State v. Kincaid
CourtOhio Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2024-1184
JudgeKennedy, C.J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,
it may be cited as State v. Kincaid, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4510.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-4510
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KINCAID, APPELLANT.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,
it may be cited as State v. Kincaid, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4510.]
Criminal law—Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution—Officer safety
does not justify prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff since a
sniff is not part of the traffic-stop mission—State failed to meet its burden
to prove that traffic stop was not unlawfully extended when evidence failed
to establish that administrative tasks incident to traffic stop were ongoing
when canine indicated—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause
remanded.
(No. 2024-1184—Submitted October 8, 2025—Decided November 17, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Meigs County,
No. 22CA4, 2024-Ohio-2668.
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KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, DEWINE,
BRUNNER, DETERS, and HAWKINS, JJ., joined. SHANAHAN, J., dissented, with an
opinion.
KENNEDY, C.J.
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from the Fourth District Court of Appeals
presents the question whether the United States Supreme Court recognized an
officer-safety exception to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), such that officer safety may
justify prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff. We answer that question
in the negative.
{¶ 2} On December 26, 2019, Meigs County Sheriff’s Deputy Tylun
Campbell stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. After discovering that the driver
was appellant, John Kincaid, Campbell decided to conduct a canine sniff of the
exterior of the vehicle. For officer safety, Campbell radioed for backup and waited
for it to arrive before conducting the sniff, which subsequently revealed the
presence of narcotics. Kincaid moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
it was obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure. The trial court
upheld the stop, saying that once a vehicle is lawfully stopped for a traffic violation,
the law-enforcement officer may “detain or keep” the driver of the vehicle “long
enough” to complete a canine sniff outside the vehicle. The Fourth District
affirmed on different grounds, holding that the short extension of the stop to wait
for backup was reasonable in light of officer-safety concerns. 2024-Ohio-2668,
¶ 27 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 3} However, the United States Supreme Court has not recognized such
an officer-safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. Rather, a traffic stop must
end as soon as its mission is complete, absent reasonable suspicion that justifies
continuing the seizure. Rodriguez at 355. And the State bears the burden of proving
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that a search or seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971); Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d
216, 219-220 (1988). Because the State failed to meet its burden here, the
continued seizure of Kincaid to conduct a canine sniff violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. We therefore reverse the Fourth District’s judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Traffic Stop
{¶ 4} On December 26, 2019, Deputy Campbell observed a vehicle commit
two marked-lanes violations. After observing the violations but before pulling the
vehicle over, Campbell ran a registration check of the license plate. Through that
check, Campbell learned that the vehicle was registered to Kincaid. Campbell then
conducted a traffic stop.
{¶ 5} When Deputy Campbell approached the driver, he was not surprised
to see that it was Kincaid behind the wheel. Campbell later testified that he had not
met Kincaid before stopping him but had “seen him around” and had “prior
information that [Kincaid] was trafficking drugs” in Meigs County. After Campbell
confirmed that Kincaid was the driver, he told Kincaid the reason for the traffic
stop—the two marked-lanes violations—and decided that he was going to conduct
a canine sniff of Kincaid’s vehicle.
{¶ 6} After this initial conversation and before conducting the canine sniff,
Deputy Campbell radioed another deputy, Deputy Hutton, and advised Hutton to
meet him on Minersville Hill Road. While waiting for Hutton to arrive, Campbell
asked dispatch to run a license check on both Kincaid and his passenger. There
were no outstanding warrants for either man.
{¶ 7} When Deputy Hutton arrived, Deputy Campbell returned to his
cruiser, retrieved his canine, and commanded her to sniff by saying “find it.” He
then ran the canine around Kincaid’s vehicle; the canine sat by the driver’s-side
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front door, indicating that she smelled drugs. The deputies then ordered Kincaid
and his passenger to exit the vehicle, patted them down, and searched the vehicle;
they found heroin and fentanyl in baggies in a cigarette box under the driver’s seat,
as well as money on the floorboard. Kincaid admitted that he had made the money
from selling narcotics.
B. Trial-Court Proceedings
{¶ 8} The State indicted Kincaid on one count each of possession of heroin,
possession of fentanyl, trafficking in heroin, and trafficking in fentanyl.
{¶ 9} Kincaid moved to suppress the evidence that was discovered during
the traffic stop. Among other things, he argued that “[s]ubsequent to [his]
unreasonable stop, [Deputy Campbell] expanded the purpose and duration of the
stop into a drug investigation by searching [Kincaid’s] vehicle with a police
[canine].” According to Kincaid, this “extension was not supported by probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.” Kincaid maintained that he had been “subjected to
an unlawful seizure, unlawful extension of that seizure, and unlawful search not
supported by probable cause resulting in [the] seizure of evidence.”
{¶ 10} During the suppression hearing, Deputy Campbell admitted that his
investigation of the marked-lanes violations had ended by the time he told Kincaid
why he had been pulled over. Campbell also admitted that he had decided to
conduct the canine sniff of Kincaid’s vehicle at that time. Campbell made this
decision because he had prior information that Kincaid had been selling drugs in
Meigs County. But the State did not produce the source of that information.
Campbell also testified that there are logs that mark events of traffic stops by time,
but the State did not introduce those logs into evidence. Concerning the license and
warrant checks, Campbell had the following exchange with Kincaid’s attorney on
cross-examination:
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Q: Ok. That’s fair enough. And, during the . . . I just
want to be clear, during that five to ten (10) minutes, that you were
waiting for Deputy Hutton to arrive, um, you did not, uh, you did
not run a criminal history or anything of that sort at that time for Mr.
Kincaid, correct?
A: Uh, I ran both of their licenses, uh, when dispatch
runs them, there’s . . . there’s . . . they should bring up the criminal
history at that point.
Q: And, nothing . . . no warrants or anything like that
that you were holding Mr. Kincaid on, correct?
A: No.
(Ellipses in original.)
{¶ 11} Deputy Campbell testified that it had taken five to ten minutes for
Deputy Hutton to arrive and that during that time, Campbell was “actively
investigating” Kincaid and his passenger for drug trafficking by asking them
whether they were in possession of narcotics. Campbell said that for officer-safety
reasons, he had waited for Hutton to arrive before conducting the canine sniff of
the exterior of the vehicle and that he would not have called Hutton for backup if
he had just been writing Kincaid a ticket. Campbell acknowledged that he never
wrote Kincaid a ticket for the marked-lanes violations.
{¶ 12} In his posthearing brief, Kincaid argued that upon learning that
Kincaid was the driver of the vehicle, Deputy Campbell had abandoned his
investigation of the traffic violations and the business of the traffic stop was over
because Campbell did not conduct “any more activities germane to the traffic
violation[s].” Rather, Kincaid asserted, Campbell had extended the traffic stop for
a criminal investigation supported only by Campbell’s “general belief” that Kincaid
was involved in trafficking drugs. According to Kincaid, the State did not produce
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any evidence to support Campbell’s hunch and Campbell had not had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic infractions. Kincaid
therefore argued that the extension of the stop to conduct a canine sniff of the
exterior of his vehicle was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
{¶ 13} In its posthearing brief, the State admitted that Deputy Campbell had
extended the traffic stop, but it asserted that doing so was not unconstitutional,
because waiting five to ten minutes for backup and officer safety was reasonable.
In support of its position, the State cited United States v. Winters, 782 F.3d 289, 306
(6th Cir. 2015), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that under the totality of the circumstances, the extension of a traffic stop “after
its initial purpose was completed to conduct a dog sniff” was permissible because
the law-enforcement officer had “developed reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.” The State maintained that Campbell’s extending the stop in this case was
reasonable because he had possessed a reasonable suspicion that Kincaid was
engaged in drug trafficking.
{¶ 14} In denying Kincaid’s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded
that once a vehicle is lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, the law-enforcement
officer may “detain or keep” the driver of the vehicle “long enough” to complete a
canine sniff outside the vehicle. Specifically, the trial court found that the “wait for
a second officer to arrive before giving the command to the [canine] to sniff was
not an unreasonable delay in concluding the traffic stop and thus permissible.” The
court also found that although
[t]he deputy did wait approximately 5-10 minutes for another officer
to arrive at the scene before he had his dog start walking around the
car[,] [that was] a reasonable and short duration to wait so that both
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the officers, the [canine,] and occupants of the car could be safe
during the [canine] sniff.
...
Those 5-10 minutes were justifiable based upon a reasonable
articulable fact that gave rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity
justifying an extension of the detention and thus was a reasonable
and legal seizure.
The very short delay, of approximately 5 minutes, between
the initial traffic stop for the marked lanes violation and the arrival
of the other officer was not an unreasonable delay of the time
necessary to complete the initial purpose of the stop.
Therefore, after “evaluat[ing] the duration of [the] traffic stop in light of the totality
of the circumstances,” the court found that “[Deputy Campbell] was diligent in
conducting the investigation in a reasonable period of time,” and it therefore denied
Kincaid’s motion to suppress.
{¶ 15} Kincaid pleaded no contest to the drug-trafficking counts, and the
trial court dismissed the other two counts in accordance with a plea agreement. The
trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of three to four and a half years
in prison, and it ordered the $1,570 found in Kincaid’s vehicle to be forfeited to the
Meigs County Sheriff’s Office.
C. Appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeals
{¶ 16} Kincaid appealed, arguing that “[t]he trial court erred by overruling
[his] motion to suppress, contrary to [his] right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.” In a split decision,
the Fourth District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 2024-Ohio-2668 at ¶ 34
(4th Dist.). The court of appeals’ majority acknowledged that a person’s reputation
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or past record does not give a law-enforcement officer reasonable, articulable
suspicion to “justify a shift in an investigatory intrusion from the traffic stop to a
. . . drug[] investigation,” id. at ¶ 13, and it recognized that “absent a reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct[,] an officer may not extend an otherwise-completed
traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff,” id. at ¶ 14, citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348.
{¶ 17} After reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals’ majority
concluded that Deputy Campbell had not “possess[ed] specific and sufficient
information about [Kincaid’s] alleged drug trafficking activity to extend the time
and purpose of the stop beyond the reason for the initial stop.” Id. at ¶ 27.
Moreover, it determined that Campbell’s testimony “did not offer sufficient
information or justification [for him] to [have] prolong[ed] the traffic stop beyond
the time associated with normal duties generally associated with traffic stops.” Id.
at ¶ 26. And it further determined that Campbell had “not provide[d] detailed
testimony concerning the normal general administrative duties associated with
traffic stops, including the check of [Kincaid’s] registration, the status of [his]
driver’s license, [or] the vehicle’s insurance coverage or provide[d] the exact time
when Deputy Campbell concluded these administrative tasks while he waited for
Deputy Hutton.” Id. at ¶ 26. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that Campbell
had not unreasonably extended the time required to complete the traffic stop, stating
that a delay of less than ten minutes was reasonable in light of the need for officer
safety, and therefore, the traffic stop was lawful. Id. at ¶ 26-28.
{¶ 18} The dissenting judge concluded that Deputy Campbell had
“extended the traffic stop without sufficient justification.” Id. at ¶ 35 (Hess, J.,
dissenting). In support, he referred to Campbell’s testimony that the investigation
into the marked-lanes violations was “over at the time that [Campbell] informed
Kincaid” of the violation. Id. (Hess, J., dissenting). And the dissenting judge noted
that Campbell had not testified as to any facts to “support a reasonable suspicion
that would justify extending the traffic stop.” Id. at ¶ 36 (Hess, J., dissenting). It
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was only because of Kincaid’s “reputation as an alleged drug trafficker,” the
dissenting judge said, that Campbell extended the traffic stop. Id. (Hess, J.,
dissenting).
{¶ 19} Kincaid appealed to this court, and we agreed to review one
proposition of law: “There is no officer-safety exception to the [United States]
Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).” See
2024-Ohio-5104.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 20} The mechanism for seeking the exclusion of evidence obtained
through a warrantless search or seizure is a motion to suppress. State v. French,
1995-Ohio-32, ¶ 10. “Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents
a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Toran, 2023-Ohio-3564, ¶ 14. If the
trial court’s factual findings “are supported by competent, credible evidence,” we
must accept them. Id. However, we decide questions of law independently,
“without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Id.
B. The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops
{¶ 21} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution—made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961)—protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A traffic stop is a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60
(2014). “[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative
traffic stop when he has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376,
380 (2020), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). That
is, law enforcement must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
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activity to perform a constitutionally valid traffic stop. State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-
4866, ¶ 15.
C. The Fourth Amendment and Canine Sniffs
{¶ 22} Throughout the years, the United States Supreme Court has refined
the contours of its jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of canine sniffs
under the Fourth Amendment. Starting in United States v. Place, the Court
addressed a canine sniff of luggage and recognized that a “canine sniff is sui
generis.” 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). That is, a canine sniff provides limited
information while removing inconvenience or embarrassment because it is “less
intrusive than a typical search.” Id. It “discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item,” without requiring law enforcement to rummage
through a person’s belongings. Id. Given this limited “manner in which . . .
information is obtained and . . . revealed” through a canine sniff, the United States
Supreme Court held that a canine sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
{¶ 23} Years later, the United States Supreme Court examined a canine sniff
in the context of a traffic checkpoint. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35
(2000). Applying the same analysis used in Place, the Court once again held that a
canine sniff is not a search. Id. at 40 (“The fact that officers walk a narcotics-
detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does
not transform the seizure into a search.”). “Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an
automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any
information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.” Id. Similarly, a law-
enforcement officer’s simply walking a dog around a vehicle is significantly less
intrusive than the officer’s entering the vehicle to search it. Id. Therefore, a canine
sniff at a traffic checkpoint does not constitute a search. Id.
{¶ 24} The United States Supreme Court further examined canine sniffs in
the context of ordinary traffic stops in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2004).
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There, a state trooper stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation, and while he was
writing the ticket, another trooper performed a canine sniff of the vehicle. Id. Once
again, the Court held that a canine sniff does not constitute a search since it reveals
only contraband, in which there is no “‘legitimate interest in privacy.’ ” Id. at 408-
409, quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Therefore, in
Caballes, the Court recognized that “[a]ny intrusion on [the defendant’s] privacy
expectations [did] not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable
infringement.” Id. at 409.
{¶ 25} However, Caballes noted a potential limitation on canine sniffs
during traffic stops: the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Id.
at 407-408. “A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning
ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission.” Id. at 407. Consequently, a canine
sniff can violate the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable seizures if a
person is “being unlawfully detained,” id. at 408. The United States Supreme Court
did not opine more on this, though, since the Court accepted “the state court’s
conclusion that the duration of the stop in [Caballes] was entirely justified by the
traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Id.
{¶ 26} Ten years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the
limitations on canine sniffs under the Fourth Amendment’s right against
unreasonable seizures. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. In Rodriguez, an officer
stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation and continued the detention of the occupants
to conduct a canine sniff after having finished checking their information and
issuing a warning ticket before the canine arrived. Id. at 351-352. The Court held
that the continued detention unconstitutionally prolonged the seizure absent
additional reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 353, 357-358. “[T]he
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and
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attend to related safety concerns.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 354. “Authority for
the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed.” Id. Consequently, even a valid “traffic stop ‘can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
th[e] mission.’ ” (Bracketed text added in Rodriguez.) Id. at 354-355, quoting
Caballes at 407; see also id. at 355, quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333
(2009) (“The seizure remains lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ ” [Bracketed text added in
Rodriguez.]).
{¶ 27} In addition to determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, the traffic-
stop mission includes making ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop because
those inquiries have a “close connection to roadway safety.” Id. at 355-356.
“Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 355. Officer-safety
concerns cannot justify extending a traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff, though,
since “[h]ighway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the
Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.”
Id. at 357. And a canine sniff is not usually part of a traffic stop but rather is used
to detect criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 355-357. Although an officer “may conduct
certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” he or she “may
not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355.
{¶ 28} Accordingly, while Rodriguez does acknowledge that officer-safety
concerns during a traffic stop may justify certain negligibly burdensome
precautions, the safety concerns must relate to the traffic-stop mission. Id. at 356-
357. Officer safety does not justify prolonging a stop for a canine sniff since a sniff
is not part of a traffic stop’s mission. Id. at 357. This means that prolonging a
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traffic stop to ensure officer safety before conducting a canine sniff is
unconstitutional, because prolonging the stop is not necessary to complete the
ordinary inquiries incident to the stop. See id. Indeed, this aligns with Rodriguez’s
overall holding that law enforcement cannot extend a traffic stop any longer than
the time reasonably required to complete the traffic-stop mission—which does not
include a canine sniff or any safety precautions taken related to the sniff. See id. at
355. Therefore, Rodriguez provides no officer-safety exception to the Fourth
Amendment.
D. The State’s Argument Fails
{¶ 29} It is important to note that the State’s theory as to why the search and
seizure at issue here was reasonable has shifted over the course of the proceedings.
In the trial-court proceedings, the State conceded that Deputy Campbell had
extended the traffic stop, but it claimed he had done so lawfully because he had had
prior information that Kincaid was trafficking drugs in Meigs County.
{¶ 30} Now before this court, although the State agrees in its merit brief that
Rodriguez does not provide an officer-safety exception that permits extending a
traffic stop, it has changed its theory of the case. It now claims that the traffic stop
was not extended because Deputy Campbell was “still performing the
administrative tasks associated with a traffic stop when Deputy Hutton arrived as
backup.”
{¶ 31} It is “the duty of this court . . . to determine whether the judgment of
the court of appeals is right for any reason.” Collings-Taylor Co. v. Am. Fid. Co.,
96 Ohio St. 123, 130 (1917). We therefore address the State’s new theory, which
has a glaring problem: the State failed to produce affirmative evidence during the
suppression hearing to support a finding that Deputy Campbell was still performing
administrative tasks associated with the traffic infraction when the canine indicated
to the presence of narcotics—and it is only when the canine indicated that Campbell
would have had probable cause to extend the stop.
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{¶ 32} This court has held that when a defendant seeks to suppress evidence
obtained through a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must “(1)
demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2) raise the grounds upon which the validity
of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor
notice of the basis for the challenge.” Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, at paragraph
one of the syllabus; see also State v. Codeluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574, ¶ 10. Once the
defendant has established both factors, the burden of proof, including the burden of
going forward with the evidence, shifts to the prosecutor, who must prove that
probable cause existed for the search or seizure. Wallace at paragraph two of the
syllabus. Therefore, the State bears the ultimate burden of proof to establish that
the Fourth Amendment has not been violated. State v. Wintermeyer, 2019-Ohio-
5156, ¶ 18.
{¶ 33} “‘Burden of proof’ encompasses two aspects: the burden of going
forward with evidence (or burden of production) and the burden of persuasion.”
Wallace at 219, citing State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 107 (1976). “The party
having the burden of production on a particular issue will lose on that issue as a
matter of law if the party does not produce evidence sufficient to make out a case
for the trier of fact.” State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 25. “The burden of
persuasion, on the other hand, ‘refers to the risk which is borne by a party if the
[trier of fact] finds that the evidence is in equilibrium.’ ” (Bracketed text added in
Nicholas.) Id., quoting Robinson at 107. “‘The party with the burden of persuasion
will lose if he fails to persuade the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true by such
quantum of evidence as the law demands.’ ” Id., quoting Robinson at 107. If the
State is on notice of the basis of a defendant’s challenge and fails to meet its burden,
it does not receive a second chance to do so. See, e.g., Wallace at 221 (“The
prosecutor waived argument, did not present evidence, and declined the court’s
offer of additional time in which to respond. Therefore, we find that the state failed
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to meet its burden of proof on the issue of whether there was probable cause to
administer [a breathalyzer] test.”).
{¶ 34} Here, Kincaid had to place the State on notice of his assertion that
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Deputy Campbell unreasonably
prolonged the traffic stop. He did that. In his motion to suppress, Kincaid said that
Campbell had “expanded the purpose and duration of the stop into a drug
investigation by searching [his] vehicle with a police [canine].” Kincaid also
claimed that extending the stop “was not supported by probable cause or reasonable
suspicion” and that he “was subjected to an . . . unlawful extension of [the] seizure”
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In its brief opposing Kincaid’s motion to
suppress, the State acknowledged that Kincaid had raised the issue of an
“[u]nlawful extension of [the] seizure.”
{¶ 35} The burden to prove the validity of the search and seizure therefore
fell on the State, and it had to produce sufficient evidence showing that Deputy
Campbell did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop to perform the canine sniff.
That is, it had to affirmatively establish the seizure’s constitutionality.
{¶ 36} But the State failed to meet its burden to show that the seizure of
Kincaid was no longer than necessary to address the traffic stop’s mission. The
record does not provide any definitive evidence concerning when the administrative
tasks were completed, which the State admits in its merit brief:
Prior to Deputy Hutton’s arrival, Deputy Campbell asked the
dispatcher to run both [Kincaid’s] and [his passenger’s] license for
a criminal history and to check for warrants, and at some point,
Deputy Campbell learned that neither had warrants. Deputy
Campbell did not testify that those checks and other tasks associated
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with the stop were completed before Deputy Hutton arrived on scene
as backup.
{¶ 37} As the party with the burden, it was the State’s responsibility to
develop the record in a way that would show that the administrative tasks were
ongoing. And it could have done so in a number of ways. However, all we know,
as the State says in its merit brief, is that “at some point, Deputy Campbell learned
that neither [Kincaid nor his passenger] had warrants.” (Emphasis added.) The
State is correct in its stating that “Deputy Campbell did not testify that those
[criminal history and warrant] checks and other tasks associated with the stop were
completed before Deputy Hutton arrived on scene as backup.” What the State fails
to acknowledge is that Campbell also did not testify that the administrative tasks
were ongoing when the canine indicated, nor did Campbell provide any testimony
concerning the timing of when he received the results of the checks from dispatch.
Further, Campbell never testified about how long it would have taken him to issue
a warning or a ticket. See State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 13 (record
established that “at the time the dog alerted, . . . Trooper Arnold was still waiting
for the results of the criminal-background check. She further testified that it would
take her approximately five to ten minutes to issue a warning, and anywhere from
ten to 20 minutes to issue an actual citation.”). Additionally, the record shows that
there were logs that could have established the sequence of events, but the
prosecutor did not enter those into evidence.
{¶ 38} Consequently, there is no evidence showing that the canine sniff
occurred while the administrative tasks associated with the traffic stop were still
ongoing. And this means that the State failed to meet its burden. Therefore, we
conclude that Kincaid’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and the remedy
for that violation is suppressing the evidence discovered during the unlawful
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seizure. See State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-5021, ¶ 40. The trial court should have
granted Kincaid’s motion to suppress.
E. The Dissenting Opinion’s Arguments Fail
{¶ 39} Despite the State’s admission that Deputy Campbell did not testify
about when he received the results of the license and warrant checks, the dissenting
opinion nevertheless asserts that it can infer that administrative tasks were ongoing
when the canine sniff occurred. It relies on the sequence of events—after Deputy
Campbell called for backup, he had Kincaid’s and his passenger’s licenses checked
through dispatch. Because of the short length of time it took Deputy Hutton to
arrive, the dissent infers that at least some traffic-stop inquiries remained ongoing
when the canine indicated. In essence, the dissent is inferring that the license and
warrant checks took more than 5 to 10 minutes.
{¶ 40} Of course, there is no way to know on this record how long the
checks took to run—it could have been nearly instantaneous for all we know—so
the dissent is merely stabbing in the dark; it makes an assumption, not an inference.
The dissent then claims that its inference is supported by the following exchange
between defense counsel and Deputy Campbell:
Q: Ok. That’s fair enough. And, during the . . . I just
want to be clear, during that five to ten (10) minutes, that you were
waiting for Deputy Hutton to arrive, um, you did not, uh, you did
not run a criminal history or anything of that sort at that time for Mr.
Kincaid, correct?
A: Uh, I ran both of their licenses, uh, when dispatch
runs them, there’s . . . there’s . . . they should bring up the criminal
history at that point.
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Q: And, nothing . . . no warrants or anything like that
that you were holding Mr. Kincaid on, correct?
A: No.
(Ellipses in original and emphasis added.) According to the dissent, this testimony
supports its inference that the traffic-stop inquiries remained ongoing during the 5-
to-10-minute wait for Hutton.
{¶ 41} Importantly, however, Deputy Campbell’s response—“I ran both of
their licenses . . . .”—was phrased in the past tense, which does not suggest that the
license and warrant checks were ongoing for the duration of the 5-to-10-minute
wait. Instead, it signals that the checks had been completed. Campbell did not say
that he was still running them during the five-to-ten-minute wait. And he indicated
that the results of the license checks would be available “at that point” when he ran
them.
{¶ 42} Then, Deputy Campbell testified that his reason for holding Kincaid
and his passenger during the 5-to-10-minute wait was not because of a warrant—
Campbell confirmed that there were “no warrants or anything like that.” Had the
license and warrant checks been ongoing, one would naturally expect Campbell to
have said that he did not know at the time whether Kincaid or his passenger had
outstanding warrants for their arrest. But that is not what Campbell testified to.
{¶ 43} The dissent acknowledges that Deputy Campbell did not testify to
when the license and warrant checks were completed or when he learned that there
were no outstanding warrants. And that acknowledgement by the dissent reveals
the flaw in its analysis: the dissent draws its inference that the traffic-stop inquiries
were ongoing from thin air.
{¶ 44} Inferences are reasonable only if they have sufficient support from
the evidence. See State v. Italiano, 18 Ohio St.3d 38, 41 (1985) (noting, in response
to an argument that circumstantial evidence did not support an inference of an intent
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January Term, 2026
to influence, that “there was direct evidence of [the] defendant’s intent to influence
the officers and, thus, there was sufficient support for the inference that defendant
intended to seek a reduction to the least charge possible, reckless operation”),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991); State v.
Dickerson, 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 215 (1989) (“In our view, the three-judge panel, as
the trier of fact, could have reasonably found that appellant specifically intended to
kill McCoy by inference from the direct evidence.”). Fact-finders cannot “draw
‘[a]n inference based . . . entirely upon another inference, unsupported by any
additional fact.’ ” (Bracketed text and ellipsis added in Cowans.) State v. Cowans,
1999-Ohio-250, ¶ 62, quoting Hurt v. Charles J. Rodgers Transp. Co., 164 Ohio St.
329 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 45} We do not hold that a reasonable inference on the subject here
requires evidence of precise timing, testimony identical to that in another case, time
stamps, or dispatch logs; but we hold that it does require something in the evidence
indicating when Deputy Campbell received the results of the administrative tasks
in the sequence of events: his testimony or something else probative on the merits.
{¶ 46} The facts in the record do not support the dissent’s inferences. The
only part of the timeline that we do know—and even it is not definitive—is that
Deputy Campbell was waiting around five to ten minutes for Deputy Hutton to
arrive before he conducted the canine sniff. We do not know when in the sequence
of events he received the results of the license and warrant checks from dispatch.
We do not know when exactly the canine sniff occurred. We do not know when in
the sequence of events the canine indicated to the presence of narcotics.
{¶ 47} Quite simply, we do not know whether the results of the license and
warrant checks were relayed to Campbell before the canine indicated. That is fatal
to the State’s case. Without affirmative proof that the administrative tasks
accompanying the traffic stop remained ongoing when the canine indicated, t