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand.” A plain reading of the text of ORS 133.767 indi- cates that after another state’s “executive authority” makes a demand, the Governor “may also surrender” a person under ORS 133.767 if certain conditions are met. Those conditions include: (1) that the person present in Oregon must be charged “in the manner provided in ORS 133.763”; (2) that the person must be charged with “committing an act in this state”; and (3) that the person’s acts “intentionally result[ed] in a crime in the state whose executive authority 1 Section 6 of the UCEA reads: “The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this state charged on indictment found in such other state with committing an act in this state intentionally resulting in a crime in such other state; and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, notwithstand- ing that the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom.” 222 Bennett v. Nelson is making the demand.” Under well-established rules of grammar, the adverb “intentionally” modifies the statutory phrase immediately following it, to wit, “resulting in a crime in the [demanding state].” See State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 28, 307 P3d 429 (2013) (“A grammatical reading of the ordi- nance is that ‘recklessly,’ an adverb, modifies the phrase that immediately follows it.”). Thus, for a person to be extra- ditable under ORS 133.767, they must have been charged in the demanding state with committing an act in the asylum state and have intended for that act to result in a crime in the demanding state. See Deur v. Sheriff of Newaygo Cnty., 420 Mich 440, 446, 362 NW2d 698, 702 (1984) (“We hold that the non-fugitive extradition provision of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act requires the accused to have com- mitted an act in the asylum state coupled with an intent that such act result in a crime in the demanding state.”). The allegations establishing that a person is extraditable as a non-fugitive must appear on the face of the extradition documents themselves. See ORS 133.763 (requiring that the “documents presented by the execu- tive authority making the demand show that” the person is extraditable and that the documents themselves are in “full compliance with the requirements of ORS 133.753”); ORS 133.767 (requiring non-fugitive extraditions to com- ply with ORS 133.763). An interpretation requiring facial validity is also consistent with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions’ readings of section 6 of the UCEA. See Ex Parte Rhodes, 494 SW3d 752, 756 (Tex App 2016) (concluding that the extradition documents were in order on their face in part because the demanding state “alleged, as required by [the asylum state’s non-fugitive extradi- tion statute], that even if appellant was not present in [the demanding state] for the commission of the crime, he still committed an act ‘intentionally resulting in a crime’ in [the demanding state]”); People v. Meschino, 315 Ill App 3d 488, 491, 734 NE2d 131, 134 (2000) (“We have found no cases that have interpreted section 6 [of the UCEA] in any other way. The intent requirement under section 6 is satisfied if the demanding state recites that the defendant’s act ‘inten- tionally result[ed] in a crime in the state * * * making the demand.’ ” (Second brackets and omission in original.)); Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 223 State v. Hershey, 31 Wash App 366, 371, 641 P2d 1201, 1204 (1982) (concluding that the demanding state’s documents supporting extradition were “fatally flawed” because the documents requested non-fugitive extradition but failed to include the necessary allegations to support that type of extradition under Washington’s statute codifying section 6 of the UCEA); Hill v. Blake, 186 Conn 404, 411, 441 A2d 841, 845 (1982) (“[T]he documents must not simply charge the plaintiff with a crime but * * * they must specifically charge him with committing acts outside [the demanding state] which intentionally resulted in the violation of [the demand- ing state’s] law.”); but see Earhart v. Hicks, 656 SW2d 873, 878-79 (Tenn Crim App 1983) (concluding that the extradi- tion documents were facially invalid because they failed to provide any allegations to support non-fugitive extradition, but disagreeing with the trial court’s reasoning that the non-fugitive extradition statute requires an allegation that the plaintiff intended for the act to result in a crime in the demanding state). Recognizing that the extradition documents do not explicitly contain an allegation that plaintiff “intended for that act to result in a crime in the demanding state,” defen- dant argues that they are nonetheless valid because “inart- ful pleading in the requisition documents is not necessarily fatal” to extradition. We reject that argument for several reasons. First, the allegation that plaintiff intended for his acts to result in a crime in Louisiana is not “inartfully pled.” It is completely missing from Louisiana’s documents. Next, we are not faced with a situation in which “inartful pleading” could be expected to be ironed out in further litigation or in which the most important question is whether a party articulated the issue with enough specificity to avoid unfair surprise later. Instead, this litigation arises in the context of a well-defined, straightforward administra- tive process with clearly specified requirements that must be followed before it is legally permissible for the asylum state to transfer custody of an individual to the demanding state. In this context, ORS 133.763 requires certain alle- gations to appear on the face of the documents and “close 224 Bennett v. Nelson enough” is not sufficient. See Hershey, 31 Wash App at 371 (“While [the lack of required factual assertions in the docu- ments to support non-fugitive extradition] is a technical vio- lation, it is a violation nonetheless; Washington statutes and the language of the United States Supreme Court suggest there must be strict compliance with the forms necessary to effect extradition.”). Further, the fact that the Oregon extradition war- rant included the necessary intent language is irrelevant to our analysis. It is the demanding state’s documents that must be “in order on their face” for extradition to be valid, not the asylum state’s warrant. Governor Kotek’s warrant, issued before Louisiana amended its requisition to reflect its pursuit of extradition under ORS 133.767, lacked legally sufficient support. Finally, to the extent that a principle of “inartful pleading” applies at all in the extradition context, it would only be in the context of an Oregon court’s evaluation as to whether a person has been substantially charged with crimes in the demanding state. Because Oregon courts are not immediately familiar with the criminal laws of other states, we are not required to discern whether the charging instrument contained in a demanding state’s extradition documents meets all the technical requirements of criminal pleading in the demanding state. See Fisco v. Clark, 243 Or 466, 469-70, 414 P2d 331 (1966) (“[I]n an extradition pro- ceeding, the complaint need not meet the technical require- ments of criminal pleading under the laws of the demanding state, but is sufficient if it substantially charges the person demanded with a crime.”); Pierce v. Creecy, 210 US 387, 405, 28 S Ct 714, 52 L Ed 1113 (1908) (anything beyond the “sub- stantially charged” standard “would impose upon courts * * * the duty of a critical examination of the laws of states with whose jurisprudence and criminal procedure they can have only a general acquaintance”). But that was not the basis of plaintiff’s challenge, and we do not view such a prin- ciple as having any application in the case before us. In sum, there is no allegation in Louisiana’s req- uisition or other accompanying documents that plaintiff “intended for [the alleged] act to result in a crime in the Cite as 354 Or App 214 (2026) 225 demanding state.” Without that allegation, Louisiana’s extradition documents do not demonstrate that plaintiff is an extraditable person under ORS 133.767. Louisiana’s extradition documents are thus facially invalid and could not provide a basis for Governor Kotek to issue an extradi- tion warrant. The trial court thus erred in denying plain- tiff’s petitions for habeas relief on that basis. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to discharge plaintiff from his confinement resulting from his arrest under the extradition warrant. See Hattaway v. Culbreath, 57 So 2d 661, 662-63 (Fla 1952) (reversing with instructions to discharge plaintiff from custody because the demanding state’s authenticated extradition documents did not contain the “necessary allegation that [the appel- lant] was present in the [demanding state] when the alleged crime was committed”). Reversed and remanded with instructions to dis- charge plaintiff from his confinement resulting from his arrest under the extradition warrant.