Full Opinion

160 November 18, 2026 No. 1132 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SAMUEL ALLAN LINVILLE, aka Samuel A. Linville, aka Samuel Allen Linville, Defendant-Appellant. Coos County Circuit Court 24CR05539; A185351 Martin E. Stone, Judge. Argued and submitted May 12, 2026. Kasey Anne Hooker, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Reversed. Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 161 162 State v. Linville O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for mis- demeanor failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040(3) (a), entered after a bench trial. Defendant raises four assign- ments of error, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) deny- ing defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA), (2) shifting the burden of proof to defendant during its speaking verdict, (3) admitting the state’s Exhibit 2, a sex offender reg- istration packet, and (4) imposing a $250 fine without consid- ering defendant’s ability to pay. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s MJOA because there is insufficient evidence to find that defendant failed to complete his annual sex offender registration in 2023. We thus do not reach his remaining assignments. Accordingly, we reverse. I. BACKGROUND “When reviewing the denial of a motion for judg- ment of acquittal, ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational fact- finder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Miller, 300 Or App 459, 460, 454 P3d 14 (2019) (quoting State v. Harper, 296 Or App 125, 126, 436 P3d 44 (2019)). We state the facts in accordance with that standard. In January 2024, an Oregon State Police (OSP) trooper stopped defendant for committing a bicycle violation. The trooper cited defendant for being out of compliance with his sex offender registration requirements. Defendant was subsequently charged by information with misdemeanor failure to report as a sex offender, ORS 163A.040. During the bench trial, the state called one witness, the trooper who initially cited defendant, and offered one exhibit (state’s Exhibit 2), a packet containing defendant’s sex offender registrations from 2011 to 2022 with a signed stamp indicating the records were from OSP.1 The trooper testified that when he ran defendant’s name and birth date through the Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS), he con- firmed that defendant was a sex offender and that he was 1 Defendant stipulated to the fact that he is required to periodically register as a sex offender at an appropriate authority. Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 163 not in compliance with his registration requirements. After defendant objected to that testimony on hearsay and best evidence grounds, the trial court allowed the trooper’s testi- mony for the limited purpose of showing the effect on the lis- tener. That is, the trooper’s testimony that LEDS indicated that defendant was out of compliance with his registration requirements was only admitted to show why the trooper cited defendant. The testimony was not evidence that defen- dant was, in fact, out of compliance in LEDS. The state then offered Exhibit 2, defendant’s sex offender registration packet from OSP. Defendant did not object, and the trial court admitted the exhibit. The 58-page packet has an OSP stamp and a signature on the first and last page. The stamp reads: “THE UNDERSIGNED, Legal Keeper of Records, Oregon State Police, does hereby certify that the foregoing copy has been compared by me with the original and that it is a true and correct transcript therefrom and of the whole or of a specified part of said original as the same appears on file in my official care and custody.” The stamps are signed and dated May 14, 2024. On the first page, the stamp reads, “Page 1 of 58 pages,” and on the last page, the stamp reads, “Page 58 of 58 pages,” both with the numbers written in by hand. The trooper testified that the packet showed defendant’s initial registration in 2011, and that the packet appeared to contain every subsequent reg- istration by defendant up to the most recent registration in the packet, which occurred in November 2022. The state did not call the Legal Keeper of Records from OSP and did not elicit testimony from the trooper about OSP’s record-keeping procedures or how the packet was created for the purposes of the trial. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that he had registered every year since 2011, including in 2023. He stated that he had kept a receipt from 2023, but his mother had thrown it away. During closing argument, the state argued that Exhibit 2 showed that defendant’s most recent registration occurred in 2022 because the packet was printed in 2024: 164 State v. Linville “There can—there can be no more conclusive evidence. I mean, the State can’t prove a negative certainly, but that is the best proof that can possibly come forward to the court, that 2022 was the most recent reporting that the defendant made. “* * * From the packet, the history and the defendant’s own words, you can see that he understands what he needs to do to report and, thus, if he did not do it in 2023, then he just didn’t. And, as I said, the packet speaks for itself. Page 1 is from 2022, Your Honor.” In his closing, defendant argued, “I would note from the prosecuting counsel’s own state- ments, the State can’t prove a negative, but their job is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he didn’t register. That’s their burden. “The packet, we fully agree it shows the most recent as 2022. [Defendant], by his own experience in testimony says he went and registered. I would argue that he has the habit of registering. He has been going to and registering, you can see there, from 2011 every year. Every change of address is in that packet. He goes and he registers. We don’t know what happened. It isn’t there. “He believes he would have had it, but the incident with his mother, the document may have been destroyed. And so we’d ask—We’d argue that that’s reasonable doubt, Your Honor. He says he’s registered. He’s had the habit of regis- tering. He has memories of going to lunch and all that that day, and we believe he’s not guilty, Your Honor.” The trial court found defendant guilty of one count of failure to report as a sex offender, based on Exhibit 2: “The thing that speaks loud volumes is State’s Exhibit No. 2. If I didn’t have that blue stamp at the bottom of this document, I would feel differently, but what it shows me—And I’m not criticizing [defendant]. I appreciate your testimony, your recollection, but what I have as State’s Exhibit No. 2 that shows their records, fairly comprehen- sive records of history of reporting as required, with the last report form being November 15, 2022, and the stamp indicating that it was current as of May 14, 2024. So that speaks volumes.” Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 165 II. ANALYSIS On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his MJOA because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of failure to report as a sex offender, namely because, as defendant argues, no reasonable fact- finder could infer that the packet was a complete copy of defendant’s OSP registration record given that the stamp on the packet says it is a copy “of the whole or of a specified part of” the original OSP record. Defendant argues that the state failed to proffer evidence that had defendant registered in 2023 as required, that registration would have appeared in the state’s Exhibit 2. In response, the state first argues that defendant’s assignment of error is unpreserved as defendant did not make an MJOA at trial. On the merits, the state argues that had defendant registered in 2023, the agency at which he registered would have been statutorily required to for- ward the registration to OSP within three days. Therefore, the state reasons, the fact that Exhibit 2 did not indicate that defendant had registered in 2023 allowed the factfinder to infer that defendant did not register in 2023. We conclude that defendant’s first assignment of error is preserved by his argument during closing. On the merits, we conclude that the record lacked evidence from which a factfinder could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant failed to register in 2023. A. Preservation When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the state’s evidence in closing argument during a bench trial, the defendant makes the equivalent of an MJOA and preserves the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for appeal. State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or 451, 454 n 1, 365 P3d 116 (2015). In this case, the state had the burden of proving an omission—that defendant did not complete his annual sex offender registration. In closing argument, defendant pointed to a gap in the state’s evidence that would not allow any rational factfinder to reasonably infer that defendant did, in fact, not complete his annual sex offender registration. Specifically, he argued that the state’s Exhibit 2 lacked any 166 State v. Linville evidence about whether defendant had registered in 2023, stating, “It isn’t there.” In so arguing, defendant alerted the trial court that even if it were to discredit defendant’s tes- timony, as it appears the trial court did, there was still an unexplained gap in the evidence; thus, the state presented insufficient evidence to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In general, an MJOA “must state the specific theory on which the state’s proof was insufficient.” State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 268, 97 P3d 691 (2004). But “[p]recisely what suffices to present clearly a particular position, for preser- vation purposes, is not something that can be explained by a neat verbal formula.” State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 548, 258 P3d 1228 (2011) (internal quotation marks and brack- ets omitted). “Ultimately, the preservation rule is a practi- cal one, and close calls—like this one—inevitably will turn on whether, given the particular record of a case, the court concludes that the policies underlying the rule have been sufficiently served.” State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 341, 211 P3d 262 (2009); see also Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219- 21, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (explaining that important policies behind the preservation rule include procedural fairness to the parties and to the trial court, judicial economy, and full development of the record). In this case, the policies underlying the preserva- tion rule were sufficiently served. Whether Exhibit 2 was sufficient to support the inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant did not register in 2023 was a cen- tral issue of the trial. The state relied on the stamp on the packet to support its argument that the packet was com- plete and opted to not call any witness who could attest to its completeness. In its closing, the state emphasized that the packet was “the best proof that can possibly come forward to the court[ ] that 2022 was the most recent reporting that the defendant made.” Defendant argued that the packet did not conclusively show that defendant failed to register in 2023. In rebuttal, the state argued that the packet was a complete record of defendant’s registrations—”the date of the packet shows that [it] was printed in I believe it was May of 2024, * * * there’s no other reports.” In addition, the trial court Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 167 expressly relied on the stamp to reach its verdict, stating, “the stamp indicat[es] that [the packet] was current as of May 14, 2024,” and “that speaks volumes.” The state and the trial court thus understood and fully considered the issue of whether Exhibit 2 was sufficient to establish that defendant did not register in 2023. Although defendant has further developed the argument on appeal, defendant adequately preserved his first assignment of error below. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence As noted, “[w]hen reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Miller, 300 Or App at 460 (quoting Harper, 296 Or App at 126). To the extent that inferences from circumstantial evidence are necessary to prove an element, it is a question of law what reasonable inferences may be made from the evidence. State v. Bivins, 191 Or App 460, 466-67, 83 P3d 379 (2004). If the evidence allows more than one reasonable inference, but those infer- ences are “in equipoise” and there are no other facts which would aid the factfinder in deciding to draw one inference over the other, then “it is necessary to say as a matter of law that the state has not met its burden of proof” because “it would require impermissible speculation to choose which inference to make.” State v. Stutte, 339 Or App 87, 95, 568 P3d 247 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant is required to annually register as a sex offender within 10 days of his birth date, and failure to do so constitutes the crime of failure to report as a sex offender. ORS 163A.010(3)(a)(D); ORS 163A.040(1)(f). To attempt to meet its burden to establish that defendant failed to regis- ter as required in 2023, the state presented defendant’s sex offender registration packet from OSP which contains each of defendant’s required registrations from 2011 to 2022. The packet also has a stamp that says the packet is a copy “of the whole or of a specified part of” defendant’s OSP registration record. 168 State v. Linville Two possible inferences could be drawn from that statement: either the packet was a copy of the “whole” of defendant’s OSP registration record or the packet was a copy of “a specified part” of defendant’s OSP registration record. The state presented no additional evidence to show that this packet was defendant’s “whole” registration record. The record contains no facts to aid a factfinder in choosing to infer that the packet is the whole record or a part of the whole record. Thus, the competing inferences are “in equi- poise,” and as a matter of law, the state did not meet its burden of proof. Stutte, 339 Or App at 95; see also State v. Campbell, 348 Or App 306, 311, 590 P3d 612 (2026) (“If one or more ‘scenarios are possible,’ but ‘they rely on specula- tion rather than reasonable inferences,’ then the evidence is legally insufficient to go to the factfinder.” (Quoting State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724, 732, 452 P3d 948 (2019).)). The parties agree that two cases, State v. McElroy, 232 Or App 87, 221 P3d 172 (2009), and State v. Baker, 179 Or App 486, 40 P3d 569 (2002), are significant to our analysis, although they disagree about whether the cases control the outcome here. We conclude that neither Baker nor McElroy control this case. Baker and McElroy explain that when an agency where a person can complete sex offender registra- tion has an official duty to forward that registration to the recordkeeper, such as OSP, then then absence of a particu- lar registration from a record provided by the recordkeeper allows for the inference that the registration did not occur because it can be presumed that had the person registered with the appropriate authority, that registration would appear in the record. McElroy, 232 Or App at 91-92 (citing OEC 311(1)(j)); Baker, 179 Or App at 489 (same). This case presents a related, but distinct issue, as we noted above: When has the state met its burden to establish that the lack of a record is due to defendant’s failure to register? To illustrate, in McElroy, the state called an OSP Sex Offender Registration Unit administrative specialist who was responsible for maintaining the registration records where the defendant’s records would have appeared. 232 Or App at 90. The defendant in that case argued that although the administrative specialist testified that the defendant’s Cite as 355 Or App 160 (2026) 169 registration was not in her records, the state had to prove that had the defendant registered, that registration would have been in the administrative specialist’s records. Id. at 91. The court rejected that argument because agencies had a statutory duty to forward any sex offender registrations to OSP, so the state could rely on the evidentiary presumption in OEC 311(1)(j) that an “official duty has been regularly performed” such that the factfinder could presume that had the defendant registered, the official receiving that regis- tration would have forwarded it to OSP and the testifying administrative specialist would have knowledge of it. Id. at 92 (quoting OEC 311(1)(j) (brackets omitted)). Here, had the state presented evidence that its Exhibit 2 was a complete copy of defendant’s OSP registra- tion record, McElroy would control, and the factfinder could rely on the “official duty” presumption to conclude that had defendant properly registered in 2023, it would be in the state’s Exhibit 2, defendant’s OSP registration packet. The state presented no such evidence in this case. The packet, by itself, provided no way for the factfinder to determine whether it was a complete copy of defendant’s OSP registra- tion record or a portion of the complete registration record. In addition, the state’s only witness, the trooper, did not tes- tify as to the completeness of the OSP registration packet, and his testimony about defendant’s out-of-compliance sta- tus in LEDS was not admitted for its truth, but rather to demonstrate why the trooper cited defendant. In sum, two competing inferences could be drawn from the evidence presented by the state: either defendant’s 2023 annual registration was missing from the OSP packet because defendant failed to register in 2023 or defendant registered in 2023 and defendant’s 2023 annual registration was missing from the OSP packet because the packet itself did not contain all of defendant’s registrations. The state did not call a witness from OSP who could certify that the packet reflected a copy of defendant’s entire OSP registra- tion record or who could testify, based on personal knowl- edge, that defendant’s registration record did not contain a 2023 registration. The state admitted the packet alone, with a stamp that says it is either a whole or a part of defendant’s 170 State v. Linville OSP record. Without more, the trial court could not have reasonably inferred that the packet was a complete copy of defendant’s registration record showing that defendant failed to complete his 2023 annual registration. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s MJOA. Reversed.