State v. Linville
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA185351
JudgeO'Connor
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
160 November 18, 2026 No. 1132
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SAMUEL ALLAN LINVILLE,
aka Samuel A. Linville, aka Samuel Allen Linville,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
24CR05539; A185351
Martin E. Stone, Judge.
Argued and submitted May 12, 2026.
Kasey Anne Hooker, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy
Attorney General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
O’CONNOR, J.
Reversed.
Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 161
162 State v. Linville
O’CONNOR, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for mis-
demeanor failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040(3)
(a), entered after a bench trial. Defendant raises four assign-
ments of error, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) deny-
ing defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA), (2)
shifting the burden of proof to defendant during its speaking
verdict, (3) admitting the state’s Exhibit 2, a sex offender reg-
istration packet, and (4) imposing a $250 fine without consid-
ering defendant’s ability to pay. We conclude that the trial
court erred by denying defendant’s MJOA because there is
insufficient evidence to find that defendant failed to complete
his annual sex offender registration in 2023. We thus do not
reach his remaining assignments. Accordingly, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
“When reviewing the denial of a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal, ‘we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state to determine whether a rational fact-
finder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Miller, 300 Or App 459, 460, 454
P3d 14 (2019) (quoting State v. Harper, 296 Or App 125, 126,
436 P3d 44 (2019)). We state the facts in accordance with
that standard.
In January 2024, an Oregon State Police (OSP)
trooper stopped defendant for committing a bicycle violation.
The trooper cited defendant for being out of compliance with
his sex offender registration requirements. Defendant was
subsequently charged by information with misdemeanor
failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040.
During the bench trial, the state called one witness,
the trooper who initially cited defendant, and offered one
exhibit (state’s Exhibit 2), a packet containing defendant’s
sex offender registrations from 2011 to 2022 with a signed
stamp indicating the records were from OSP.1 The trooper
testified that when he ran defendant’s name and birth date
through the Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS), he con-
firmed that defendant was a sex offender and that he was
1
Defendant stipulated to the fact that he is required to periodically register
as a sex offender at an appropriate authority.
Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 163
not in compliance with his registration requirements. After
defendant objected to that testimony on hearsay and best
evidence grounds, the trial court allowed the trooper’s testi-
mony for the limited purpose of showing the effect on the lis-
tener. That is, the trooper’s testimony that LEDS indicated
that defendant was out of compliance with his registration
requirements was only admitted to show why the trooper
cited defendant. The testimony was not evidence that defen-
dant was, in fact, out of compliance in LEDS.
The state then offered Exhibit 2, defendant’s sex
offender registration packet from OSP. Defendant did not
object, and the trial court admitted the exhibit. The 58-page
packet has an OSP stamp and a signature on the first and
last page. The stamp reads:
“THE UNDERSIGNED, Legal Keeper of Records, Oregon
State Police, does hereby certify that the foregoing copy has
been compared by me with the original and that it is a true
and correct transcript therefrom and of the whole or of a
specified part of said original as the same appears on file
in my official care and custody.”
The stamps are signed and dated May 14, 2024. On the first
page, the stamp reads, “Page 1 of 58 pages,” and on the last
page, the stamp reads, “Page 58 of 58 pages,” both with the
numbers written in by hand. The trooper testified that the
packet showed defendant’s initial registration in 2011, and
that the packet appeared to contain every subsequent reg-
istration by defendant up to the most recent registration in
the packet, which occurred in November 2022. The state did
not call the Legal Keeper of Records from OSP and did not
elicit testimony from the trooper about OSP’s record-keeping
procedures or how the packet was created for the purposes
of the trial.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified
that he had registered every year since 2011, including in
2023. He stated that he had kept a receipt from 2023, but
his mother had thrown it away.
During closing argument, the state argued that
Exhibit 2 showed that defendant’s most recent registration
occurred in 2022 because the packet was printed in 2024:
164 State v. Linville
“There can—there can be no more conclusive evidence. I
mean, the State can’t prove a negative certainly, but that is
the best proof that can possibly come forward to the court,
that 2022 was the most recent reporting that the defendant
made.
“* * * From the packet, the history and the defendant’s
own words, you can see that he understands what he needs
to do to report and, thus, if he did not do it in 2023, then he
just didn’t. And, as I said, the packet speaks for itself. Page
1 is from 2022, Your Honor.”
In his closing, defendant argued,
“I would note from the prosecuting counsel’s own state-
ments, the State can’t prove a negative, but their job is to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he didn’t register.
That’s their burden.
“The packet, we fully agree it shows the most recent
as 2022. [Defendant], by his own experience in testimony
says he went and registered. I would argue that he has the
habit of registering. He has been going to and registering,
you can see there, from 2011 every year. Every change of
address is in that packet. He goes and he registers. We
don’t know what happened. It isn’t there.
“He believes he would have had it, but the incident with
his mother, the document may have been destroyed. And
so we’d ask—We’d argue that that’s reasonable doubt, Your
Honor. He says he’s registered. He’s had the habit of regis-
tering. He has memories of going to lunch and all that that
day, and we believe he’s not guilty, Your Honor.”
The trial court found defendant guilty of one count
of failure to report as a sex offender, based on Exhibit 2:
“The thing that speaks loud volumes is State’s Exhibit
No. 2. If I didn’t have that blue stamp at the bottom of
this document, I would feel differently, but what it shows
me—And I’m not criticizing [defendant]. I appreciate your
testimony, your recollection, but what I have as State’s
Exhibit No. 2 that shows their records, fairly comprehen-
sive records of history of reporting as required, with the
last report form being November 15, 2022, and the stamp
indicating that it was current as of May 14, 2024. So that
speaks volumes.”
Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 165
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred by denying his MJOA because there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of failure to report as a sex offender,
namely because, as defendant argues, no reasonable fact-
finder could infer that the packet was a complete copy of
defendant’s OSP registration record given that the stamp on
the packet says it is a copy “of the whole or of a specified part
of” the original OSP record. Defendant argues that the state
failed to proffer evidence that had defendant registered in
2023 as required, that registration would have appeared in
the state’s Exhibit 2.
In response, the state first argues that defendant’s
assignment of error is unpreserved as defendant did not
make an MJOA at trial. On the merits, the state argues
that had defendant registered in 2023, the agency at which
he registered would have been statutorily required to for-
ward the registration to OSP within three days. Therefore,
the state reasons, the fact that Exhibit 2 did not indicate
that defendant had registered in 2023 allowed the factfinder
to infer that defendant did not register in 2023.
We conclude that defendant’s first assignment of
error is preserved by his argument during closing. On the
merits, we conclude that the record lacked evidence from
which a factfinder could infer beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant failed to register in 2023.
A. Preservation
When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency
of the state’s evidence in closing argument during a bench
trial, the defendant makes the equivalent of an MJOA and
preserves the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for appeal.
State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 454 n 1, 365 P3d
116 (2015). In this case, the state had the burden of proving
an omission—that defendant did not complete his annual
sex offender registration. In closing argument, defendant
pointed to a gap in the state’s evidence that would not allow
any rational factfinder to reasonably infer that defendant
did, in fact, not complete his annual sex offender registration.
Specifically, he argued that the state’s Exhibit 2 lacked any
166 State v. Linville
evidence about whether defendant had registered in 2023,
stating, “It isn’t there.” In so arguing, defendant alerted the
trial court that even if it were to discredit defendant’s tes-
timony, as it appears the trial court did, there was still an
unexplained gap in the evidence; thus, the state presented
insufficient evidence to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In general, an MJOA “must state the specific theory
on which the state’s proof was insufficient.” State v. Paragon,
195 Or App 265, 268, 97 P3d 691 (2004). But “[p]recisely what
suffices to present clearly a particular position, for preser-
vation purposes, is not something that can be explained by
a neat verbal formula.” State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548,
258 P3d 1228 (2011) (internal quotation marks and brack-
ets omitted). “Ultimately, the preservation rule is a practi-
cal one, and close calls—like this one—inevitably will turn
on whether, given the particular record of a case, the court
concludes that the policies underlying the rule have been
sufficiently served.” State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 341, 211
P3d 262 (2009); see also Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-
21, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (explaining that important policies
behind the preservation rule include procedural fairness to
the parties and to the trial court, judicial economy, and full
development of the record).
In this case, the policies underlying the preserva-
tion rule were sufficiently served. Whether Exhibit 2 was
sufficient to support the inference, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant did not register in 2023 was a cen-
tral issue of the trial. The state relied on the stamp on the
packet to support its argument that the packet was com-
plete and opted to not call any witness who could attest to its
completeness. In its closing, the state emphasized that the
packet was “the best proof that can possibly come forward to
the court[ ] that 2022 was the most recent reporting that the
defendant made.” Defendant argued that the packet did not
conclusively show that defendant failed to register in 2023.
In rebuttal, the state argued that the packet was a complete
record of defendant’s registrations—”the date of the packet
shows that [it] was printed in I believe it was May of 2024,
* * * there’s no other reports.” In addition, the trial court
Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 167
expressly relied on the stamp to reach its verdict, stating,
“the stamp indicat[es] that [the packet] was current as of
May 14, 2024,” and “that speaks volumes.” The state and the
trial court thus understood and fully considered the issue of
whether Exhibit 2 was sufficient to establish that defendant
did not register in 2023.
Although defendant has further developed the
argument on appeal, defendant adequately preserved his
first assignment of error below.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
As noted, “[w]hen reviewing the denial of a motion
for judgment of acquittal, ‘we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the state to determine whether a
rational factfinder could have found the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Miller, 300 Or App at
460 (quoting Harper, 296 Or App at 126). To the extent that
inferences from circumstantial evidence are necessary to
prove an element, it is a question of law what reasonable
inferences may be made from the evidence. State v. Bivins,
191 Or App 460, 466-67, 83 P3d 379 (2004). If the evidence
allows more than one reasonable inference, but those infer-
ences are “in equipoise” and there are no other facts which
would aid the factfinder in deciding to draw one inference
over the other, then “it is necessary to say as a matter of
law that the state has not met its burden of proof” because
“it would require impermissible speculation to choose which
inference to make.” State v. Stutte, 339 Or App 87, 95, 568
P3d 247 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant is required to annually register as a sex
offender within 10 days of his birth date, and failure to do
so constitutes the crime of failure to report as a sex offender.
ORS 163A.010(3)(a)(D); ORS 163A.040(1)(f). To attempt to
meet its burden to establish that defendant failed to regis-
ter as required in 2023, the state presented defendant’s sex
offender registration packet from OSP which contains each
of defendant’s required registrations from 2011 to 2022. The
packet also has a stamp that says the packet is a copy “of the
whole or of a specified part of” defendant’s OSP registration
record.
168 State v. Linville
Two possible inferences could be drawn from that
statement: either the packet was a copy of the “whole” of
defendant’s OSP registration record or the packet was a
copy of “a specified part” of defendant’s OSP registration
record. The state presented no additional evidence to show
that this packet was defendant’s “whole” registration record.
The record contains no facts to aid a factfinder in choosing
to infer that the packet is the whole record or a part of the
whole record. Thus, the competing inferences are “in equi-
poise,” and as a matter of law, the state did not meet its
burden of proof. Stutte, 339 Or App at 95; see also State v.
Campbell, 348 Or App 306, 311, 590 P3d 612 (2026) (“If one
or more ‘scenarios are possible,’ but ‘they rely on specula-
tion rather than reasonable inferences,’ then the evidence is
legally insufficient to go to the factfinder.” (Quoting State v.
Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724, 732, 452 P3d 948 (2019).)).
The parties agree that two cases, State v. McElroy,
232 Or App 87, 221 P3d 172 (2009), and State v. Baker, 179 Or
App 486, 40 P3d 569 (2002), are significant to our analysis,
although they disagree about whether the cases control the
outcome here. We conclude that neither Baker nor McElroy
control this case. Baker and McElroy explain that when an
agency where a person can complete sex offender registra-
tion has an official duty to forward that registration to the
recordkeeper, such as OSP, then then absence of a particu-
lar registration from a record provided by the recordkeeper
allows for the inference that the registration did not occur
because it can be presumed that had the person registered
with the appropriate authority, that registration would
appear in the record. McElroy, 232 Or App at 91-92 (citing
OEC 311(1)(j)); Baker, 179 Or App at 489 (same). This case
presents a related, but distinct issue, as we noted above:
When has the state met its burden to establish that the lack
of a record is due to defendant’s failure to register?
To illustrate, in McElroy, the state called an OSP
Sex Offender Registration Unit administrative specialist
who was responsible for maintaining the registration records
where the defendant’s records would have appeared. 232 Or
App at 90. The defendant in that case argued that although
the administrative specialist testified that the defendant’s
Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 169
registration was not in her records, the state had to prove
that had the defendant registered, that registration would
have been in the administrative specialist’s records. Id. at
91. The court rejected that argument because agencies had
a statutory duty to forward any sex offender registrations to
OSP, so the state could rely on the evidentiary presumption
in OEC 311(1)(j) that an “official duty has been regularly
performed” such that the factfinder could presume that had
the defendant registered, the official receiving that regis-
tration would have forwarded it to OSP and the testifying
administrative specialist would have knowledge of it. Id. at
92 (quoting OEC 311(1)(j) (brackets omitted)).
Here, had the state presented evidence that its
Exhibit 2 was a complete copy of defendant’s OSP registra-
tion record, McElroy would control, and the factfinder could
rely on the “official duty” presumption to conclude that had
defendant properly registered in 2023, it would be in the
state’s Exhibit 2, defendant’s OSP registration packet. The
state presented no such evidence in this case. The packet,
by itself, provided no way for the factfinder to determine
whether it was a complete copy of defendant’s OSP registra-
tion record or a portion of the complete registration record.
In addition, the state’s only witness, the trooper, did not tes-
tify as to the completeness of the OSP registration packet,
and his testimony about defendant’s out-of-compliance sta-
tus in LEDS was not admitted for its truth, but rather to
demonstrate why the trooper cited defendant.
In sum, two competing inferences could be drawn
from the evidence presented by the state: either defendant’s
2023 annual registration was missing from the OSP packet
because defendant failed to register in 2023 or defendant
registered in 2023 and defendant’s 2023 annual registration
was missing from the OSP packet because the packet itself
did not contain all of defendant’s registrations. The state
did not call a witness from OSP who could certify that the
packet reflected a copy of defendant’s entire OSP registra-
tion record or who could testify, based on personal knowl-
edge, that defendant’s registration record did not contain a
2023 registration. The state admitted the packet alone, with
a stamp that says it is either a whole or a part of defendant’s
170 State v. Linville
OSP record. Without more, the trial court could not have
reasonably inferred that the packet was a complete copy
of defendant’s registration record showing that defendant
failed to complete his 2023 annual registration. Accordingly,
the trial court erred by denying defendant’s MJOA.
Reversed.