Full Opinion

224 November 18, 2026 No. 1140 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KEATON COLE STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 16CR23833; A182548 Eric Butterfield, Judge. Submitted June 17, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant. Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. POWERS, J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 224 (2026) 225 POWERS, J. In this criminal proceeding, defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence following a remand for resentencing from the post-conviction court. In his first and second assignments of error, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it instructed the jury on defendant’s first-degree assault charge at his original jury trial. In his third assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in resentencing him when it relied on defendant’s admitted enhancement factors to impose an upward departure sentence without findings by a jury or a written jury waiver. As explained below, we conclude that defendant invited any error attributed to the jury instruc- tions because defendant affirmatively requested those instructions. We further conclude that defendant waived his argument regarding the admitted enhancement factors. Accordingly, we affirm. Although the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history, we provide an abbreviated recita- tion of the undisputed facts in this nonprecedential memo- randum opinion. In 2016, defendant was charged by indict- ment with first-degree assault, unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm, felon in posses- sion of a firearm, and obliteration or change of identifica- tion number on a firearm. Before trial, both defendant and the state submitted requests for the Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions (UCrJI) for first-degree assault and its culpa- ble mental state, intent. At trial, the trial court instructed the jury in accor- dance with the requested UCrJI. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts; however, the verdict on one of the counts was nonunanimous. During sentencing, defendant admitted two enhancement factors: (1) defendant admitted that the crime involved persistent involvement and similar offenses or repetitive assaults unrelated to the offense; and (2) defen- dant admitted that prior criminal justice sanctions had not deterred him from re-offending. The court confirmed that defendant had reviewed his decision to admit the enhance- ment factors and that he understood the implications. 226 State v. Stephens Defendant did not sign a written waiver of his right to a jury trial for the enhancement factors. In accordance with the admitted enhancement fac- tors, the trial court found that defendant’s gridblock was a 10A on his conviction for first-degree assault and imposed an upward departure of 240 months in prison. Defendant appealed, assigning error to an unrelated jury instruction. We affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Stephens, 291 Or App 448, 416 P3d 1115, rev den, 363 Or 224 (2018). Years later in 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US 83, 93, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), which concluded that the Sixth Amendment requirement that a criminal convic- tion is supported by a unanimous jury verdict applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2022, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that, unless the state asserts and proves a procedural defense set out in the Post- Conviction Hearings Act, a post-conviction petitioner is enti- tled to retroactive relief for a conviction from a nonunani- mous jury. Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604, 633, 532 P3d 86 (2022). Under Watkins, defendant’s nonunanimous convic- tion was vacated and the post-conviction court remanded the case to the trial court for “further proceedings, includ- ing, but not limited to, resentencing on all counts, or retrial.” Prior to resentencing, the state elected not to retry the charge associated with the vacated conviction and defen- dant filed a memorandum of law arguing that the resentenc- ing court was not authorized to impose an upward departure sentence without jury factfinding or a written waiver under ORS 136.773. Defendant also raised that argument at the resentencing hearing. The trial court once again imposed an upward durational departure of 240 months based on the admitted enhancement factors from defendant’s first sentencing. Defendant timely appeals, raising three assign- ments of error. In his first and second assignments of error, defen- dant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it instructed the jury on the assault charge. Defendant did Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 224 (2026) 227 not preserve that argument during his initial trial and requests that we exercise plain error review under ORAP 5.45(1). Defendant contends that the jury instructions on intent and first-degree assault were plainly erroneous when taken together because they allowed the jury to reach a verdict without finding any culpable mental state as to the serious physical injury element of first-degree assault, ORS 163.185(1)(a).1 In response, the state offers four reasons why defen- dant’s argument is not properly before us. First, the state contends that defendant invited the assigned error by affir- matively requesting the jury instructions at trial. Second, the state argues that defendant waived the matter by not raising it in his first appeal. Third, the state asserts that defendant’s challenge to the jury instructions exceeds the scope of the post-conviction court’s remand. Fourth, the state maintains that the jury instructions did not consti- tute plain error, that any error was harmless, and that we should decline to exercise our discretion to correct any error. We agree with the state’s argument that defendant invited error by affirmatively requesting the UCrJI, which obviates the need to address the remaining arguments by the state. The invited error doctrine provides that a party who “was actively instrumental in bringing * * * about” an alleged error “cannot be heard to complain, and the case ought not to be reversed because of it.” Anderson v. Oregon Railroad Co., 45 Or 211, 217, 77 P 119 (1904). The doctrine applies when “a party has invited the trial court to rule in a particular way, under circumstances that suggest that the party will be bound by the ruling or at least will not later seek a reversal on the basis of it.” State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 270, 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006). The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure “that parties do not ‘blame the court’ for their intentional or strategic trial choices that later prove unwise and then, to the trial court’s 1 ORS 163.185 provides, in part: “(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if the person: “(a) Intentionally causes serious physical injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon[.]” 228 State v. Stephens surprise, use the error that they invited to obtain a new trial.” Id. Here, defendant requested that the trial court instruct jurors pursuant to the UCrJI for first-degree assault and its culpable mental state, intent. The court did just that. Because defendant affirmatively requested the jury instructions he now assigns error to, we conclude that defendant was “actively instrumental” in bringing about any error that resulted from the jury instructions. As a result, we reject defendant’s first and second assignments of error. In his third assignment of error, defendant asserts that the resentencing court erred in imposing an upward departure sentence on Count 1. Defendant argues that the resentencing court erred by relying on defendant’s admitted enhancement factors without obtaining a written waiver of the right to a jury trial as required by ORS 136.773.2 In defen- dant’s view, the central question is whether the resentenc- ing court had the authority to impose an upward departure on Count 1. Among its arguments, the state contends that defendant waived the argument he now advances on appeal because he did not challenge the validity of the enhancement factors (that he admitted) during his first appeal. We review “a claim that the sentencing court failed to comply with the requirements of law in imposing a sen- tence for errors of law.” State v. Capri, 248 Or App 391, 394, 273 P3d 290 (2012). In reviewing the parties’ arguments, we agree with the state’s argument that the waiver rule applies. Under the general rule, we “[o]rdinarily * * * refrain from considering issues that could have been raised in an initial appeal but were not.” State v. Herfurth, 307 Or App 534, 536, 478 P3d 601 (2020). That rule is intended to “(1) prevent a party from appealing in a piecemeal manner, (2) keep a 2 ORS 136.773 provides, in part: “(1) When an enhancement fact relates to the defendant, the court shall submit the enhancement fact to the jury during the sentencing phase of the criminal proceeding if the defendant is found guilty of an offense to which the enhancement fact applies unless the defendant makes a written waiver of the right to a jury trial on the enhancement fact and: “(a) Admits to the enhancement fact; or “(b) Elects to have the enhancement fact tried to the court.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 224 (2026) 229 party from shifting its position, and (3) promote the finality of appellate courts’ decisions and promote judicial efficiency.” Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or App 672, 681, 410 P3d 336 (2018). Here, defendant did not raise an argument about the impropriety of the trial court’s reliance on his admitted enhancement factors in his first appeal. We understand that defendant assigns error to trial court’s action during the resentencing hearing, and not to the trial court’s original sentencing decision. However, our waiver rule is directed at arguments that “could have been raised in an initial appeal but were not.” Herfurth, 307 Or App at 536. Defendant could have raised his challenge in his first appeal and he did not. Further, the policies supporting the waiver rule sup- port the application of it in this case. First, defendant could have raised this argument in his initial appeal instead of pursuing a piecemeal approach. That is, although defendant orally agreed to the jury waiver at his original trial and con- firmed that he was aware of the implications of admitting to the enhancement factors, he did not raise the validity of that waiver as plain error in his first appeal. See, e.g., State v. Engerseth, 255 Or App 765, 769-70, 299 P3d 567, rev den, 353 Or 868 (2013) (explaining that, even if the trial court plainly erred by not obtaining a written jury waiver before imposing a departure sentence, we would decline to exer- cise discretion to correct any plain error because the defen- dant stipulated to the enhancement fact). Second, accepting defendant’s argument would not promote judicial efficiency. Reversing on this assignment of error would require further resentencing, ten years after defendant’s first trial. In short, we conclude that defendant waived his challenge. Because we conclude that defendant waived his argument, we do not consider the scope of the resentencing court’s authority on remand from a post-conviction court. Affirmed.