State v. Detrick

690 November 12, 2026 No. 1102 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES ROBERT DETRICK, Defendant-Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 24CR23351; A185520 Theodore E. Sims, Judge. Submitted October 7, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 690 (2026) 691 TOOKEY, P. J. Defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of strangulation constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.187, and one count of misdemeanor assault in the fourth degree constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160.1 Defendant raises two assignments of error. First, defendant contends that the “trial court erred when it denied defen- dant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.” Second, defendant contends that the “trial court erred when it ordered defen- dant to pay per diem fees.” We remand for resentencing on defendant’s second assignment of error and otherwise affirm. As for the first assignment of error, which was pre- served, defendant argues that the trial court erred in deny- ing defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the “evidence was insufficient to prove that [the victim] suf- fered substantial pain.” In response, the state argues that a “reasonable trier of fact could have found that the victim suffered pain that was considerable, and more than fleet- ing, and, thus, suffered ‘physical injury.’ ” We agree with the state. In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, making reason- able inferences, could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewis, 266 Or App 523, 524, 337 P3d 199 (2014) (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). “A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if the person: [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes physical injury to another[.]” ORS 163.160(1)(a). “Physical injury” is defined as “impairment of physical con- dition or substantial pain.” ORS 161.015(7). “Substantial 1 Defendant was found guilty of two counts of assault in the fourth degree constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160(3), and one count of strangulation constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.187(4). The trial court merged one of the assault guilty verdicts with the strangulation guilty verdict. Defendant appeals only the assault conviction that was not merged; thus, we limit our discussion to that conviction. 692 State v. Detrick pain” means “considerable pain, which is something more than a fleeting sensation.” State v. Guzman, 276 Or App 208, 212, 366 P3d 816 (2016) (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial pain must meet both a degree or intensity threshold as well as a durational threshold— both of which are measured subjectively from the victim’s point of view.” State v. Modrzejewski, 311 Or App 739, 742- 43, 490 P3d 172 (2021) (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, a rational trier of fact, making reason- able inferences, could have determined that the victim suf- fered substantial pain. The victim testified that defendant “shoved” her into a sliding glass door and “punche[d] * * * the back of [her] head.” The victim also testified that she felt “pressure and * * * pain on the back of [her] head, like, throbbing,” and had a “headache” as a result. The victim could not recall how long her head hurt after the incident, but there was evidence that defendant’s head pain lasted several hours. Specifically, the responding officer testified that the day after the altercation, the victim told him that her “pain was actually worse” than the day before and “she was not going to go to work [the following day] because she wasn’t able to perform her job duties with the amount of pain she was in.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove that the victim suffered substantial pain; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Greenwood, 107 Or App 678, 682, 813 P2d 58 (1991) (“headache or pain” that “lasted an hour or so” constituted “substantial pain”). As for the second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering that defendant pay per diem fees when the “per diem fees [requirement] appeared for the first time in defendant’s judgment.” On appeal, the state concedes the error, stating that the trial court “imposed ‘per diem’ fees in the judgment without first announcing them at sentencing,” and that such error “require[es] a remand for resentencing.” We agree with and accept the state’s concession. See State v. Dennis, 303 Or App 595, 596, 464 P3d 518 (2020) (“a trial court errs when Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 690 (2026) 693 it imposes fines or fees in a written judgment that it did not pronounce at sentencing”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by ordering that defendant pay per diem fees without announcing such requirement in open court. Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.