State v. Walker

312 October 28, 2026 No. 1053 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGELA MAE WALKER, Defendant-Appellant. Linn County Circuit Court 23CR07824; A186903 Keith B. Stein, Judge. Submitted August 5, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Stacy M. Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 312 (2026) 313 O’CONNOR, J. Defendant appeals a sentencing judgment entered after she pleaded no contest to one count of first-degree forgery (Count 1) and one count of identity theft (Count 8). Defendant presents a combined argument for three assign- ments of error that all relate to the state’s and the trial court’s deviation from the plea agreement after defendant initially failed to appear for sentencing. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. As an initial matter, with respect to defendant’s second and third assignments of error, we conclude that any error below was invited and therefore does not provide a basis for reversal. Under the invited-error doctrine, “a party who was actively instrumental in bringing about an alleged error cannot be heard to complain, and the case ought not to be reversed because of it.” State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214, 203 P3d 274, rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). In her second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by impos- ing a 28-month prison sentence on Count 1. But defense counsel recommended a 28-month prison sentence for Count 1 at the sentencing hearing. Thus, even if it were error, we would not reverse because of it as defendant was actively instrumental in bringing about the alleged sentencing error. State v. Licence, 340 Or App 716, 719, 572 P3d 1100, rev den, 374 Or 421 (2025) (concluding that any error assigned to the length of the sentence imposed was invited where the trial court imposed the sentence the defendant requested). Defendant’s third assignment of error, that the trial court erred by imposing restitution, was similarly invited because defendant told the trial court that she would not object to any restitution imposed by the court. See Kammeyer, 226 Or App at 214 (finding invited error where the defendant was offered a chance to withdraw his plea in order to object to the proposed restitution that was not provided for in the plea agreement, but “[i]nstead he reiterated that his plea was ‘good,’ that he did not wish to withdraw it, and that he was ‘okay’ with paying the proposed restitution”). With respect to her remaining assignment of error, the first assignment of error, defendant provides two 314 State v. Walker alternative arguments to support her position that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive, rather than concur- rent, sentences. Defendant first argues that the state was obligated to recommend the agreed-upon sentence because it remained bound to the plea agreement at the time of the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the trial court erred by allowing the state to deviate from the agreement without providing a remedy to defendant, she argues. Defendant argues in the alternative that the trial court had an inde- pendent statutory obligation to provide her an opportunity to withdraw her plea when it deviated from the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement because the plea was subject to the procedural protection of ORS 135.432(3). We conclude that defendant failed to preserve her first assignment of error. Defendant asked the trial court to impose concurrent sentences, but she did not object to the imposition of consecutive sentences. She did not raise those arguments to the trial court, and they are unpreserved. State v. Fowler, 350 Or App 512, 513, 594 P3d 466 (2026). The error is not plain. See State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (setting out requirements for plain-error review). Although defendant’s claimed error is an error of law, it is not obvious or apparent on the record considering either of defendant’s arguments. First, it is not obvious that the state remained bound to the plea agreement. After defendant failed to appear for her initial sentencing hearing, the enforceabil- ity of the agreement is at least reasonably in dispute. See State v. Clements, 265 Or App 9, 29, 333 P3d 1177 (2014), rev den, 356 Or 689 (2015) (“Implicit in the terms of the plea agreement was the requirement that defendant appear for and submit to sentencing. Defendant, therefore, breached the plea agreement by failing to appear at his sentencing and instead absconding for years.”). Also, it is not obvious nor beyond dispute that the parties reached and then pre- sented a “tentative plea agreement” to the trial judge, or that the trial judge advised parties it would “concur in the proposed disposition” when it came time for sentencing. ORS 135.432(2). Because it is not clear that the requirements of ORS 135.432(2) were met, it is certainly not obvious that Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 312 (2026) 315 the trial court was required to comply with ORS 135.432(3) when it deviated from the plea agreement at sentencing. Cf. State v. Marler, 351 Or App 663, 669, ___ P3d ___ (2026) (“At a minimum, it certainly is not obvious that ORS 135.390(5) applied, so the trial court cannot have committed plain error in failing to follow the procedure in ORS 135.390(5).”). Second, the error is not apparent on the record. Even assuming the state remained bound to the plea agree- ment at the sentencing hearing, the parties appear to dis- agree on the contours of the final agreement. Determining whether the state breached the plea agreement by recom- mending fully consecutive sentences would require us to choose among competing inferences. Id. at 666. Finally, even if the requirements for plain-error review were met, we would not exercise our discretion to correct the error. Defendant’s counsel failed to raise a single objection or argue that consecutive sentences were legally impermissible. The trial court did not have opportunity to consider argument on “both sides of the issue.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991). Although we recognize the gravity of the potential error, as defendant may be incarcerated for years longer than she anticipated, defendant may be able to develop a record in post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or 431, 822 P2d 703 (1991) (providing that failing to pursue the procedure established in ORS 135.432 may “trig- ger an inquiry into the adequacy of trial counsel and the potential for prejudice to petitioner”). In sum, the trial court did not err by imposing con- secutive sentences, a 28-month sentence on Count 1, and restitution. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.