Full Opinion

No. 1133 November 18, 2026 171 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GERARDO JESUS TRUJILLO-TORRES, Defendant-Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 22CR38423; A183249 Tracy A. Prall, Judge. On respondent’s motion to dismiss filed July 29, 2026; appellant’s response filed August 26, 2026, and respondent’s reply filed September 22, 2026. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, for motion and reply. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, for response. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PER CURIAM Motion to dismiss and vacate denied. 172 State v. Trujillo-Torres PER CURIAM Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm and attempted first-degree murder with a fire- arm. In December 2023, the sentencing court ordered defen- dant to pay restitution to several victims in the total amount of $547,026.71, making him jointly and severally liable with his surviving co-conspirator. The restitution order is reflected in the court’s Second Amended Judgment entered December 20, 2023, nunc pro tunc July 6, 2023. Defendant appealed, raising a single assignment of error in which he challenged a portion of the restitution order, specifically $407,400.94 to be paid to A, the attempted-murder victim. We reversed and remanded in a precedential opinion issued on June 24, 2026. State v. Trujillo-Torres, 350 Or App 786, 595 P3d 1078 (2026). On July 29, 2026, the state moved to dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the appellate opinion. The state argues that the appeal is moot—and was already moot before we issued our opinion—because, on January 9, 2026, the state filed a “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment (Money Award— Restitution)” in which it acknowledged partial satisfaction of the Second Amended Judgment based on the victim A’s stip- ulation to having received (from someone other than defen- dant) “funds in full satisfaction of the restitution award of $407,400.94 contained in the ‘Second Amended Judgment.’ ” In response to the state’s motion, defendant has taken the position that he “does not oppose” dismissal of the appeal and vacatur of our appellate decision so long as “the portion of the underlying judgment imposing the restitution award” also is vacated. The state opposes the latter, argu- ing that this court lacks authority to vacate the restitution order in the Second Amended Judgment when the appeal is moot and that, “[i]n any event, it is unnecessary to vacate the money judgment payable to [A] because that financial obligation is now fulfilled.” Having considered the parties’ arguments, we deny the state’s motion, because we are unpersuaded that the appeal is moot. Generally speaking, “[m]ootness results when a change in circumstance or some intervening event has Cite as 355 Or App 171 (2026) 173 eliminated the possibility that the requested relief can be pro- vided.” Garges v. Premo, 362 Or 797, 801, 421 P3d 345 (2018). The party moving to dismiss an appeal as moot has the bur- den to establish mootness. State v. K. J. B., 362 Or 777, 785, 416 P3d 291 (2018). Here, the state argues that this appeal is moot for the same reason as the appeal in State v. Rodriguez, 88 Or App 429, 745 P2d 811 (1987), rev den, 305 Or 577 (1988), but that case is readily distinguishable. In Rodriguez, the trial court ordered the defendant “to pay restitution for automobile collision damages caused by his criminal activity, despite the fact that he had settled the claim with the vic- tim’s insurance company before he was convicted.” Id. at 431 (emphasis added). In this case, nothing in the record suggests that A was paid the $407,400.94 before defendant was con- victed. To the contrary, the only evidence is that she received payment some three years after restitution was ordered, thus partially satisfying the Second Amended Judgment. The state fails to explain how satisfaction of a judg- ment renders an appeal of that judgment moot. The general rule is to the contrary, and the state has addressed neither the general rule nor its few exceptions. See Ramex, Inc. v. Northwest Basic Industries, 176 Or App 75, 80, 29 P3d 1211 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that vol- untarily paying a judgment does not preclude a party from appealing from that judgment.”). It bears note that the record is silent as to the identity of the third party who paid the res- titution amount to A and the circumstances of that payment. We therefore deny the state’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the opinion issued on June 24, 2026. The state’s argument for vacatur—that “[a]llowing the published opinion in this case to remain, despite that the appeal is moot, will undermine the public interest because of the risk that an important issue will elude review by the Oregon Supreme Court for reasons other than its legal mer- its”—is premised on the appeal being moot and Supreme Court review thus unattainable. But we have concluded that the appeal is not moot. The state is therefore free to seek review in the Supreme Court, not only of our merits decision but also of our mootness decision, if it so wishes. Motion to dismiss and vacate denied.