Full Opinion

No. 1137 November 18, 2026 205 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICKI SCOTT COLLIN, Defendant-Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 21CR34897; A183789 (Control), A184901 Chris C. Colburn, Judge pro tempore. Submitted April 14, 2026. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Joel C. Duran, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant. Ricki Collin filed the supplemental brief pro se. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, O’Connor, Judge, and Walters, Senior Judge. SHORR, P. J. Affirmed. 206 State v. Collin SHORR, P. J. In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of second- degree criminal trespass, ORS 164.245, and three counts of criminal trespass with a firearm, ORS 164.265, as well as a judgment finding him in violation of his probation in that same case. Defendant raises ten counseled assignments of error that relate to hearsay evidence, procedural due pro- cess, and the trial court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction. Defendant also raises four pro se assignments of error. We affirm. For several months in 2020 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant would shop at Safeway without wearing a mask, despite being asked to do so by store employees. Defendant’s behavior escalated during that time to include filming employees, yelling at employees, ask- ing employees repeatedly whether they would be fired if they removed their masks, and destroying store property. Due to those behaviors, defendant was trespassed from Safeway’s stores. Some time after receiving the trespass notice, defen- dant returned to Safeway several times and received cita- tions for second-degree criminal trespass and criminal tres- pass with a firearm. Hearsay. In defendant’s first through fourth assign- ments of error he challenges the admission of portions of tes- timony by the Safeway store manager, Anderson, in which she testified to what other store employees reported to her about defendant’s behavior. Anderson’s testimony was that those reports, in part, led her to request her supervisors to trespass defendant. At trial, defendant objected to the testi- mony as hearsay and the trial court overruled the objection, giving a limiting instruction to the jury that it was not to consider the statements for their truth but only for whether they informed Anderson’s decision as to whether to issue a criminal trespass notice. We review a trial court’s decision to admit tes- timony over a hearsay objection for legal error. State v. Almekinders, 339 Or App 576, 578, 568 P3d 611, rev den, 374 Or 372 (2025). Defendant’s main theory at trial with respect Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 205 (2026) 207 to Safeway’s trespass order was that the trespass order was unlawful because it violated disability discrimination laws or defendant’s free speech rights. The statements at issue here were not admitted for their truth, but for their effect on Anderson, namely, to demonstrate that she was moti- vated by a nondiscriminatory, constitutionally permissible purpose. See State v. White, 211 Or App 210, 216, 154 P3d 124, adh’d to as clarified on recons, 213 Or App 584, 162 P3d 336, rev den, 343 Or 224 (2007) (“When the lawfulness of an order is raised as a defense [to second-degree criminal tres- pass], the state still has the burden of proving the element and disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Thus, the statements fell under an exception to the hearsay rule. See State v. Schiller-Munneman, 359 Or 808, 817, 377 P3d 554 (2016) (“An out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is offered to show the statement’s effect on the listener, and the effect on the listener is relevant.”). The trial court did not err in admitting them. Procedural Due Process. In defendant’s fifth through eighth assignments of error, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis of procedural due process because, according to defendant, he was not given sufficient process to challenge the trespass order as unlawful. We disagree. Defendant has not identified any liberty or property inter- est he possesses that would allow him to enter Safeway, a private entity, or adequately demonstrated how the due pro- cess protections would apply to a nongovernmental entity’s decision to exclude him from its stores. See City of Eugene v. Gannon, 294 Or App 819, 822, 432 P3d 1141 (2018), rev den, 364 Or 535, cert den, 589 US 924 (2019) (noting that an “alleged absence of process” to challenge a notice of exclu- sion “violated [the] defendant’s right to due process only if the exclusion order deprived [the] defendant of a constitu- tionally protected liberty or property interest”); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 US 1, 7, 99 S Ct 2100, 60 L Ed 2d 668 (1979) (“The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due process we have inquired into the nature of the indi- vidual’s claimed interest.”). Further, because defendant has 208 State v. Collin not adequately developed an argument addressing how any government involvement with providing defendant the form and notice of trespass matters in this case, we reject his fifth through eighth assignments of error. Jury Instruction. In defendant’s ninth and tenth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the culpable mental state of knowledge applied to the “lawfully directed” element of the crimes of second-degree trespass and trespass with a fire- arm. We review a trial court’s jury instructions for errors of law, and in determining whether evidence supports giving an instruction, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. State v. Burris, 301 Or App 430, 432, 456 P3d 684 (2019). A person commits the crime of second-degree tres- pass and trespass with a firearm “if the person enters or remains unlawfully * * * in or upon premises.” ORS 164.245(1); ORS 164.265(1). As relevant here, the phrase “enter or remain unlawfully” means “[t]o enter premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed not to enter the premises.” ORS 164.205(3)(c). Defendant requested that the jury be instructed that, in order for the state to meet its burden, it would have needed to prove that he “entered the[ ] premises with knowledge that he had been lawfully directed not to enter the premises.” The state dis- agreed and the trial court instructed the jury that “the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in or on prem- ises open the public.” On appeal, defendant argues that the “lawfully directed” element is an essential element of trespassing that requires a culpable mental state and that the mental state of knowledge applies to that element. See White, 211 Or App at 215-16 (“[A]n essential element of criminal tres- pass in the second degree, ORS 164.245, is that the underly- ing order to leave the premises must be ‘lawful.’ ” (Footnote omitted.)). The state argues that knowledge of the lawful- ness of the exclusion order is not an element of the offense. We agree with the state. “Knowledge that conduct consti- tutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning or Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 205 (2026) 209 application of the statute defining an offense, is not an ele- ment of an offense unless the statute clearly so provides.” ORS 161.115(4). Defendant’s interpretation, which would require the state to prove awareness of the lawfulness of the order, would, in essence, require proof of knowledge “that conduct constitutes an offense,” and defendant has not demonstrated how the trespass statute “clearly so provides” for that element. Pro Se Assignments. Defendant raises several pro se assignments of error. In his first assignment, he argues that the trial court erred “when it failed to dismiss the charges on its own motion or under ORS 1.025” because police offi- cers engaged in the crime of “simulating legal process,” ORS 162.355. In his second assignment, he argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on “bias crimes” and in “prohibit[ing] defendant from addressing” his interpre- tation of the law with the jury. In his third assignment, he argues that the trial court erred “when it made biased state- ments” at defendant’s sentencing proceeding. Defendant did not preserve any of those claims of error and, because he has not requested plain error review—nor does any error appear plain to us—we decline to address them here in the first instance. See State v. Ardizzone, 270 Or App 666, 673, 349 P3d 597, rev den, 358 Or 145 (2015) (explaining that we “ordinarily will not proceed to the question of plain error unless an appellant has explicitly asked us to do so”). In defendant’s fourth pro se assignment of error, he argues that the trial court “erred and abused its discretion” when it “found that defendant violated his probation con- ditions due to the voicemail defendant left Safeway.” In so finding, the trial court extended the deadline for defendant to complete his community service by two months but placed a strict deadline on completion. Defendant successfully com- pleted the term of his probation and has not identified any collateral consequences from the finding of a probation vio- lation. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s fourth assignment of error as moot. See State v. England, 334 Or App 545, 547, 556 P3d 1056 (2024) (“Generally, an appeal from a judg- ment revoking probation becomes moot once the defendant has served the sanction imposed at the probation violation 210 State v. Collin proceeding.”); State v. Morter, 319 Or App 454, 455, 508 P3d 598 (2022) (dismissing as moot appeals from judgments revoking probation “given that the jail sentences have long since been served”).1 Affirmed. 1 Although the state did not argue that the assignment of error is moot, we have an obligation to address mootness even in the absence of argument by the parties. See Reid v. DCBS, 235 Or App 397, 400, 232 P3d 994 (2010) (“Because we are not constitutionally empowered to decide moot cases, we must determine mootness even if it is not raised by the parties.”).