State v. B. B. S.

326 October 28, 2026 No. 1057 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of B. B. S., a Youth. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. B. B. S., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 23JU05124; A184755 Thomas A. Goldman, Judge pro tempore. Submitted December 16, 2025. Ginger Fitch and Youth, Rights & Justice filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 326 (2026) 327 PER CURIAM Youth appeals from a judgment finding him within the jurisdiction of the court for acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute attempted second-degree assault, unlawful use of a weapon, menacing, strangulation, and harassment. In four assignments of error, youth argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the requisite intent for harassment, and that the state failed to prove that his actions were not justified by self-defense. We affirm. In his first assignment of error, youth argues that there was insufficient evidence from which the juvenile court could find he possessed the requisite specific intent for harassment. We disagree. As charged here, harassment requires proof of youth’s intent to harass or annoy through offensive physical contract. See ORS 166.065(1)(a) (so stat- ing). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi- dence supporting a youth’s adjudication, we “view the evi- dence in the light most favorable to the state and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essen- tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. D. B. O., 326 Or App 384, 386, 532 P3d 921 (2023). The evidence here included testimony that youth was kicking his sister, E, without provocation, the kicks hurt, and youth continued to kick after being told forcefully to stop. From that evidence, a rational factfinder could infer that youth intended his kicks to harass or annoy E. In his second through fourth assignments of error, youth contends that the state failed to disprove his affir- mative defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, youth contends that the juvenile court “fail[ed] to apply the narrow definition of initial aggressor under ORS 161.215(1)(b)”; failed to consider his “communication of a withdrawal” and “his further inability to physically with- draw[ ] under the circumstances”; and incorrectly applied an adult “reasonable-person standard” to a child. Youth, how- ever, did not make those arguments to the juvenile court. Because youth has not requested plain-error review, we decline to address them here in the first instance. See State v. Hallam, 307 Or App 796, 803, 479 P3d 545 (2020) (“We 328 State v. B. B. S. ordinarily will not proceed to the question of plain error unless an appellant has explicitly asked us to do so.”). Affirmed.