State v. Brinkman

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Brinkman, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3190.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-3190 THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRINKMAN, APPELLANT. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Brinkman, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3190.] Criminal law—Aggravated murders—Convictions and death sentences affirmed. (No. 2023-0891—Submitted August 19, 2025—Decided August 20, 2026.) APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, No. CR-17-618342-A. __________________ FISCHER, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion. FISCHER, J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal of right from aggravated-murder convictions and death sentences.  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO INTRODUCTION {¶ 2} On June 10, 2017, appellant, George Brinkman Jr., murdered his friend Suzanne and her adult daughters, Taylor and Kylie, in their home in North Royalton. On June 13, Brinkman surrendered to police and confessed to the murders. {¶ 3} In November 2018, a three-judge panel of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas accepted Brinkman’s guilty plea to, and found Brinkman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of, six counts of aggravated murder, with accompanying capital specifications, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of kidnapping, and three counts of gross abuse of a corpse. After the mitigation hearing, the three-judge panel sentenced Brinkman to death for each victim. {¶ 4} On appeal, we held that the three-judge panel failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it did not advise Brinkman at the time he entered his guilty plea that he was waiving his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to have appellee, the State of Ohio, prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brinkman, 2021-Ohio-2473, ¶ 16. Because he did not have a “full understanding” that by pleading guilty, he would be waiving those two constitutional rights, id., citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 478 (1981), we vacated Brinkman’s convictions and death sentences, id. at ¶ 23. {¶ 5} Brinkman’s case was remanded to the common pleas court for new proceedings. Id. After a new presiding judge was assigned, Brinkman’s attorneys informed the court that Brinkman intended to waive his right to a jury trial and enter a guilty plea to the amended indictment.1 1. On remand, the trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the indictment “to delete surplusage in the course of conduct specification under [R.C.] 292[9].04(A)(5) and in each of the felony murder specifications under [R.C.] 2929.04(A)(7) in Counts 1 through 6.” The amended indictment charged Brinkman with six counts of aggravated murder: Counts 1, 3, and 5 charged him with purposely, and with prior calculation and design, causing the death of Suzanne, Taylor, and 2  January Term, 2026 {¶ 6} On November 9, 2022, Brinkman entered a guilty plea to the amended indictment, which a new three-judge panel (“the panel”) accepted. On November 9 and 10, the State presented its evidence on each count and capital specification to the panel. On November 14, the panel found Brinkman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all counts and capital specifications contained in the amended indictment. After a mitigation hearing, the panel sentenced Brinkman to death for each victim, a total of three death sentences. {¶ 7} Brinkman now appeals as of right and raises 22 propositions of law, each of which we overrule. After conducting an independent review, we conclude that although some mitigating factors exist, the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the three aggravated murders. We further conclude that each death sentence is appropriate and proportionate with respect to other capital cases involving similar aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we affirm all three death sentences. RELEVANT FACTS {¶ 8} On June 9, 2017, the day before the murders, Brinkman purchased ammunition and a knife from a Walmart store. On the morning of June 10, the day of the murders, he purchased a knife sharpener, a razor, cargo pants, a work shirt, and a backpack from another Walmart store and withdrew $1,600 from his bank account. Records of text messages sent between Brinkman and Suzanne from that Kylie, respectively, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), and Counts 2, 4, and 6 charged him with purposely causing the death of Suzanne, Taylor, and Kylie, respectively, while committing or attempting to commit or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary and/or kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B). Counts 1 through 6 contained capital specifications under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) for “the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons” and under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) for committing each aggravated murder while he was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary and kidnapping “and either [he] was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design.” 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO morning reveal that Brinkman asked if he could come over to Suzanne’s house specifically while her daughters were absent. {¶ 9} Suzanne’s boyfriend, Scott Plymale, stopped by Suzanne’s house around 4:30 p.m. on June 10 to give her a flower bouquet. When he arrived, Plymale noticed that Suzanne’s and her daughters’ cars were there and that Brinkman’s van was backed up to a front window. Plymale knocked on Suzanne’s front door, but no one answered, so he left the flowers on the porch. {¶ 10} Taylor’s boyfriend, Dale Koster, called Plymale on June 11 and said that Taylor had not shown up for their date the previous night. Koster said that he was at Suzanne’s house and was knocking on the door but that no one was answering even though all their cars were there. Koster used a screwdriver to force the front door open. Upon entering, Koster called Plymale again and said that he saw the flowers that Plymale had left for Suzanne lying on a table right inside the front door. Koster eventually opened a bedroom door and told Plymale that he saw a body. Plymale told Koster to leave the house, and Plymale called 9-1-1. {¶ 11} A responding police officer found the bodies of Suzanne and her daughters face down on the bed in a first-floor bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, the officer first found the body of a “female lying on the left side of [the] bed . . . with an arm hanging off the bed with clear lividity as though it had been deceased for some time.” The officer then noticed the outlines of two more bodies face down underneath blankets on the bed. {¶ 12} Police focused on Brinkman as a suspect after interviewing Plymale and Koster. Police first contacted Brinkman on June 12; he said that he knew about the murders and agreed to come into the police station. However, Brinkman did not show up at the police station. Meanwhile, police issued a “be on the look out” or “BOLO” alert for Brinkman and his van. {¶ 13} Investigators eventually located Brinkman in Brunswick, Ohio, at the house of his friend Amy Szijarto. While Brinkman and Szijarto were 4  January Term, 2026 conversing, unbeknownst to them, a team of law-enforcement personnel had arrived outside the house. The team entered the house and safely led Szijarto out the front door, but Brinkman retreated to the house’s second floor, where he sequestered himself. An eight-hour standoff ensued, which lasted until about 5:30 a.m. on June 13, when police finally arrested Brinkman. {¶ 14} Brinkman was transported to the police station, where he waived his Miranda rights. That afternoon during law enforcement’s questioning, Brinkman denied any involvement in the murders of Suzanne and her daughters. But later that night, during a smoke break, Brinkman volunteered: “For the sake of the family, you have the right guy.” {¶ 15} Police re-Mirandized Brinkman before he confessed to committing the murders. According to Brinkman’s account, he specifically arranged to visit with Suzanne on June 10 while her daughters were absent. At first, Suzanne and Brinkman were simply talking, but he then began to assault her. Brandishing a knife, Brinkman took Suzanne to a first-floor bedroom and threw her onto the bed. Around that time, Suzanne’s daughters came home. Threatening them with the knife, Brinkman ordered Taylor and Kylie to lie down on the bed next to their mother. Brinkman had Kylie zip tie the hands of her mother and sister to the bed frame, and Brinkman then put zip ties around Kylie’s hands. All three women were initially restrained while lying on their backs. But starting with Suzanne, and then Taylor and Kylie, Brinkman removed their restraints, had them each turn onto their stomach, and restrained them with zip ties and a roll of duct tape. As he instructed Taylor to turn over, he said, “I don’t want you screaming, I’m not going to hurt you.” Throughout the commotion, Suzanne was yelling insults at Brinkman, and at some point, he “took the knife to her,” stabbing the back of her neck and then the side of her throat, because, in his words, he was “looking just to hit the artery.” Taylor and Kylie began to scream when Brinkman murdered Suzanne. At some point, Taylor broke free, but Brinkman was able to duct-tape and zip-tie her hands. 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Brinkman then jumped on Taylor and “put her face in the pillow” until she stopped breathing. When Kylie tried to move and get up, Brinkman wrapped a power cord around her neck and strangled her “until she stopped moving.” {¶ 16} Autopsies were conducted by a deputy medical examiner from the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office, who testified that Suzanne died from “[s]harp force injuries of [her] head, neck, and extremities with vascular, airway, and soft tissue injuries.” Taylor’s cause of death was asphyxia, and Kylie’s cause of death was asphyxia with cervical compression. Taylor had abrasions and contusions on her head, trunk, and extremities, and Kylie had abrasions on her neck and contusions on her bilateral lower extremities. In Kylie’s case, the deputy medical examiner noted that some of the “hair from her anterior scalp had been pulled out by the roots.” The deputy medical examiner testified that there was a hemorrhage in the inside of Kylie’s neck, which was evidence of some struggle. {¶ 17} Brinkman’s DNA was recovered from the front door’s interior handle, Suzanne’s left wrist, Kylie’s wrists, and several items in the bedroom. Investigators recovered a power cord and zip ties from Suzanne’s bedroom and discovered a large amount of Suzanne’s hair on top of a suitcase that was outside her bedroom. ISSUES ON APPEAL {¶ 18} On appeal, Brinkman raises 22 propositions of law. The analysis section of this opinion groups related propositions of law for easier discussion. Accordingly, some propositions of law are addressed out of order. {¶ 19} The first five propositions of law allege various defects in the proceedings that Brinkman says require reversal. Brinkman argues that the panel erred when it sentenced him to death without making the necessary findings that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) (No. 1), shifted the burden to Brinkman to prove that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating circumstances (No. 2), refused to grant expert 6  January Term, 2026 status or give mitigating weight to two of Brinkman’s mitigation witnesses (No. 3), granted the State’s rebuttal witness expert status when that witness’s conception of mitigation was contrary to controlling law and his expert opinions were flawed (No. 4), and allowed and considered overly emotional testimony of four victim-impact witnesses (No. 5). {¶ 20} The next grouping of Brinkman’s propositions of law relates to his plea hearing. He challenges the sufficiency of the capital indictment (No. 20), adequacy of the guilty-plea and jury-waiver colloquies (Nos. 18 and 19, respectively), admission of gruesome photographs (No. 15), and sufficiency of the evidence as to his aggravated-burglary conviction and the associated R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) felony-murder capital specifications predicated on aggravated burglary attached to Counts 1 through 6 (No. 6). {¶ 21} The next grouping relates to alleged errors that occurred during the mitigation hearing. Brinkman challenges the panel’s weighing process (Nos. 8, 9, and 12), sentencing opinion (No. 7), merger analysis (No. 16), and proportionality analysis (Nos. 10 and 11), and he challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s death- penalty scheme (Nos. 17 and 21). {¶ 22} Finally, Brinkman argues that cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial (No. 22) and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (Nos. 13 and 14). {¶ 23} In addition to reviewing the propositions of law that Brinkman raises, we independently evaluate his death sentences as required under R.C. 2929.05(A). Having reviewed each proposition of law and conducted our own independent sentence evaluation under R.C. 2929.05(A), we affirm Brinkman’s convictions and death sentences. 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO ANALYSIS I. FIRST FIVE PROPOSITIONS OF LAW {¶ 24} In proposition of law No. 1, Brinkman contends that the panel erred when it failed to “find[], by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors,” as required by R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). Relatedly, in proposition of law No. 2, he argues that the panel improperly shifted the burden of proof to him to show that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating circumstances and thus erroneously imposed the death penalty. {¶ 25} In proposition of law No. 3, Brinkman argues that the panel erred when it refused to grant expert status to two of his mitigation witnesses and that the panel exacerbated the errors when it gave their testimony zero weight in mitigation. He contends in proposition of law No. 4 that the panel compounded the errors regarding these two mitigation witnesses by granting the State’s rebuttal witness expert status despite that witness’s purportedly flawed conception of mitigation. {¶ 26} In proposition of law No. 5, Brinkman argues that the panel allowed and considered improper victim-impact evidence. {¶ 27} For the reasons that will be explained, we reject each of these propositions of law. A. Compliance with R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) {¶ 28} In his first proposition of law, Brinkman argues that the panel did not comply with R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) when it sentenced him to death, and in his second proposition of law, he argues that the panel improperly flipped the burden of proof to him when it weighed the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors. Although the panel’s presiding judge misspoke initially about the applicable sentencing standard, the record demonstrates that the panel complied with the applicable statutory provisions when it sentenced Brinkman to death. 8  January Term, 2026 1. R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) {¶ 29} To impose a death sentence on an offender who pleads guilty to a count in an indictment containing at least one capital specification listed in R.C. 2929.04(A), a panel of three judges must unanimously find “by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors” (emphasis added), R.C. 2929.03(D)(3). If the three-judge panel fails to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, the three-judge panel “shall impose one of” the life sentences set forth in R.C. 2929.03(D)(3)(a) or (b). Id. 2. Relevant Facts {¶ 30} On May 31, 2023, the panel convened for Brinkman’s sentencing hearing. Before the panel discussed merging the aggravated-murder counts related to each victim and allowed the State to present victim-impact witnesses, the presiding judge stated: Pursuant to [R.C.] 2929.03 and 2929.04, evidence regarding aggravating circumstances, mitigation, and related exhibits were received by the three-judge panel in hearings conducted on May 15th, 16th, 17th, and 30th of 2023. The three-judge panel has deliberated and based upon evidence adduced at hearing and applicable law, as to Counts 1 through 6, the panel unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating factors. The three-judge panel will file a more detailed analysis of this conclusion in a separate entry to follow in accordance with [R.C.] 2929.03(F). 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Emphasis added.) Another panel member then remarked, “So we are ready as a panel to impose sentence.” No one objected to the presiding judge’s statement that “the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating factors.” {¶ 31} The panel convened the parties for an unscheduled hearing the next day “upon notice from the State and concern that the particular findings need[ed] to be more . . . clarified.” A panel member explained that the hearing was necessary to “supplement, clarify, and correct the court pronouncement regarding aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.” Next, the panel member addressed one of the assistant prosecuting attorneys directly and stated: “[T]here’s one sentence in the findings that concerns you.” {¶ 32} The following discussion ensued: [ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Well, it’s the—just to make sure that the court, one and all, did not shift the burden over to the defense in that your findings, if that is your findings, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the—any mitigating factors that were presented or that you found, yourself, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that’s what we— JUDGE [TWO]: So you’re looking for a clarification of the language? [ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: A clarification whether that is what in fact happened or not. JUDGE [TWO]: Very good. Counsel, anything? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. Judge, for the record, we would object to any clarification at this point. I think the prosecutor pointed out that the language is essentially burden shifting, so we would object to any correction at this point. 10  January Term, 2026 JUDGE [TWO]: All right. Objection of course is overruled. The three-judge panel here will incorporate the entire proceedings conducted on the record yesterday, 5/31/23, and state the following, with the concurrence of my fellow judges, the three-judge panel. It will read as follows in the entry: The three-judge panel unanimously finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. ... The court is going to incorporate this particular finding and will issue the sentencing order in compliance with what we did yesterday. Is there anything else? JUDGE [THREE]: No, other than I will concur. JUDGE [TWO]: Okay, very good. ... [PRESIDING JUDGE]: I absolutely concur. One of the panel members reaffirmed that making the correct finding under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors “was absolutely our intention” but acknowledged “that we had incorrect verbiage” and “[t]hat was not the discussion that we had.” And the presiding judge confirmed, “It was our intention yesterday [to make the correct finding under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3)]. It was also consistent with our deliberations. We have not deviated from the expectations of the law. We’ve been consistent.” {¶ 33} The panel filed a journal entry in compliance with Crim.R. 32(C), in which it fully described the court proceedings that took place on May 31 and June 1. The panel entered its sentencing opinion meeting the requirements of R.C. 2929.03(F) on June 16. 11  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 3. Analysis {¶ 34} Defense counsel’s failure to object to the presiding judge’s inaccurate weighing statement during the sentencing hearing forfeits the error absent a showing of plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Hill, 1995-Ohio-287, ¶ 26. {¶ 35} Brinkman argues that the panel’s May 31 finding “mandates a life sentence under the plain language of R.C. 2929.03(D)(3),” that the “purported ‘clarification’ is a nullity,” and that “[a]ny such error in a capital case, which resulted in a death sentence being imposed despite the Ohio death penalty statute mandating a life sentence on those findings, is obviously plain error and meets any requirement for relief on appeal.” (Boldface and emphasis deleted.) {¶ 36} “To demonstrate plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), the party asserting error must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights.” State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, ¶ 17, citing State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 52. “The elements of the plain-error doctrine are conjunctive: all three must apply to justify [a] . . . court’s intervention.” State v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 9; accord State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68, ¶ 20 (“By its very terms, [Crim.R. 52(B)] places three limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to correct an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial.”). “‘We have interpreted [the third] aspect of the rule to mean that the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome of the trial.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Bond at ¶ 17, quoting Barnes at ¶ 20. Even if the appellant satisfies all three aspects of the plain- error test, we must still consider “whether correcting the error is required to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice or whether the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 35. {¶ 37} The panel’s May 31 conclusion stating that it “unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating factors” is an inaccurate recitation of the law. To be sure, the 12  January Term, 2026 panel’s statement reverses the applicable weighing calculus by indicating that the mitigating factors must outweigh the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. By incorrectly reciting the appropriate weighing calculus under R.C. 2929.03(D)(3), the panel gave the parties the impression that it had actually determined that the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors were in equipoise. See State v. Stallings, 2000-Ohio-164, ¶ 27. {¶ 38} Stallings is instructive. In Stallings, the trial court told the jury at various times during voir dire that “‘if [the jury] find[s] the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances’ then it should vote on various life sentences.” (Bracketed text in original.) Id. at ¶ 26. Despite noting that the trial court’s incorrect formulation of the R.C. 2929.03(D) weighing “confuses the burden of proof,” id. at ¶ 27, we held that “no outcome-determinative plain error occurred,” id. at ¶ 29, emphasized that the trial court’s initial jury instructions during voir dire were preliminary and could not be equated to the final instructions given before the jury’s deliberations, id., and noted that “the parties understood and generally articulated the correct legal standard at the penalty phase,” id. at ¶ 30. {¶ 39} Similarly, no plain error exists in this case. Although Brinkman easily satisfies the first two aspects of the plain-error test, he has not shown that the panel’s error affected his substantial rights. The panel reconvened the next day, June 1, and stated in open court that its sentencing deliberations were consistent with the statutory weighing calculation. {¶ 40} As in Stallings, throughout the proceedings in this case, the panel and the parties regularly referred to the correct weighing standard. The record demonstrates that the panel understood the applicable sentencing standard and its responsibility in determining the appropriate sentence in this case. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record actually “suggesting [that] the aggravating circumstance[s] and mitigating factors are in equipoise,” Hill, 1995-Ohio-287, at ¶ 30; accord id. at ¶ 22-23, 27 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the jury was 13  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO misled by a verdict form and jury instructions that reversed R.C. 2929.03(D)(2)’s sentencing standard and holding that no plain error occurred because the trial-court judge and the parties generally referred to the correct sentencing standard in the sentencing proceedings). {¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Brinkman’s first proposition of law. B. Shifting Burden of Proof {¶ 42} In proposition of law No. 2, Brinkman contends that the presiding judge’s misstatement on May 31, 2023, demonstrates that the panel impermissibly flipped the burden of proof during the mitigation hearing by requiring him to prove that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Brinkman argues that flipping the burden of proof amounts to structural error that can only be remedied by a new mitigation hearing. {¶ 43} We have applied the plain-error test to claims of structural error that were not objected to during trial. See Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, at ¶ 17 (observing that “four justices determined in West that a plain-error analysis is still necessary when the party asserting a structural error did not object to that error in the trial court”), citing State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35 (lead opinion), and West at ¶ 38-41 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Thus, because Brinkman failed to object to the presiding judge’s misstatement, we must analyze this claim through the plain-error analysis. {¶ 44} The first two aspects of our plain-error analysis ask first whether an error occurred during the trial-court proceedings and second whether that error was plain. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, at ¶ 52. Brinkman’s challenge is not in showing that a plain error occurred—we think it did, given the presiding judge’s express misstatement and the panel’s decision to hold another hearing to correct that mistake—but in showing that “the error affected [his] substantial rights,” Bond at ¶ 19. We are not persuaded that the error was structural. 14  January Term, 2026 {¶ 45} Indeed, Brinkman has not cited any applicable authority that supports his claim that the presiding judge’s misstatement is akin to any of the errors that the United States Supreme Court has recognized as structural error. See State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 21 (observing that structural error necessarily involves “fundamental constitutional rights, including the denial of counsel to an indigent defendant, the denial of counsel of choice, the denial of self-representation at trial, the denial of a public trial, and the failure to instruct the jury that a defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”), citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017), and United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 611 (2013). {¶ 46} To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the panel was aware of the applicable law and knew how to analyze the issues, as explained above. {¶ 47} We therefore reject proposition of law No. 2. C. Defense Mitigation Witnesses {¶ 48} In proposition of law No. 3, Brinkman contends that the panel denied expert status to two of his mitigation witnesses as a pretext for arbitrarily discrediting their testimony and affording zero weight to his core mitigation evidence. He contends in his reply brief that in denying his request to deem Drs. Arne Reimers and Hanna Ljung as experts in their respective fields, the panel committed structural error because “the factfinder’s arbitrary disregard, with zero weight, of compelling mitigation evidence . . . will always result in a sentencing proceeding which is fundamentally unfair.” (Emphasis in original.) In response, the State argues that the panel was free to assign little or no weight to the testimony of Reimers and Ljung, respectively, and that the panel meaningfully considered the mitigation evidence that Brinkman presented, as demonstrated by the panel’s sentencing opinion. 15  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 1. Relevant Facts {¶ 49} Defense counsel retained Drs. Reimers and Ljung to “evaluate Mr. Brinkman’s conditions and his drug treatment and their potential impact on his offenses.” Reimers and Ljung, who partner together to run a private consulting company, prepared an evaluation that focused on four prescribed medications that Brinkman was taking at the time of the offenses to treat his uncontrolled diabetes and other medical conditions. Their joint report concentrated on the pharmacological and neuropsychological aspects of Brinkman’s medical and prescription histories and their connection to the aggravated murders. In his merit brief, Brinkman summarized the overall conclusions made by Reimers and Ljung: The doctors conclusively demonstrated and concluded that, at the relevant time in June 2017, Brinkman had four strikes against him insofar as being vulnerable to adverse drug reactions [“ADRs”] from the [prescription medications] gabapentin, naproxen, duloxetine, and hydroxyzine: (1) He was prescribed a powerful combination of two or more such drugs which act on the central nervous system. (2) He suffered for years with uncontrolled diabetes, which damaged his kidneys, and thereby impaired the way his body processes such drugs. (3) He suffers from several significant psychiatric conditions and has a history of depression and anxiety and recurrent states of anger caused by his diabetes, thereby making him more sensitive to psychiatric ADRs from his medication. (4) He was taking naproxen which can itself induce psychiatric ADRs, but also enhances the effects of gabapentin, duloxetine, and hydroxyzine, which can do so too. 16  January Term, 2026 (Emphasis and boldface in original.) {¶ 50} Reimers and Ljung noted in their report that about two months before the murders, Brinkman’s dosage of gabapentin was significantly increased, which elevated his risk for ADRs. Brinkman was also taking naproxen at the same time, which can increase the body’s exposure to gabapentin. Brinkman claims in his merit brief that taking naproxen “further amplif[ied] [his] risk of psychiatric and behavioral ADRs from his large dosage of gabapentin.” {¶ 51} The State filed a motion in limine under Evid.R. 702(B) and (C), seeking to exclude Reimers and Ljung from testifying as experts and arguing that their respective testimony would not be relevant or reliable. According to the State’s motion, Reimers and Ljung were “not qualified or licensed to testify as experts on Brinkman’s medical diagnoses, their complications, and prescribed medications for treatment,” because in their report, the doctors “have ignored the scientific method, have cited no on point peer-reviewed, controlled studies, and based their conclusions on unverified subjective data.” In Brinkman’s opposition to the State’s motion, he contended that holding a Daubert hearing would be “completely unnecessary” given that the panel was the fact-finder. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). {¶ 52} The panel delayed its ruling on Reimers’s and Ljung’s respective expert status until the defense proffered each witness as an expert during the mitigation hearing. However, when defense counsel moved to have Reimers and Ljung declared as experts in the fields of pharmacology and neuropsychology, respectively, the panel again held its decision in abeyance. After the defense rested its mitigation case, the panel declined to grant either Reimers or Ljung expert status. However, the panel promised to “consider all of their testimony and give it the weight that [it felt was] proper,” even though it concluded that it “just [did] not feel 17  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO at [that] point in time that [Reimers or Ljung were] at a level which would qualify [them] as experts, to be given that title or designation.” 2. Applicable Law {¶ 53} Evid.R. 7022 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. See Terry v. Caputo, 2007-Ohio-5023, ¶ 24. Evid.R. 702 provides: A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply: (A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons; (B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony; (C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information. . . . 69 Ohio St.3d CXIX. We have observed that the “qualification and reliability requirements of Evid.R. 702 are distinct. Because even a qualified expert is capable of rendering scientifically unreliable testimony, it is imperative for a trial court, as gatekeeper, to examine the principles and methodology that underlie an expert’s opinion.” Valentine v. Conrad, 2006-Ohio-3561, ¶ 17. Trial courts “should favor the admissibility of expert testimony whenever it is relevant and the criteria of Evid.R. 702 are met.” State v. Nemeth, 1998-Ohio-376, ¶ 22. Even still, the decision whether to qualify a witness as an expert is a matter well within the trial 2. We recently amended Evid.R. 702, which took effect on July 1, 2024. Supreme Court of Ohio, Final Rule Amendments, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ruleamendments/documents /As%20Adopted.pdf (accessed Feb. 27, 2026) [https://perma.cc/VN4X-BY7A]. In this opinion, we use the former version of Evid.R. 702, 69 Ohio St.3d CXIX. 18  January Term, 2026 court’s discretion. See Valentine at ¶ 9. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). However, no court has the discretion to misapply or commit errors of law. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38. {¶ 54} During the mitigation hearing, when it denied Brinkman’s request to deem Drs. Reimers and Ljung experts in their respective fields of pharmacology and neuropsychology, the panel specified that it “question[ed] the reliability of the information [provided by Reimers and Ljung], and particularly as it pertains to the procedures, tests, or experiments.” The panel’s ruling thus hinged on Evid.R. 702(C), and we will assume that Reimers and Ljung satisfied Evid.R. 702(A) and (B). {¶ 55} When evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence under Evid.R. 702(C), a trial court must consider several factors: “(1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 1998-Ohio-178, ¶ 14 (lead opinion), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594. Neither special education nor certification is necessary to confer expert status on a witness, as long as the knowledge he or she possesses will aid the trier of fact in performing its fact-finding function. State v. Baston, 1999-Ohio-280, ¶ 25. Analytically, the trial court’s primary focus should be on the reliability of the proposed expert opinion. A court should not be “concerned with the substance of the experts’ conclusions” but instead concerned with “how the experts arrived at their conclusions.” Valentine at ¶ 16. 3. Denying Expert Status to Drs. Reimers and Ljung {¶ 56} Brinkman sought to have Drs. Reimers and Ljung testify as experts in their respective fields of pharmacology and neuropsychology to establish that 19  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Brinkman suffered from cognitive impairments and adverse behaviors at the time of the murders, brought on as a result of his prescribed medications. The panel refused to qualify Reimers and Ljung as experts, stating in its sentencing opinion that their testimony and report were unreliable and “lacking in scientific integrity,” in par